Lambèr Royakkers
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Lambèr Royakkers has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Rinie van Est
Department of Industrial Engineering and Innovation Sciences, Technology Innovation and Society, Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands
4 shared publications Rinie van Est
Eindhoven University of Technology
3 shared publications- Christine Boshuijzen-Van Burken
The University of New South Wales
2 shared publications - Fount LeRon Shults
University of Agder
2 shared publications - Frank Dignum
Utrecht University
2 shared publications - Hilde Weerts
Eindhoven University of Technology
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 January 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Journal on Responsible Computing
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-20
Are There Exceptions to Goodhart's law? On the Moral Justification of Fairness-Aware Machine Learning
Fairness-aware machine learning (fair-ml) techniques are algorithmic interventions designed to ensure that individuals who are affected by the predictions of a machine learning model are treated fairly. The problem is often posed as an optimization problem, where the objective is to achieve high predictive performance under a quantitative fairness constraint. However, any attempt to design a fair-ml algorithm must assume a world where Goodhart’s law has an exception: when a fairness measure becomes an optimization constraint, it does not cease to be a good measure. In this article, we argue that fairness measures are particularly sensitive to Goodhart’s law. Our main contributions are as follows. First, we present a framework for moral reasoning about the justification of fairness metrics. In contrast to existing work, our framework incorporates the belief that whether a distribution of outcomes is fair depends not only on the cause of inequalities but also on what moral claims decision subjects have to receive a particular benefit or avoid a burden. We use the framework to distill moral and empirical assumptions under which particular fairness metrics correspond to a fair distribution of outcomes. Second, we explore the extent to which employing fairness metrics as a constraint in a fair-ml algorithm is morally justifiable, exemplified by the fair-ml algorithm introduced by Hardt et al. [ 21 ]. We illustrate that enforcing a fairness metric through a fair-ml algorithm often does not result in the fair distribution of outcomes that motivated its use and can even harm the individuals the intervention was intended to protect.
- 10 January 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Journal on Responsible Computing
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-20
Open AccessAre There Exceptions to Goodhart's law? On the Moral Justification of Fairness-Aware Machine Learning
Fairness-aware machine learning (fair-ml) techniques are algorithmic interventions designed to ensure that individuals who are affected by the predictions of a machine learning model are treated fairly. The problem is often posed as an optimization problem, where the objective is to achieve high predictive performance under a quantitative fairness constraint. However, any attempt to design a fair-ml algorithm must assume a world where Goodhart’s law has an exception: when a fairness measure becomes an optimization constraint, it does not cease to be a good measure. In this article, we argue that fairness measures are particularly sensitive to Goodhart’s law. Our main contributions are as follows. First, we present a framework for moral reasoning about the justification of fairness metrics. In contrast to existing work, our framework incorporates the belief that whether a distribution of outcomes is fair depends not only on the cause of inequalities but also on what moral claims decision subjects have to receive a particular benefit or avoid a burden. We use the framework to distill moral and empirical assumptions under which particular fairness metrics correspond to a fair distribution of outcomes. Second, we explore the extent to which employing fairness metrics as a constraint in a fair-ml algorithm is morally justifiable, exemplified by the fair-ml algorithm introduced by Hardt et al. [ 21 ]. We illustrate that enforcing a fairness metric through a fair-ml algorithm often does not result in the fair distribution of outcomes that motivated its use and can even harm the individuals the intervention was intended to protect.
- 15 October 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 111-120
Assessing chatbots from a sociotechnical perspective
Chatbots are a type of social robot that is most commonly used and is already having a major social impact. This chapter looks at chatbots, also named conversational agents, from a technological and social perspective. So first we look at what kind of machines are chatbots, and what kind of technologies are we discussing when we talk about chatbots. To address this question, we will identify various key technical characteristics of chatbots that influence how chatbots intervene in social practices. We then discuss various social, ethical, and, in particular, anthropological issues surrounding chatbots. We specifically focus on dehumanization issues raised by the interaction between chatbots and humans, such as objectification, paternalism, deception, and social de-skilling.
- 15 October 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 111-120
Assessing chatbots from a sociotechnical perspective
Chatbots are a type of social robot that is most commonly used and is already having a major social impact. This chapter looks at chatbots, also named conversational agents, from a technological and social perspective. So first we look at what kind of machines are chatbots, and what kind of technologies are we discussing when we talk about chatbots. To address this question, we will identify various key technical characteristics of chatbots that influence how chatbots intervene in social practices. We then discuss various social, ethical, and, in particular, anthropological issues surrounding chatbots. We specifically focus on dehumanization issues raised by the interaction between chatbots and humans, such as objectification, paternalism, deception, and social de-skilling.
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 295-306
Bytes and Battles: Pathways to De-escalation in the Cyber Conflict Arena
- 13 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 295-306
Bytes and Battles: Pathways to De-escalation in the Cyber Conflict Arena
- Open Access
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Digital Society
- Vol. 3 (2) , 1-21
Technological Citizenship in Times of Digitization: An Integrative Framework
This article introduces an integrative framework for technological citizenship, examining the impact of digitization and the active roles of citizens in shaping this impact across the private, social, and public sphere. It outlines the dual nature of digitization, offering opportunities for enhanced connectivity and efficiency while posing challenges to privacy, security, and democratic integrity. Technological citizenship is explored through the lenses of liberal, communitarian, and republican theories, highlighting the active roles of citizens in navigating the opportunities and risks presented by digital technologies across all life spheres. By operationalizing technological citizenship, the article aims to address the gap in existing literature on the active roles of citizens in the governance of digitization. The framework emphasizes empowerment and resilience as crucial capacities for citizens to actively engage with and govern digital technologies. It illuminates citizens’ active participation in shaping the digital landscape, advocating for policies that support their engagement in safeguarding private, social, and public values in the digital age. The study calls for further research into technological citizenship, emphasizing its significance in fostering a more inclusive and equitable digital society.
- 13 May 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Digital Society
- Vol. 3 (2) , 1-21
Open AccessTechnological Citizenship in Times of Digitization: An Integrative Framework
This article introduces an integrative framework for technological citizenship, examining the impact of digitization and the active roles of citizens in shaping this impact across the private, social, and public sphere. It outlines the dual nature of digitization, offering opportunities for enhanced connectivity and efficiency while posing challenges to privacy, security, and democratic integrity. Technological citizenship is explored through the lenses of liberal, communitarian, and republican theories, highlighting the active roles of citizens in navigating the opportunities and risks presented by digital technologies across all life spheres. By operationalizing technological citizenship, the article aims to address the gap in existing literature on the active roles of citizens in the governance of digitization. The framework emphasizes empowerment and resilience as crucial capacities for citizens to actively engage with and govern digital technologies. It illuminates citizens’ active participation in shaping the digital landscape, advocating for policies that support their engagement in safeguarding private, social, and public values in the digital age. The study calls for further research into technological citizenship, emphasizing its significance in fostering a more inclusive and equitable digital society.
- Open Access
Does the End Justify the Means? On the Moral Justification of Fairness-Aware Machine Learning
Fairness-aware machine learning (fair-ml) techniques are algorithmic interventions designed to ensure that individuals who are affected by the predictions of a machine learning model are treated fairly, typically measured in terms of a quantitative fairness metric. Despite the multitude of fairness metrics and fair-ml algorithms, there is still little guidance on the suitability of different approaches in practice. In this paper, we present a framework for moral reasoning about the justification of fairness metrics and explore the moral implications of the use of fair-ml algorithms that optimize for them. In particular, we argue that whether a distribution of outcomes is fair, depends not only on the cause of inequalities but also on what moral claims decision subjects have to receive a particular benefit or avoid a burden. We use our framework to analyze the suitability of two fairness metrics under different circumstances. Subsequently, we explore moral arguments that support or reject the use of the fair-ml algorithm introduced by Hardt et al. (2016). We argue that under very specific circumstances, particular metrics correspond to a fair distribution of burdens and benefits. However, we also illustrate that enforcing a fairness metric by means of a fair-ml algorithm may not result in the fair distribution of outcomes and can have several undesirable side effects. We end with a call for a more holistic evaluation of fair-ml algorithms, beyond their direct optimization objectives.
Open AccessDoes the End Justify the Means? On the Moral Justification of Fairness-Aware Machine Learning
Fairness-aware machine learning (fair-ml) techniques are algorithmic interventions designed to ensure that individuals who are affected by the predictions of a machine learning model are treated fairly, typically measured in terms of a quantitative fairness metric. Despite the multitude of fairness metrics and fair-ml algorithms, there is still little guidance on the suitability of different approaches in practice. In this paper, we present a framework for moral reasoning about the justification of fairness metrics and explore the moral implications of the use of fair-ml algorithms that optimize for them. In particular, we argue that whether a distribution of outcomes is fair, depends not only on the cause of inequalities but also on what moral claims decision subjects have to receive a particular benefit or avoid a burden. We use our framework to analyze the suitability of two fairness metrics under different circumstances. Subsequently, we explore moral arguments that support or reject the use of the fair-ml algorithm introduced by Hardt et al. (2016). We argue that under very specific circumstances, particular metrics correspond to a fair distribution of burdens and benefits. However, we also illustrate that enforcing a fairness metric by means of a fair-ml algorithm may not result in the fair distribution of outcomes and can have several undesirable side effects. We end with a call for a more holistic evaluation of fair-ml algorithms, beyond their direct optimization objectives.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by IGI Global Scientific Publishing in International Journal of Technoethics
- Vol. 14 (1) , 1-20
Which Democratic Way to Go?
There are concerns amongst researchers and the general public that social media platforms threaten democratic values. Social media corporations and their engineers have responded to these concerns with various design solutions. Though the objective of designing social media democratically sounds straightforward, the concrete reality is not. The authors discuss what a democratic design for social media platforms could look like by exploring two classical conceptions of democracy, one in the liberal tradition and the other in the deliberative tradition. In particular, they discuss three concerns: 1) mis- and disinformation; 2) hate speech; and 3) the relations between filter bubbles, echo chambers, and public debate. By describing the underlying ideals of the two traditions and translating these into design guidelines, the authors make explicit how varied and contrary the implications of different conceptions of democracy can be for addressing public concerns and designing for democratic social media. With these things in mind, this article responds to a call, which is to raise awareness among social media corporations, engineers, and policymakers about varying democratic ideals and the implications that these may have for social media.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by IGI Global Scientific Publishing in International Journal of Technoethics
- Vol. 14 (1) , 1-20
Open AccessWhich Democratic Way to Go?
There are concerns amongst researchers and the general public that social media platforms threaten democratic values. Social media corporations and their engineers have responded to these concerns with various design solutions. Though the objective of designing social media democratically sounds straightforward, the concrete reality is not. The authors discuss what a democratic design for social media platforms could look like by exploring two classical conceptions of democracy, one in the liberal tradition and the other in the deliberative tradition. In particular, they discuss three concerns: 1) mis- and disinformation; 2) hate speech; and 3) the relations between filter bubbles, echo chambers, and public debate. By describing the underlying ideals of the two traditions and translating these into design guidelines, the authors make explicit how varied and contrary the implications of different conceptions of democracy can be for addressing public concerns and designing for democratic social media. With these things in mind, this article responds to a call, which is to raise awareness among social media corporations, engineers, and policymakers about varying democratic ideals and the implications that these may have for social media.
- 30 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 121-132
The Ten Commandments for Responsible Augmented Reality
- 30 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 121-132
The Ten Commandments for Responsible Augmented Reality
- Open Access
- 14 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 179 (3) , 907-918
Can Creativity Be a Collective Virtue? Insights for the Ethics of Innovation
Virtue accounts of innovation ethics have recognized the virtue of creativity as an admirable trait in innovators. However, such accounts have not paid sufficient attention to the way creativity functions as a collective phenomenon. We propose a collective virtue account to supplement existing virtue accounts. We base our account on Kieran’s definition of creativity as a virtue and distinguish three components in it: creative output, mastery and intrinsic motivation. We argue that all of these components can meaningfully be attributed to innovation groups. This means that we can also attribute the virtue of creativity to group agents involved in innovation. Recognizing creativity as a collective virtue in innovation is important because it allows for a more accurate evaluation of how successful innovation generally happens. The innovator who takes a collective virtue account of creativity seriously will give attention to the facilitation of an environment where the group can flourish collectively, rather than only nurturing the individual genius.
- 14 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 179 (3) , 907-918
Open AccessCan Creativity Be a Collective Virtue? Insights for the Ethics of Innovation
Virtue accounts of innovation ethics have recognized the virtue of creativity as an admirable trait in innovators. However, such accounts have not paid sufficient attention to the way creativity functions as a collective phenomenon. We propose a collective virtue account to supplement existing virtue accounts. We base our account on Kieran’s definition of creativity as a virtue and distinguish three components in it: creative output, mastery and intrinsic motivation. We argue that all of these components can meaningfully be attributed to innovation groups. This means that we can also attribute the virtue of creativity to group agents involved in innovation. Recognizing creativity as a collective virtue in innovation is important because it allows for a more accurate evaluation of how successful innovation generally happens. The innovator who takes a collective virtue account of creativity seriously will give attention to the facilitation of an environment where the group can flourish collectively, rather than only nurturing the individual genius.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
- Vol. 23 (4)
Agent-Based Modelling of Values: The Case of Value Sensitive Design for Refugee Logistics
We have used value sensitive design as a method to develop an agent-based model of values in humanitarian logistics for refugees. Schwartz's theory of universal values is implemented in the model in such a way that agents can make value trade-o s, which are operationalized into a measure of refugee wellbeing and a measure of public opinion about how the refugee logistics is being handled. By trying out di erent 'valuescenarios', stakeholders who are responsible for, or involved in refugee logistics can have insights into the effects of various value choices. The model is visualized and made usable as a platform (interactive website) for decision-makers to understand the trade-o s in policies for government and non-government organizations.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
- Vol. 23 (4)
Open AccessAgent-Based Modelling of Values: The Case of Value Sensitive Design for Refugee Logistics
We have used value sensitive design as a method to develop an agent-based model of values in humanitarian logistics for refugees. Schwartz's theory of universal values is implemented in the model in such a way that agents can make value trade-o s, which are operationalized into a measure of refugee wellbeing and a measure of public opinion about how the refugee logistics is being handled. By trying out di erent 'valuescenarios', stakeholders who are responsible for, or involved in refugee logistics can have insights into the effects of various value choices. The model is visualized and made usable as a platform (interactive website) for decision-makers to understand the trade-o s in policies for government and non-government organizations.