Jennifer Nado
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jennifer Nado has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Joachim Horvath
Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
1 shared publication- Michael Johnson
Department of Philosophy, Hong Kong University, Pok Fu Lam, Hong Kong
1 shared publication Philosophy Documentation Center
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-22
Truth in philosophy: a conceptual engineering approach
The focus of this paper will be to examine the implications that a “practical” approach to conceptual engineering might have for the “traditional” conception of philosophy as uncovering truths about phenomena of philosophical interest. In doing so, I will be building on the ideas of a figure that many take to be the first major philosopher to write on conceptual engineering: Rudolf Carnap. Though the current wave of interest in conceptual engineering goes back less than a decade, many conceptual engineers have found precedent for their views in Carnap’s characterization of what he called “explication.” Interestingly, however, not nearly as much attention has been paid to another Carnapian thesis which seems to me to have deep relevance to methodological questions about conceptual engineering. I have in mind here the distinction between internal and external questions proposed in “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950b) and the accompanying claim that external questions lack cognitive content and can be cogently approached only as a matter of pragmatic decision-making. This is the aspect of Carnap’s views upon which I propose to build. I'll first make the case that there is a suggestive similarity between Carnap’s claim that external questions are matters of pragmatic choice and the practical conceptual engineer’s claim that engineering success should be characterized in terms of suitability to a function or purpose. After that, I'll look at potential worries about the Carnapian distinction—including, e.g., the concern that it relies on the analytic/synthetic distinction. Finally, I will propose a somewhat modified and expanded version of the distinction and examine its consequences for the thesis that philosophy aims at discovering truths about phenomena of philosophical interest.
- 16 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Asian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-22
Open AccessTruth in philosophy: a conceptual engineering approach
The focus of this paper will be to examine the implications that a “practical” approach to conceptual engineering might have for the “traditional” conception of philosophy as uncovering truths about phenomena of philosophical interest. In doing so, I will be building on the ideas of a figure that many take to be the first major philosopher to write on conceptual engineering: Rudolf Carnap. Though the current wave of interest in conceptual engineering goes back less than a decade, many conceptual engineers have found precedent for their views in Carnap’s characterization of what he called “explication.” Interestingly, however, not nearly as much attention has been paid to another Carnapian thesis which seems to me to have deep relevance to methodological questions about conceptual engineering. I have in mind here the distinction between internal and external questions proposed in “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950b) and the accompanying claim that external questions lack cognitive content and can be cogently approached only as a matter of pragmatic decision-making. This is the aspect of Carnap’s views upon which I propose to build. I'll first make the case that there is a suggestive similarity between Carnap’s claim that external questions are matters of pragmatic choice and the practical conceptual engineer’s claim that engineering success should be characterized in terms of suitability to a function or purpose. After that, I'll look at potential worries about the Carnapian distinction—including, e.g., the concern that it relies on the analytic/synthetic distinction. Finally, I will propose a somewhat modified and expanded version of the distinction and examine its consequences for the thesis that philosophy aims at discovering truths about phenomena of philosophical interest.
- 23 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 106 (1) , 136-156
Classification procedures as the targets of conceptual engineering
- 23 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 106 (1) , 136-156
Classification procedures as the targets of conceptual engineering
- 30 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 69 (1) , 49-74
Re-engineering knowledge: a case study in pluralist conceptual engineering
When fans of conceptual engineering discuss examples of their craft, they frequently focus on cases of ‘one-to-one’ conceptual engineering. That is to say, they focus on cases where a target pre-engineering concept is revised into, or replaced by, a single successor. The possibility that we might instead replace a suboptimal concept with multiple successors is, by contrast, comparatively underexplored. The goal of this paper is to defend this type of pluralist conceptual engineering as legitimate, and as a promising approach to unravelling certain traditional philosophical puzzles. I’ll do so largely by way of example, by exploring a preliminary application of the pluralist approach to one of the most notoriously recalcitrant targets of conceptual analysis: knowledge.
- 30 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 69 (1) , 49-74
Re-engineering knowledge: a case study in pluralist conceptual engineering
When fans of conceptual engineering discuss examples of their craft, they frequently focus on cases of ‘one-to-one’ conceptual engineering. That is to say, they focus on cases where a target pre-engineering concept is revised into, or replaced by, a single successor. The possibility that we might instead replace a suboptimal concept with multiple successors is, by contrast, comparatively underexplored. The goal of this paper is to defend this type of pluralist conceptual engineering as legitimate, and as a promising approach to unravelling certain traditional philosophical puzzles. I’ll do so largely by way of example, by exploring a preliminary application of the pluralist approach to one of the most notoriously recalcitrant targets of conceptual analysis: knowledge.
- 25 November 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 66 (10) , 1974-2000
Taking control: conceptual engineering without (much) metasemantics
This paper critiques the semantics-driven approach to conceptual engineering presented in Herman Cappelen’s recent book, Fixing Language. I focus on three core aspects of Cappelen’s ‘Austerity Framework’: first, the claim that conceptual engineering targets the meanings of linguistic expressions (rather than concepts); second, the claim that the linguistic phenomenon of ‘samesaying’ fixes the limits of permissible revision; and third, the claim that the process of conceptual engineering is largely both outside of our control and epistemically inaccessible to us. I contrast the Austerity Framework with my own proposal, which I call the ‘Practical Role Account’. The Practical Role Account disavows a substantial role for metasemantics in a theory of conceptual engineering; I argue that it consequently both offers a more inclusive view on the limits of revision, and places the process of conceptual engineering back within our control.
- 25 November 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 66 (10) , 1974-2000
Taking control: conceptual engineering without (much) metasemantics
This paper critiques the semantics-driven approach to conceptual engineering presented in Herman Cappelen’s recent book, Fixing Language. I focus on three core aspects of Cappelen’s ‘Austerity Framework’: first, the claim that conceptual engineering targets the meanings of linguistic expressions (rather than concepts); second, the claim that the linguistic phenomenon of ‘samesaying’ fixes the limits of permissible revision; and third, the claim that the process of conceptual engineering is largely both outside of our control and epistemically inaccessible to us. I contrast the Austerity Framework with my own proposal, which I call the ‘Practical Role Account’. The Practical Role Account disavows a substantial role for metasemantics in a theory of conceptual engineering; I argue that it consequently both offers a more inclusive view on the limits of revision, and places the process of conceptual engineering back within our control.
- 24 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (12) , 11673-11694
Knowledge and normality
- 24 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (12) , 11673-11694
Knowledge and normality
- 17 September 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 64 (1-2) , 76-96
Conceptual engineering via experimental philosophy
Conceptual engineering provides a prima facie attractive alternative to traditional, conceptual analysis based approaches to philosophical method – particularly for those with doubts about the epistemic merits of intuition. As such, it seems to be a natural fit for those persuaded by the critiques of intuition offered by experimental philosophy. Recently, a number of authors [Schupbach, J. 2015. “Experimental Explication.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3): 672–710; Shepherd, J., and J. Justus. 2015. “X-Phi and Carnapian Explication.” Erkenntnis 80 (2): 381–402; Fisher, J. 2015. “Pragmatic Experimental Philosophy.” Philosophical Psychology 28: 412–433; Machery, E. 2017. Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds. Oxford University Press] have suggested that experimental philosophy might be employed in service of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I provide a novel argument for x-phi’s relevance to conceptual engineering, based on a ‘functionalist’ approach to conceptual engineering. In short, I argue that experimental philosophy is distinctively well-suited to investigation of the purposes or functions which our concepts serve, and the means by which they fulfil (or fail to fulfil) those functions. Experimental philosophy thereby uncovers potential engineering solutions that may serve as models for the conceptual engineer.
- 17 September 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 64 (1-2) , 76-96
Conceptual engineering via experimental philosophy
Conceptual engineering provides a prima facie attractive alternative to traditional, conceptual analysis based approaches to philosophical method – particularly for those with doubts about the epistemic merits of intuition. As such, it seems to be a natural fit for those persuaded by the critiques of intuition offered by experimental philosophy. Recently, a number of authors [Schupbach, J. 2015. “Experimental Explication.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3): 672–710; Shepherd, J., and J. Justus. 2015. “X-Phi and Carnapian Explication.” Erkenntnis 80 (2): 381–402; Fisher, J. 2015. “Pragmatic Experimental Philosophy.” Philosophical Psychology 28: 412–433; Machery, E. 2017. Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds. Oxford University Press] have suggested that experimental philosophy might be employed in service of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I provide a novel argument for x-phi’s relevance to conceptual engineering, based on a ‘functionalist’ approach to conceptual engineering. In short, I argue that experimental philosophy is distinctively well-suited to investigation of the purposes or functions which our concepts serve, and the means by which they fulfil (or fail to fulfil) those functions. Experimental philosophy thereby uncovers potential engineering solutions that may serve as models for the conceptual engineer.
- Top Cited Papers
- 23 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (S7) , 1507-1527
Conceptual engineering, truth, and efficacy
- 23 January 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 198 (S7) , 1507-1527
Top Cited PapersConceptual engineering, truth, and efficacy
- 8 November 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 145-170
Knowledge Second (for Metaphilosophy)
- 23 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research
- Vol. 34 (3) , 447-463
How To Think About Philosophical Methodology
- 23 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research
- Vol. 34 (3) , 447-463
How To Think About Philosophical Methodology
- 30 April 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 45 (2) , 717-734
Actual vs. Counterfactual Dispositional Metasemantics: A Reply to Andow
- 30 April 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 45 (2) , 717-734
Actual vs. Counterfactual Dispositional Metasemantics: A Reply to Andow