Carmen Herrero
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Carmen Herrero has a total of 40 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jaume Masip
University of Salamanca
22 shared publications Eugenio Garrido
Department of Social Psychology and Anthropology, University of Salamanca
13 shared publications- Iris Blandón-Gitlin
California State University
4 shared publications Alberto Barba
University of Salamanca
2 shared publications- Ana María Ullán
Department of Social Psychology, University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain
2 shared publications Carmen Martínez
Department of Social Psychology and Anthropology, University of Salamanca, Salamanca, Spain
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Wiley in Behavioral Sciences & the Law
- Vol. 41 (6) , 504-525
“It wasn't me, check the cameras!” Suspects' apparent verifiable responses might not indicate innocence
The verifiability of a suspect's alibi is often interpreted as a sign of innocence. Because the police resources are limited, verifiability could be used to dismiss suspects of minor offenses. We examined whether alibi verifiability actually indicates innocence for minor crimes. In Experiment 1, participants imagined they were guilty or innocent suspects of minor crimes and selected a response to convince the police of their innocence. Compared to innocent suspects, guilty suspects were more likely to select pseudo-verifiable responses (which seemed verifiable but were not) rather than non-verifiable responses. Experiment 2 revealed that pseudo-verifiable responses increased observers' perceptions of innocence (rather than guilt). Experiment 3 suggested that people infer the police will not verify alibis of minor crimes, which may lead people to invent pseudo-verifiable responses. These results indicate that apparent verifiability does not necessarily indicate innocence. The police should systematically test alternative hypotheses whenever they encounter apparent verifiable responses.
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Wiley in Behavioral Sciences & the Law
- Vol. 41 (6) , 504-525
Open Access“It wasn't me, check the cameras!” Suspects' apparent verifiable responses might not indicate innocence
The verifiability of a suspect's alibi is often interpreted as a sign of innocence. Because the police resources are limited, verifiability could be used to dismiss suspects of minor offenses. We examined whether alibi verifiability actually indicates innocence for minor crimes. In Experiment 1, participants imagined they were guilty or innocent suspects of minor crimes and selected a response to convince the police of their innocence. Compared to innocent suspects, guilty suspects were more likely to select pseudo-verifiable responses (which seemed verifiable but were not) rather than non-verifiable responses. Experiment 2 revealed that pseudo-verifiable responses increased observers' perceptions of innocence (rather than guilt). Experiment 3 suggested that people infer the police will not verify alibis of minor crimes, which may lead people to invent pseudo-verifiable responses. These results indicate that apparent verifiability does not necessarily indicate innocence. The police should systematically test alternative hypotheses whenever they encounter apparent verifiable responses.
- Open Access
- 18 November 2021
- Published by Estonian Academy Publishers in Trames. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences
- Vol. 25 (4) , 395-419
HOW PEOPLE [TRY TO] DETECT LIES IN EVERYDAY LIFE
Laboratory-based deception-detection experiments often fail to capture the features of everyday life lie detection among ordinary citizens. In this study, we examined how people [try to] detect deception in real life. Over 10 weeks, every time the participants felt they had detected a lie, they filled in an online survey. Results show that, in everyday life, many lies are detected unexpectedly, often from non-behavioral indicators, that people suspecting deception search for both behavioral cues and non-behavioral information, but that non-behavioral information is more useful to detect deception. The study addresses aspects unexplored in prior studies on everyday life lie detection, provides new insights, and has theoretical implications.
- 18 November 2021
- Published by Estonian Academy Publishers in Trames. Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences
- Vol. 25 (4) , 395-419
Open AccessHOW PEOPLE [TRY TO] DETECT LIES IN EVERYDAY LIFE
Laboratory-based deception-detection experiments often fail to capture the features of everyday life lie detection among ordinary citizens. In this study, we examined how people [try to] detect deception in real life. Over 10 weeks, every time the participants felt they had detected a lie, they filled in an online survey. Results show that, in everyday life, many lies are detected unexpectedly, often from non-behavioral indicators, that people suspecting deception search for both behavioral cues and non-behavioral information, but that non-behavioral information is more useful to detect deception. The study addresses aspects unexplored in prior studies on everyday life lie detection, provides new insights, and has theoretical implications.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Edicions A Peticio in Quaestio facti
- No. 2
Psicología, ciencias forenses y prueba: ¿(No) es oro todo lo que reluce?
El presente trabajo plantea la necesidad de que el Derecho y los tribunales utilicen el conocimiento científico procedente de la psicología. Más concretamente, sugiere el papel de distintos procesos psicológicos y sociales en la obtención, interpretación y valoración de la prueba. Para ello, aborda la problemática del testimonio del experto y la admisibilidad de la prueba aportando investigaciones empíricas que cuestionan la distintividad del razonamiento legal. Se constata la diferente consideración o estatus otorgado a la psicología frente a otras disciplinas forenses, se muestra la utilización por parte de los operadores jurídicos de creencias de sentido común no validadas científicamente y se ilustran sus efectos negativos en algunas decisiones de la sala 2ª del Tribunal Supremo. En particular, las referidas a criterios orientativos para valorar la credibilidad de las víctimas.Además, se proponen distintas áreas en las que el Derecho puede beneficiarse de los conocimientos de la psicología jurídica y se sugiere una aproximación más amplia al rol del perito. Por otra parte, se aplicará el conocimiento de la psicología, especialmente de la psicología cognitiva, para explicar los errores en las pruebas forenses. Se analizan también las implicaciones para la prueba de los hechos y para la calidad de la toma de decisiones. Finalmente, se aboga por una mayor interacción entre académicos/profesionales de la psicología y el derecho, así como por la necesidad de estudios empíricos con los profesionales del sistema de justicia.
- 1 July 2020
- Published by Edicions A Peticio in Quaestio facti
- No. 2
Psicología, ciencias forenses y prueba: ¿(No) es oro todo lo que reluce?
El presente trabajo plantea la necesidad de que el Derecho y los tribunales utilicen el conocimiento científico procedente de la psicología. Más concretamente, sugiere el papel de distintos procesos psicológicos y sociales en la obtención, interpretación y valoración de la prueba. Para ello, aborda la problemática del testimonio del experto y la admisibilidad de la prueba aportando investigaciones empíricas que cuestionan la distintividad del razonamiento legal. Se constata la diferente consideración o estatus otorgado a la psicología frente a otras disciplinas forenses, se muestra la utilización por parte de los operadores jurídicos de creencias de sentido común no validadas científicamente y se ilustran sus efectos negativos en algunas decisiones de la sala 2ª del Tribunal Supremo. En particular, las referidas a criterios orientativos para valorar la credibilidad de las víctimas.Además, se proponen distintas áreas en las que el Derecho puede beneficiarse de los conocimientos de la psicología jurídica y se sugiere una aproximación más amplia al rol del perito. Por otra parte, se aplicará el conocimiento de la psicología, especialmente de la psicología cognitiva, para explicar los errores en las pruebas forenses. Se analizan también las implicaciones para la prueba de los hechos y para la calidad de la toma de decisiones. Finalmente, se aboga por una mayor interacción entre académicos/profesionales de la psicología y el derecho, así como por la necesidad de estudios empíricos con los profesionales del sistema de justicia.
- Open Access
- 4 January 2018
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 8, 2207
Learning to Detect Deception from Evasive Answers and Inconsistencies across Repeated Interviews: A Study with Lay Respondents and Police Officers
Previous research has shown that inconsistencies across repeated interviews do not indicate deception because liars deliberately tend to repeat the same story. However, when a strategic interview approach that makes it difficult for liars to use the repeat strategy is used, both consistency and evasive answers differ significantly between truth tellers and liars, and statistical software (binary logistic regression analyses) can reach high classification rates (Masip et al., 2016b). Yet, if the interview procedure is to be used in applied settings the decision process will be made by humans, not statistical software. To address this issue, in the current study, 475 college students (Experiment 1) and 142 police officers (Experiment 2) were instructed to code and use consistency, evasive answers, or a combination or both before judging the veracity of Masip et al.'s (2016b) interview transcripts. Accuracy rates were high (60% to over 90%). Evasive answers yielded higher rates than consistency, and the combination of both these cues produced the highest accuracy rates in identifying both truthful and deceptive statements. Uninstructed participants performed fairly well (around 75% accuracy), apparently because they spontaneously used consistency and evasive answers. The pattern of results was the same among students, all officers, and veteran officers only, and shows that inconsistencies between interviews and evasive answers reveal deception when a strategic interview approach that hinders the repeat strategy is used.
- 4 January 2018
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 8, 2207
Open AccessLearning to Detect Deception from Evasive Answers and Inconsistencies across Repeated Interviews: A Study with Lay Respondents and Police Officers
Previous research has shown that inconsistencies across repeated interviews do not indicate deception because liars deliberately tend to repeat the same story. However, when a strategic interview approach that makes it difficult for liars to use the repeat strategy is used, both consistency and evasive answers differ significantly between truth tellers and liars, and statistical software (binary logistic regression analyses) can reach high classification rates (Masip et al., 2016b). Yet, if the interview procedure is to be used in applied settings the decision process will be made by humans, not statistical software. To address this issue, in the current study, 475 college students (Experiment 1) and 142 police officers (Experiment 2) were instructed to code and use consistency, evasive answers, or a combination or both before judging the veracity of Masip et al.'s (2016b) interview transcripts. Accuracy rates were high (60% to over 90%). Evasive answers yielded higher rates than consistency, and the combination of both these cues produced the highest accuracy rates in identifying both truthful and deceptive statements. Uninstructed participants performed fairly well (around 75% accuracy), apparently because they spontaneously used consistency and evasive answers. The pattern of results was the same among students, all officers, and veteran officers only, and shows that inconsistencies between interviews and evasive answers reveal deception when a strategic interview approach that hinders the repeat strategy is used.
- 1 November 2017
- Published by Grupo Editorial Psicofundación in Psicothema
- Vol. 4 (29) , 490-495
Examining police officers’ response bias in judging veracity
Deception detection research has shown that, in judging veracity, police officers are less truth biased than non-officers. However, previous researchers have normally used videotaped statements where an unknown (but presumably large) number of stereotypical or real deception cues are displayed by the senders. We examined non-officers, novice officers, and experienced officers’ response tendencies in a more controlled situation where cue availability was severely restricted. We used written vignettes describing either police-related or police-unrelated scenarios where the protagonist denied having committed a misdeed. Each vignette contained only two pieces of relevant information, one suggesting that the protagonist was lying and one suggesting that she or he was telling the truth. Officers made fewer truth judgments than non-officers in judging police-relevant vignettes, but not in judging police-irrelevant vignettes. Both novice and experienced officers had greater judgmental confidence than non-officers. The findings are consistent with the Adaptive Lie Detection Theory (ALIED). Future research should continue to explore how the police relevance of the situation or task at hand influences novice and experienced officers’ veracity judgments.
- 1 November 2017
- Published by Grupo Editorial Psicofundación in Psicothema
- Vol. 4 (29) , 490-495
Examining police officers’ response bias in judging veracity
Deception detection research has shown that, in judging veracity, police officers are less truth biased than non-officers. However, previous researchers have normally used videotaped statements where an unknown (but presumably large) number of stereotypical or real deception cues are displayed by the senders. We examined non-officers, novice officers, and experienced officers’ response tendencies in a more controlled situation where cue availability was severely restricted. We used written vignettes describing either police-related or police-unrelated scenarios where the protagonist denied having committed a misdeed. Each vignette contained only two pieces of relevant information, one suggesting that the protagonist was lying and one suggesting that she or he was telling the truth. Officers made fewer truth judgments than non-officers in judging police-relevant vignettes, but not in judging police-irrelevant vignettes. Both novice and experienced officers had greater judgmental confidence than non-officers. The findings are consistent with the Adaptive Lie Detection Theory (ALIED). Future research should continue to explore how the police relevance of the situation or task at hand influences novice and experienced officers’ veracity judgments.
- Open Access
- 1 November 2016
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 7, 1702
Strategic Interviewing to Detect Deception: Cues to Deception across Repeated Interviews
Previous deception research on repeated interviews found that liars are not less consistent than truth tellers, presumably because liars use a “repeat strategy” to be consistent across interviews. The goal of this study was to design an interview procedure to overcome this strategy. Innocent participants (truth tellers) and guilty participants (liars) had to convince an interviewer that they had performed several innocent activities rather than committing a mock crime. The interview focused on the innocent activities (alibi), contained specific central and peripheral questions, and was repeated after one week without forewarning. Cognitive load was increased by asking participants to reply quickly. The liars’ answers in replying to both central and peripheral questions were significantly less accurate, less consistent, and more evasive than the truth tellers’ answers. Logistic regression analyses yielded classification rates ranging from around 70% (with consistency as the predictor variable), 85% (with evasive answers as the predictor variable), to over 90% (with an improved measure of consistency that incorporated evasive answers as the predictor variable, as well as with response accuracy as the predictor variable). These classification rates were higher than the interviewers’ accuracy rate (54%).
- 1 November 2016
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 7, 1702
Open AccessStrategic Interviewing to Detect Deception: Cues to Deception across Repeated Interviews
Previous deception research on repeated interviews found that liars are not less consistent than truth tellers, presumably because liars use a “repeat strategy” to be consistent across interviews. The goal of this study was to design an interview procedure to overcome this strategy. Innocent participants (truth tellers) and guilty participants (liars) had to convince an interviewer that they had performed several innocent activities rather than committing a mock crime. The interview focused on the innocent activities (alibi), contained specific central and peripheral questions, and was repeated after one week without forewarning. Cognitive load was increased by asking participants to reply quickly. The liars’ answers in replying to both central and peripheral questions were significantly less accurate, less consistent, and more evasive than the truth tellers’ answers. Logistic regression analyses yielded classification rates ranging from around 70% (with consistency as the predictor variable), 85% (with evasive answers as the predictor variable), to over 90% (with an improved measure of consistency that incorporated evasive answers as the predictor variable, as well as with response accuracy as the predictor variable). These classification rates were higher than the interviewers’ accuracy rate (54%).
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica
- Vol. 169, 45-55
An empirical test of the decision to lie component of the Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT)
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Acta Psychologica
- Vol. 169, 45-55
An empirical test of the decision to lie component of the Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT)
- 1 April 2016
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Law and Human Behavior
- Vol. 40 (2) , 169-181
Experienced and novice officers’ generalized communication suspicion and veracity judgments.
Deception detection research has shown that police officers are less truth-biased and make their veracity judgments with greater confidence than do nonofficers. Here we examined nonofficers, novice officers, and experienced officers' response bias, confidence, and generalized communicative suspicion. In Experiment 1, novice officers aligned with nonofficers in terms of both generalized communicative suspicion scores and confidence, with both these groups scoring lower than experienced officers. Generalized communicative suspicion scores and veracity judgments were not significantly related for either sample. However, novice officers aligned with experienced officers in terms of judgments: both police groups were lie-biased, whereas nonofficers were truth-biased. These findings suggest that unlike experienced officers, who have embraced the police culture to a greater degree, novice officers are not dispositionally suspicious (generalized communicative suspicion); however, they are able to mirror the prototypical police behavior (deception judgments) in police-related contexts. Experiment 2 supported these notions.
- 1 April 2016
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Law and Human Behavior
- Vol. 40 (2) , 169-181
Experienced and novice officers’ generalized communication suspicion and veracity judgments.
Deception detection research has shown that police officers are less truth-biased and make their veracity judgments with greater confidence than do nonofficers. Here we examined nonofficers, novice officers, and experienced officers' response bias, confidence, and generalized communicative suspicion. In Experiment 1, novice officers aligned with nonofficers in terms of both generalized communicative suspicion scores and confidence, with both these groups scoring lower than experienced officers. Generalized communicative suspicion scores and veracity judgments were not significantly related for either sample. However, novice officers aligned with experienced officers in terms of judgments: both police groups were lie-biased, whereas nonofficers were truth-biased. These findings suggest that unlike experienced officers, who have embraced the police culture to a greater degree, novice officers are not dispositionally suspicious (generalized communicative suspicion); however, they are able to mirror the prototypical police behavior (deception judgments) in police-related contexts. Experiment 2 supported these notions.
- 5 December 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Communication
- Vol. 65 (1) , 125-145
Police Detection of Deception: Beliefs About Behavioral Cues to Deception Are Strong Even Though Contextual Evidence Is More Useful
- 5 December 2014
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Communication
- Vol. 65 (1) , 125-145
Police Detection of Deception: Beliefs About Behavioral Cues to Deception Are Strong Even Though Contextual Evidence Is More Useful