Christian Barry
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Christian Barry has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gerhard Øverland
University of Melbourne
3 shared publications - Garrett Cullity
Australian National University
2 shared publications Gerhard Øverland
University of Oslo
2 shared publications- Matthew Lindauer
City University of New York
2 shared publications Patrick Tomlin
University of Warwick
2 shared publications- Charlotte Streck
University of Potsdam
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Climate Policy
- Vol. 26 (3) , 493-501
Considering durability in carbon dioxide removal strategies for climate change mitigation
- 9 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Climate Policy
- Vol. 26 (3) , 493-501
Open AccessConsidering durability in carbon dioxide removal strategies for climate change mitigation
- Open Access
- 24 January 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Politics, Philosophy & Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 27-54
Which emissions belong to us? The case for contributory value-chain emissions accounting
States and other climate actors now commonly set ‘net zero’ targets – pledging that, by a certain date, they will put no more carbon into the atmosphere than they take out. However, there is controversy over what exactly should count as attaining such targets. The method of emissions accounting that states currently use – territorial emissions accounting – is often criticized as problematic, but a fully satisfactory explanation of the problem is needed. We argue that the key both to understanding the problem and to solving it is that there is a specific kind of cooperative contribution – a mereological contribution – that a national net zero commitment needs to make to global climate action in order to meet the standards that global citizens should hold states to. On this basis, we propose an alternative method – Contributory Value-Chain Accounting – showing how it can be qualified to reflect trade relationships between net-zero-aligned countries, and defending it against the objections that it involves double counting, is infeasible and too informationally demanding, and that it would send the wrong incentive signals.
- 24 January 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Politics, Philosophy & Economics
- Vol. 25 (1) , 27-54
Open AccessWhich emissions belong to us? The case for contributory value-chain emissions accounting
States and other climate actors now commonly set ‘net zero’ targets – pledging that, by a certain date, they will put no more carbon into the atmosphere than they take out. However, there is controversy over what exactly should count as attaining such targets. The method of emissions accounting that states currently use – territorial emissions accounting – is often criticized as problematic, but a fully satisfactory explanation of the problem is needed. We argue that the key both to understanding the problem and to solving it is that there is a specific kind of cooperative contribution – a mereological contribution – that a national net zero commitment needs to make to global climate action in order to meet the standards that global citizens should hold states to. On this basis, we propose an alternative method – Contributory Value-Chain Accounting – showing how it can be qualified to reflect trade relationships between net-zero-aligned countries, and defending it against the objections that it involves double counting, is infeasible and too informationally demanding, and that it would send the wrong incentive signals.
- 19 June 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 102 (1) , 21-36
Supererogation and Optimisation
This paper examines three approaches to the relationship between our moral reasons to bear costs for others’ sake before and beyond the call of duty. Symmetry holds that you are required to optimise your beneficial sacrifices even when they are genuinely supererogatory. If you are required to bear a cost C for the sake of a benefit B, when they are the only costs and benefits at stake, you are also conditionally required to bear an additional cost C, for the sake of an additional benefit B, when enough other costs and benefits are at stake that both of your alternatives are presumptively supererogatory. Disconnection rejects the requirement to optimise when your options are presumptively supererogatory and maintains that you have an entirely free hand to choose as you will among them. Asymmetry holds that when acting beyond the call of duty you are entitled to a measure of additional freedom compared to when you are not taking on supererogatory costs—you can prioritise your own well-being and reasons to a greater degree—but places constraints on the options that you may permissibly choose. We defend a version of Asymmetry and explore its implications for recent debates on charitable giving.
- 19 June 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 102 (1) , 21-36
Supererogation and Optimisation
This paper examines three approaches to the relationship between our moral reasons to bear costs for others’ sake before and beyond the call of duty. Symmetry holds that you are required to optimise your beneficial sacrifices even when they are genuinely supererogatory. If you are required to bear a cost C for the sake of a benefit B, when they are the only costs and benefits at stake, you are also conditionally required to bear an additional cost C, for the sake of an additional benefit B, when enough other costs and benefits are at stake that both of your alternatives are presumptively supererogatory. Disconnection rejects the requirement to optimise when your options are presumptively supererogatory and maintains that you have an entirely free hand to choose as you will among them. Asymmetry holds that when acting beyond the call of duty you are entitled to a measure of additional freedom compared to when you are not taking on supererogatory costs—you can prioritise your own well-being and reasons to a greater degree—but places constraints on the options that you may permissibly choose. We defend a version of Asymmetry and explore its implications for recent debates on charitable giving.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2022
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Ethics
- Vol. 132 (2) , 352-381
Offsetting and Risk Imposition
Suppose one of your actions imposes a risk of harm that, on its own, would be excessive, but a second reduces the risk of harm by a corresponding amount. By pairing the two actions together to form...
- 1 January 2022
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Ethics
- Vol. 132 (2) , 352-381
Top Cited PapersOffsetting and Risk Imposition
Suppose one of your actions imposes a risk of harm that, on its own, would be excessive, but a second reduces the risk of harm by a corresponding amount. By pairing the two actions together to form...
- 20 November 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 133 (529) , 286-294
Economic Statecraft: Human Rights, Sanctions, and Conditionality, by Cécile Fabre
- 20 November 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Mind
- Vol. 133 (529) , 286-294
Economic Statecraft: Human Rights, Sanctions, and Conditionality, by Cécile Fabre
- 19 November 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Moral Philosophy
- Vol. 19 (3) , 229-253
A Puzzle of Enforceability: Why do Moral Duties Differ in their Enforceability?
When someone is poised to fail to fulfil a moral duty, we can respond in a variety of ways. We might remind them of their duty, or seek to persuade them through argument. Or we might intervene forcibly to ensure that they act in accordance with their duty. Some duties appear to be such that the duty-bearer can be liable to forcible interference when this is necessary to ensure that they comply with them. We’ll call duties that carry such liabilities enforcement-apt. Not all duties seem to be enforcement-apt. Some, for example, accept that a person in a monogamous marriage has a moral duty to refrain from infidelity, but deny that a spouse can be compelled to comply with their duty to be faithful without transgressing her rights. More controversially, some think that our duties to assist others in severe need are not enforcement-apt. What could explain the contrast between duties that are enforcement-apt while and those that are not? We’ll call this the puzzle of enforceability and our paper considers three broad strategies for responding to it. The first strategy takes the form of identifying some substantive feature or features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a duty to possess some enforcement status. We consider a range of candidate explanations of this sort but find that none are plausible. The second strategy rejects the idea that there are genuinely enforcement-inapt duties and instead seeks to explain why there can nonetheless be marked differences amongst duties concerning how they can be enforced and who can enforce them. We find that this strategy too is largely unsuccessful. The third strategy offered seeks an explanation of differences in enforcement status by appeal to the broader social costs of enforcing certain kinds of duties. We find that this approach holds some promise but note that it requires adopting a controversial set of moral commitments. We conclude by considering our options in the absence of a solution to our puzzle.
- 19 November 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Moral Philosophy
- Vol. 19 (3) , 229-253
A Puzzle of Enforceability: Why do Moral Duties Differ in their Enforceability?
When someone is poised to fail to fulfil a moral duty, we can respond in a variety of ways. We might remind them of their duty, or seek to persuade them through argument. Or we might intervene forcibly to ensure that they act in accordance with their duty. Some duties appear to be such that the duty-bearer can be liable to forcible interference when this is necessary to ensure that they comply with them. We’ll call duties that carry such liabilities enforcement-apt. Not all duties seem to be enforcement-apt. Some, for example, accept that a person in a monogamous marriage has a moral duty to refrain from infidelity, but deny that a spouse can be compelled to comply with their duty to be faithful without transgressing her rights. More controversially, some think that our duties to assist others in severe need are not enforcement-apt. What could explain the contrast between duties that are enforcement-apt while and those that are not? We’ll call this the puzzle of enforceability and our paper considers three broad strategies for responding to it. The first strategy takes the form of identifying some substantive feature or features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a duty to possess some enforcement status. We consider a range of candidate explanations of this sort but find that none are plausible. The second strategy rejects the idea that there are genuinely enforcement-inapt duties and instead seeks to explain why there can nonetheless be marked differences amongst duties concerning how they can be enforced and who can enforce them. We find that this strategy too is largely unsuccessful. The third strategy offered seeks an explanation of differences in enforcement status by appeal to the broader social costs of enforcing certain kinds of duties. We find that this approach holds some promise but note that it requires adopting a controversial set of moral commitments. We conclude by considering our options in the absence of a solution to our puzzle.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Global Ethics
- Vol. 16 (3) , 305-315
Reconsidering a human right to democracy
In this brief article, I will raise some challenges to each of Pablo Gilabert’s arguments for a HRD. First, I will question whether the instrumental case for affirming a HRD is as strong as Gilabert and others have suggested. I will then call into question the argument from moral risk, arguing that, for any particular country, we should not operate with a strong presumption that they should pursue further democratization as a high-priority goal. Finally, I will consider the strength of our intuitive support for a stringent human right to democracy. As Gilabert points out, there could be a genuine HRD, even if it did not always provide us with an overriding reason to call for the implementation of democracy. I will explore how much normative priority claims to respect democratic decisions have by considering what we have reason to do when democratic decisions would lead to violations of other, noncontroversial human rights.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Global Ethics
- Vol. 16 (3) , 305-315
Reconsidering a human right to democracy
In this brief article, I will raise some challenges to each of Pablo Gilabert’s arguments for a HRD. First, I will question whether the instrumental case for affirming a HRD is as strong as Gilabert and others have suggested. I will then call into question the argument from moral risk, arguing that, for any particular country, we should not operate with a strong presumption that they should pursue further democratization as a high-priority goal. Finally, I will consider the strength of our intuitive support for a stringent human right to democracy. As Gilabert points out, there could be a genuine HRD, even if it did not always provide us with an overriding reason to call for the implementation of democracy. I will explore how much normative priority claims to respect democratic decisions have by considering what we have reason to do when democratic decisions would lead to violations of other, noncontroversial human rights.
- 26 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 39 (5) , 503-526
A critique of some recent victim-centered theories of nonconsequentialism
- 26 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Law and Philosophy
- Vol. 39 (5) , 503-526
A critique of some recent victim-centered theories of nonconsequentialism
- Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethics & Global Politics
- Vol. 12 (1) , 76-97
Harm, responsibility, and enforceability
In this article I respond to the eight critical essays in this issue that evaluate the claims in my book with Gerhard Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Ethics & Global Politics
- Vol. 12 (1) , 76-97
Open AccessHarm, responsibility, and enforceability
In this article I respond to the eight critical essays in this issue that evaluate the claims in my book with Gerhard Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency.