José Alcalde
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
José Alcalde has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Antonio Romero-Medina
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Getafe, Spain
7 shared publications - Matthias Dahm
Universitat Rovira i Virgili
6 shared publications - Josep E. Peris
Univ Alacant, MQiTE & IUDESP, Alicante, Spain
3 shared publications - José A. Silva
IUDESP and Dep. Fonaments de l’Anàlisi Econòmica, University of Alicante, Alicante, Spain
2 shared publications José Angel Silva Reus
Universidad de Alicante - Department of Economic Analysis
2 shared publicationsMaria del Carmen Marco-Gil
Technical University of Cartagena (UPCT)
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 9 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 218
Corrigendum to “Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule” [J. Econ. Theory 158 (2015) 308–318]
- 9 May 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 218
Corrigendum to “Random assignment: Redefining the serial rule” [J. Econ. Theory 158 (2015) 308–318]
- Open Access
- 16 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 217, 63-90
On the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement
- 16 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 217, 63-90
Open AccessOn the trade-off between supplier diversity and cost-effective procurement
- Open Access
- 2 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Decisions in Economics and Finance
- Vol. 45 (2) , 481-502
Equalizing solutions for bankruptcy problems revisited
When solving bankruptcy problems through equalizing solutions, agents with small claims prefer to distribute the estate according to the Constrained Equal Awards solution, while the adoption of the Constrained Equal Losses solution is preferred by agents with high claims. Therefore, the determination of which is the central claimant, as a reference to distinguish the agents with a high claim from those with a low claim, is a relevant question when designing hybrid solutions, or new methods to distribute the available estate in a bankruptcy problem. We explore the relationship between the equal awards parameter $$\lambda $$ and the equal losses parameter $$\mu $$ that characterize the two solutions. We show that the central claimant is fully determined by these parameters. In addition, we explore how to compute these parameters and present optimization problems that provide the Constrained Equal Awards and the Constrained Equal Losses solutions.- 2 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Decisions in Economics and Finance
- Vol. 45 (2) , 481-502
Open AccessEqualizing solutions for bankruptcy problems revisited
When solving bankruptcy problems through equalizing solutions, agents with small claims prefer to distribute the estate according to the Constrained Equal Awards solution, while the adoption of the Constrained Equal Losses solution is preferred by agents with high claims. Therefore, the determination of which is the central claimant, as a reference to distinguish the agents with a high claim from those with a low claim, is a relevant question when designing hybrid solutions, or new methods to distribute the available estate in a bankruptcy problem. We explore the relationship between the equal awards parameter $$\lambda $$ and the equal losses parameter $$\mu $$ that characterize the two solutions. We show that the central claimant is fully determined by these parameters. In addition, we explore how to compute these parameters and present optimization problems that provide the Constrained Equal Awards and the Constrained Equal Losses solutions. - Open Access
- 17 May 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Equalizing solutions for bankruptcy problems revisited
When solving bankruptcy problems through equalizing solutions, agents with small claims prefer to distribute the estate according to the Constrained Equal Awards solution while the adoption of the Constrained Equal Losses solution is preferred by agents with high claims. Therefore, the determination of which is the central claimant, as a reference to distinguish the agents with a high claim from those with a low claim, is a relevant question when designing hybrid solutions, or new methods to distribute the available estate in a bankruptcy problem. We explore the relationship between the equal awards parameter \lambda and the equal losses parameter \mu that characterize both solutions. We show that the central claimant is fully determined by these parameters. In addition we explore how to compute these parameters and present optimization problems that provide the Constrained Equal Awards and the Constrained Equal Losses solutions.
- 17 May 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEqualizing solutions for bankruptcy problems revisited
When solving bankruptcy problems through equalizing solutions, agents with small claims prefer to distribute the estate according to the Constrained Equal Awards solution while the adoption of the Constrained Equal Losses solution is preferred by agents with high claims. Therefore, the determination of which is the central claimant, as a reference to distinguish the agents with a high claim from those with a low claim, is a relevant question when designing hybrid solutions, or new methods to distribute the available estate in a bankruptcy problem. We explore the relationship between the equal awards parameter \lambda and the equal losses parameter \mu that characterize both solutions. We show that the central claimant is fully determined by these parameters. In addition we explore how to compute these parameters and present optimization problems that provide the Constrained Equal Awards and the Constrained Equal Losses solutions.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 115, 78-87
Mixing solutions for claims problems
- 1 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Mathematical Social Sciences
- Vol. 115, 78-87
Open AccessMixing solutions for claims problems
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 115, 225-246
Dual sourcing with price discovery
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 115, 225-246
Dual sourcing with price discovery
- Open Access
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 110, 32-49
Beyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- 1 July 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 110, 32-49
Open AccessBeyond the Spanish MIR with consent: (Hidden) cooperation and coordination in matching
- 25 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 83 (2) , 293-307
Fair student placement
- 25 March 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 83 (2) , 293-307
Fair student placement
- 21 August 2014
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 10 (3) , 295-312
Affirmative action and school choice
This paper studies a way of introducing affirmative action in the school choice problem to implement integration policies. The paper proposes the use of a natural two‐step mechanism. The (equitable) first step is introduced as an adaptation of the deferred‐acceptance algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley, when students are divided into two groups. The (efficient) second step captures the idea of exchanging places inherent to Gale's top trading cycle.
- 21 August 2014
- Published by Wiley in International Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 10 (3) , 295-312
Affirmative action and school choice
This paper studies a way of introducing affirmative action in the school choice problem to implement integration policies. The paper proposes the use of a natural two‐step mechanism. The (equitable) first step is introduced as an adaptation of the deferred‐acceptance algorithm designed by Gale and Shapley, when students are divided into two groups. The (efficient) second step captures the idea of exchanging places inherent to Gale's top trading cycle.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 80, 193-208
Competition for procurement shares
- 1 July 2013
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 80, 193-208
Open AccessCompetition for procurement shares