CZChristian Zehnder

Christian Zehnder

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Christian Zehnder has a total of 28 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Worker Empowerment and Subjective Evaluation: On Building an Effective Conflict Culture

    by W. Bentley MacLeod, Victoria Valle Lara, Christian Zehnder

    Although conflicts typically lead to a waste of resources, organizations may still benefit from a corporate culture that tolerates or even encourages conflicts. The reason is that coordinated conflicts may help to enforce norms and foster cooperation. In this paper, we report results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to explore whether and under what conditions an efficiency-enhancing conflict culture can emerge. Using a principal-agent setup with subjective performance evaluation, we show that establishing a functional conflict culture is a delicate matter. If conflicts are encouraged in a careless hands-off manner, the destructive side of conflicts is likely to dominate. To be successful, a conflict culture requires a careful management of fairness norms. In our experiment, we find that conflicts have positive net effects on efficiency only if an explicit code of conduct is established and conflicts are institutionalized through a grievance process. Thus, providing workers with more power may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving productivity when performance evaluations are subjective. This paper was accepted by Axel Ockenfels, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation [Grant 100018_152903]. W. Bentley MacLeod thanks Princeton University for support via a faculty research grant. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.03085 .

  • Open Access

    How good can bad leaders be? The opportunity costs of leader selection

    by Matthieu Légeret, Christian Zehnder, Benjamin Tur


  • Secure Survey Design in Organizations: Theory and Experiments

    by Sylvain Chassang, Christian Zehnder

    We study secure survey designs in organizational settings where fear of retaliation makes it hard to elicit truth. Theory predicts that (i) randomized-response techniques offer no improvement because they are strategically equivalent to direct elicitation, (ii) exogenously distorting survey responses (hard garbling) can improve information transmission, and (iii) the impact of survey design on reporting can be estimated in equilibrium. Laboratory experiments confirm that hard garbling outperforms direct elicitation but randomized response works better than expected. False accusations slightly but persistently bias treatment effect estimates. Additional experiments reveal that play converges to equilibrium if learning from others’ experience is possible. (JEL C83, C90, D83, D91)


  • Open Access

    Communication and hidden action: A credit market experiment

    by Martin Brown, Jan Schmitz, Christian Zehnder


  • Building an Equilibrium: Rules vs. Principles in Relational Contracts

    by Robert Gibbons, Manuel Grieder, Holger Herz, Christian Zehnder

    Effective collaboration within and between organizations requires efficient adaptation to unforeseen change. We study how parties build relational contracts that achieve this goal. We focus on the “clarity problem”—whether parties have a shared understanding of the promises they make to each other. Specifically, (a) a buyer and seller play a trading game in several periods; (b) they know their environment will change but do not know how; and (c) before any trading occurs, they can reach a nonbinding agreement about how to play the entire game. We hypothesize that pairs whose initial agreement defines a broad principle rather than a narrow rule are more successful in solving the clarity problem and in achieving efficient adaptation after unforeseen change. In our baseline condition, we indeed observe that pairs who articulate principles achieve significantly higher performance after change occurred. Underlying this correlation, we also find that pairs with principle-based agreements were more likely to both expect and take actions that were consistent with what their agreement prescribed. To investigate a causal link between principle-based agreements and performance, we implement a “nudge” intervention that induces more pairs to articulate principles. The intervention succeeds in coordinating more pairs on efficient quality immediately after the unforeseen change, but it fails to coordinate expectations on price, ultimately leading to conflicts and preventing an increase in long-run performance after the shock. Our results suggest that (1) principle-based agreements may improve organizational performance but (2) high-performing relational contracts may be difficult to build. History: This paper has been accepted for the Organization Science Special Issue on Experiments in Organizational Theory. Funding: We gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Sloan School's Program on Innovation in Markets and Organizations. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.2021.1503 .


  • Top Cited Papers

    “Just Words? Just Speeches?” On the Economic Value of Charismatic Leadership

    by John Antonakis, Giovanna D’adda, Roberto A. Weber, Christian Zehnder

    Leadership theories in sociology and psychology argue that effective leaders influence follower behavior not only through the design of incentives and institutions, but also through personal abilities to persuade and motivate. Although charismatic leadership has received considerable attention in the management literature, existing research has not yet established causal evidence for an effect of leader charisma on follower performance in incentivized and economically relevant situations. We report evidence from field and laboratory experiments that investigate whether a leader’s charisma—in the form of a stylistically different motivational speech—can induce individuals to undertake personally costly but socially beneficial actions. In the field experiment, we find that workers who are given a charismatic speech increase their output by about 17% relative to workers who listen to a standard speech. This effect is statistically significant and comparable in size to the positive effect of high-powered financial incentives. We then investigate the effect of charisma in a series of laboratory experiments in which subjects are exposed to motivational speeches before playing a repeated public goods game. Our results reveal that a higher number of charismatic elements in the speech can increase public good contributions by up to 19%. However, we also find that the effectiveness of charisma varies and appears to depend on the social context in which the speech is delivered. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.


  • Open Access

    Norwid’s Critique of Conspiratorial Reason

    by Christian Zehnder

  • Open Access

    Worker Empowerment and Subjective Evaluation: On Building an Effective Conflict Culture

    by W. Bentley MacLeod, Victoria Valle Lara, Christian Zehnder

    Although conflicts typically lead to a waste of resources, organizations may still benefit from a corporate culture that tolerates or even encourages conflicts. The reason is that coordinated conflicts may help to enforce informal contracts and foster cooperation. In this paper we report results of a series of laboratory experiments designed to explore whether and under what conditions an efficiency-enhancing conflict culture can emerge. Using a principal-worker setup with subjective performance evaluation, we show that establishing a functional conflict culture is a delicate matter. If conflicts are encouraged in a careless, hands-off manner, the destructive side of conflicts is likely to dominate. To be successful a conflict culture requires a careful management of fairness norms. In our experiment we find that conflicts have positive net effects on efficiency only if an explicit code of conduct is established and conflicts are institutionalized through a grievance process. Thus, providing workers with more power may be a necessary but not sufficient condition for improving productivity when performance evaluations are subjective. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

  • Competitive pricing reduces wasteful counterproductive behaviors

    by Björn Bartling, Manuel Grieder, Christian Zehnder


  • A productive clash of cultures: Injecting economics into leadership research

    by Christian Zehnder, Holger Herz, Jean-Philippe Bonardi