Michael Tunstall
Research Subjects
Michael Tunstall has a total of 86 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- William Peter Marnane
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering, University College Cork, Cork, Ireland
8 shared publications David Naccache
École Normale Supérieure
4 shared publicationsDan Page
3 shared publicationsKeith Mayes
3 shared publicationsClaire Whelan
TDS (Time Data Security) Ltd
2 shared publicationsColin C. Murphy
University College Cork
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 10 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 643-646
Differential Fault Analysis
- 22 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 334-361
On Applying Boolean Masking to Exponents
- 15 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-4
Differential Fault Analysis
- 23 May 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 9 (2) , 173-184
Constant-time higher-order Boolean-to-arithmetic masking
- 23 May 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 9 (2) , 173-184
Constant-time higher-order Boolean-to-arithmetic masking
- Open Access
- 12 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 9 (1) , 21-36
Online template attacks
- 12 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Cryptographic Engineering
- Vol. 9 (1) , 21-36
Open AccessOnline template attacks
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-7
Key extraction from the primary side of a switched-mode power supply
In this paper we detail techniques that can be used to analyze and attack an AES implementation on an FPGA from the primary (i.e., external) side of a switched-mode power supply. Our attack only requires measurements of the duty cycle of the power supply, and then increases the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) though averaging, deconvolution and wavelet based detrending. The result is an exploitable source of leakage that allows a secret key to be determined from low-frequency power measurements. The techniques and procedures provide a general approach to performing differential power analysis (DPA) from a single point of information for any single hypothesized intermediate value, suggesting their potential for improving other types of side-channel analysis.
- 1 December 2016
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-7
Key extraction from the primary side of a switched-mode power supply
In this paper we detail techniques that can be used to analyze and attack an AES implementation on an FPGA from the primary (i.e., external) side of a switched-mode power supply. Our attack only requires measurements of the duty cycle of the power supply, and then increases the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) though averaging, deconvolution and wavelet based detrending. The result is an exploitable source of leakage that allows a secret key to be determined from low-frequency power measurements. The techniques and procedures provide a general approach to performing differential power analysis (DPA) from a single point of information for any single hypothesized intermediate value, suggesting their potential for improving other types of side-channel analysis.
- Open Access
- 24 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 169-184
Randomizing the Montgomery Powering Ladder
- 24 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 169-184
Open AccessRandomizing the Montgomery Powering Ladder
- 1 September 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 620-640
SoC It to EM: ElectroMagnetic Side-Channel Attacks on a Complex System-on-Chip
- 1 September 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 620-640
SoC It to EM: ElectroMagnetic Side-Channel Attacks on a Complex System-on-Chip