Steven Huddart
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Steven Huddart has a total of 32 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
John S. Hughes
The Anderson School at UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095‐1481, USA
7 shared publicationsCarolyn B. Levine
Fuqua School of Business, Duke University, Durham NC 27708‐0120, USA
4 shared publications- Kai Du
The Pennsylvania State University
4 shared publications Mark H. Lang
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
4 shared publicationsMark Lang
Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27599
4 shared publicationsBin Ke
National University of Singapore
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
In the Shadow of Insider Trading
We study how focal-firm insider-trading regulation affects informed trading across economically-linked markets. In a multi-market Kyle model, focal-firm disclosure or penalties reallocate informed trading toward linked markets. Expected losses fall in the focal market but rise in every linked market under a proportional-allocation refinement. Penalties applied symmetrically across markets protect liquidity traders only above a threshold. Weaker penalties can reduce price efficiency and increase liquidity trader losses even as insider utility falls. When shadow trades are harder to detect, equal statutory sanctions are not equally effective. The analysis identifies the cross-market incidence of disclosure and enforcement.
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessIn the Shadow of Insider Trading
We study how focal-firm insider-trading regulation affects informed trading across economically-linked markets. In a multi-market Kyle model, focal-firm disclosure or penalties reallocate informed trading toward linked markets. Expected losses fall in the focal market but rise in every linked market under a proportional-allocation refinement. Penalties applied symmetrically across markets protect liquidity traders only above a threshold. Weaker penalties can reduce price efficiency and increase liquidity trader losses even as insider utility falls. When shadow trades are harder to detect, equal statutory sanctions are not equally effective. The analysis identifies the cross-market incidence of disclosure and enforcement.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (2) , 123-140
Rotten Apples and Sterling Examples: Norm-Based Moral Reasoning and Peer Influences on Honesty
We develop a general norm-dependent utility function with disutility for actions that are inferior or superior to a norm. We test its validity by assessing the moderating role of norm sensitivity in explaining responses to peer influences in a budget reporting experiment. Managers become less honest after seeing a less honest peer (the rotten apple effect) and more honest after seeing a more honest peer (the sterling example effect). We measure the sensitivity to social norms by the Maintaining Norms Schema score generated from the responses to the Defining Issue Test-2 moral reasoning questionnaire. We find that (1) the sterling example effect is significantly increased in an individual’s sensitivity to social norms and (2) the rotten apple effect does not vary significantly with an individual’s sensitivity to social norms. Our evidence supports inclusion of a disutility component for actions that are inferior to the norm in representations of personal preferences. JEL Classifications: C72, D03; J44; M41; M55.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in Journal of Management Accounting Research
- Vol. 36 (2) , 123-140
Open AccessRotten Apples and Sterling Examples: Norm-Based Moral Reasoning and Peer Influences on Honesty
We develop a general norm-dependent utility function with disutility for actions that are inferior or superior to a norm. We test its validity by assessing the moderating role of norm sensitivity in explaining responses to peer influences in a budget reporting experiment. Managers become less honest after seeing a less honest peer (the rotten apple effect) and more honest after seeing a more honest peer (the sterling example effect). We measure the sensitivity to social norms by the Maintaining Norms Schema score generated from the responses to the Defining Issue Test-2 moral reasoning questionnaire. We find that (1) the sterling example effect is significantly increased in an individual’s sensitivity to social norms and (2) the rotten apple effect does not vary significantly with an individual’s sensitivity to social norms. Our evidence supports inclusion of a disutility component for actions that are inferior to the norm in representations of personal preferences. JEL Classifications: C72, D03; J44; M41; M55.
- Retracted
- 27 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 76 (1)
Lost in standardization: Effects of financial statement database discrepancies on inference
- 27 December 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 76 (1)
RetractedLost in standardization: Effects of financial statement database discrepancies on inference
- Open Access
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Lost in Standardization: Revisiting Accounting-based Return Anomalies Using As-filed Financial Statement Data
SEC-mandated, machine-readable structured filings, or “as-filed data,” are an alternative source to Compustat for companies’ accounting data. Discrepancies between as-filed and Compustat data, potentially a result of Compustat’s standardizations, affect inferences about the existence and magnitude of the accruals anomaly: accruals calculated from as-filed data do predict returns and accruals calculated from Compustat data do not. Trades of hedge funds that download structured filings correlate with the as-filed accruals signal and, especially, the discrepancy between as-filed and Compustat accruals signals. Inferences about four other accounting-based anomalies are similarly affected by discrepancies between data sources.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLost in Standardization: Revisiting Accounting-based Return Anomalies Using As-filed Financial Statement Data
SEC-mandated, machine-readable structured filings, or “as-filed data,” are an alternative source to Compustat for companies’ accounting data. Discrepancies between as-filed and Compustat data, potentially a result of Compustat’s standardizations, affect inferences about the existence and magnitude of the accruals anomaly: accruals calculated from as-filed data do predict returns and accruals calculated from Compustat data do not. Trades of hedge funds that download structured filings correlate with the as-filed accruals signal and, especially, the discrepancy between as-filed and Compustat accruals signals. Inferences about four other accounting-based anomalies are similarly affected by discrepancies between data sources.
- 23 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1263-1300
Economic persistence, earnings informativeness, and stock return regularities
- 23 April 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1263-1300
Economic persistence, earnings informativeness, and stock return regularities
- 3 July 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Behavioral Finance
- Vol. 18 (3) , 281-303
The Efficiency of Stock-Based Incentives: Experimental Evidence
The authors report the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects are offered contracts structured similar to equity compensation packages and result in subjects receiving cash payments that are a function of their effort and random factors. The authors compare the outcomes from alternative contractual forms to theoretical benchmarks and report the efficiency of the contracts to provide evidence on whether options or stocks that have same economic cost to the employer yield the same or different effort levels from the managers. Both contracts elicit lower levels of effort than would be chosen by an expected-payoff-maximizing decision maker. Effort choices under the option contract did not differ significantly from effort choices under the stock contract except for male subjects. The option contract elicits a higher effort level for these subjects and condition than the stock contract. Effort choices reflect loss aversion and regret based on past stock price realizations.
- 3 July 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Behavioral Finance
- Vol. 18 (3) , 281-303
The Efficiency of Stock-Based Incentives: Experimental Evidence
The authors report the results of laboratory experiments in which subjects are offered contracts structured similar to equity compensation packages and result in subjects receiving cash payments that are a function of their effort and random factors. The authors compare the outcomes from alternative contractual forms to theoretical benchmarks and report the efficiency of the contracts to provide evidence on whether options or stocks that have same economic cost to the employer yield the same or different effort levels from the managers. Both contracts elicit lower levels of effort than would be chosen by an expected-payoff-maximizing decision maker. Effort choices under the option contract did not differ significantly from effort choices under the stock contract except for male subjects. The option contract elicits a higher effort level for these subjects and condition than the stock contract. Effort choices reflect loss aversion and regret based on past stock price realizations.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Reporting System, Investor Learning, and Stock Return Regularities
We propose a unified framework for understanding accounting-based regularities. The underlying states of a firm follow a Markov process and are only imperfectly revealed through signals from a reporting system. Based on the signals, a representative Bayesian investor forms beliefs about the hidden states. Our model delivers predictions that are consistent with several empirical findings on the relationships between accounting reports and stock returns, including market reactions to breaks of earnings strings, and the return predictability based on accruals and book-tax differences. We also conduct simulations to gauge how these regularities vary with two characteristics of the reporting system, informativeness and conservatism.
- 1 April 2017
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessReporting System, Investor Learning, and Stock Return Regularities
We propose a unified framework for understanding accounting-based regularities. The underlying states of a firm follow a Markov process and are only imperfectly revealed through signals from a reporting system. Based on the signals, a representative Bayesian investor forms beliefs about the hidden states. Our model delivers predictions that are consistent with several empirical findings on the relationships between accounting reports and stock returns, including market reactions to breaks of earnings strings, and the return predictability based on accruals and book-tax differences. We also conduct simulations to gauge how these regularities vary with two characteristics of the reporting system, informativeness and conservatism.
- 19 December 2016
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 34 (1) , 577-581
Discussion of “The Effects of Vertical Pay Dispersion: Experimental Evidence in a Budget Setting”
Guo, Libby, and Liu (2017) (hereafter GLL), examine how pairs of experimental subjects interact in a game framed as a funding request from a privately informed subordinate to a superior. When the superior's pay is higher than the subordinate's, subordinates display more self‐serving dishonesty and superiors are more tolerant of it than when their pay is the same. In this discussion, I compare GLL's design with an ultimatum game, consider additional tensions that arise in pay‐level comparisons, address the applicability of their results, and suggest some extensions. I conclude by calling for new theory that regularizes GLL's surprising findings.
- 19 December 2016
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 34 (1) , 577-581
Discussion of “The Effects of Vertical Pay Dispersion: Experimental Evidence in a Budget Setting”
Guo, Libby, and Liu (2017) (hereafter GLL), examine how pairs of experimental subjects interact in a game framed as a funding request from a privately informed subordinate to a superior. When the superior's pay is higher than the subordinate's, subordinates display more self‐serving dishonesty and superiors are more tolerant of it than when their pay is the same. In this discussion, I compare GLL's design with an ultimatum game, consider additional tensions that arise in pay‐level comparisons, address the applicability of their results, and suggest some extensions. I conclude by calling for new theory that regularizes GLL's surprising findings.
- 1 October 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 37 (7) , 461-481
The social constitution of regulation: The endogenization of insider trading laws
- 1 October 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Accounting, Organizations and Society
- Vol. 37 (7) , 461-481
The social constitution of regulation: The endogenization of insider trading laws