Paul Taggart

The rise of populism as a global phenomenon has captured the attention of scholars and raised concerns about its impact on democracy. Thanks to a growing academic consensus around an ideational definition of populism, one can observe the generation of important cumulative knowledge on the relationship between populism and democracy. Political science has been at the forefront of this development, and this symposium seeks to both offer state-of-the art information on this topic and discuss blind spots that future studies should try to address.

Pundits and academics alike are increasingly concerned about the health of democracy worldwide. Much of this concern is tied to the rise of populism, a global phenomenon presenting challenges to both long-established and relatively young democracies. Political science has been at the forefront of this debate, and thanks to a growing—but not universal—consensus on the ideational definition of populism, our understanding of the subject has deepened considerably. This symposium maps key debates on the complex and often ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy. In this concluding piece, we build on the arguments presented throughout the symposium and related academic discussions to outline two paths for future research on the populism and democracy nexus: a top-down and a bottom-up perspective.

This article is an attempt to present, develop, and deploy the use of the concept of “unpolitics” in relation to Brexit. The article starts with an outline of the concept of unpolitics and then turns to its application to Brexit. The argument is that in the politics of Brexit, specifically in the appeal of part of the “leave” campaign and in the behaviour and appeal of Johnson, we can identify unpolitics as playing a significant role. For the “Vote Leave,” we can identify unpolitical tropes as explicit elements of the campaign. Also, during Johnson’s premiership and his campaign in the 2019 general election, the appeal and behaviour exhibited elements of unpolitics. Johnson’s political demise was not due to Brexit, Covid-19, or Putin but represented the playing out of his unpolitics.

With a proliferation of scholarly work focusing on populist, far-left, and far-right parties, questions have arisen about the correct ways to ideologically classify such parties. To ensure transparency and uniformity in research, the discipline could benefit from a systematic procedure. In this letter, we discuss how we have employed the method of ‘Expert-informed Qualitative Comparative Classification’ (EiQCC) to construct the newest version of The PopuList (3.0) – a database of populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since 1989. This method takes into account the in-depth knowledge of national party experts while allowing for systematic comparative analysis across cases and over time. We also examine how scholars have made use of the previous versions of the dataset, explain how the new version of The PopuList differs from previous ones, and compare it to other data. We conclude with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of The PopuList dataset.

Brexit was potentially a highly divisive issue for the EU27 with states having different relationships with the UK. And yet in the period from the UK's referendum in 2016 until the exit of the UK in 2020, the EU27 maintained a remarkable degree of unity. This article examines relative EU27 unity in the face of the Brexit process. The article is based on interviews and other research on four selected EU member states: Germany, France, Poland and Ireland. The article considers four different factors drawn from the theoretical literature that might account for EU27 unity and then examines how they played out in each of the four states. We then compare across the cases and conclude that they all shaped national responses to Brexit, but that how they mattered and the patterns of effects were differentiated among the cases. This points towards the importance of seeing Brexit as a multifaceted phenomenon.

COVID-19 shocked the world and provided a particular challenge for populist radical right (PRR) forces. We lay out three research questions that this special issue addresses through case studies of the PRR in government in Brazil, Hungary, Turkey and the US and in opposition in France, Italy, Germany and Spain: (1) How have PRR actors responded to the pandemic? (2) How have PRR actors framed the politics of the pandemic? and (3) What have been the effects of the pandemic on the popularity of the PRR? We explain the case selection of this special issue and summarize the main findings of the eight case studies, which show that the pandemic did not severely damage the PRR and that they had very different responses to the challenge. This reinforces the idea that the PRR is not ephemeral but is rather the by-product of structural transformations of contemporary societies and is here for the foreseeable future.

In this interview, Paul Taggart explains that populism thrives because of its being ‘unpolitical’. In other words, Taggart identifies the primal appeal of populism in a sort of gut instinct that politics is not a good thing to be involved with. As a result, he claims that the quintessential populist constituency is formed by those that would not normally bother or even really think about politics constitute. In particular, he claims that populism has a problem with the process of politics which involves trade-offs, compromise, negotiation and building coalitions. Finally, he argues that populism has three basic options once it gets into power. The first is to moderate its populism, the second is it can reshape the institutions of politics, and the third is to behave in government as if they are in opposition.

The populist use of tropes such as conspiracy theories plays an increasingly important role in their politics. Populism and conspiracy theories present a number of common traits – Manichaeanism, a sense of victimhood, and an ambivalence towards representative politics – and populists’ use of conspiracy theories is politically purposeful. Targeting a conspiring elite serves to vilify real or fictional opponents and/or shield populists from hostile attacks. Looking at three cases of populists in government – Orbán in Hungary, Trump in the United States, and Chávez in Venezuela – we examine the definition of conspiring elites (who), the circumstances under which conspiracy theories are propagated (when), and the ultimate purpose of conspiratorial framing (why). We demonstrate how populists in power use conspiracy theories to demonise and delegitimise their opponents, to promote or prolong a sense of crisis, and to rally support while distracting from possible failure.