Steven K. Dallas

This research examines how drip pricing—a strategy whereby a firm advertises only part of a product’s price up front and then reveals additional mandatory or optional fees/surcharges as the consumer proceeds through the buying process—affects consumer choice and satisfaction.

Overconsumption of sugary drinks is linked with obesity. These beverages have been the target of recent public health policies, and, simultaneously, some firms have altered their pricing of such beverages, including charging the same price for all beverage sizes (“any‐size‐same‐price” pricing). We compare the effect of any‐size‐same‐price pricing versus standard pricing on soft drink beverage size choices and further explore the effect of this firm lever under different health‐related policy situations. Overall, we show that any‐size‐same‐price pricing increases consumers’ focus on the value of getting a good financial deal and thereby increases beverage size selections. Further, the allure of any‐size‐same‐price pricing prevents calorie postings from successfully reducing choice of larger sizes as occurs under standard pricing. However, a more graphic health intervention can reduce the appeal of larger sizes under any‐size‐same‐price pricing. Finally, the findings are not moderated by diet versus nondiet beverage selections, indicating that consumers do not perceive the value of larger sizes under any‐size‐same‐price pricing to come from getting more calories. We conclude by discussing how this work can improve the design of public health nutrition policies.

The authors examine how consumers respond to pseudo-free offers—offers that are presented to consumers as free but that require consumers to make a nonmonetary payment (such as completing a survey or providing personal information) in order to receive the “free” good or service. Across six studies, the authors find that consumers are generally just as likely to accept pseudo-free offers (with nonmonetary costs) as comparable truly free offers (with no costs), as long as the costs of the pseudo-free offers are below some threshold. Additionally, they find that consumers are significantly more likely to accept pseudo-free offers (with nonmonetary costs) than comparable nonfree offers (with monetary costs). The authors provide evidence that consumers respond to pseudo-free offers in this way because, in general, consumers generate neutral or positive attributions for why firms make these offers, and these attributions, in turn, lead consumers to perceive the pseudo-free offers as fair. However, when contextual influences, characteristics of the pseudo-free offer, or individual dispositions increase the likelihood of negative attributions, consumers’ preference for pseudo-free offers is attenuated.

Providing calorie counts on restaurants’ menus/menu boards is one of the most prominent policy interventions that has been implemented to combat the obesity epidemic in America. However, previous research across multiple disciplines has found little effect of providing calorie counts on calories ordered, leading some to call calorie provision a failed policy. The authors propose that this failure is partly due to not considering how people process information when making food choices: Americans read from left‐to‐right, processing calorie information only after processing the food item's name. Thus, the authors test a simple way to improve the effectiveness of calorie counts: display calorie counts to the left (vs. right) of food items. A field study and a laboratory study with American participants found that calorie counts to the left (vs. right) decreased calories ordered by 16.31%. A final laboratory study demonstrated that this effect is reversed among Hebrew‐speakers, who read from right‐to‐left, providing further evidence that the order in which calorie information is processed matters. Accordingly, calling calorie labeling a policy failure may be premature.