Stefano Staffolani
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Stefano Staffolani has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Claudia Pigini
Marche Polytechnic University
3 shared publications - Massimiliano Bratti
Università degli Studi di Milano
2 shared publications - Matteo Picchio
Department of Economics and Social Sciences, Marche Polytechnic University, Ancona, Italy
2 shared publications - Alessia Lo Turco
Università Politecnica delle Marche
1 shared publication - Alina Verashchagina
G. d’Annunzio University of Chieti-Pescara, Pescara, Italy
1 shared publication - Andrea Presbitero
International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Metroeconomica
Strategic AI Underuse: Effort Incentives, Displacement Risk, and Organizational Responses
This paper studies how workers' employment concerns can affect the effective use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools after adoption. When productive use of these tools raises workers' perceived risk of displacement, employees may optimally reduce productive effort, trading current earnings against employment security. The baseline represents the first implementation period, when neither side has yet observed behaviour and production under the new technology. The firm evaluates adoption using the observed pre‐AI effort level, while workers forecast the production scale from the most recently observed aggregate output. Strategic underuse can therefore partly or fully offset the productivity gains expected from AI tools and make an initially attractive technology unprofitable after implementation. After implementation, the firm observes the effective effort response, while its organizational options depend on whether it can diagnose the incentive mechanism behind that response and on the cost or feasibility of workforce adjustment. The firm may choose technological reversion, labour hoarding, workforce restructuring through voluntary separations, or employment‐preserving contracts based on negotiated working‐time reductions. Robustness benchmarks show that the displacement‐induced incentive for underuse can persist when firms and workers form more forward‐looking expectations. A Monte Carlo calibration illustrates that all four organizational responses can arise as profit‐maximizing outcomes.
- 2 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Metroeconomica
Strategic AI Underuse: Effort Incentives, Displacement Risk, and Organizational Responses
This paper studies how workers' employment concerns can affect the effective use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) tools after adoption. When productive use of these tools raises workers' perceived risk of displacement, employees may optimally reduce productive effort, trading current earnings against employment security. The baseline represents the first implementation period, when neither side has yet observed behaviour and production under the new technology. The firm evaluates adoption using the observed pre‐AI effort level, while workers forecast the production scale from the most recently observed aggregate output. Strategic underuse can therefore partly or fully offset the productivity gains expected from AI tools and make an initially attractive technology unprofitable after implementation. After implementation, the firm observes the effective effort response, while its organizational options depend on whether it can diagnose the incentive mechanism behind that response and on the cost or feasibility of workforce adjustment. The firm may choose technological reversion, labour hoarding, workforce restructuring through voluntary separations, or employment‐preserving contracts based on negotiated working‐time reductions. Robustness benchmarks show that the displacement‐induced incentive for underuse can persist when firms and workers form more forward‐looking expectations. A Monte Carlo calibration illustrates that all four organizational responses can arise as profit‐maximizing outcomes.
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
Talent Heterogeneity, Task Substitutability, and Effort Allocation in Teams
This paper studies cooperation and defection in teams when workers differ in talent and tasks vary in their degree of substitutability. We consider an organizational environment in which workers receive equal shares of team output, the principal allocates workers to teams, and a minimum effort standard is enforced through monitoring. Using a CES production technology, we characterize the equilibrium effort profiles that emerge under different combinations of task technology, talent heterogeneity, and effort standards. Mutual cooperation is most likely when workers have similar talent levels and tasks are complementary, whereas mutual defection becomes more prevalent as substitutability increases. Most importantly, asymmetric effort equilibria arise only when talent heterogeneity interacts with a production technology that departs from the Cobb–Douglas benchmark. Under substitutability, the more talented worker tends to cooperate while the less talented worker defects; under complementarity, the opposite pattern may emerge. The paper contributes by identifying a technological condition for asymmetric effort allocation in teams. More broadly, the results show that free riding may emerge as an equilibrium response to task technology and team composition rather than as a simple consequence of weak incentives. From the principal's perspective, profits depend more on team composition and task technology than on the strictness of effort standards, and asymmetric effort allocation may represent a stable and profitable organizational outcome.
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
Talent Heterogeneity, Task Substitutability, and Effort Allocation in Teams
This paper studies cooperation and defection in teams when workers differ in talent and tasks vary in their degree of substitutability. We consider an organizational environment in which workers receive equal shares of team output, the principal allocates workers to teams, and a minimum effort standard is enforced through monitoring. Using a CES production technology, we characterize the equilibrium effort profiles that emerge under different combinations of task technology, talent heterogeneity, and effort standards. Mutual cooperation is most likely when workers have similar talent levels and tasks are complementary, whereas mutual defection becomes more prevalent as substitutability increases. Most importantly, asymmetric effort equilibria arise only when talent heterogeneity interacts with a production technology that departs from the Cobb–Douglas benchmark. Under substitutability, the more talented worker tends to cooperate while the less talented worker defects; under complementarity, the opposite pattern may emerge. The paper contributes by identifying a technological condition for asymmetric effort allocation in teams. More broadly, the results show that free riding may emerge as an equilibrium response to task technology and team composition rather than as a simple consequence of weak incentives. From the principal's perspective, profits depend more on team composition and task technology than on the strictness of effort standards, and asymmetric effort allocation may represent a stable and profitable organizational outcome.
- Open Access
- 18 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Cooperation or Defection in Teams? Talent Heterogeneity and Task Substitutability in Organizational Strategy
This paper analyzes cooperation and defection in teams where agents differ in talent and tasks vary in their degree of substitutability. We study a stylized organizational setting in which a principal assigns workers to teams, sets a minimum effort standard through monitoring, and shares output according to a fixed rule that grants equal compensation to workers. Agents choose between a cooperative effort norm and a minimal effort level that satisfies organizational requirements.Using a CES production technology, we show that the interaction between task substitutability, talent heterogeneity, and effort standards generates distinct behavioral regimes. Cooperation is more likely when required effort is low and tasks are complementary, whereas highly substitutable tasks tend to induce asymmetric behavior, with the more talented agent cooperating and the less talented one free riding. Such behavior arises only when task technology departs from the Cobb--Douglas case and workers differ in talent, and may increase the principal’s payoff.The analysis highlights that free riding and asymmetric effort are not necessarily organizational failures, but can emerge as stable and profitable outcomes of rational organizational design. The results contribute to organizational economics by clarifying how monitoring, talent allocation, and task technology jointly shape cooperative outcomes in teams.
- 18 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCooperation or Defection in Teams? Talent Heterogeneity and Task Substitutability in Organizational Strategy
This paper analyzes cooperation and defection in teams where agents differ in talent and tasks vary in their degree of substitutability. We study a stylized organizational setting in which a principal assigns workers to teams, sets a minimum effort standard through monitoring, and shares output according to a fixed rule that grants equal compensation to workers. Agents choose between a cooperative effort norm and a minimal effort level that satisfies organizational requirements.Using a CES production technology, we show that the interaction between task substitutability, talent heterogeneity, and effort standards generates distinct behavioral regimes. Cooperation is more likely when required effort is low and tasks are complementary, whereas highly substitutable tasks tend to induce asymmetric behavior, with the more talented agent cooperating and the less talented one free riding. Such behavior arises only when task technology departs from the Cobb--Douglas case and workers differ in talent, and may increase the principal’s payoff.The analysis highlights that free riding and asymmetric effort are not necessarily organizational failures, but can emerge as stable and profitable outcomes of rational organizational design. The results contribute to organizational economics by clarifying how monitoring, talent allocation, and task technology jointly shape cooperative outcomes in teams.
- 5 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Econometrics
- Vol. 36 (6) , 663-685
If not now, when? The timing of childbirth and labor market outcomes
Summary: We study the effect of childbirth and birth timing on female labor market outcomes in Italy. The impact is traced up to 21 years since school completion by estimating a factor analytic model with dynamic selection into treatments. We find that childbirth, especially the first delivery, negatively affects female earnings and participation. Women having their first child soon after school exit catch up with childless women after 12–15 years. The negative consequences are smaller if the first child is delayed up to 7–9 years after school completion or if a second childbirth occurs within 6 years since school exit.
- 5 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Applied Econometrics
- Vol. 36 (6) , 663-685
If not now, when? The timing of childbirth and labor market outcomes
Summary: We study the effect of childbirth and birth timing on female labor market outcomes in Italy. The impact is traced up to 21 years since school completion by estimating a factor analytic model with dynamic selection into treatments. We find that childbirth, especially the first delivery, negatively affects female earnings and participation. Women having their first child soon after school exit catch up with childless women after 12–15 years. The negative consequences are smaller if the first child is delayed up to 7–9 years after school completion or if a second childbirth occurs within 6 years since school exit.
- Open Access
- 29 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Italian Economic Journal
- Vol. 8 (1) , 105-143
Firing Costs and Job Loss: The Case of the Italian Jobs Act
A recent reform in the Italian labour market has modified the permanent contract by reducing firing costs. Using a discontinuity in the application of the reform, we evaluate its effect on the probability of being still employed about three and a half years later. In contrast with theoretical predictions, we find that the job survival probability is not smaller for the treated and even significantly larger in some cases. We investigate the composition of permanent workers hired after the reform and we find evidence of treated firms changing their recruitment strategy in favour of potentially more productive workers.
- 29 May 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Italian Economic Journal
- Vol. 8 (1) , 105-143
Open AccessFiring Costs and Job Loss: The Case of the Italian Jobs Act
A recent reform in the Italian labour market has modified the permanent contract by reducing firing costs. Using a discontinuity in the application of the reform, we evaluate its effect on the probability of being still employed about three and a half years later. In contrast with theoretical predictions, we find that the job survival probability is not smaller for the treated and even significantly larger in some cases. We investigate the composition of permanent workers hired after the reform and we find evidence of treated firms changing their recruitment strategy in favour of potentially more productive workers.
- 30 December 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 56 (1) , 23-60
Does apprenticeship improve job opportunities? A regression discontinuity approach
- 30 December 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 56 (1) , 23-60
Does apprenticeship improve job opportunities? A regression discontinuity approach
- 5 May 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Higher Education
- Vol. 71 (1) , 119-142
Beyond participation: do the cost and quality of higher education shape the enrollment composition? The case of Italy
- 5 May 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Higher Education
- Vol. 71 (1) , 119-142
Beyond participation: do the cost and quality of higher education shape the enrollment composition? The case of Italy
- 12 October 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 25-37
A Microeconometric Analysis of Female Labour Force Participation in Italy
- 12 October 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 25-37
A Microeconometric Analysis of Female Labour Force Participation in Italy
- 24 September 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 221-237
Labour Market Transitions During the Financial Crisis in Italy
- 24 September 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 221-237
Labour Market Transitions During the Financial Crisis in Italy
- 9 March 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Economic Journal
- Vol. 25 (1) , 29-46
Individual Earnings, International Outsourcing and Technological Change: Evidence from Italy
The aim of this paper is to evaluate empirically the relative effects of international outsourcing of materials and services and of ICT capital deepening on wage inequality between blue and white collars in the Italian manufacturing industry during the period 1985–1999. We merge an administrative data set on workers’ wages and individual characteristics with data on imported inputs from Italian input–output tables and other sector-level variables. Our results confirm that both material and service outsourcing widen the skilled/unskilled wage gap while ICT capital deepening positively affects real wages regardless of the worker's status. However, important differences emerge when the overall sample is split between traditional and innovative sectors.
- 9 March 2011
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Economic Journal
- Vol. 25 (1) , 29-46
Individual Earnings, International Outsourcing and Technological Change: Evidence from Italy
The aim of this paper is to evaluate empirically the relative effects of international outsourcing of materials and services and of ICT capital deepening on wage inequality between blue and white collars in the Italian manufacturing industry during the period 1985–1999. We merge an administrative data set on workers’ wages and individual characteristics with data on imported inputs from Italian input–output tables and other sector-level variables. Our results confirm that both material and service outsourcing widen the skilled/unskilled wage gap while ICT capital deepening positively affects real wages regardless of the worker's status. However, important differences emerge when the overall sample is split between traditional and innovative sectors.