Ruiliang Yan

Inflation compresses the margins that finance digital coupon programs on e-commerce platforms. This study examines how inflation affects coupon governance in a decentralized manufacturer–e-tailer supply chain and what the allocation of promotional authority implies for the chain’s economic sustainability, measured by channel profit, efficiency relative to an integrated benchmark, promotional cost per unit sold, consumer surplus, and the inflation rate at which each firm can still cover its fixed costs. A Stackelberg model compares manufacturer-funded coupons, e-tailer-funded coupons, cooperative cost sharing, and independent dual coupons enabled by platform stacking. Inflation lowers coupon values and both firms’ profits across all regimes, whereas its effect on posted retail prices depends on coupon effectiveness. In the model, e-tailer funding outperforms manufacturer funding because the party that pays for the coupon also captures the higher retail margin that the coupon supports. Cost sharing raises coupon intensity but lowers channel profit, leaving the e-tailer worse off than under either single-funder regime, making it the regime in which the e-tailer becomes unviable first. Dual coupons yield the highest decentralized profits, but the advantage reflects the division of promotional effort between issuers with separate redemption costs; it shrinks as redemption pools overlap or the two coupons become substitutes, and vanishes when stacking is restricted. Proportional advantages between regimes narrow with inflation only when inflation also raises consumers’ price sensitivity.

Purpose: This research explores how digital coupons can be leveraged to reduce channel competition and enhance collaboration in the manufacturer-reseller business-to-business (B2B) market–an area that has not been previously addressed in the literature. Design/methodology/approach: We employ a game-theoretical approach to analyze and compare different scenarios, deriving optimal marketing strategies for business managers. Findings: Our results reveal that, compared to manufacturer-funded digital coupons, two novel mechanisms - reseller-funded digital coupons and cost-sharing of digital coupons -are more effective in mitigating channel competition and benefiting both the manufacturer and reseller. However, a key challenge arises: While manufacturers prefer a cost-sharing approach, resellers favor fully funding their own digital coupons. To reconcile these preferences, we introduce an innovative hybrid mechanism that combines quantity discounts with cost-sharing of digital coupons. This approach effectively reduces channel conflict and maximizes benefits for all parties in the online-to-offline (O2O) B2B market. Originality/value: This research fills a critical gap in the literature on O2O coordination by developing innovative strategies to reduce channel competition in the manufacturer-reseller B2B market. Our findings are particularly relevant as e-commerce continues to grow while traditional offline retailing maintains a significant market presence.

E-tailers normally have more accurate information regarding their products and services than consumers due to the nature of online transactions. To reduce consumers’ concerns of hidden information, e-tailers can use lenient return policies to attempt to signal high product and service quality. This research proposes a model to investigate the signaling effect of two components of return policy, return window—short return window vs. long return window and return depth—full refund vs. partial refund, on product quality and service quality. Data was collected using an online survey and analyzed using structural equation modeling. The results show that both a long return window and a full refund signal high service quality, which then positively affects purchase intention. When it comes to product quality, return window does not have a signaling effect, while the signaling effect of return depth is moderated by service quality.