CBChristian Barry

Christian Barry

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Christian Barry has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Considering durability in carbon dioxide removal strategies for climate change mitigation

    by Charlotte Streck, Sara Minoli, Stephanie Roe, Christian Barry, Matthew Brander, Solene Chiquier, Garrett Cullity, Peter Ellis, Jason Funk, Matthew J. Gidden, et al.


  • Open Access

    Which emissions belong to us? The case for contributory value-chain emissions accounting

    by Christian Barry, Garrett Cullity

    States and other climate actors now commonly set ‘net zero’ targets – pledging that, by a certain date, they will put no more carbon into the atmosphere than they take out. However, there is controversy over what exactly should count as attaining such targets. The method of emissions accounting that states currently use – territorial emissions accounting – is often criticized as problematic, but a fully satisfactory explanation of the problem is needed. We argue that the key both to understanding the problem and to solving it is that there is a specific kind of cooperative contribution – a mereological contribution – that a national net zero commitment needs to make to global climate action in order to meet the standards that global citizens should hold states to. On this basis, we propose an alternative method – Contributory Value-Chain Accounting – showing how it can be qualified to reflect trade relationships between net-zero-aligned countries, and defending it against the objections that it involves double counting, is infeasible and too informationally demanding, and that it would send the wrong incentive signals.


  • Supererogation and Optimisation

    by Christian Barry, Seth Lazar

    This paper examines three approaches to the relationship between our moral reasons to bear costs for others’ sake before and beyond the call of duty. Symmetry holds that you are required to optimise your beneficial sacrifices even when they are genuinely supererogatory. If you are required to bear a cost C for the sake of a benefit B, when they are the only costs and benefits at stake, you are also conditionally required to bear an additional cost C, for the sake of an additional benefit B, when enough other costs and benefits are at stake that both of your alternatives are presumptively supererogatory. Disconnection rejects the requirement to optimise when your options are presumptively supererogatory and maintains that you have an entirely free hand to choose as you will among them. Asymmetry holds that when acting beyond the call of duty you are entitled to a measure of additional freedom compared to when you are not taking on supererogatory costs—you can prioritise your own well-being and reasons to a greater degree—but places constraints on the options that you may permissibly choose. We defend a version of Asymmetry and explore its implications for recent debates on charitable giving.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Offsetting and Risk Imposition

    by Christian Barry, Garrett Cullity

    Suppose one of your actions imposes a risk of harm that, on its own, would be excessive, but a second reduces the risk of harm by a corresponding amount. By pairing the two actions together to form...


  • A Puzzle of Enforceability: Why do Moral Duties Differ in their Enforceability?

    by Christian Barry, Emily McTernan

    When someone is poised to fail to fulfil a moral duty, we can respond in a variety of ways. We might remind them of their duty, or seek to persuade them through argument. Or we might intervene forcibly to ensure that they act in accordance with their duty. Some duties appear to be such that the duty-bearer can be liable to forcible interference when this is necessary to ensure that they comply with them. We’ll call duties that carry such liabilities enforcement-apt. Not all duties seem to be enforcement-apt. Some, for example, accept that a person in a monogamous marriage has a moral duty to refrain from infidelity, but deny that a spouse can be compelled to comply with their duty to be faithful without transgressing her rights. More controversially, some think that our duties to assist others in severe need are not enforcement-apt. What could explain the contrast between duties that are enforcement-apt while and those that are not? We’ll call this the puzzle of enforceability and our paper considers three broad strategies for responding to it. The first strategy takes the form of identifying some substantive feature or features that are necessary and/or sufficient for a duty to possess some enforcement status. We consider a range of candidate explanations of this sort but find that none are plausible. The second strategy rejects the idea that there are genuinely enforcement-inapt duties and instead seeks to explain why there can nonetheless be marked differences amongst duties concerning how they can be enforced and who can enforce them. We find that this strategy too is largely unsuccessful. The third strategy offered seeks an explanation of differences in enforcement status by appeal to the broader social costs of enforcing certain kinds of duties. We find that this approach holds some promise but note that it requires adopting a controversial set of moral commitments. We conclude by considering our options in the absence of a solution to our puzzle.


  • Reconsidering a human right to democracy

    by Christian Barry

    In this brief article, I will raise some challenges to each of Pablo Gilabert’s arguments for a HRD. First, I will question whether the instrumental case for affirming a HRD is as strong as Gilabert and others have suggested. I will then call into question the argument from moral risk, arguing that, for any particular country, we should not operate with a strong presumption that they should pursue further democratization as a high-priority goal. Finally, I will consider the strength of our intuitive support for a stringent human right to democracy. As Gilabert points out, there could be a genuine HRD, even if it did not always provide us with an overriding reason to call for the implementation of democracy. I will explore how much normative priority claims to respect democratic decisions have by considering what we have reason to do when democratic decisions would lead to violations of other, noncontroversial human rights.


  • Moral Uncertainty and the Criminal Law

    by Christian Barry, Patrick Tomlin


  • Open Access

    Harm, responsibility, and enforceability

    by Christian Barry

    In this article I respond to the eight critical essays in this issue that evaluate the claims in my book with Gerhard Øverland, Responding to Global Poverty: Harm, Responsibility, and Agency.