PSPiotr Skowron

Piotr Skowron

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Piotr Skowron has a total of 51 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Proportional justified representation

    by Luis Sánchez-Fernández, Edith Elkind, Martin Lackner, Norberto Fernández García, Jesús A. Fisteus, Pablo Basanta Val, Piotr Skowron


  • Open Access

    A General Theory of Proportionality with Additive Utilities

    by Piotr Skowron

    We consider a model where a subset of candidates must be selected based on voter preferences, subject to general constraints that specify which subsets are feasible. This model generalizes committee elections with diversity constraints, participatory budgeting (including constraints specifying how funds must be allocated to projects from different pools), and public decision-making. Axioms of proportionality have recently been defined for this general model, but the proposed rules apply only to approval ballots, where each voter submits a subset of candidates she finds acceptable. We propose proportional rules for cardinal ballots, where each voter assigns a numerical value to each candidate corresponding to her utility if that candidate is selected. In developing these rules, we also introduce methods that produce proportional rankings, ensuring that every prefix of the ranking satisfies proportionality.

  • Open Access

    Participatory budgeting with cumulative votes

    by Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Stanisław Szufa, Nimrod Talmon

    In participatory budgeting a group of decision makers is given a set of projects—each with a cost—and has to decide which projects should be funded within the constraints of an available budget. Each decision maker, in some form, expresses their preference over the projects. The goal of an aggregation procedure is to select—based on voter preferences—a subset of projects whose total cost does not exceed the budget and optimal in some sense. We propose several aggregation methods based on the idea of cumulative votes, e.g., for the setting when each of the n voters is given one coin equal to $$(\nicefrac {1}{n})$$ th of the budget and she specifies how this coin should be split among the projects. We compare our aggregation methods based on (1) axiomatic properties, and (2) computer simulations. We identify one class of methods, Minimal Transfers, that demonstrates particularly desirable behaviour. In particular, it satisfies a strong notion of proportionality, and, thus, is promising for its use in practice.


  • Open Access

    Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending

    by Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Seyedeh Zeinab Pishbin, Oskar Skibski, Piotr Skowron, Tomasz Wąs


  • Open Access

    Drawing a Map of Elections

    by Stanisław Szufa, Niclas Boehmer, Robert Bredereck, Piotr Faliszewski, Rolf Niedermeier, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko, Nimrod Talmon

    Our main contribution is the introduction of the map of elections framework. A map of elections consists of three main elements: (1) a dataset of elections (i.e., collections of ordinal votes over given sets of candidates), (2) a way of measuring similarities between these elections, and (3) a representation of the elections in the 2D Euclidean space as points, so that the more similar two elections are, the closer are their points. In our maps, we mostly focus on datasets of synthetic elections, but we also show an example of a map over real-life ones. To measure similarities, we would have preferred to use, e.g., the isomorphic swap distance, but this is infeasible due to its high computational complexity. Hence, we propose polynomial-time computable positionwise distance and use it instead. Regarding the representations in 2D Euclidean space, we mostly use the Kamada-Kawai algorithm, but we also show two alternatives. We develop the necessary theoretical results to form our maps and argue experimentally that they are accurate and credible. Further, we show how coloring the elections in a map according to various criteria helps in analyzing results of a number of experiments. In particular, we show colorings according to the scores of winning candidates or committees, running times of ILP-based winner determination algorithms, and approximation ratios achieved by particular algorithms.

  • Open Access

    Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting

    by Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk, Grzegorz Lisowski, Piotr Skowron, Stanisław Szufa

    We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices as possible, provided that their projects get selected and the prices are not below the minimum costs of their delivery. We study the existence of pure Nash equilibria (NE) in such games, focusing on the AV/Cost, Phragmén, and Method of Equal Shares rules. Furthermore, we report an experimental study of strategic cost selection on real-life PB election data.

  • Open Access

    A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making

    by Tomáš Masařík, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Piotr Skowron

    We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalizes committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that need to be selected), various elections with diversity constraints, the model of public decisions (where decisions need to be taken on a number of independent issues), and the model of collective scheduling. A critical property of voting is that it should be fair---not only to individuals but also to groups of voters with similar opinions on the subject of the vote; in other words, the outcome of an election should proportionally reflect the voters' preferences. We formulate axioms of proportionality in this general model. Our axioms do not require predefining groups of voters; to the contrary, we ensure that the opinions of every subset of voters whose preferences are cohesive-enough are taken into account to the extent that is proportional to the size of the subset. Our axioms generalize the strongest known satisfiable axioms for the more specific models. We explain how to adapt two prominent committee election rules, Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) and Phragmén Sequential Rule, as well as the concept of stable-priceability to our general model. The two rules satisfy our proportionality axioms if and only if the feasibility constraints are matroids.


  • Multiwinner Voting

    by Dorothea Baumeister, Piotr Faliszewski, Jörg Rothe, Piotr Skowron


  • Open Access

    A Generalised Theory of Proportionality in Collective Decision Making

    by Tomáš Masařík, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Piotr Skowron

    We consider a voting model, where a number of candidates need to be selected subject to certain feasibility constraints. The model generalises committee elections (where there is a single constraint on the number of candidates that need to be selected), various elections with diversity constraints, the model of public decisions (where decisions needs to be taken on a number of independent issues), and the model of collective scheduling. A critical property of voting is that it should be fair -- not only to individuals but also to groups of voters with similar opinions on the subject of the vote; in other words, the outcome of an election should proportionally reflect the voters' preferences. We formulate axioms of proportionality in this general model. Our axioms do not require predefining groups of voters; to the contrary, we ensure that the opinion of every subset of voters whose preferences are cohesive-enough are taken into account to the extent that is proportional to the size of the subset. Our axioms generalise the strongest known satisfiable axioms for the more specific models. We explain how to adapt two prominent committee election rules, Proportional Approval Voting (PAV) and Phragmén Sequential Rule, as well as the concept of stable-priceability to our general model. The two rules satisfy our proportionality axioms if and only if the feasibility constraints are matroids.

  • Open Access

    Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools, and Analysis

    by Piotr Faliszewski, Jarosław Flis, Dominik Peters, Grzegorz Pierczyński, Piotr Skowron, Dariusz Stolicki, Stanisław Szufa, Nimrod Talmon

    We provide a library of participatory budgeting data (Pabulib) and open source tools (Pabutools and Pabustats) for analysing this data. We analyse how the results of participatory budgeting elections would change if a different selection rule was applied. We provide evidence that the outcomes of the Method of Equal Shares would be considerably fairer than those of the Utilitarian Greedy rule that is currently in use. We also show that the division of the projects into districts and/or categories can in many cases be avoided when using proportional rules. We find that this would increase the overall utility of the voters.