Maarten Pieter Schinkel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Maarten Pieter Schinkel has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrea Günster
ETH Zurich, Professorship for Intellectual Property
4 shared publications Francesco Russo
3 shared publications- Jan Tuinstra
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam School of Economics
3 shared publications Martin Carree
Universiteit Maastricht, NETHERLANDS
3 shared publicationsArnoud Den Boer
Korteweg-de Vries Instituut, University of Amsterdam, 1090 GE Amsterdam, Netherlands
1 shared publicationFrancisca Wals
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Artificial Collusion: Examining Supracompetitive Pricing by Q-Learning Algorithms
We examine concerns that pricing algorithms, employing reinforcement learning, used by competitors would autonomously and systematically learn to collude. Findings of supracompetitive prices with Q-learning have recently raised that alarm. However, a detailed analysis of the inner workings of this algorithm type reveals that it often does not satisfy conditions for what constitutes “autonomous” algorithmic collusion that would be a cartel risk in practice. We find that Q-learning can learn collusive equilibria only on timescales irrelevant to the firm’s objective. Competitors are committed to using the same Q-learning algorithm, starting at the same moment, with the same hyperparameters and action spaces, although it is outperformed by the first alternative pricing rule. This level of synchronization suggests the need for an explicit cartel agreement. Our analysis gives criteria for practically relevant, explicitly and tacitly colluding pricing algorithms that would constitute a threat to competition. Whether autonomous algorithmic collusion is a potential threat to competition remains to be seen. There is not yet reason for competition agencies to be overly suspicious of pricing algorithms, other than of “collusion by algorithm,” in which pricing software is used to implement cartel agreements or is coded with collusive intent. This paper was accepted by Martin Bichler, market design, platform, and demand analytics. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08557 .
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Artificial Collusion: Examining Supracompetitive Pricing by Q-Learning Algorithms
We examine concerns that pricing algorithms, employing reinforcement learning, used by competitors would autonomously and systematically learn to collude. Findings of supracompetitive prices with Q-learning have recently raised that alarm. However, a detailed analysis of the inner workings of this algorithm type reveals that it often does not satisfy conditions for what constitutes “autonomous” algorithmic collusion that would be a cartel risk in practice. We find that Q-learning can learn collusive equilibria only on timescales irrelevant to the firm’s objective. Competitors are committed to using the same Q-learning algorithm, starting at the same moment, with the same hyperparameters and action spaces, although it is outperformed by the first alternative pricing rule. This level of synchronization suggests the need for an explicit cartel agreement. Our analysis gives criteria for practically relevant, explicitly and tacitly colluding pricing algorithms that would constitute a threat to competition. Whether autonomous algorithmic collusion is a potential threat to competition remains to be seen. There is not yet reason for competition agencies to be overly suspicious of pricing algorithms, other than of “collusion by algorithm,” in which pricing software is used to implement cartel agreements or is coded with collusive intent. This paper was accepted by Martin Bichler, market design, platform, and demand analytics. Supplemental Material: The data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08557 .
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Koninklijke Boom uitgevers in Markt en Mededinging
- Vol. 29 (2) , 68-81
Herstel van de brievenpostmarkt
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Koninklijke Boom uitgevers in Markt en Mededinging
- Vol. 29 (2) , 68-81
Herstel van de brievenpostmarkt
- Open Access
- 20 November 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Antitrust Enforcement
- Vol. 13 (2) , 237-264
Breaking up Big Tech: scissor-line suggestions for smart cuts
Calls for the breakup of Big Tech, especially where behavioural remedies are cumbersome to enforce effectively, are becoming louder on both sides of the Atlantic. If there are going to be structural remedies against network companies, we propose they better be ‘smart cuts’: targeted interventions to insulate core platform functions with minimal damage to positive network effects. One major concern with dominant platforms is information bias: intentional distortion of information presented to a user to steer them away from the best matches to their query and towards content that benefits the platform instead. It can be addressed by separating a hybrid platform’s recommender system from its peripheral services with commercial tentacles in the real economy. This realigns incentives to provide users with unbiased information and invites competition on and between intermediaries. We offer scissor-line suggestions for the gatekeepers Alphabet, Amazon, and Apple. Smart cuts have a conceptual basis: they go beyond unwinding recent acquisitions and open up ecosystem structures to competition, allow for targeted flanking access regulation, and alleviate competition law enforcement.
- 20 November 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Antitrust Enforcement
- Vol. 13 (2) , 237-264
Open AccessBreaking up Big Tech: scissor-line suggestions for smart cuts
Calls for the breakup of Big Tech, especially where behavioural remedies are cumbersome to enforce effectively, are becoming louder on both sides of the Atlantic. If there are going to be structural remedies against network companies, we propose they better be ‘smart cuts’: targeted interventions to insulate core platform functions with minimal damage to positive network effects. One major concern with dominant platforms is information bias: intentional distortion of information presented to a user to steer them away from the best matches to their query and towards content that benefits the platform instead. It can be addressed by separating a hybrid platform’s recommender system from its peripheral services with commercial tentacles in the real economy. This realigns incentives to provide users with unbiased information and invites competition on and between intermediaries. We offer scissor-line suggestions for the gatekeepers Alphabet, Amazon, and Apple. Smart cuts have a conceptual basis: they go beyond unwinding recent acquisitions and open up ecosystem structures to competition, allow for targeted flanking access regulation, and alleviate competition law enforcement.
- 19 February 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Competition Law & Economics
- Vol. 18 (3) , 584-612
On Distributive Justice by Antitrust: The Robin Hood Cartel
Equity concerns in antitrust could justify market power in return for a fairer allocation by weighing the consumer welfare of certain disadvantaged groups more heavily. A simple example of an equity-justified agreement illustrates how seeking distributive justice through relaxed antitrust enforcement is ineffective and inefficient. Permitting competitors to jointly set prices gives them the power to price discriminate, which they could use to redistribute wealth by overcharging the rich and giving lower than competitive prices to the poor. Provided society values redistribution enough, such a ‘Robin Hood cartel’ is profitable, despite losing money on the poor and creating deadweight losses. Yet the poor will be given only what is minimally required in return for permission to take from the rich. Without conditions, the joint-profit maximizing wealth redistribution is nothing more than alms for the poor. They receive more under a full-payout plan, but total deadweight losses remain high. In essence, assigning a larger relative consumer welfare weight to the poor discounts the inefficiencies on the rich.
- 19 February 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Competition Law & Economics
- Vol. 18 (3) , 584-612
On Distributive Justice by Antitrust: The Robin Hood Cartel
Equity concerns in antitrust could justify market power in return for a fairer allocation by weighing the consumer welfare of certain disadvantaged groups more heavily. A simple example of an equity-justified agreement illustrates how seeking distributive justice through relaxed antitrust enforcement is ineffective and inefficient. Permitting competitors to jointly set prices gives them the power to price discriminate, which they could use to redistribute wealth by overcharging the rich and giving lower than competitive prices to the poor. Provided society values redistribution enough, such a ‘Robin Hood cartel’ is profitable, despite losing money on the poor and creating deadweight losses. Yet the poor will be given only what is minimally required in return for permission to take from the rich. Without conditions, the joint-profit maximizing wealth redistribution is nothing more than alms for the poor. They receive more under a full-payout plan, but total deadweight losses remain high. In essence, assigning a larger relative consumer welfare weight to the poor discounts the inefficiencies on the rich.
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 61, 572-589
Platform monopolization by narrow-PPC-BPG combination: Booking et al.
- 1 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 61, 572-589
Platform monopolization by narrow-PPC-BPG combination: Booking et al.
- 8 July 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 394-410
Table of antitrust decisions in alphabetical order
- 8 July 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 394-410
Table of antitrust decisions in alphabetical order
- 8 July 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 393
Table of landmark merger decisions described in the book in alphabetical order
- 8 July 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 393
Table of landmark merger decisions described in the book in alphabetical order
- 8 July 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 387-391
Table of landmark decisions described in the book
- 8 July 2010
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 387-391
Table of landmark decisions described in the book
- Open Access
- 6 February 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 36 (2) , 97-131
European Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions
- 6 February 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 36 (2) , 97-131
Open AccessEuropean Antitrust Policy 1957–2004: An Analysis of Commission Decisions
- 22 December 2008
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 56 (4) , 778-808
QUANTIFYING THE SCOPE FOR EFFICIENCY DEFENSE IN MERGER CONTROL: THE WERDEN‐FROEB‐INDEX*
This paper introduces the Werden‐Froeb Index (WFI) to assist in evaluating merger‐specific efficiencies in horizontal mergers. The index measures the weighted average reduction in marginal costs required to restore pre‐merger equilibrium prices and quantities after the (full or partial) merger is consummated. The WFI is well defined, objective and robust, and it has relatively low information requirements. We propose to use the index as a natural complement to concentration measures such as the Hirschmann‐Herfindahl Index in the assessment of horizontal mergers.
- 22 December 2008
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 56 (4) , 778-808
QUANTIFYING THE SCOPE FOR EFFICIENCY DEFENSE IN MERGER CONTROL: THE WERDEN‐FROEB‐INDEX*
This paper introduces the Werden‐Froeb Index (WFI) to assist in evaluating merger‐specific efficiencies in horizontal mergers. The index measures the weighted average reduction in marginal costs required to restore pre‐merger equilibrium prices and quantities after the (full or partial) merger is consummated. The WFI is well defined, objective and robust, and it has relatively low information requirements. We propose to use the index as a natural complement to concentration measures such as the Hirschmann‐Herfindahl Index in the assessment of horizontal mergers.