Arnon Keren
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Arnon Keren has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ori Lev
Sapir Academic College
2 shared publications - Abdolkarim Sadrieh
University of Magdeburg
1 shared publication - Aviv Barnoy
Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Netherlands
1 shared publication Bernd Irlenbusch
University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany
1 shared publication- Bettina Rockenbach
Department of Economics, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
1 shared publication - Boaz Miller
Zefat Academic College
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- p. 1-20
Norm Violations in Online Discourse: Epistemic and Civil Foundations for Platform Design and Moderation
- 14 November 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- p. 1-20
Open AccessNorm Violations in Online Discourse: Epistemic and Civil Foundations for Platform Design and Moderation
- 28 August 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 75-92
Epistemic Authority and Expertise
How should laypersons respond to the testimony of honest experts, who testify on matters within their field of expertise? Should they believe such experts on their authority? The chapter argues that while laypersons should often believe such experts’ testimony on experts’ authority, it is not the case that laypersons should always do so. The argument for this claim is based on the premise that we should believe a person on her authority only if we have reason to believe the person has epistemic authority on the matter. The chapter studies the relations between epistemic authority and expertise, and argues that genuine experts do not always have authority on questions that fall within their domain of expertise. Thus, having epistemic authority on a question is neither sufficient nor necessary for being an expert on the question. Moreover, laypersons might recognize a person as an expert on a certain question, while being justified in believing that the expert does not have epistemic authority on that question. In such cases, they should not believe experts on their authority.
- 28 August 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 75-92
Epistemic Authority and Expertise
How should laypersons respond to the testimony of honest experts, who testify on matters within their field of expertise? Should they believe such experts on their authority? The chapter argues that while laypersons should often believe such experts’ testimony on experts’ authority, it is not the case that laypersons should always do so. The argument for this claim is based on the premise that we should believe a person on her authority only if we have reason to believe the person has epistemic authority on the matter. The chapter studies the relations between epistemic authority and expertise, and argues that genuine experts do not always have authority on questions that fall within their domain of expertise. Thus, having epistemic authority on a question is neither sufficient nor necessary for being an expert on the question. Moreover, laypersons might recognize a person as an expert on a certain question, while being justified in believing that the expert does not have epistemic authority on that question. In such cases, they should not believe experts on their authority.
- 3 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (7) , 141-143
Two Kinds of Ignorance and Their Implications for Informed Consent
- 3 July 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 25 (7) , 141-143
Two Kinds of Ignorance and Their Implications for Informed Consent
- Open Access
- 3 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 39 (6) , 612-625
Expert Authority and Its Assessment
- 3 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 39 (6) , 612-625
Open AccessExpert Authority and Its Assessment
- 24 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-22
Disagreement, progress, and the goal of philosophy
- 24 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (2) , 1-22
Disagreement, progress, and the goal of philosophy
- 26 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 25 (2) , 351-368
Informed Consent, Error and Suspending Ignorance: Providing Knowledge or Preventing Error?
- 26 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 25 (2) , 351-368
Informed Consent, Error and Suspending Ignorance: Providing Knowledge or Preventing Error?
- Open Access
- 8 September 2020
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 46 (12) , 813-814
Uncertainty, error and informed consent to challenge trials of COVID-19 vaccines: response to Steel et al
In a recent article, Steel, Buchak and Eyal (SBE) argue that current levels of uncertainty do not present a good reason to bar controlled human infection (CHI) trials of COVID-19 vaccines from proceeding. We argue that their argumentation for this conclusion is flawed. SBE are mistaken about the effects which different forms of ignorance have on participants’ ability to provide valid informed consent. Decision-makers considering whether to allow such trials, we argue, must ultimately consider the likelihood that consent to participation in such trials under current conditions would be valid, and whether this likelihood is high enough to permit such trials. This is a question that SBE completely ignore. We conclude that there indeed are valid concerns about conducting CHI trials given the current state of knowledge about COVID-19, concerns which SBE fail to address.
- 8 September 2020
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
- Vol. 46 (12) , 813-814
Open AccessUncertainty, error and informed consent to challenge trials of COVID-19 vaccines: response to Steel et al
In a recent article, Steel, Buchak and Eyal (SBE) argue that current levels of uncertainty do not present a good reason to bar controlled human infection (CHI) trials of COVID-19 vaccines from proceeding. We argue that their argumentation for this conclusion is flawed. SBE are mistaken about the effects which different forms of ignorance have on participants’ ability to provide valid informed consent. Decision-makers considering whether to allow such trials, we argue, must ultimately consider the likelihood that consent to participation in such trials under current conditions would be valid, and whether this likelihood is high enough to permit such trials. This is a question that SBE completely ignore. We conclude that there indeed are valid concerns about conducting CHI trials given the current state of knowledge about COVID-19, concerns which SBE fail to address.
- 8 June 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 109-120
Trust and Belief
One fundamental divide among philosophers studying the nature of trust concerns the relation between trust and belief. According to doxastic accounts of trust, trust entails a belief about the trustee: either the belief that she is trustworthy with respect to what she is trusted to do, or that she will do what she is trusted to do. Non-doxastic accounts deny that trusting entails holding such a belief. The chapter describes and evaluates the main considerations which have been cited for and against doxastic accounts of trust. It argues that a preemptive reasons account of trust neutralizes some of the key objections to doxastic accounts, and that considerations favoring a doxastic account appear to be stronger than those favoring non-doxastic accounts. The chapter also suggests that the debate about the nature of trust, and the mental state required for trusting can benefit from linking it with the debate about the value of trust.
- 8 June 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 109-120
Trust and Belief
One fundamental divide among philosophers studying the nature of trust concerns the relation between trust and belief. According to doxastic accounts of trust, trust entails a belief about the trustee: either the belief that she is trustworthy with respect to what she is trusted to do, or that she will do what she is trusted to do. Non-doxastic accounts deny that trusting entails holding such a belief. The chapter describes and evaluates the main considerations which have been cited for and against doxastic accounts of trust. It argues that a preemptive reasons account of trust neutralizes some of the key objections to doxastic accounts, and that considerations favoring a doxastic account appear to be stronger than those favoring non-doxastic accounts. The chapter also suggests that the debate about the nature of trust, and the mental state required for trusting can benefit from linking it with the debate about the value of trust.
- 25 September 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 114-135
Trust, Preemption, and Knowledge
This chapter gives an account of epistemic trust. Keren argues that trust in general is a matter of declining to take precautions against the trustee’s failing to come through and that this amounts in the epistemic case to declining to rely on evidence for the testified proposition, instead relying solely on the testifier. But if this is so, how can trust play a positive role in securing knowledge? The key, Keren argues, lies in recognizing that trust is preemptive: trusting someone entails believing that she is trustworthy, and this belief preempts any other evidence about whether she will come through. In other words, this belief gives the truster himself a good reason to desist from relying on any evidence other than the trustee’s word. But if trust is preemptive, how is it compatible with epistemic responsibility, which seems to involve relying on your own evidence? Because, Keren claims, preempting your own evidence in favor of the testifier’s say-so enables your belief to be supported by her evidence—which, we may assume, is superior to your own. Far from forfeiting epistemic responsibility, then, epistemic trust in the preemptive account gives you justificatory access to a swathe of evidence that you would not otherwise have had.
- 25 September 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 114-135
Trust, Preemption, and Knowledge
This chapter gives an account of epistemic trust. Keren argues that trust in general is a matter of declining to take precautions against the trustee’s failing to come through and that this amounts in the epistemic case to declining to rely on evidence for the testified proposition, instead relying solely on the testifier. But if this is so, how can trust play a positive role in securing knowledge? The key, Keren argues, lies in recognizing that trust is preemptive: trusting someone entails believing that she is trustworthy, and this belief preempts any other evidence about whether she will come through. In other words, this belief gives the truster himself a good reason to desist from relying on any evidence other than the trustee’s word. But if trust is preemptive, how is it compatible with epistemic responsibility, which seems to involve relying on your own evidence? Because, Keren claims, preempting your own evidence in favor of the testifier’s say-so enables your belief to be supported by her evidence—which, we may assume, is superior to your own. Far from forfeiting epistemic responsibility, then, epistemic trust in the preemptive account gives you justificatory access to a swathe of evidence that you would not otherwise have had.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 85 (5) , 781-792
The Public Understanding of What? Laypersons’ Epistemic Needs, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and the Demarcation of Science
What must laypersons understand about science to allow them to make sound decisions on science-related issues? Relying on recent developments in social epistemology, this article argues that scientific education should have the goal not of bringing laypersons’ understanding of science closer to that of expert insiders but rather of cultivating the kind of competence characteristic of “competent outsiders.” Moreover, it argues that philosophers of science have an important role to play in attempts to promote this kind of understanding but that, to successfully fulfill this role, they will have to approach central questions in the field differently.
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 85 (5) , 781-792
Top Cited PapersThe Public Understanding of What? Laypersons’ Epistemic Needs, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and the Demarcation of Science
What must laypersons understand about science to allow them to make sound decisions on science-related issues? Relying on recent developments in social epistemology, this article argues that scientific education should have the goal not of bringing laypersons’ understanding of science closer to that of expert insiders but rather of cultivating the kind of competence characteristic of “competent outsiders.” Moreover, it argues that philosophers of science have an important role to play in attempts to promote this kind of understanding but that, to successfully fulfill this role, they will have to approach central questions in the field differently.