Cesaltina Pacheco Pires
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Cesaltina Pacheco Pires has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Margarida Catalão-Lopes
CEGIST, Instituto Superior Técnico Universidade de Lisboa Lisbon Portugal
6 shared publications - Sílvia Ferreira Jorge
GOVCOPP – Governance, Competitiveness and Public Policies, Universidade de Aveiro, Aveiro, Portugal
5 shared publications - Elisabete Gomes Santana Félix
University of Évora
4 shared publications - Andreia Dionísio
Departamento de Gestão, Center for Advanced Studies in Management and Economics (CEFAGE), IIFA, Universidade de Évora, Escola de Ciências Sociais
3 shared publications - Joana Pinho
Catholic University of Portugal (UCP) - Católica Porto Business School
2 shared publications - José Carlos Nunes
Escola Superior de Gestão e Tecnologia de Santarém, Instituto Politécnico de Santarém, Santarém, Portugal
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 21 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
Combating fraud in poverty alleviation programs: should we use monitoring, workfare or both?
- 21 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
Combating fraud in poverty alleviation programs: should we use monitoring, workfare or both?
- 12 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 145-162
EU GREEN: How Peripheral Regional Universities Created a European Alliance Based in SDGs
- 12 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 145-162
EU GREEN: How Peripheral Regional Universities Created a European Alliance Based in SDGs
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 30 (3) , 207-232
Do CEO Characteristics Matter in Product Recalls?
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of the Economics of Business
- Vol. 30 (3) , 207-232
Do CEO Characteristics Matter in Product Recalls?
- Open Access
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Venture Capital
- Vol. 25 (4) , 457-486
The impact of concentration among venture capitalists: revisiting the determinants of venture capital
- 6 December 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Venture Capital
- Vol. 25 (4) , 457-486
Open AccessThe impact of concentration among venture capitalists: revisiting the determinants of venture capital
- Open Access
- 27 October 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Smart Cities
- Vol. 5 (4) , 1488-1507
Disentangling Housing Supply to Shift towards Smart Cities: Analysing Theoretical and Empirical Studies
The search for a pleasant home has concerned people ever since. Paradoxically, people are facing strong difficulties in finding a decent place to settle their lives in cities. As such, the housing market regained momentum in connection with the development of Smart Cities, where life quality of residents is strongly emphasized. Well-being in the metropolis is affected by a wide variety of factors with housing supply being among the most important, hence stirred by financing costs, construction costs, vacancy rate, sales delay, inflation rate, housing stock, price of agricultural land, and regulation. The present article reviews empirical studies on housing supply for a better understanding of the dynamics in this market, shedding some light on the expectable outcomes of policy actions in the promotion of sustainable housing towards the smart city transition. Our review shows that the long-run price elasticity of housing supply is larger than the short-run, as well as the existence of substantial differences in the price elasticity across countries and regions. As such, overall, the hypothesis of a perfectly elastic supply is rejected. In addition, our review highlights that housing supply is negatively related to financial costs, inflation, sales delay, and the existence of regulatory or physical constraints. Also, the elasticity is lower when there are regulatory constraints. Newfangled strategic interaction models, though overlooked in the literature, reinforce that housing does not fit the perfect competition frame. The review proves that we are in face of a non-competitive market in which policy intervention is required to maximize social welfare; policy packages to grant people access to the housing market may be required. However, policy interventions should be carefully designed and clear, to mitigate their potentially negative impact on the housing supply as adverse results may be harmful to the transition towards a smart city.
- 27 October 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Smart Cities
- Vol. 5 (4) , 1488-1507
Open AccessDisentangling Housing Supply to Shift towards Smart Cities: Analysing Theoretical and Empirical Studies
The search for a pleasant home has concerned people ever since. Paradoxically, people are facing strong difficulties in finding a decent place to settle their lives in cities. As such, the housing market regained momentum in connection with the development of Smart Cities, where life quality of residents is strongly emphasized. Well-being in the metropolis is affected by a wide variety of factors with housing supply being among the most important, hence stirred by financing costs, construction costs, vacancy rate, sales delay, inflation rate, housing stock, price of agricultural land, and regulation. The present article reviews empirical studies on housing supply for a better understanding of the dynamics in this market, shedding some light on the expectable outcomes of policy actions in the promotion of sustainable housing towards the smart city transition. Our review shows that the long-run price elasticity of housing supply is larger than the short-run, as well as the existence of substantial differences in the price elasticity across countries and regions. As such, overall, the hypothesis of a perfectly elastic supply is rejected. In addition, our review highlights that housing supply is negatively related to financial costs, inflation, sales delay, and the existence of regulatory or physical constraints. Also, the elasticity is lower when there are regulatory constraints. Newfangled strategic interaction models, though overlooked in the literature, reinforce that housing does not fit the perfect competition frame. The review proves that we are in face of a non-competitive market in which policy intervention is required to maximize social welfare; policy packages to grant people access to the housing market may be required. However, policy interventions should be carefully designed and clear, to mitigate their potentially negative impact on the housing supply as adverse results may be harmful to the transition towards a smart city.
- Open Access
- 15 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Amazing Geometry of Price Competition with Quality Dependent Production Costs
This paper explores in detail a price game with two potential competitors who sell products with different qualities and where unit production costs are increasing with quality. Depending on the quality combinations, many types of price equilibria configurations may exist, besides the classical cases of high-quality monopoly or duopoly with partial or full coverage. In accordance with previous results, there exists a duopoly corner solution. But we also show that there are quality combinations where the monopolist is the low-quality firm, and this firm may or not be constrained by the presence of the other competitor. We determine, in a general setup concerning firms’ marginal cost and quality valuation dispersion, the parameter combinations under which each price Nash equilibrium holds and show graphically the different market regions for different values of the valuation parameter, which reveals an amazing geometry. Besides providing a full characterization of the different market configurations, our findings are the backbone of future analysis of quality choices and may be relevant both for firms and policy makers.
- 15 August 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Amazing Geometry of Price Competition with Quality Dependent Production Costs
This paper explores in detail a price game with two potential competitors who sell products with different qualities and where unit production costs are increasing with quality. Depending on the quality combinations, many types of price equilibria configurations may exist, besides the classical cases of high-quality monopoly or duopoly with partial or full coverage. In accordance with previous results, there exists a duopoly corner solution. But we also show that there are quality combinations where the monopolist is the low-quality firm, and this firm may or not be constrained by the presence of the other competitor. We determine, in a general setup concerning firms’ marginal cost and quality valuation dispersion, the parameter combinations under which each price Nash equilibrium holds and show graphically the different market regions for different values of the valuation parameter, which reveals an amazing geometry. Besides providing a full characterization of the different market configurations, our findings are the backbone of future analysis of quality choices and may be relevant both for firms and policy makers.
- Open Access
- 21 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Product differentiation and quality costs: An experiment
This work builds and tests a vertical product differentiation duopoly model, where firms first choose quality and then choose prices, in the lab. We consider both the case in which production costs are unaffected by the quality of the good produced and the case in which production costs increase with quality. Results indicate that, overall, firms differentiated their products less than theoretically predicted, and prices are set just to cover marginal costs. Regardless of the cost structure, the firm attracting more consumers makes higher profits. Moving from a scenario in which quality is costless to a scenario in which it is costly: decreases qualities, increases prices, and decreases the number of consumers served.
- 21 January 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessProduct differentiation and quality costs: An experiment
This work builds and tests a vertical product differentiation duopoly model, where firms first choose quality and then choose prices, in the lab. We consider both the case in which production costs are unaffected by the quality of the good produced and the case in which production costs increase with quality. Results indicate that, overall, firms differentiated their products less than theoretically predicted, and prices are set just to cover marginal costs. Regardless of the cost structure, the firm attracting more consumers makes higher profits. Moving from a scenario in which quality is costless to a scenario in which it is costly: decreases qualities, increases prices, and decreases the number of consumers served.
- 26 May 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 21 (2) , 395-432
Do I Know Ω? An Axiomatic Model of Awareness and Knowledge
In modeling game and decision theory situations, it has been usual to start by considering Ω, the set of conceivable states of the world. I wish to propose a more fundamental view. I do not assume that the agent knows Ω. Instead the agent is assumed to derive for herself a representation of the universe. Given her knowledge and her ability to reason about it the agent deduces a set of conceivable states of the world and a set of possible states of the world. The epistemic model considered in this paper uses a propositional framework. The model distinguishes between the knowledge of the existence of a proposition, which I call awareness, and the knowledge of the truth or the falsity of the proposition. Depending upon whether one assumes that the agent is aware or not of all the propositions, she will or will not have a “complete model” of the world. When the agent is not aware of all the propositions, the states of the world and the possibility correspondence imaginable by her are coarser than the modeler's. The agent has an incomplete knowledge of both the states of the world and the information structure. In addition, I extend the model with “incompleteness” to a dynamic setting. Under the assumption that the agent's knowledge is non-decreasing over time, I show that the set of states of the world conceivable by the agent and her possibility correspondence get finer over time.
- 26 May 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 21 (2) , 395-432
Do I Know Ω? An Axiomatic Model of Awareness and Knowledge
In modeling game and decision theory situations, it has been usual to start by considering Ω, the set of conceivable states of the world. I wish to propose a more fundamental view. I do not assume that the agent knows Ω. Instead the agent is assumed to derive for herself a representation of the universe. Given her knowledge and her ability to reason about it the agent deduces a set of conceivable states of the world and a set of possible states of the world. The epistemic model considered in this paper uses a propositional framework. The model distinguishes between the knowledge of the existence of a proposition, which I call awareness, and the knowledge of the truth or the falsity of the proposition. Depending upon whether one assumes that the agent is aware or not of all the propositions, she will or will not have a “complete model” of the world. When the agent is not aware of all the propositions, the states of the world and the possibility correspondence imaginable by her are coarser than the modeler's. The agent has an incomplete knowledge of both the states of the world and the information structure. In addition, I extend the model with “incompleteness” to a dynamic setting. Under the assumption that the agent's knowledge is non-decreasing over time, I show that the set of states of the world conceivable by the agent and her possibility correspondence get finer over time.
- 9 May 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 29 (3) , 686-705
Does asymmetric information always help entry deterrence? Can it increase welfare?
This paper compares the scenarios of complete and incomplete information in a general model where the incumbent can make a capital investment to deter entry. We show that the informational structure can make an unexpected difference in terms of entry deterrence and efficiency. Although asymmetric information encourages entry deterrence behavior, in some cases it decreases the probability of this behavior inducing no entry and thus promotes competition. In other cases, asymmetric information induces less entry but may lead to higher welfare.
- 9 May 2020
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 29 (3) , 686-705
Does asymmetric information always help entry deterrence? Can it increase welfare?
This paper compares the scenarios of complete and incomplete information in a general model where the incumbent can make a capital investment to deter entry. We show that the informational structure can make an unexpected difference in terms of entry deterrence and efficiency. Although asymmetric information encourages entry deterrence behavior, in some cases it decreases the probability of this behavior inducing no entry and thus promotes competition. In other cases, asymmetric information induces less entry but may lead to higher welfare.
- 8 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 41-48
Financial Structure, Product Market Decisions and Default Risk in an Asymmetric Duopoly
- 8 October 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 41-48
Financial Structure, Product Market Decisions and Default Risk in an Asymmetric Duopoly