Michalis Drouvelis
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Michalis Drouvelis has a total of 64 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniele Nosenzo
Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark
3 shared publications Abel Brodeur
Department of Economics University of Ottawa Ottawa Ontario Canada
2 shared publications- Alex Possajennikov
University of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK
2 shared publications - Benjamin M. Marx
Department of Economics , 14589 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign , 1407 W. Gregory , Urbana , IL 61801 , USA
2 shared publications Benjamin Marx
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
2 shared publicationsFrancesca Cornaglia
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Coordination by Sunspots: Letter is Mightier than Colour
We set up an experiment to test whether players use a payoff-irrelevant public message (BLUE or RED) as a possible sunspot to coordinate in a Battle of the Sexes game in which the pure strategies are labelled as X and Y. We find that most players do not play a "sunspot equilibrium"; instead, they learn to coordinate on a particular focal point (pure strategy X) in the game, largely ignoring the presence of the public signal (colour), and stick to this focal point, even after the public signal is withdrawn. Colour-contingent play emerges in only two of the six matching groups, which adopt opposite mappings.
- 10 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCoordination by Sunspots: Letter is Mightier than Colour
We set up an experiment to test whether players use a payoff-irrelevant public message (BLUE or RED) as a possible sunspot to coordinate in a Battle of the Sexes game in which the pure strategies are labelled as X and Y. We find that most players do not play a "sunspot equilibrium"; instead, they learn to coordinate on a particular focal point (pure strategy X) in the game, largely ignoring the presence of the public signal (colour), and stick to this focal point, even after the public signal is withdrawn. Colour-contingent play emerges in only two of the six matching groups, which adopt opposite mappings.
- Open Access
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Time Blocking, Goal Setting, and Work Performance
We experimentally examine how time blocking (dividing a fixed work period into shorter intervals) and non-binding goals influence worker performance. Measuring four outcomes, task performance, effort, accuracy, and mistake rate, we find that time blocking primarily operates through a speed accuracy trade off. While it substantially increases the number of tables attempted within a given period it simultaneously reduces accuracy, resulting in only a modest net gain in output. Goal setting, meanwhile, has no significant effect overall. The effects are heterogeneous and depend strongly on worker ability. For high-ability workers, goal setting significantly improves performance. Combining time blocking with goal setting yields the largest performance gains, indicating that the two techniques complement each other for this group. For low-ability workers, neither technique, individually or combined, produces significant improvements: although time blocking raises effort, the associated decline in accuracy offsets any potential benefit. Our findings highlight worker ability as a key moderator of non-monetary motivational interventions and caution against applying multiple techniques simultaneously without accounting for workforce heterogeneity.
- 9 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessTime Blocking, Goal Setting, and Work Performance
We experimentally examine how time blocking (dividing a fixed work period into shorter intervals) and non-binding goals influence worker performance. Measuring four outcomes, task performance, effort, accuracy, and mistake rate, we find that time blocking primarily operates through a speed accuracy trade off. While it substantially increases the number of tables attempted within a given period it simultaneously reduces accuracy, resulting in only a modest net gain in output. Goal setting, meanwhile, has no significant effect overall. The effects are heterogeneous and depend strongly on worker ability. For high-ability workers, goal setting significantly improves performance. Combining time blocking with goal setting yields the largest performance gains, indicating that the two techniques complement each other for this group. For low-ability workers, neither technique, individually or combined, produces significant improvements: although time blocking raises effort, the associated decline in accuracy offsets any potential benefit. Our findings highlight worker ability as a key moderator of non-monetary motivational interventions and caution against applying multiple techniques simultaneously without accounting for workforce heterogeneity.
- Open Access
- 17 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 187
On the robustness of monetary stakes and lying
- 17 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 187
Open AccessOn the robustness of monetary stakes and lying
- Open Access
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 158, 330-347
The effects of induced emotions on punishment and reward
- 1 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 158, 330-347
Open AccessThe effects of induced emotions on punishment and reward
- Open Access
- 24 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 64 (2) , 468-490
Social distance and delegation: Does anonymity matter?
In this paper, we report on two experimental studies that examine the impact of social distance on delegation and uncover the role of anonymity driving delegation in a principal‐agent setting. Study 1 shows that reducing the social distance makes principals less likely to delegate. Study 2 offers evidence that the likelihood of delegation is not affected by whether the principal is informed that the recipients will not find out whether the principal is their friend or a stranger. Our findings have implications for the underlying sources of pro‐sociality in organizational settings where managers make their decisions through hiring external agents.
- 24 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 64 (2) , 468-490
Open AccessSocial distance and delegation: Does anonymity matter?
In this paper, we report on two experimental studies that examine the impact of social distance on delegation and uncover the role of anonymity driving delegation in a principal‐agent setting. Study 1 shows that reducing the social distance makes principals less likely to delegate. Study 2 offers evidence that the likelihood of delegation is not affected by whether the principal is informed that the recipients will not find out whether the principal is their friend or a stranger. Our findings have implications for the underlying sources of pro‐sociality in organizational settings where managers make their decisions through hiring external agents.
- Open Access
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 64 (1) , 5-7
Introduction to the symposium on reproducibility and replicability in economics: Part II
- 19 November 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 64 (1) , 5-7
Open AccessIntroduction to the symposium on reproducibility and replicability in economics: Part II
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 81 (4) , 1407-1434
Communicating in a coordination game with private information
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 81 (4) , 1407-1434
Communicating in a coordination game with private information
- Open Access
- 2 May 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 64 (1) , 120-130
Reciprocity and the tragedies of maintaining and providing the commons: A replication and an extension to income inequality
Social cooperation often requires individuals to exhibit restraint for the greater good, incurring costs for maintaining public goods or establishing them through generosity. Will cooperative behaviors differ between maintenance and provision dilemmas? We replicate findings showing that low cooperation is more likely in maintenance than provision scenarios among a non‐student sample with reciprocity being the main reason behind cooperative differences. A separate experiment reports similar effects in the case of income inequality, also suggesting dilemma‐specific reciprocity is vital in averting the 'tragedy of the commons'. Our findings reinforce and broaden previous conclusions in the literature.
- 2 May 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 64 (1) , 120-130
Open AccessReciprocity and the tragedies of maintaining and providing the commons: A replication and an extension to income inequality
Social cooperation often requires individuals to exhibit restraint for the greater good, incurring costs for maintaining public goods or establishing them through generosity. Will cooperative behaviors differ between maintenance and provision dilemmas? We replicate findings showing that low cooperation is more likely in maintenance than provision scenarios among a non‐student sample with reciprocity being the main reason behind cooperative differences. A separate experiment reports similar effects in the case of income inequality, also suggesting dilemma‐specific reciprocity is vital in averting the 'tragedy of the commons'. Our findings reinforce and broaden previous conclusions in the literature.
- Open Access
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
Introduction to the symposium on reproducibility and replicability in economics: Part I
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
Open AccessIntroduction to the symposium on reproducibility and replicability in economics: Part I
- Open Access
- 10 August 2024
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 62 (4) , 1629-1651
Social framing effects in leadership by example: Preferences or beliefs?
We study the impact of framing on leading‐by‐example. Our 2 × 2 design consists of group level frames (Wall Street vs. Community) and individual level frames (First/Second Movers vs. Leader/Followers). We report on two studies where we elicit participants' beliefs allowing us to evaluate whether framing effects are driven by beliefs or preferences. Across both studies, average contributions are significantly lower in the Community—First Mover frame. This is primarily because leaders contribute less, pulling down followers' contributions. We find that contributions are strongly related to first order and second order beliefs but framing effects remain once we control for beliefs.
- 10 August 2024
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 62 (4) , 1629-1651
Open AccessSocial framing effects in leadership by example: Preferences or beliefs?
We study the impact of framing on leading‐by‐example. Our 2 × 2 design consists of group level frames (Wall Street vs. Community) and individual level frames (First/Second Movers vs. Leader/Followers). We report on two studies where we elicit participants' beliefs allowing us to evaluate whether framing effects are driven by beliefs or preferences. Across both studies, average contributions are significantly lower in the Community—First Mover frame. This is primarily because leaders contribute less, pulling down followers' contributions. We find that contributions are strongly related to first order and second order beliefs but framing effects remain once we control for beliefs.