WCWinston W. Chang

Winston W. Chang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Winston W. Chang has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Inner Workings of the Chinese Economy and the US–China Trade War

    by Winston W. Chang

    China has been touted as a unique success story in development economics. The world financial crisis of 2007–2010 impacted China severely. Its GDP growth slowed, corporate debts piled up, equity markets became volatile, the renminbi weakened, and its forex reserves shrank in the face of capital flight. This paper analyzes the policymakers’ approaches in coping with the recent external shocks to the economy noted for having rigid economic structures (such as the trilemma problem and privatization issues). It discusses the tough balancing act facing the policymakers and the various reform options, including capital flow liberalization and structural reform. Finally, the paper discusses the US–China trade war.


  • Brexit and its economic consequences

    by Winston W. Chang

    As the formal process of Brexit has already started, there is much uncertainty about Brexit's impacts on Britain's social, political and economic future. This paper examines the economic impact. After briefly discussing some significant EU treaties that serve as the background materials, it presents the key arguments advocated by the leave and remain camps. The economic impact depends critically on the negotiation outcomes. Aside from the debate on the divorce costs, there are numerous issues that must be negotiated, such as immigration, trade in goods, services, agriculture, fisheries and financial regulations. We discuss various scenarios of possible new trade regimes, resulting in different impacts on the UK economy. With each side having its bargaining chips to play, the trade‐offs between “give and take” in the negotiation game are analysed. Considering various strategic options, this paper urges rationality and cooperation, especially weighing both sides’ entwined economic interests, in addition to their mutual security, defence, environmental and world concerns. The potential gains and losses in the event where the UK contemplates new trade arrangements with the non‐EU countries are analysed in the Appendix.


  • World Trade and the Environment: Issues and Policies

    by Winston W. Chang

    This paper provides an overview of trade, environmental and related public issues and policies. It discusses the pollution problem, the recent global warming trend, the attempts of various institutions, including the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, regional, national and other organizations, to solve the global trade and environmental issues. The paper also discusses a number of basic theoretical issues and empirical findings, such as the free‐rider problem, the tragedy of the commons, the theory of second best, the relative efficacy of price and quantity control, carbon leakage, border carbon adjustments, the cap‐and‐trade system, the pollution haven hypothesis, the optimal social discount rate and the environmental Kuznets curve. Some computable general equilibrium models are reviewed and several notable World Trade Organization environmental and health‐related trade dispute cases are analysed, including the tuna–dolphin, shrimp–turtle, eco‐labelling, beef‐hormone and genetically modified organism cases.


  • Vertically Related Markets, Foreign Competition and Optimal Privatization Policy

    by Winston W. Chang, Han Eol Ryu

    This paper examines the optimal privatization policy in vertically related markets in which an upstream public firm competes with a foreign private rival in supplying a produced input to the domestic and foreign downstream firms competing in the domestic market. It shows that if the upstream public firm's market share is sufficiently high, full nationalization is optimal and the resulting profit margin is positive. However, complete privatization is never optimal. Numerical simulations reveal both the diverse optimal privatization regimes and the patterns of optimal privatization levels with varying numbers of the domestic and foreign downstream firms.


  • Optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

    by Winston W. Chang

    This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.