Peter F. Lovibond
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Peter F. Lovibond has a total of 109 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jessica C. Lee
School of Psychology, University of Sydney
16 shared publications - Gabrielle Weidemann
School of Psychology, Western Sydney University
11 shared publications - Chris Mitchell
Royal Holloway, University of London
7 shared publications - Ben Colagiuri
School of Psychology, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
6 shared publications Chris J. Mitchell
School of Psychology, Plymouth University
6 shared publicationsChristopher J. Mitchell
6 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Illusory or normative? Selective inferences about hidden causes can protect illusory causal beliefs
Our ability to extract causal information from direct experience is crucial in making sense of our world. It is therefore puzzling that people often overestimate the relationship between objectively unrelated events. Such causal illusions can be investigated in a contingency learning task, where participants judge the effectiveness of a cue in causing a target outcome based on their observed covariation across a series of trials. When cue and outcome co-occur (cell A trials), the outcome is readily attributed to the cue. But how do participants interpret outcomes in the absence of the cue (cell C trials), where the cause of the outcome is unspecified? We asked participants to provide open-ended (Experiment 1) or forced-choice (Experiments 2 and 3) explanations for trials in a causal illusion task where the cue was a medicine and the outcome was recovery from a disease. Participants inferred a range of plausible hidden causes for cell C recoveries (e.g., stronger immunity, less severe disease, spontaneous recovery). Critically, they rated these causes as less likely to be present on cell A trials, and those who attributed cell A recoveries only to the medicine showed the highest causal ratings for the medicine. Such a selective inference about the scope of a hidden cause may allow learners to explain away cue-absent outcomes that would otherwise undermine the perceived causal strength of the target cue, without violating normative principles. This mechanism may help explain how false causal beliefs can be maintained in the face of a null relationship.
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessIllusory or normative? Selective inferences about hidden causes can protect illusory causal beliefs
Our ability to extract causal information from direct experience is crucial in making sense of our world. It is therefore puzzling that people often overestimate the relationship between objectively unrelated events. Such causal illusions can be investigated in a contingency learning task, where participants judge the effectiveness of a cue in causing a target outcome based on their observed covariation across a series of trials. When cue and outcome co-occur (cell A trials), the outcome is readily attributed to the cue. But how do participants interpret outcomes in the absence of the cue (cell C trials), where the cause of the outcome is unspecified? We asked participants to provide open-ended (Experiment 1) or forced-choice (Experiments 2 and 3) explanations for trials in a causal illusion task where the cue was a medicine and the outcome was recovery from a disease. Participants inferred a range of plausible hidden causes for cell C recoveries (e.g., stronger immunity, less severe disease, spontaneous recovery). Critically, they rated these causes as less likely to be present on cell A trials, and those who attributed cell A recoveries only to the medicine showed the highest causal ratings for the medicine. Such a selective inference about the scope of a hidden cause may allow learners to explain away cue-absent outcomes that would otherwise undermine the perceived causal strength of the target cue, without violating normative principles. This mechanism may help explain how false causal beliefs can be maintained in the face of a null relationship.
- Open Access
- 1 November 2025
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
- Vol. 132 (6) , 1275-1293
The role of expectancy in Pavlovian conditioning.
A review of Pavlovian conditioning in animals and humans reveals a critical role for expectancy in the learning of an association between a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (US), as well as in the expression of this association in a conditioned response (CR). The automatic and involuntary nature of CRs has traditionally been explained in terms of the formation of excitatory or inhibitory links between representations of the CS and US. However, this view has difficulty accounting for the variety of CRs that are observed, some qualitatively different from those elicited by the US, depending on the imminence of the predicted US and the nature of the CS. Furthermore, in humans, the same anticipatory responses are seen when the CS-US relationship is instructed rather than experienced and when the imminent occurrence of the US is directly instructed, without a mediating CS. These findings suggest an alternative explanation in which CRs are anticipatory responses elicited automatically by a specific state of expectancy of the US. The similarity between Pavlovian conditioning in animals and humans in turn suggests a continuity of core mechanisms for learning and performance. We conclude that research and theory in Pavlovian conditioning should go beyond the search for direct CS-US connections and seek to understand the mechanisms that underlie CS-US contingency knowledge, expectancy states, and the generation of anticipatory responses. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 November 2025
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
- Vol. 132 (6) , 1275-1293
Open AccessThe role of expectancy in Pavlovian conditioning.
A review of Pavlovian conditioning in animals and humans reveals a critical role for expectancy in the learning of an association between a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (US), as well as in the expression of this association in a conditioned response (CR). The automatic and involuntary nature of CRs has traditionally been explained in terms of the formation of excitatory or inhibitory links between representations of the CS and US. However, this view has difficulty accounting for the variety of CRs that are observed, some qualitatively different from those elicited by the US, depending on the imminence of the predicted US and the nature of the CS. Furthermore, in humans, the same anticipatory responses are seen when the CS-US relationship is instructed rather than experienced and when the imminent occurrence of the US is directly instructed, without a mediating CS. These findings suggest an alternative explanation in which CRs are anticipatory responses elicited automatically by a specific state of expectancy of the US. The similarity between Pavlovian conditioning in animals and humans in turn suggests a continuity of core mechanisms for learning and performance. We conclude that research and theory in Pavlovian conditioning should go beyond the search for direct CS-US connections and seek to understand the mechanisms that underlie CS-US contingency knowledge, expectancy states, and the generation of anticipatory responses. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
- Open Access
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Occasion setting in humans: Norm or exception?
In this commentary, we propose that occasion setting in humans may be even more widespread than Leising and colleagues assume. In contrast to animal work, our research using the feature negative procedure (A+ AX-) reveals substantial individual differences in what people learn about the feature (X). We discuss findings showing that the majority of participants in our experiments learn something akin to occasion setting, and present reasons for why this may be the case. We conclude that occasion-setting may be the norm in humans because it allows existing learning to be preserved, and for the possibility that the effect of a cue is unique to its accompanying target.
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessOccasion setting in humans: Norm or exception?
In this commentary, we propose that occasion setting in humans may be even more widespread than Leising and colleagues assume. In contrast to animal work, our research using the feature negative procedure (A+ AX-) reveals substantial individual differences in what people learn about the feature (X). We discuss findings showing that the majority of participants in our experiments learn something akin to occasion setting, and present reasons for why this may be the case. We conclude that occasion-setting may be the norm in humans because it allows existing learning to be preserved, and for the possibility that the effect of a cue is unique to its accompanying target.
- Open Access
- 23 May 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 77 (3) , 551-562
Unidirectional rating scales overestimate the illusory causation phenomenon
Illusory causation is a phenomenon in which people mistakenly perceive a causal relationship between a cue and outcome even though the contingency between them is actually zero. Illusory causation studies typically use a unidirectional causal rating scale, where one endpoint refers to no relationship and the other to a strongly positive causal relationship. This procedure may bias mean causal ratings in a positive direction, either by censoring negative ratings or by discouraging participants from giving the normative rating of zero which is at the bottom extreme of the scale. To test this possibility, we ran two experiments that directly compared the magnitude of causal illusions when assessed with a unidirectional (zero—positive) versus a bidirectional (negative—zero—positive) rating scale. Experiment 1 used high cue and outcome densities (both 75%), whereas Experiment 2 used neutral cue and outcome densities (both 50%). Across both experiments, we observed a larger illusory causation effect in the unidirectional group compared with the bidirectional group, despite both groups experiencing the same training trials. The causal illusions in Experiment 2 were observed despite participants accurately learning the conditional probabilities of the outcome occurring in both the presence and absence of the cue, suggesting that the illusion is driven by the inability to accurately integrate conditional probabilities to infer causal relationships. Our results indicate that although illusory causation is a genuine phenomenon that is observable with either a undirectional or a bidirectional rating scale, its magnitude may be overestimated when unidirectional rating scales are used.
- 23 May 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
- Vol. 77 (3) , 551-562
Open AccessUnidirectional rating scales overestimate the illusory causation phenomenon
Illusory causation is a phenomenon in which people mistakenly perceive a causal relationship between a cue and outcome even though the contingency between them is actually zero. Illusory causation studies typically use a unidirectional causal rating scale, where one endpoint refers to no relationship and the other to a strongly positive causal relationship. This procedure may bias mean causal ratings in a positive direction, either by censoring negative ratings or by discouraging participants from giving the normative rating of zero which is at the bottom extreme of the scale. To test this possibility, we ran two experiments that directly compared the magnitude of causal illusions when assessed with a unidirectional (zero—positive) versus a bidirectional (negative—zero—positive) rating scale. Experiment 1 used high cue and outcome densities (both 75%), whereas Experiment 2 used neutral cue and outcome densities (both 50%). Across both experiments, we observed a larger illusory causation effect in the unidirectional group compared with the bidirectional group, despite both groups experiencing the same training trials. The causal illusions in Experiment 2 were observed despite participants accurately learning the conditional probabilities of the outcome occurring in both the presence and absence of the cue, suggesting that the illusion is driven by the inability to accurately integrate conditional probabilities to infer causal relationships. Our results indicate that although illusory causation is a genuine phenomenon that is observable with either a undirectional or a bidirectional rating scale, its magnitude may be overestimated when unidirectional rating scales are used.
- Open Access
- 3 April 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (15)
A cognitive pathway to punishment insensitivity
Individuals differ in their sensitivity to the adverse consequences of their actions, leading some to persist in maladaptive behaviors. Two pathways have been identified for this insensitivity: a motivational pathway based on excessive reward valuation and a behavioral pathway based on autonomous stimulus–response mechanisms. Here, we identify a third, cognitive pathway based on differences in punishment knowledge and use of that knowledge to suppress behavior. We show that distinct phenotypes of punishment sensitivity emerge from differences in what people learn about their actions. Exposed to identical punishment contingencies, some people (sensitive phenotype) form correct causal beliefs that they use to guide their behavior, successfully obtaining rewards and avoiding punishment, whereas others form incorrect but internally coherent causal beliefs that lead them to earn punishment they do not like. Incorrect causal beliefs were not inherently problematic because we show that many individuals benefit from information about why they are being punished, revaluing their actions and changing their behavior to avoid further punishment (unaware phenotype). However, one condition where incorrect causal beliefs were problematic was when punishment is infrequent. Under this condition, more individuals show punishment insensitivity and detrimental patterns of behavior that resist experience and information-driven updating, even when punishment is severe (compulsive phenotype). For these individuals, rare punishment acted as a “trap,” inoculating maladaptive behavioral preferences against cognitive and behavioral updating.
- 3 April 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (15)
Open AccessA cognitive pathway to punishment insensitivity
Individuals differ in their sensitivity to the adverse consequences of their actions, leading some to persist in maladaptive behaviors. Two pathways have been identified for this insensitivity: a motivational pathway based on excessive reward valuation and a behavioral pathway based on autonomous stimulus–response mechanisms. Here, we identify a third, cognitive pathway based on differences in punishment knowledge and use of that knowledge to suppress behavior. We show that distinct phenotypes of punishment sensitivity emerge from differences in what people learn about their actions. Exposed to identical punishment contingencies, some people (sensitive phenotype) form correct causal beliefs that they use to guide their behavior, successfully obtaining rewards and avoiding punishment, whereas others form incorrect but internally coherent causal beliefs that lead them to earn punishment they do not like. Incorrect causal beliefs were not inherently problematic because we show that many individuals benefit from information about why they are being punished, revaluing their actions and changing their behavior to avoid further punishment (unaware phenotype). However, one condition where incorrect causal beliefs were problematic was when punishment is infrequent. Under this condition, more individuals show punishment insensitivity and detrimental patterns of behavior that resist experience and information-driven updating, even when punishment is severe (compulsive phenotype). For these individuals, rare punishment acted as a “trap,” inoculating maladaptive behavioral preferences against cognitive and behavioral updating.
- 1 April 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 49 (2) , 75-86
Retardation of acquisition after conditioned inhibition and latent inhibition training in human causal learning.
Inhibitory stimuli are slow to acquire excitatory properties when paired with the outcome in a retardation test. However, this pattern is also seen after simple nonreinforced exposure: latent inhibition. It is commonly assumed that retardation would be stronger for a conditioned inhibitor than for a latent inhibitor, but there is surprisingly little empirical evidence comparing the two in either animals or humans. Thus, retardation after inhibitory training could in principle be attributable entirely to latent inhibition. We directly compared the speed of excitatory acquisition after conditioned inhibition and matched latent inhibition training in human causal learning. Conditioned inhibition training produced stronger transfer in a summation test, but the two conditions did not differ substantially in a retardation test. We offer two explanations for this dissociation. One is that learned predictiveness attenuated the latent inhibition that otherwise would have occurred during conditioned inhibition training, so that retardation in that condition was primarily due to inhibition. The second explanation is that inhibitory learning in these experiments was hierarchical in nature, similar to negative occasion-setting. By this account, the conditioned inhibitor was able to negatively modulate the test excitor in a summation test, but was no more retarded than a latent inhibitor in its ability to form a direct association with the outcome.
- 1 April 2023
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 49 (2) , 75-86
Retardation of acquisition after conditioned inhibition and latent inhibition training in human causal learning.
Inhibitory stimuli are slow to acquire excitatory properties when paired with the outcome in a retardation test. However, this pattern is also seen after simple nonreinforced exposure: latent inhibition. It is commonly assumed that retardation would be stronger for a conditioned inhibitor than for a latent inhibitor, but there is surprisingly little empirical evidence comparing the two in either animals or humans. Thus, retardation after inhibitory training could in principle be attributable entirely to latent inhibition. We directly compared the speed of excitatory acquisition after conditioned inhibition and matched latent inhibition training in human causal learning. Conditioned inhibition training produced stronger transfer in a summation test, but the two conditions did not differ substantially in a retardation test. We offer two explanations for this dissociation. One is that learned predictiveness attenuated the latent inhibition that otherwise would have occurred during conditioned inhibition training, so that retardation in that condition was primarily due to inhibition. The second explanation is that inhibitory learning in these experiments was hierarchical in nature, similar to negative occasion-setting. By this account, the conditioned inhibitor was able to negatively modulate the test excitor in a summation test, but was no more retarded than a latent inhibitor in its ability to form a direct association with the outcome.
- Open Access
- 10 January 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
A cognitive pathway to punishment insensitivity
Individuals differ in sensitivity to the adverse consequences of their actions, leading some to persist in maladaptive behaviours. Two pathways have been identified for this insensitivity: a motivational pathway based on reward valuation and a behavioural pathway based on stimulus–response mechanisms. Here we identify a third, cognitive pathway based on differences in punishment knowledge. Exposed to identical punishment contingencies, some people (Sensitive) form correct causal beliefs that guide their behaviour to avoid punishment, whereas others form incorrect causal beliefs that lead them to earn punishment. Incorrect causal beliefs were not inherently problematic, many individuals benefited from information about why punishment was occurring, revaluing their actions and changing their behaviour (Unaware). However, we identify one condition where incorrect causal beliefs can be problematic: when punishment is infrequent. Under this condition, more individuals showed detrimental patterns of behaviour that resisted information-driven updating (Compulsive). For these individuals, rare punishment inoculated behavioural preferences against cognitive and behavioural updating.
- 10 January 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessA cognitive pathway to punishment insensitivity
Individuals differ in sensitivity to the adverse consequences of their actions, leading some to persist in maladaptive behaviours. Two pathways have been identified for this insensitivity: a motivational pathway based on reward valuation and a behavioural pathway based on stimulus–response mechanisms. Here we identify a third, cognitive pathway based on differences in punishment knowledge. Exposed to identical punishment contingencies, some people (Sensitive) form correct causal beliefs that guide their behaviour to avoid punishment, whereas others form incorrect causal beliefs that lead them to earn punishment. Incorrect causal beliefs were not inherently problematic, many individuals benefited from information about why punishment was occurring, revaluing their actions and changing their behaviour (Unaware). However, we identify one condition where incorrect causal beliefs can be problematic: when punishment is infrequent. Under this condition, more individuals showed detrimental patterns of behaviour that resisted information-driven updating (Compulsive). For these individuals, rare punishment inoculated behavioural preferences against cognitive and behavioural updating.
- Open Access
- 6 January 2023
- Published by Ubiquity Press, Ltd. in Journal of Cognition
- Vol. 6 (1) , 19-32
Inhibitory Learning with Bidirectional Outcomes: Prevention Learning or Causal Learning in the Opposite Direction?
Influential models of causal learning assume that learning about generative and preventive relationships are symmetrical to each other. That is, a preventive cue directly prevents an outcome from occurring (i.e., "direct" prevention) in the same way a generative cue directly causes an outcome to occur. However, previous studies from our lab have shown that many participants do not infer a direct prevention causal structure after feature-negative discrimination (A+/AB-) with a unidirectional outcome (Lee & Lovibond, 2021). Melchers et al. (2006) suggested that the use of a bidirectional outcome that can either increase or decrease from baseline, encourages direct prevention learning. Here we test an alternative possibility that a bidirectional outcome encourages encoding of a generative relationship in the opposite direction, where B directly causes a decrease in the outcome. Thus, previous evidence of direct prevention learning using bidirectional outcomes may instead be explained by some participants inferring an "Opposite Causal" structure. In two experiments, participants did indeed report an opposite causal structure. In Experiment 1, these participants showed the lowest outcome predictions when B was combined with a novel cause in a summation test, and lowest outcome predictions when B was presented alone. In Experiment 2, B successfully blocked learning to a novel cue that was directly paired with a reduction in the outcome, and this effect was strongest among participants who endorsed an Opposite Causal structure. We conclude that previous evidence of direct prevention learning using bidirectional outcomes may be a product of excitatory rather than inhibitory learning.
- 6 January 2023
- Published by Ubiquity Press, Ltd. in Journal of Cognition
- Vol. 6 (1) , 19-32
Open AccessInhibitory Learning with Bidirectional Outcomes: Prevention Learning or Causal Learning in the Opposite Direction?
Influential models of causal learning assume that learning about generative and preventive relationships are symmetrical to each other. That is, a preventive cue directly prevents an outcome from occurring (i.e., "direct" prevention) in the same way a generative cue directly causes an outcome to occur. However, previous studies from our lab have shown that many participants do not infer a direct prevention causal structure after feature-negative discrimination (A+/AB-) with a unidirectional outcome (Lee & Lovibond, 2021). Melchers et al. (2006) suggested that the use of a bidirectional outcome that can either increase or decrease from baseline, encourages direct prevention learning. Here we test an alternative possibility that a bidirectional outcome encourages encoding of a generative relationship in the opposite direction, where B directly causes a decrease in the outcome. Thus, previous evidence of direct prevention learning using bidirectional outcomes may instead be explained by some participants inferring an "Opposite Causal" structure. In two experiments, participants did indeed report an opposite causal structure. In Experiment 1, these participants showed the lowest outcome predictions when B was combined with a novel cause in a summation test, and lowest outcome predictions when B was presented alone. In Experiment 2, B successfully blocked learning to a novel cue that was directly paired with a reduction in the outcome, and this effect was strongest among participants who endorsed an Opposite Causal structure. We conclude that previous evidence of direct prevention learning using bidirectional outcomes may be a product of excitatory rather than inhibitory learning.
- 1 October 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 48 (4) , 336-348
Reversal of inhibition by no-modulation training but not by extinction in human causal learning.
One of the many strengths of the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model is that it accounts for both excitatory and inhibitory learning using a single error-correction mechanism. However, it makes the counterintuitive prediction that nonreinforced presentations of an inhibitory stimulus will lead to extinction of its inhibitory properties. Zimmer-Hart and Rescorla (1974) provided the first of several animal conditioning studies that contradicted this prediction. However, the human data are more mixed. Accordingly, we set out to test whether extinction of an inhibitor occurs in human causal learning after simultaneous feature negative training with a conventional unidirectional outcome. In 2 experiments with substantial sample sizes, we found no evidence of extinction after presentations of the inhibitory stimulus alone in either a summation test or causal ratings. By contrast, 2 "no-modulation" procedures that contradicted the original training contingencies successfully reversed inhibition. These results did not differ substantially as a function of participants' self-reported causal structures (configural/modulation/prevention). We hypothesize that inhibitory learning may be intrinsically modulatory, analogous to negative occasion-setting, even with simultaneous training. This hypothesis would explain why inhibition is reversed by manipulations that contradict modulation but not by simple extinction, as well as other properties of inhibitory learning such as imperfect transfer to another excitor. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 October 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 48 (4) , 336-348
Reversal of inhibition by no-modulation training but not by extinction in human causal learning.
One of the many strengths of the Rescorla and Wagner (1972) model is that it accounts for both excitatory and inhibitory learning using a single error-correction mechanism. However, it makes the counterintuitive prediction that nonreinforced presentations of an inhibitory stimulus will lead to extinction of its inhibitory properties. Zimmer-Hart and Rescorla (1974) provided the first of several animal conditioning studies that contradicted this prediction. However, the human data are more mixed. Accordingly, we set out to test whether extinction of an inhibitor occurs in human causal learning after simultaneous feature negative training with a conventional unidirectional outcome. In 2 experiments with substantial sample sizes, we found no evidence of extinction after presentations of the inhibitory stimulus alone in either a summation test or causal ratings. By contrast, 2 "no-modulation" procedures that contradicted the original training contingencies successfully reversed inhibition. These results did not differ substantially as a function of participants' self-reported causal structures (configural/modulation/prevention). We hypothesize that inhibitory learning may be intrinsically modulatory, analogous to negative occasion-setting, even with simultaneous training. This hypothesis would explain why inhibition is reversed by manipulations that contradict modulation but not by simple extinction, as well as other properties of inhibitory learning such as imperfect transfer to another excitor. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 July 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 48 (3) , 179-189
Generalization following symmetrical intradimensional discrimination training.
A challenge for generalization models is to specify how excitation generated from a CS+ (i.e., positive evidence) should interact with inhibition from a CS- (i.e., negative evidence) to produce generalized responding. Empirically, many generalization phenomena are consistent with the monotonicity principle, which states that additional positive evidence should increase generalized responding, whereas additional negative evidence should decrease responding. However, a recent study (Lee et al.,, 2019) demonstrated that additional negative evidence can sometimes increase generalization, in direct contrast to animal data and associative accounts of generalization. The current study investigated whether a similar effect could be found in a symmetrical intradimensional discrimination procedure with two sources of negative evidence (CS-s) located on each side of a CS+. In three experiments, we compared generalization along a green-blue dimension between one group of participants who learned that an aqua-colored shape (CS+) predicted an outcome (Single Positive group) with another group who also learned that both a slightly greener and a slightly bluer shape led to no outcome (Double Negative group). Experiments 1A and 1B showed no effect of the additional negative evidence in increasing generalization around the CS+. However, changing a stimulus feature at test (shape) resulted in a higher gradient peak in the Double Negative group relative to the Single Positive group in Experiment 2. Although this result violates the monotonicity principle, an extended version of Blough's (1975) model applying cue competition to multiple stimulus dimensions (i.e., shape and color) successfully replicated the group differences. Our results suggest that associative mechanisms can account for some instances in which negative evidence increases generalization. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 July 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 48 (3) , 179-189
Generalization following symmetrical intradimensional discrimination training.
A challenge for generalization models is to specify how excitation generated from a CS+ (i.e., positive evidence) should interact with inhibition from a CS- (i.e., negative evidence) to produce generalized responding. Empirically, many generalization phenomena are consistent with the monotonicity principle, which states that additional positive evidence should increase generalized responding, whereas additional negative evidence should decrease responding. However, a recent study (Lee et al.,, 2019) demonstrated that additional negative evidence can sometimes increase generalization, in direct contrast to animal data and associative accounts of generalization. The current study investigated whether a similar effect could be found in a symmetrical intradimensional discrimination procedure with two sources of negative evidence (CS-s) located on each side of a CS+. In three experiments, we compared generalization along a green-blue dimension between one group of participants who learned that an aqua-colored shape (CS+) predicted an outcome (Single Positive group) with another group who also learned that both a slightly greener and a slightly bluer shape led to no outcome (Double Negative group). Experiments 1A and 1B showed no effect of the additional negative evidence in increasing generalization around the CS+. However, changing a stimulus feature at test (shape) resulted in a higher gradient peak in the Double Negative group relative to the Single Positive group in Experiment 2. Although this result violates the monotonicity principle, an extended version of Blough's (1975) model applying cue competition to multiple stimulus dimensions (i.e., shape and color) successfully replicated the group differences. Our results suggest that associative mechanisms can account for some instances in which negative evidence increases generalization. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).