PKPeyman Khezr

Peyman Khezr

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Peyman Khezr has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Consignment Auctions and Second-Best Endowments

    by Peyman Khezr

    Consignment auctions combine free allocation of emission permits with centralized uniformprice reallocation. Because firms receive the clearing price for permits they consign and pay the same price for permits they acquire, initial endowments affect strategic bidding as well as distribution. We study optimal endowment design when the regulator is constrained to the uniform-price auction format. With heterogeneous downward-sloping marginal values, we characterize a unique ex post equilibrium within the positive affine strategy class and show that no fixed ex ante endowment vector can implement the ex post efficient allocation. We then derive the second-best endowment rule. Strategic misallocation has a one-dimensional allocation-neutral direction, allowing coordinated changes in endowments to alter prices and transfers without changing permit allocations. Under full consignment, the optimal endowment equals each firm's expected efficient permit use; under partial consignment, regulator-retained permits are deducted according to firm-specific residual demand weights. Along this path, allocative welfare is invariant to the consignment share until a non-negativity constraint binds, and optimized consignment generally welfare-dominates a pure uniformprice auction under an allocative criterion. When public revenue carries an additional social premium, heterogeneous firms generate a trade-off between allocative efficiency and regulator revenue.

  • Open Access

    Reinforcement Learning for Portfolio Choice in Large and Changing Asset Universes

    by Farouq Masoudy, Armin Pourkhanali, Peyman Khezr

    Portfolio allocation in large and time-varying equity universes is challenging because high-dimensional decision rules can generate unstable and concentrated portfolios. Existing reinforcement-learning approaches typically determine all asset weights through a single high-dimensional action, providing limited control over diversification and implementation. We propose Structured-Action Proximal Policy Optimisation (SA-PPO), which separates aggregate portfolio positioning from cross-sectional security selection and the enforcement of portfolio constraints. Using a historically reconstructed S&P 500 universe and rolling out-of-sample tests from 2016 to 2025, SA-PPO delivers higher risk-adjusted performance, cumulative wealth, and certainty-equivalent returns than a broad set of passive, optimisation-based, and learning-based benchmarks. Relative to flat RL policies, it produces more diversified portfolios with moderate turnover. The results remain economically meaningful after transaction costs of up to 50 basis points and across different market conditions. Factor and return-spread regressions also indicate positive abnormal performance. Within the reconstructed U.S. large-cap universe, the findings are consistent with structured action generation improving the out-of-sample regularisation and implementability of high-dimensional portfolio policies.

  • Open Access

    Natural Disasters, Investor Uncertainty and the Cost of Going Public

    by Jonathan A. Batten, Peyman Khezr, Di Mo, Armin Pourkhanali

    Pricing in initial public offerings (IPOs) reflects both firm fundamentals and the quality of information available to investors at the time of issuance. While prior research shows that macroeconomic crises and broad financial shocks influence IPO valuation, less is known about how localized disruptions affect the information environment in which offer prices are formed. This study examines whether exposure to natural disasters during the issuance month alters the bookbuilding process and subsequent market outcomes. We combine county-level disaster records from the SHELDUS database with a sample of 1,263 U.S. IPOs to identify geographically concentrated and plausibly exogenous shocks to investor attention and valuation certainty. IPOs exposed to recent disasters exhibit more negative offer price revisions and lower first-day returns, consistent with more conservative pricing during bookbuilding rather than temporary sentiment-driven reversals in secondary markets. These effects are strongest for smaller firms and for IPOs with wider indicative price ranges, settings typically associated with greater information asymmetry and valuation dispersion. We further show that downward adjustments made at issuance are not fully offset in aftermarket trading, implying a persistent increase in the effective cost of equity capital for affected issuers. By treating natural disasters as localized uncertainty shocks, the analysis clarifies how short-lived environmental events influence primary-market price formation, investor behavior, and firms’ access to public equity markets. More broadly, the findings highlight the sensitivity of capital-raising outcomes to disruptions in the information and governance mechanisms that underpin IPO pricing.

  • Open Access

    The Use of Artificial Intelligence for Auction Design

    by Peyman Khezr, Kendall Taylor

    This paper investigates the use of artificial intelligence—specifically, model‐free reinforcement learning—as a method to simulate bidding behavior in auctions. We survey six algorithms that are particularly suitable for learning and bidding in environments with large strategy sets and incomplete information such as auctions. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of these algorithms, detailing how they operate and why they are suitable for use in auction environments. We then present an illustrative example, comparing the performance of each algorithm across three common multi‐unit auctions. Most of the chosen algorithms perform very well in terms of learning and bidding, although some outperform others. This paper highlights the significance of using artificial intelligence to enhance auction design, particularly the design of multi‐unit auctions.

  • Voting with Time Commitment for Decentralized Governance: Bond Voting as a Sybil-Resistant Mechanism

    by Vijay Mohan, Peyman Khezr, Chris Berg

    In this paper, we examine the usefulness of time commitment as a voting resource for decentralized governance when the identity of voters cannot be verified. In order to do so, we take a closer look at two issues that confront token-based voting systems used by blockchain communities and organizations: voter fraud through the creation of multiple identities (Sybil attack) and concentration of voting power in the hands of the wealthy (plutocracy). Our contribution is threefold: first, we lay analytical foundations for the formal modeling of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a voting system to be resistant to a Sybil attack; second, we show that tokens as the only instrument for weighting votes cannot simultaneously achieve resistance to both Sybil attacks and a plutocracy in the voting process; and third, we design a voting mechanism, bond voting, that is Sybil resistant and offers a second instrument (time commitment) that is effective for countering plutocracy when large token holders also have a relatively high opportunity cost of locking tokens for a vote. Overall, our paper emphasizes the importance of time-based suffrage in decentralized governance. This paper was accepted by Joshua Gans, business strategy. Funding: This work was supported by Gitcoin (Using commitment voting for better DAO governance) and the Australian Research Council [Grant DP200101808].


  • Open Access

    Carbon Pricing and Resale in Emission Trading Systems

    by Peyman Khezr

    Secondary markets and resale are integral components of all emission trading systems. Despite the justification for these secondary trades, such as unpredictable demand, they may encourage speculation and result in the misallocation of permits. In this paper, our aim is to underscore the importance of efficiency in the initial allocation mechanism and to explore how concerns leading to the establishment of secondary markets, such as uncertain demand, can be addressed through alternative means, such as frequent auctions. We demonstrate that the existence of a secondary market could lead to higher untruthful bids in the auction, further encouraging speculation and the accumulation of rent. Our results suggest that an inefficient initial allocation could enable speculators with no use value for the permits to bid in the auction and subsequently earn rents in secondary markets by trading these permits. Even if the secondary market operates efficiently, the resulting rent, which represents a potential loss of auction revenue, cannot be overlooked.

  • Open Access

    Strategic Bidding in Knapsack Auctions

    by Peyman Khezr, Vijay Mohan, Lionel Page

    This paper examines knapsack auctions as a method to solve the knapsack problem with incomplete information, where object values are private and sizes are public. We analyze three auction types-uniform price (UP), discriminatory price (DP), and generalized second price (GSP)-to determine efficient resource allocation in these settings. Using a Greedy algorithm for allocating objects, we analyze bidding behavior, revenue and efficiency of these three auctions using theory, lab experiments, and AI-enriched simulations. Our results suggest that the uniform-price auction has the highest level of truthful bidding and efficiency while the discriminatory price and the generalized second-price auctions are superior in terms of revenue generation. This study not only deepens the understanding of auction-based approaches to NP-hard problems but also provides practical insights for market design.

  • Open Access

    A Review of the Global State of Play for Recycling Incentives for Producers and Consumers

    by Stuart J. Thomas, Peyman Khezr

    This report reviews recycling practices in various industries in different countries, with a particular eye on recycling incentives for consumers and producers of packaged goods. Incentivisation has always been a major challenge when it comes to ensuring effective, sustainable, and persistent recycling actions. This paper reviews extensive literature from both producer and consumer perspectives, to provide a comprehensive understanding of what drives different stakeholders towards sustainable practices, bridging this knowledge gap within the Circular Economies framework. From the producer perspective, initiating or participating in a pro-environmental program has been shown to be economically beneficial, through the perceived environmental reputation by consumers and the relationship with governments and other stakeholders, and improved financial performance and productivity. From the consumer perspective, it is crucial for success of recycling programs that they are designed to match different types of incentives to targeted behaviours, and while monetary incentives have shown to generally have a positive impact on recycling behaviours, combining with other methods such as environmental appeals, green labelling or gamification of recycling actions can further improve engagement and promote intrinsic motivation.