Ezzeldin Shereen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Ezzeldin Shereen has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- György Dán
Division of Network and Systems Engineering, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
7 shared publications - Henrik Sandberg
KTH Royal Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Serkan Sarıtaş
Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering, Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara, Turkey
2 shared publications - Jean-Yves Le Boudec
EPFL
1 shared publication - Kiarash Kazari
Division of Network and Systems Engineering, School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication - Marguerite Delcourt
School of Computer and Communication Sciences, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- Vol. 11 (4) , 1899-1910
Network Topology-Aware Mitigation of Undetectable PMU Time Synchronization Attacks
Time Synchronization attacks constitute a major threat to PMU-based smart grid applications, their cost-efficient detection and mitigation is thus of utmost importance. In this paper we propose a mitigation approach based on authenticated network-based time synchronization. Our approach relies on the observation that a time synchronization attack can be undetectable if and only if it targets at least three time references in the power system, and such attacks need to be mitigated through appropriate security controls. We first provide a formal proof of this result, including a characterization of the degrees of freedom of the attacker in constructing an attack. We then formulate the problem of mitigating undetectable attacks at minimum cost as an integer linear program, and prove that it is NP-hard. To solve the problem, we propose two approximation algorithms based on (1) computing shortest paths, and (2) solving a linear relaxation of the problem. Extensive simulations suggest the superiority of the proposed algorithms on IEEE benchmark power system graphs compared to baseline solutions. We report mitigation cost savings of at least 76% compared to a naive approach for mitigation and at least 30% compared the state-of-the-art.
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
- Vol. 11 (4) , 1899-1910
Open AccessNetwork Topology-Aware Mitigation of Undetectable PMU Time Synchronization Attacks
Time Synchronization attacks constitute a major threat to PMU-based smart grid applications, their cost-efficient detection and mitigation is thus of utmost importance. In this paper we propose a mitigation approach based on authenticated network-based time synchronization. Our approach relies on the observation that a time synchronization attack can be undetectable if and only if it targets at least three time references in the power system, and such attacks need to be mitigated through appropriate security controls. We first provide a formal proof of this result, including a characterization of the degrees of freedom of the attacker in constructing an attack. We then formulate the problem of mitigating undetectable attacks at minimum cost as an integer linear program, and prove that it is NP-hard. To solve the problem, we propose two approximation algorithms based on (1) computing shortest paths, and (2) solving a linear relaxation of the problem. Extensive simulations suggest the superiority of the proposed algorithms on IEEE benchmark power system graphs compared to baseline solutions. We report mitigation cost savings of at least 76% compared to a naive approach for mitigation and at least 30% compared the state-of-the-art.
- Open Access
- 22 June 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Vol. 15 (1) , 959-972
A Reinforcement Learning Approach to Undetectable Attacks Against Automatic Generation Control
Automatic generation control (AGC) is an essential functionality for ensuring the stability of power systems, and its secure operation is thus of utmost importance to power system operators. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of AGC to false data injection attacks that could remain undetected by traditional detection methods based on the area control error (ACE) and the recently proposed unknown input observer (UIO). We formulate the problem of computing undetectable attacks as a multi-objective partially observable Markov decision process. We propose a flexible reward function that allows to explore the trade-off between attack impact and detectability, and use the proximal policy optimization (PPO) algorithm for learning efficient attack policies. Through extensive simulations of a 3-area power system, we show that the proposed attacks can drive the frequency beyond critical limits, while remaining undetectable by state-of-the-art algorithms employed for fault and attack detection in AGC. Our results also show that detectors trained using supervised and unsupervised machine learning can both significantly outperform existing detectors.
- 22 June 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Vol. 15 (1) , 959-972
Open AccessA Reinforcement Learning Approach to Undetectable Attacks Against Automatic Generation Control
Automatic generation control (AGC) is an essential functionality for ensuring the stability of power systems, and its secure operation is thus of utmost importance to power system operators. In this paper, we investigate the vulnerability of AGC to false data injection attacks that could remain undetected by traditional detection methods based on the area control error (ACE) and the recently proposed unknown input observer (UIO). We formulate the problem of computing undetectable attacks as a multi-objective partially observable Markov decision process. We propose a flexible reward function that allows to explore the trade-off between attack impact and detectability, and use the proximal policy optimization (PPO) algorithm for learning efficient attack policies. Through extensive simulations of a 3-area power system, we show that the proposed attacks can drive the frequency beyond critical limits, while remaining undetectable by state-of-the-art algorithms employed for fault and attack detection in AGC. Our results also show that detectors trained using supervised and unsupervised machine learning can both significantly outperform existing detectors.
- 11 February 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Vol. 13 (4) , 3241-3254
Detection and Localization of PMU Time Synchronization Attacks via Graph Signal Processing
Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs) against Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) constitute a major threat to modern smart grid applications. By compromising the time reference of a set of PMUs, an attacker can change the phase angle of their measured phasors, with potentially detrimental impact on grid operation and control. Going beyond traditional residual-based techniques in detecting TSAs, in this paper we propose the use of Graph Signal Processing (GSP) to model the power grid so as to facilitate the detection and localization of TSAs. We analytically show that modeling the state of the power system as a low-pass graph signal can significantly improve the resilience of the grid against TSAs. We propose TSA detection and localization methods based on GSP, leveraging state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms. We provide empirical evidence for the efficiency of the proposed methods based on extensive simulations on five IEEE benchmark systems. In fact, our methods can detect at least 77% more TSAs of significant impact and localize an additional 70% of the attacked PMUs compared to state-of-the-art techniques.
- 11 February 2022
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Vol. 13 (4) , 3241-3254
Detection and Localization of PMU Time Synchronization Attacks via Graph Signal Processing
Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs) against Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) constitute a major threat to modern smart grid applications. By compromising the time reference of a set of PMUs, an attacker can change the phase angle of their measured phasors, with potentially detrimental impact on grid operation and control. Going beyond traditional residual-based techniques in detecting TSAs, in this paper we propose the use of Graph Signal Processing (GSP) to model the power grid so as to facilitate the detection and localization of TSAs. We analytically show that modeling the state of the power system as a low-pass graph signal can significantly improve the resilience of the grid against TSAs. We propose TSA detection and localization methods based on GSP, leveraging state-of-the-art machine learning algorithms. We provide empirical evidence for the efficiency of the proposed methods based on extensive simulations on five IEEE benchmark systems. In fact, our methods can detect at least 77% more TSAs of significant impact and localize an additional 70% of the attacked PMUs compared to state-of-the-art techniques.
- 6 May 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Vol. 12 (5) , 4460-4470
Time-Synchronization Attack Detection in Unbalanced Three-Phase Systems
Phasor measurement units (PMU) rely on an accurate time-synchronization to phase-align the phasors and timestamp the voltage and current phasor measurements. Among the symmetrical components computed from the phasors in three-phase systems, the standard practice only uses the direct-sequence component for state estimation and bad data detection (BDD). Time-synchronization attacks (TSAs) can compromise the measured phasors and can, thus, significantly alter the state estimate in a manner that is undetectable by widely used power-system BDD algorithms. In this paper we investigate the potential of utilizing the three-phase model instead of the direct-sequence model for mitigating the vulnerability of state estimation to undetectable TSAs. We show analytically that if the power system is unbalanced then the use of the three-phase model as input to BDD algorithms enables to detect attacks that would be undetectable if only the direct-sequence model was used. Simulations performed on the IEEE 39-bus benchmark using real load profiles recorded on the grid of the city of Lausanne confirm our analytical results. Our results provide a new argument for the adoption of three-phase models for BDD, as their use is a simple, yet effective measure for reducing the vulnerability of PMU measurements to TSAs.
- 6 May 2021
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
- Vol. 12 (5) , 4460-4470
Time-Synchronization Attack Detection in Unbalanced Three-Phase Systems
Phasor measurement units (PMU) rely on an accurate time-synchronization to phase-align the phasors and timestamp the voltage and current phasor measurements. Among the symmetrical components computed from the phasors in three-phase systems, the standard practice only uses the direct-sequence component for state estimation and bad data detection (BDD). Time-synchronization attacks (TSAs) can compromise the measured phasors and can, thus, significantly alter the state estimate in a manner that is undetectable by widely used power-system BDD algorithms. In this paper we investigate the potential of utilizing the three-phase model instead of the direct-sequence model for mitigating the vulnerability of state estimation to undetectable TSAs. We show analytically that if the power system is unbalanced then the use of the three-phase model as input to BDD algorithms enables to detect attacks that would be undetectable if only the direct-sequence model was used. Simulations performed on the IEEE 39-bus benchmark using real load profiles recorded on the grid of the city of Lausanne confirm our analytical results. Our results provide a new argument for the adoption of three-phase models for BDD, as their use is a simple, yet effective measure for reducing the vulnerability of PMU measurements to TSAs.
- 6 November 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
- Vol. 38 (1) , 169-179
Model-Based and Data-Driven Detectors for Time Synchronization Attacks Against PMUs
Precise time synchronization of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) is critical for monitoring and control of smart grids. Thus, time synchronization attacks (TSAs) against PMUs pose a severe threat to smart grid security. In this paper we present an approach for detecting TSAs based on the interaction between the time synchronization system and the power system. We develop a phasor measurement model and use it to derive an accurate closed form expression for the correlation between the frequency adjustments made by the PMU clock and the resulting change in the measured phase angle, without an attack. We then propose one model-based and three data-driven TSA detectors that exploit the change in correlation due to a TSA. Using extensive simulations, we evaluate the proposed detectors under different strategies for implementing TSAs, and show that the proposed detectors are superior to state-of-the-art clock frequency anomaly detection, especially for unstable clocks.
- 6 November 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
- Vol. 38 (1) , 169-179
Model-Based and Data-Driven Detectors for Time Synchronization Attacks Against PMUs
Precise time synchronization of Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) is critical for monitoring and control of smart grids. Thus, time synchronization attacks (TSAs) against PMUs pose a severe threat to smart grid security. In this paper we present an approach for detecting TSAs based on the interaction between the time synchronization system and the power system. We develop a phasor measurement model and use it to derive an accurate closed form expression for the correlation between the frequency adjustments made by the PMU clock and the resulting change in the measured phase angle, without an attack. We then propose one model-based and three data-driven TSA detectors that exploit the change in correlation due to a TSA. Using extensive simulations, we evaluate the proposed detectors under different strategies for implementing TSAs, and show that the proposed detectors are superior to state-of-the-art clock frequency anomaly detection, especially for unstable clocks.
- 23 October 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 439-458
Adversarial Attacks on Continuous Authentication Security: A Dynamic Game Approach
- 23 October 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 439-458
Adversarial Attacks on Continuous Authentication Security: A Dynamic Game Approach