M. Cristina Molinari
M. Cristina Molinari has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Juan Julian Merelo
University of Granada
3 shared publications Raluca Buia
Ca Foscari University of Venice
1 shared publicationRaluca E. Buia
Ca Foscari University of Venice
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Network Analysis and Mining
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-13
An analysis of colleganza contracts in the Republic of Venice and its relationship to the Serrata of the Great Council
From its inception, the Republic of Venice was a state focused on maritime trade, an activity that required large amounts of capital and involved many risks. To meet these needs, the Republic used a type of contract called colleganza , a form of profit-sharing partnership by which a sedentary investor ( stans ) financed a travelling merchant ( tractor ). The colleganza benefited a large portion of the population and constituted a commercial as well as a social network. In this paper, we use an existing database of colleganza contracts to investigate access to the nobility in the Republic of Venice during the Serrata (1297–1323), a constitutional process through which membership in the Great Council, the most important political assembly of the republic, became hereditary and limited to noble families, making the patriciate the ruling class of Venice. We first show that there was no social stratification between the role of stans and tractor and that many families switched from one role to the other. Next, we investigate the probability of being admitted to the Great Council and find that it was higher for families who were more active in the colleganza , both in terms of the number of contracts and roles held, and who had higher DNSL-betweenness in the colleganza social network. We conclude that a strong presence in various roles in the colleganza contracts and centrality in the network were sources of social capital that could be harnessed to ensure the family’s social advancement and access to nobility.
- 10 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Network Analysis and Mining
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-13
Open AccessAn analysis of colleganza contracts in the Republic of Venice and its relationship to the Serrata of the Great Council
From its inception, the Republic of Venice was a state focused on maritime trade, an activity that required large amounts of capital and involved many risks. To meet these needs, the Republic used a type of contract called colleganza , a form of profit-sharing partnership by which a sedentary investor ( stans ) financed a travelling merchant ( tractor ). The colleganza benefited a large portion of the population and constituted a commercial as well as a social network. In this paper, we use an existing database of colleganza contracts to investigate access to the nobility in the Republic of Venice during the Serrata (1297–1323), a constitutional process through which membership in the Great Council, the most important political assembly of the republic, became hereditary and limited to noble families, making the patriciate the ruling class of Venice. We first show that there was no social stratification between the role of stans and tractor and that many families switched from one role to the other. Next, we investigate the probability of being admitted to the Great Council and find that it was higher for families who were more active in the colleganza , both in terms of the number of contracts and roles held, and who had higher DNSL-betweenness in the colleganza social network. We conclude that a strong presence in various roles in the colleganza contracts and centrality in the network were sources of social capital that could be harnessed to ensure the family’s social advancement and access to nobility.
- 30 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 366-380
Self-loops in Social Networks: Behavior of Eigenvector Centrality
- 30 March 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 366-380
Self-loops in Social Networks: Behavior of Eigenvector Centrality
- Open Access
- 25 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Computational Social Science
- Vol. 7 (1) , 425-449
Intra-family links in the analysis of marital networks
Marriage networks, which represent the matrimonial connections between different families in a given historical and geographical milieu, rarely take into account one aspect of internal family dynamics, namely the existence of intra-family marriages. The inclusion of such marriages, represented in the graph by self-loops, is essential to compute more accurate measures of centrality. In this paper, we discuss various procedures for incorporating these links into the analysis, with the requirement that they be compatible with the use of already available social network analysis software. We then apply them to two historical marriage networks, one from the Republic of Venice and the other from Taiwan. By comparing centrality measures for the baseline and modified networks, we found that the most satisfactory of the proposed methods is the one that duplicate nodes of families with intra-family marriages and adds new edges that link these duplicated nodes to all the families to which the original node was connected. This procedure is computationally simple and conceptually sound, making it a useful tool for analyzing marital networks.
- 25 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Computational Social Science
- Vol. 7 (1) , 425-449
Open AccessIntra-family links in the analysis of marital networks
Marriage networks, which represent the matrimonial connections between different families in a given historical and geographical milieu, rarely take into account one aspect of internal family dynamics, namely the existence of intra-family marriages. The inclusion of such marriages, represented in the graph by self-loops, is essential to compute more accurate measures of centrality. In this paper, we discuss various procedures for incorporating these links into the analysis, with the requirement that they be compatible with the use of already available social network analysis software. We then apply them to two historical marriage networks, one from the Republic of Venice and the other from Taiwan. By comparing centrality measures for the baseline and modified networks, we found that the most satisfactory of the proposed methods is the one that duplicate nodes of families with intra-family marriages and adds new edges that link these duplicated nodes to all the families to which the original node was connected. This procedure is computationally simple and conceptually sound, making it a useful tool for analyzing marital networks.
- 14 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- Vol. 35 (2) , 327-348
Much ado about nothing: voting in sixteenth-century Republic of Genoa
- 14 August 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- Vol. 35 (2) , 327-348
Much ado about nothing: voting in sixteenth-century Republic of Genoa
- 17 October 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- Vol. 31 (2) , 169-187
How the Republic of Venice chose its Doge: lot-based elections and supermajority rule
- 17 October 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Constitutional Political Economy
- Vol. 31 (2) , 169-187
How the Republic of Venice chose its Doge: lot-based elections and supermajority rule
- 16 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Organization Review
- Vol. 14 (4) , 545-559
A Second Best Theory of Institutional Quality
- 16 August 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Organization Review
- Vol. 14 (4) , 545-559
A Second Best Theory of Institutional Quality
- 1 December 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 66 (4) , 297-304
Corruption and positive selection in privatization
- 1 December 2012
- Published by Elsevier in Research in Economics
- Vol. 66 (4) , 297-304
Corruption and positive selection in privatization
- Open Access
- 4 December 2008
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Corruption and Positive Selection in Privatization
We consider the supply of a public good based on a publicly-owned facility. The Government has a choice between provision in-house and privatizing the facility and then outsourcing the production. In particular, we focus on corruption in the decision to privatize and on its effect on social welfare when there is asymmetric information on the public and private manager's efficiency. Our analysis shows that a corrupt Government, that chooses to privatize only in exchange for a bribe, makes a positive selection on the private firm's efficiency and, thus, may raise expected social welfare above what an honest Government could get.
- 4 December 2008
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessCorruption and Positive Selection in Privatization
We consider the supply of a public good based on a publicly-owned facility. The Government has a choice between provision in-house and privatizing the facility and then outsourcing the production. In particular, we focus on corruption in the decision to privatize and on its effect on social welfare when there is asymmetric information on the public and private manager's efficiency. Our analysis shows that a corrupt Government, that chooses to privatize only in exchange for a bribe, makes a positive selection on the private firm's efficiency and, thus, may raise expected social welfare above what an honest Government could get.
- 1 June 2000
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 94 (2) , 425-427
Military Capabilities and Escalation: A Correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick
Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two-sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict. I show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions, and I offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games.
- 1 June 2000
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 94 (2) , 425-427
Military Capabilities and Escalation: A Correction to Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick
Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, and Zorick analyze the evolution of crises as a two-sided incomplete information game in order to illuminate the relationship between observable military capabilities and the escalation of a dispute to armed conflict. I show that an error in the derivation of the equilibria invalidates their conclusions, and I offer a few suggestions on how to model the evolution of crises as incomplete information games.