Jonathan Wolff
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jonathan Wolff has a total of 63 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Avner De-Shalit
4 shared publications- Adam Oliver
London School of Economics and Political Science
1 shared publication Adriana Allen
Development Planning Unit, UCL (University College London), London, UK
1 shared publicationAissatou Touré
Indpendent consultant, Dakar, Senegal
1 shared publicationAnant Bhan
Centre for Ethics, Yenepoya University, Mangalore, Karnataka, India
1 shared publication- Anna Petherick1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 June 2026
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 13 (6)
What could a human right to participate in science be?
At first sight, the idea of a human right to participate in science may seem absurd. Many assume science must be the preserve only of those with the training and aptitude to make a substantial contribution. However, feminist philosophy of science teaches that science is a social practice, with norms of inclusion and exclusion, and who, in fact, has the chance to participate depends on political and social assumptions alongside scientific ones. Political philosophers have also introduced the notion of ‘contributive justice’: that it is an injustice if some lack the opportunity to contribute to the well-being of others. Combining these insights with that of science as a global public good, I explore the possibilities and complications of a human right to participate in science, considering where the duties corresponding to such a right may also fall.
- 3 June 2026
- Published by The Royal Society in Royal Society Open Science
- Vol. 13 (6)
Open AccessWhat could a human right to participate in science be?
At first sight, the idea of a human right to participate in science may seem absurd. Many assume science must be the preserve only of those with the training and aptitude to make a substantial contribution. However, feminist philosophy of science teaches that science is a social practice, with norms of inclusion and exclusion, and who, in fact, has the chance to participate depends on political and social assumptions alongside scientific ones. Political philosophers have also introduced the notion of ‘contributive justice’: that it is an injustice if some lack the opportunity to contribute to the well-being of others. Combining these insights with that of science as a global public good, I explore the possibilities and complications of a human right to participate in science, considering where the duties corresponding to such a right may also fall.
- Open Access
- 11 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 32 (1) , 191-197
Returning to Hobbes: Reflections on Political Philosophy
- 11 December 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies
- Vol. 32 (1) , 191-197
Open AccessReturning to Hobbes: Reflections on Political Philosophy
- 22 November 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 133 (531) , 906-913
Justice Across Ages: Treating Young and Old as Equals, by Juliana Uhuru Bidadanure
Should it be a matter of concern that youth unemployment rates are significantly higher in some countries than they have been historically? Or that parliaments around the world contain so few representatives under the age of 30? These, and many other questions about such things as the differential experience of unemployment, precarious jobs and poverty at different life stages, or access to healthcare or housing by age, are standard fare in public discussions of justice. But political philosophy, certainly in the English-language tradition, has been surprisingly reticent about questions of what Juliana Uhuru Bidadanure calls ‘justice across ages’. Even as discussions of inequality in contemporary political philosophy increasingly include questions of inequality between people of different genders, races, or disability statuses, the individual in question seems to be assumed to be someone in the middle years of life, with the young and the old simply ignored. Bidadanure, in a series of papers, has perhaps done more than anyone recently to draw our attention to questions of justice across ages, and especially justice for the young. Her powerful new book consolidates and develops her earlier analysis. Of course, as Bidadanure recognises (and engages with) there is an impressive, if small, literature of relevant work, by authors such as Norman Daniels 1998, Dennis McKerlie 2013, and Larry Temkin 1993. There is also, as she notes, a vast literature on our duties to future generations, which is less pertinent to the themes of this volume. Nevertheless, Bidadanure has very much put her own stamp on the topic of justice between people of different ages living at the same time.
- 22 November 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 133 (531) , 906-913
Justice Across Ages: Treating Young and Old as Equals, by Juliana Uhuru Bidadanure
Should it be a matter of concern that youth unemployment rates are significantly higher in some countries than they have been historically? Or that parliaments around the world contain so few representatives under the age of 30? These, and many other questions about such things as the differential experience of unemployment, precarious jobs and poverty at different life stages, or access to healthcare or housing by age, are standard fare in public discussions of justice. But political philosophy, certainly in the English-language tradition, has been surprisingly reticent about questions of what Juliana Uhuru Bidadanure calls ‘justice across ages’. Even as discussions of inequality in contemporary political philosophy increasingly include questions of inequality between people of different genders, races, or disability statuses, the individual in question seems to be assumed to be someone in the middle years of life, with the young and the old simply ignored. Bidadanure, in a series of papers, has perhaps done more than anyone recently to draw our attention to questions of justice across ages, and especially justice for the young. Her powerful new book consolidates and develops her earlier analysis. Of course, as Bidadanure recognises (and engages with) there is an impressive, if small, literature of relevant work, by authors such as Norman Daniels 1998, Dennis McKerlie 2013, and Larry Temkin 1993. There is also, as she notes, a vast literature on our duties to future generations, which is less pertinent to the themes of this volume. Nevertheless, Bidadanure has very much put her own stamp on the topic of justice between people of different ages living at the same time.
- Open Access
- 14 April 2022
- Published by University Library J. C. Senckenberg in Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric
- Vol. 13 (02) , 78-98
COVID-19 and Authoritarianism: Two Strategies of Engaging Fear
This paper considers ways in which rulers can respond to, generate, or exploit fear of COVID-19 infection for various ends, and in particular distinguishes between ‘fear-invoking’ and ‘fear-minimising’ strategies. It examines historical precedent for executive overreach in crises and then moves on to look in more detail at some specific areas where fear is being mobilised or generated: in ways that lead to the suspension of civil liberties; that foster discrimination against minorities; and that boost the personality cult of leaders and limit criticism or competition. Finally, in the Appendix, we present empirical work, based on the results of an original survey in Brazil, that provides support for the conjectures in the previous sections. While it is too early to tell what the longer-term outcomes of the changes we note will be, our purpose here is simply to identify some warning signs that threaten the key institutions and values of democracy.
- 14 April 2022
- Published by University Library J. C. Senckenberg in Global Justice : Theory Practice Rhetoric
- Vol. 13 (02) , 78-98
Open AccessCOVID-19 and Authoritarianism: Two Strategies of Engaging Fear
This paper considers ways in which rulers can respond to, generate, or exploit fear of COVID-19 infection for various ends, and in particular distinguishes between ‘fear-invoking’ and ‘fear-minimising’ strategies. It examines historical precedent for executive overreach in crises and then moves on to look in more detail at some specific areas where fear is being mobilised or generated: in ways that lead to the suspension of civil liberties; that foster discrimination against minorities; and that boost the personality cult of leaders and limit criticism or competition. Finally, in the Appendix, we present empirical work, based on the results of an original survey in Brazil, that provides support for the conjectures in the previous sections. While it is too early to tell what the longer-term outcomes of the changes we note will be, our purpose here is simply to identify some warning signs that threaten the key institutions and values of democracy.
- 4 April 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
- Vol. 91, 103-118
No More Benefit Cheats
The concept of the ‘benefit cheat’ plays a critical role in political rhetoric and public policy and it has been deployed to justify changes to the benefit system that have had a very negative impact on well being and justice. The authors argue that the concept is dangerous, adding to the existing burdens of poverty and exclusion and that it must be eradicated by a reorganisation of the welfare system. Dignity and a spirit of equality must be the starting point for any system of welfare that aims to promote universal well being.
- 4 April 2022
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement
- Vol. 91, 103-118
No More Benefit Cheats
The concept of the ‘benefit cheat’ plays a critical role in political rhetoric and public policy and it has been deployed to justify changes to the benefit system that have had a very negative impact on well being and justice. The authors argue that the concept is dangerous, adding to the existing burdens of poverty and exclusion and that it must be eradicated by a reorganisation of the welfare system. Dignity and a spirit of equality must be the starting point for any system of welfare that aims to promote universal well being.
- Open Access
- 6 May 2021
- Published by BMJ in BMJ Global Health
- Vol. 6 (5) , e005912
Ethical and policy considerations for COVID-19 vaccination modalities: delayed second dose, fractional dose, mixed vaccines
- 6 May 2021
- Published by BMJ in BMJ Global Health
- Vol. 6 (5) , e005912
Open AccessEthical and policy considerations for COVID-19 vaccination modalities: delayed second dose, fractional dose, mixed vaccines
- 18 February 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 110-121
The Human Right to Health
- Open Access
- 11 June 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-39
Beyond Poverty
Poverty is often defined as lacking the financial resources to meet a defined set of needs. The stated level of financial resources is taken to define a poverty line. Accordingly, the clear policy response to poverty is to raise the incomes of those who fall below such a line. In this paper, drawing on the capability approach, I argue that this approach is limited in two related ways, and it is necessary to move “beyond poverty” both in a conceptual and a policy sense. First, it is rarely if ever the case that a particular level of financial resources is necessary or sufficient to meet a set of needs, as other factors also act as critical inputs. Second, to bring people over the threshold set of needs, policies that do not raise income, such as the provision of collective goods, will often be more effective in the long term than income transfers. Nevertheless, in the short-term raising incomes will often be the easiest and most available strategy and hence there is also reason to retain the concept of poverty and related policies.
- 11 June 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 23-39
Open AccessBeyond Poverty
Poverty is often defined as lacking the financial resources to meet a defined set of needs. The stated level of financial resources is taken to define a poverty line. Accordingly, the clear policy response to poverty is to raise the incomes of those who fall below such a line. In this paper, drawing on the capability approach, I argue that this approach is limited in two related ways, and it is necessary to move “beyond poverty” both in a conceptual and a policy sense. First, it is rarely if ever the case that a particular level of financial resources is necessary or sufficient to meet a set of needs, as other factors also act as critical inputs. Second, to bring people over the threshold set of needs, policies that do not raise income, such as the provision of collective goods, will often be more effective in the long term than income transfers. Nevertheless, in the short-term raising incomes will often be the easiest and most available strategy and hence there is also reason to retain the concept of poverty and related policies.
- 31 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 123-134
The Basis of European Cooperation