Christian Zehnder
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Christian Zehnder has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ernst Fehr
University of Zürich
5 shared publications- Holger Herz
University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland
3 shared publications Martin Brown
Study Center Gerzensee and University of St. Gallen, Dorfstrasse 2, CH-3115 Gerzensee, Switzerland
3 shared publicationsArmin Falk
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods
2 shared publications- Manuel Grieder
Zurich University of Applied Sciences (ZHAW)
2 shared publications Benjamin Tur
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (6) , 4643-4668
Worker Empowerment and Subjective Evaluation: On Building an Effective Conflict Culture
Although conflicts typically lead to a waste of resources, organizations may still benefit from a corporate culture that tolerates or even encourages conflicts. The reason is that coordinated conflicts may help to enforce norms and foster cooperation. In this paper, we report results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to explore whether and under what conditions an efficiency-enhancing conflict culture can emerge. Using a principal-agent setup with subjective performance evaluation, we show that establishing a functional conflict culture is a delicate matter. If conflicts are encouraged in a careless hands-off manner, the destructive side of conflicts is likely to dominate. To be successful, a conflict culture requires a careful management of fairness norms. In our experiment, we find that conflicts have positive net effects on efficiency only if an explicit code of conduct is established and conflicts are institutionalized through a grievance process. Thus, providing workers with more power may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving productivity when performance evaluations are subjective. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation [Grant 100018_152903]. W. Bentley MacLeod thanks Princeton University for support via a faculty research grant. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03085 .
- 1 June 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 71 (6) , 4643-4668
Worker Empowerment and Subjective Evaluation: On Building an Effective Conflict Culture
Although conflicts typically lead to a waste of resources, organizations may still benefit from a corporate culture that tolerates or even encourages conflicts. The reason is that coordinated conflicts may help to enforce norms and foster cooperation. In this paper, we report results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to explore whether and under what conditions an efficiency-enhancing conflict culture can emerge. Using a principal-agent setup with subjective performance evaluation, we show that establishing a functional conflict culture is a delicate matter. If conflicts are encouraged in a careless hands-off manner, the destructive side of conflicts is likely to dominate. To be successful, a conflict culture requires a careful management of fairness norms. In our experiment, we find that conflicts have positive net effects on efficiency only if an explicit code of conduct is established and conflicts are institutionalized through a grievance process. Thus, providing workers with more power may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving productivity when performance evaluations are subjective. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation [Grant 100018_152903]. W. Bentley MacLeod thanks Princeton University for support via a faculty research grant. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03085 .
- Open Access
- 10 December 2024
- Published by Elsevier in The Leadership Quarterly
- Vol. 36 (2)
How good can bad leaders be? The opportunity costs of leader selection
- 10 December 2024
- Published by Elsevier in The Leadership Quarterly
- Vol. 36 (2)
Open AccessHow good can bad leaders be? The opportunity costs of leader selection
- 1 November 2024
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 16 (4) , 371-405
Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments
We study secure survey designs in organizational settings where fear of retaliation makes it hard to elicit truth. Theory predicts that (i) randomized-response techniques offer no improvement because they are strategically equivalent to direct elicitation, (ii) exogenously distorting survey responses (hard garbling) can improve information transmission, and (iii) the impact of survey design on reporting can be estimated in equilibrium. Laboratory experiments confirm that hard garbling outperforms direct elicitation but randomized response works better than expected. False accusations slightly but persistently bias treatment effect estimates. Additional experiments reveal that play converges to equilibrium if learning from others’ experience is possible. (JEL C83, C90, D83, D91)
- 1 November 2024
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 16 (4) , 371-405
Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments
We study secure survey designs in organizational settings where fear of retaliation makes it hard to elicit truth. Theory predicts that (i) randomized-response techniques offer no improvement because they are strategically equivalent to direct elicitation, (ii) exogenously distorting survey responses (hard garbling) can improve information transmission, and (iii) the impact of survey design on reporting can be estimated in equilibrium. Laboratory experiments confirm that hard garbling outperforms direct elicitation but randomized response works better than expected. False accusations slightly but persistently bias treatment effect estimates. Additional experiments reveal that play converges to equilibrium if learning from others’ experience is possible. (JEL C83, C90, D83, D91)
- Open Access
- 29 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 218, 423-455
Communication and hidden action: A credit market experiment
- 29 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 218, 423-455
Open AccessCommunication and hidden action: A credit market experiment
- 1 November 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 34 (6) , 2231-2249
Building an Equilibrium: Rules vs. Principles in Relational Contracts
Effective collaboration within and between organizations requires efficient adaptation to unforeseen change. We study how parties build relational contracts that achieve this goal. We focus on the “clarity problem”—whether parties have a shared understanding of the promises they make to each other. Specifically, (a) a buyer and seller play a trading game in several periods; (b) they know their environment will change but do not know how; and (c) before any trading occurs, they can reach a nonbinding agreement about how to play the entire game. We hypothesize that pairs whose initial agreement defines a broad principle rather than a narrow rule are more successful in solving the clarity problem and in achieving efficient adaptation after unforeseen change. In our baseline condition, we indeed observe that pairs who articulate principles achieve significantly higher performance after change occurred. Underlying this correlation, we also find that pairs with principle-based agreements were more likely to both expect and take actions that were consistent with what their agreement prescribed. To investigate a causal link between principle-based agreements and performance, we implement a “nudge” intervention that induces more pairs to articulate principles. The intervention succeeds in coordinating more pairs on efficient quality immediately after the unforeseen change, but it fails to coordinate expectations on price, ultimately leading to conflicts and preventing an increase in long-run performance after the shock. Our results suggest that (1) principle-based agreements may improve organizational performance but (2) high-performing relational contracts may be difficult to build. History: This paper has been accepted for the Organization Science Special Issue on Experiments in Organizational Theory. Funding: We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School's Program on Innovation in Markets and Organizations. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1503 .
- 1 November 2023
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Organization Science
- Vol. 34 (6) , 2231-2249
Building an Equilibrium: Rules vs. Principles in Relational Contracts
Effective collaboration within and between organizations requires efficient adaptation to unforeseen change. We study how parties build relational contracts that achieve this goal. We focus on the “clarity problem”—whether parties have a shared understanding of the promises they make to each other. Specifically, (a) a buyer and seller play a trading game in several periods; (b) they know their environment will change but do not know how; and (c) before any trading occurs, they can reach a nonbinding agreement about how to play the entire game. We hypothesize that pairs whose initial agreement defines a broad principle rather than a narrow rule are more successful in solving the clarity problem and in achieving efficient adaptation after unforeseen change. In our baseline condition, we indeed observe that pairs who articulate principles achieve significantly higher performance after change occurred. Underlying this correlation, we also find that pairs with principle-based agreements were more likely to both expect and take actions that were consistent with what their agreement prescribed. To investigate a causal link between principle-based agreements and performance, we implement a “nudge” intervention that induces more pairs to articulate principles. The intervention succeeds in coordinating more pairs on efficient quality immediately after the unforeseen change, but it fails to coordinate expectations on price, ultimately leading to conflicts and preventing an increase in long-run performance after the shock. Our results suggest that (1) principle-based agreements may improve organizational performance but (2) high-performing relational contracts may be difficult to build. History: This paper has been accepted for the Organization Science Special Issue on Experiments in Organizational Theory. Funding: We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School's Program on Innovation in Markets and Organizations. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1503 .
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (9) , 6355-6381
“Just Words? Just Speeches?” On the Economic Value of Charismatic Leadership
Leadership theories in sociology and psychology argue that effective leaders influence follower behavior not only through the design of incentives and institutions, but also through personal abilities to persuade and motivate. Although charismatic leadership has received considerable attention in the management literature, existing research has not yet established causal evidence for an effect of leader charisma on follower performance in incentivized and economically relevant situations. We report evidence from field and laboratory experiments that investigate whether a leader’s charisma—in the form of a stylistically different motivational speech—can induce individuals to undertake personally costly but socially beneficial actions. In the field experiment, we find that workers who are given a charismatic speech increase their output by about 17% relative to workers who listen to a standard speech. This effect is statistically significant and comparable in size to the positive effect of high-powered financial incentives. We then investigate the effect of charisma in a series of laboratory experiments in which subjects are exposed to motivational speeches before playing a repeated public goods game. Our results reveal that a higher number of charismatic elements in the speech can increase public good contributions by up to 19%. However, we also find that the effectiveness of charisma varies and appears to depend on the social context in which the speech is delivered. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.
- 1 September 2022
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
- Vol. 68 (9) , 6355-6381
Top Cited Papers“Just Words? Just Speeches?” On the Economic Value of Charismatic Leadership
Leadership theories in sociology and psychology argue that effective leaders influence follower behavior not only through the design of incentives and institutions, but also through personal abilities to persuade and motivate. Although charismatic leadership has received considerable attention in the management literature, existing research has not yet established causal evidence for an effect of leader charisma on follower performance in incentivized and economically relevant situations. We report evidence from field and laboratory experiments that investigate whether a leader’s charisma—in the form of a stylistically different motivational speech—can induce individuals to undertake personally costly but socially beneficial actions. In the field experiment, we find that workers who are given a charismatic speech increase their output by about 17% relative to workers who listen to a standard speech. This effect is statistically significant and comparable in size to the positive effect of high-powered financial incentives. We then investigate the effect of charisma in a series of laboratory experiments in which subjects are exposed to motivational speeches before playing a repeated public goods game. Our results reveal that a higher number of charismatic elements in the speech can increase public good contributions by up to 19%. However, we also find that the effectiveness of charisma varies and appears to depend on the social context in which the speech is delivered. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.
- Open Access
- 31 December 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- p. 261-278
Norwid’s Critique of Conspiratorial Reason
- 31 December 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH
- p. 261-278
Open AccessNorwid’s Critique of Conspiratorial Reason
- Open Access
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Worker Empowerment and Subjective Evaluation: On Building an Effective Conflict Culture
Although conflicts typically lead to a waste of resources, organizations may still benefit from a corporate culture that tolerates or even encourages conflicts. The reason is that coordinated conflicts may help to enforce informal contracts and foster cooperation. In this paper we report results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to explore whether and under what conditions an efficiency-enhancing conflict culture can emerge. Using a principal-worker setup with subjective performance evaluation, we show that establishing a functional conflict culture is a delicate matter. If conflicts are encouraged in a careless, hands-off manner, the destructive side of conflicts is likely to dominate. To be successful a conflict culture requires a careful management of fairness norms. In our experiment we find that conflicts have positive net effects on efficiency only if an explicit code of conduct is established and conflicts are institutionalized through a grievance process. Thus, providing workers with more power may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving productivity when performance evaluations are subjective. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessWorker Empowerment and Subjective Evaluation: On Building an Effective Conflict Culture
Although conflicts typically lead to a waste of resources, organizations may still benefit from a corporate culture that tolerates or even encourages conflicts. The reason is that coordinated conflicts may help to enforce informal contracts and foster cooperation. In this paper we report results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to explore whether and under what conditions an efficiency-enhancing conflict culture can emerge. Using a principal-worker setup with subjective performance evaluation, we show that establishing a functional conflict culture is a delicate matter. If conflicts are encouraged in a careless, hands-off manner, the destructive side of conflicts is likely to dominate. To be successful a conflict culture requires a careful management of fairness norms. In our experiment we find that conflicts have positive net effects on efficiency only if an explicit code of conduct is established and conflicts are institutionalized through a grievance process. Thus, providing workers with more power may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving productivity when performance evaluations are subjective. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.
- 1 December 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 156, 34-47
Competitive pricing reduces wasteful counterproductive behaviors
- 1 December 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 156, 34-47
Competitive pricing reduces wasteful counterproductive behaviors
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in The Leadership Quarterly
- Vol. 28 (1) , 65-85
A productive clash of cultures: Injecting economics into leadership research
- 1 February 2017
- Published by Elsevier in The Leadership Quarterly
- Vol. 28 (1) , 65-85
A productive clash of cultures: Injecting economics into leadership research