Johanna Ullrich
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Johanna Ullrich has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Edgar Weippl
University of Vienna
6 shared publications - Adrian Dabrowski
University of Applied Sciences Technikum Wien, Vienna, Austria
3 shared publications - Florian Holzbauer
Faculty of Computer Science, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria and Doctoral School Computer Science, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
3 shared publications - Georg Merzdovnik
SBA Research
3 shared publications - Aaron Kaplan
DIGIT S.2 / European Commission, Vienna, Austria
1 shared publication - Aljosha Judmayer
SBA Research
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 135-153
EU Digital Sovereignty in Practice: A Technical Assessment of Digital Infrastructure Dependencies
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 135-153
Open AccessEU Digital Sovereignty in Practice: A Technical Assessment of Digital Infrastructure Dependencies
- Open Access
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 474-492
Tracking Internet Disruptions in Ukraine: Insights from Three Years of Active Full Block Scans
- 28 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 474-492
Open AccessTracking Internet Disruptions in Ukraine: Insights from Three Years of Active Full Block Scans
- 12 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 106-125
Zero-Click SnailLoad: From Minimal to No User Interaction
- 12 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 106-125
Zero-Click SnailLoad: From Minimal to No User Interaction
- Open Access
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 280-294
Destination Reachable: What ICMPv6 Error Messages Reveal About Their Sources
The probability of hitting an active IPv6 address by chance is virtually zero; instead, it appears more promising to analyze ICMPv6 error messages that are returned in case of an undeliverable packet. In this paper, we investigate the implementation of ICMPv6 error messages by different router vendors, whether a remote network's deployment status might be inferred from them, and analyze ICMPv6 error messaging behavior of routers in the IPv6 Internet. We find that Address Unreachable with a delay of more than a second indicates active networks, whereas Time Exceeded, Reject Route and Address Unreachable with short delays pinpoint inactive networks. Furthermore, we found that ICMPv6 rate-limiting implementations, used to protect routers, allow the fingerprinting of vendors and OS-versions. This enabled us to detect more than a million periphery routers relying on Linux kernels from 2018 (or before); these kernels have reached end of life (EOL) and no longer receive security updates.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 280-294
Open AccessDestination Reachable: What ICMPv6 Error Messages Reveal About Their Sources
The probability of hitting an active IPv6 address by chance is virtually zero; instead, it appears more promising to analyze ICMPv6 error messages that are returned in case of an undeliverable packet. In this paper, we investigate the implementation of ICMPv6 error messages by different router vendors, whether a remote network's deployment status might be inferred from them, and analyze ICMPv6 error messaging behavior of routers in the IPv6 Internet. We find that Address Unreachable with a delay of more than a second indicates active networks, whereas Time Exceeded, Reject Route and Address Unreachable with short delays pinpoint inactive networks. Furthermore, we found that ICMPv6 rate-limiting implementations, used to protect routers, allow the fingerprinting of vendors and OS-versions. This enabled us to detect more than a million periphery routers relying on Linux kernels from 2018 (or before); these kernels have reached end of life (EOL) and no longer receive security updates.
- Open Access
An Extended View on Measuring Tor AS-level Adversaries
Tor provides anonymity to millions of users around the globe which has made it a valuable target for malicious actors. As a low-latency anonymity system, it is vulnerable to traffic correlation attacks from strong passive adversaries such as large autonomous systems (ASes). In preliminary work, we have developed a measurement approach utilizing the RIPE Atlas framework -- a network of more than 11,000 probes worldwide -- to infer the risk of deanonymization for IPv4 clients in Germany and the US. In this paper, we apply our methodology to additional scenarios providing a broader picture of the potential for deanonymization in the Tor network. In particular, we (a) repeat our earlier (2020) measurements in 2022 to observe changes over time, (b) adopt our approach for IPv6 to analyze the risk of deanonymization when using this next-generation Internet protocol, and (c) investigate the current situation in Russia, where censorship has been intensified after the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to our results, Tor provides user anonymity at consistent quality: While individual numbers vary in dependence of client and destination, we were able to identify ASes with the potential to conduct deanonymization attacks. For clients in Germany and the US, the overall picture, however, has not changed since 2020. In addition, the protocols (IPv4 vs. IPv6) do not significantly impact the risk of deanonymization. Russian users are able to securely evade censorship using Tor. Their general risk of deanonymization is, in fact, lower than in the other investigated countries. Beyond, the few ASes with the potential to successfully perform deanonymization are operated by Western companies, further reducing the risk for Russian users.
Open AccessAn Extended View on Measuring Tor AS-level Adversaries
Tor provides anonymity to millions of users around the globe which has made it a valuable target for malicious actors. As a low-latency anonymity system, it is vulnerable to traffic correlation attacks from strong passive adversaries such as large autonomous systems (ASes). In preliminary work, we have developed a measurement approach utilizing the RIPE Atlas framework -- a network of more than 11,000 probes worldwide -- to infer the risk of deanonymization for IPv4 clients in Germany and the US. In this paper, we apply our methodology to additional scenarios providing a broader picture of the potential for deanonymization in the Tor network. In particular, we (a) repeat our earlier (2020) measurements in 2022 to observe changes over time, (b) adopt our approach for IPv6 to analyze the risk of deanonymization when using this next-generation Internet protocol, and (c) investigate the current situation in Russia, where censorship has been intensified after the beginning of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to our results, Tor provides user anonymity at consistent quality: While individual numbers vary in dependence of client and destination, we were able to identify ASes with the potential to conduct deanonymization attacks. For clients in Germany and the US, the overall picture, however, has not changed since 2020. In addition, the protocols (IPv4 vs. IPv6) do not significantly impact the risk of deanonymization. Russian users are able to securely evade censorship using Tor. Their general risk of deanonymization is, in fact, lower than in the other investigated countries. Beyond, the few ASes with the potential to successfully perform deanonymization are operated by Western companies, further reducing the risk for Russian users.
- 13 March 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 258-270
Measuring Cookies and Web Privacy in a Post-GDPR World
- 13 March 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 258-270
Measuring Cookies and Web Privacy in a Post-GDPR World
- 26 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 197-204
A Performance Assessment of Network Address Shuffling in IoT Systems
- 26 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 197-204
A Performance Assessment of Network Address Shuffling in IoT Systems
- Open Access
- 15 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 493-511
The Beauty or The Beast? Attacking Rate Limits of the Xen Hypervisor
- 15 September 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 493-511
Open AccessThe Beauty or The Beast? Attacking Rate Limits of the Xen Hypervisor
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-4
Secure cyber-physical production systems: Solid steps towards realization
Sophisticated production systems include plenty of information technology (IT) in order to gain more efficiency. However, this on-going development bears the drawback of lacking security. Cyber-physical production systems (CPPS) are likely to be struck by a cyber-launched attack; but might also be themselves the origin of an attack targeting IT infrastructures or other production systems. Far from an ideal solution, the involved engineering disciplines appear to work in parallel despite aiming for the same goal: securing the production systems. In this paper, we highlight small measures that are able to achieve large effects on CPPS security: (1) Extending interoperability testing by security testing gains robustness against intentionally malformed inputs; (2) the extension of today's models so that they enable the description of malicious actions would allow to assess system behavior in presence of an attack; and (3) a layered approach on CPPS security enables to address malicious activities at an adequate, semantic layer without the need for precarious shadow systems.
- 1 April 2016
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-4
Secure cyber-physical production systems: Solid steps towards realization
Sophisticated production systems include plenty of information technology (IT) in order to gain more efficiency. However, this on-going development bears the drawback of lacking security. Cyber-physical production systems (CPPS) are likely to be struck by a cyber-launched attack; but might also be themselves the origin of an attack targeting IT infrastructures or other production systems. Far from an ideal solution, the involved engineering disciplines appear to work in parallel despite aiming for the same goal: securing the production systems. In this paper, we highlight small measures that are able to achieve large effects on CPPS security: (1) Extending interoperability testing by security testing gains robustness against intentionally malformed inputs; (2) the extension of today's models so that they enable the description of malicious actions would allow to assess system behavior in presence of an attack; and (3) a layered approach on CPPS security enables to address malicious activities at an adequate, semantic layer without the need for precarious shadow systems.
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Vol. 8086, 287-294
Towards a Hardware Trojan Detection Cycle
Intentionally inserted malfunctions in integrated circuits, referred to as Hardware Trojans, have become an emerging threat. Recently, the scientific community started to propose technical approaches to mitigate the threat of unspecified and potentially malicious functionality. However, these detection and prevention mechanisms are still hardly integrated in the industry's Hardware development life cycles. We therefore propose in this work a secure hardware development life cycle that assembles methods from trustworthy software engineering. In addition to full traceability from specification to implementation, and down to each gate, we introduce a feedback detection cycle that systematically escorts every single step of the development process. To do so, we integrate different detection methods for each development phase that are derived from a common knowledge base.
- 1 September 2014
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Vol. 8086, 287-294
Towards a Hardware Trojan Detection Cycle
Intentionally inserted malfunctions in integrated circuits, referred to as Hardware Trojans, have become an emerging threat. Recently, the scientific community started to propose technical approaches to mitigate the threat of unspecified and potentially malicious functionality. However, these detection and prevention mechanisms are still hardly integrated in the industry's Hardware development life cycles. We therefore propose in this work a secure hardware development life cycle that assembles methods from trustworthy software engineering. In addition to full traceability from specification to implementation, and down to each gate, we introduce a feedback detection cycle that systematically escorts every single step of the development process. To do so, we integrate different detection methods for each development phase that are derived from a common knowledge base.