Nicholas F. Jacobs
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Nicholas F. Jacobs has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Sidney M. Milkis
University of Virginia
4 shared publications- Sidney M. Milkis
University of Virginia
2 shared publications B K Munis
University of Virginia
1 shared publicationB. Kal Munis
Department of History and Political Science, Utah Valley University, Orem, UT, USA
1 shared publication- B. Kal Munis
Department of Political Science, Montana State University , 2-116 Wilson Hall, Bozeman, MT 5971-2240
1 shared publication - Cathryn van Kessel
Texas Christian University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 18 September 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 55 (4) , 702-731
Postfunctionalism across the Atlantic: The “New Politics” in European Integration and US Federalism
The European Union’s internal market was modeled in part on the United States’ national market, yet public attitudes toward market governance in the two arenas have long been understood through different theoretical lenses. In this article, we apply the postfunctionalist theory of European integration—developed to explain EU citizens’ attitudes toward supranational authority—to American federalism, testing whether cultural identity divides (GAL/TAN) shape public opinion on central market governance in the United States as they do in Europe. Using an original survey of 16,000 respondents across eight EU countries and 4,000 Americans, we find that postfunctionalist dynamics are robust in both contexts, challenging prevailing views that American attitudes toward federalism are driven primarily by Left–Right ideology or material interests. Our findings suggest that identity-based contestation over governance extends beyond the EU’s nation-state politics, requiring a broader theoretical framework to understand the intersection of culture, federalism, and economic integration across advanced democracies.
- 18 September 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 55 (4) , 702-731
Postfunctionalism across the Atlantic: The “New Politics” in European Integration and US Federalism
The European Union’s internal market was modeled in part on the United States’ national market, yet public attitudes toward market governance in the two arenas have long been understood through different theoretical lenses. In this article, we apply the postfunctionalist theory of European integration—developed to explain EU citizens’ attitudes toward supranational authority—to American federalism, testing whether cultural identity divides (GAL/TAN) shape public opinion on central market governance in the United States as they do in Europe. Using an original survey of 16,000 respondents across eight EU countries and 4,000 Americans, we find that postfunctionalist dynamics are robust in both contexts, challenging prevailing views that American attitudes toward federalism are driven primarily by Left–Right ideology or material interests. Our findings suggest that identity-based contestation over governance extends beyond the EU’s nation-state politics, requiring a broader theoretical framework to understand the intersection of culture, federalism, and economic integration across advanced democracies.
- 7 December 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
- Vol. 52 (3) , 239-248
The Nationalization of Individual Campaign Contributions in U.S. Senate Elections, 1984-2020
This article explores the trend of increasing nationalization in American politics and its effect on the U.S. Senate's federalizing dynamics, using campaign finance as an indicator. We analyze the geographic distribution of campaign contributions to U.S. Senate races from 1984 to 2020, tracing the nationalization of donor behavior in America. Key findings suggest that more ideologically conservative senators and those running for their first election are likely to rely heavily on out-of-state donations, with regional differences also evident. We argue that the nationalization of campaign finance challenges the Senate's representative structure and hints at another dimension of inequality in American politics—geographical versus national influence. This study offers no definitive normative argument but posits restricting out-of-state donations as a potential solution to address the growing inequality in the voting power of Senate members.
- 7 December 2023
- Published by SAGE Publications in American Politics Research
- Vol. 52 (3) , 239-248
The Nationalization of Individual Campaign Contributions in U.S. Senate Elections, 1984-2020
This article explores the trend of increasing nationalization in American politics and its effect on the U.S. Senate's federalizing dynamics, using campaign finance as an indicator. We analyze the geographic distribution of campaign contributions to U.S. Senate races from 1984 to 2020, tracing the nationalization of donor behavior in America. Key findings suggest that more ideologically conservative senators and those running for their first election are likely to rely heavily on out-of-state donations, with regional differences also evident. We argue that the nationalization of campaign finance challenges the Senate's representative structure and hints at another dimension of inequality in American politics—geographical versus national influence. This study offers no definitive normative argument but posits restricting out-of-state donations as a potential solution to address the growing inequality in the voting power of Senate members.
- 12 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 54 (2) , 201-227
Seeing Red and Blue: Assessing How Americans Understand Geographic Polarization, Secession, and the Value of Federalism
This article examines how public perceptions about the divide between blue and red states shape attitudes about secession in the United States. Through a nationally representative survey of the adult American population, I measure how individuals perceive political differences between states, and demonstrate that as perceptions of political differences increase, so too does support for secession. Measured through multiple questions and an experimental design, these findings demonstrate a previously underexplored dynamic of the country’s partisan divisions. Both Democrats and Republicans are more likely to support secession as their awareness of the “red” and “blue” divide increases—an attitude that is statistically independent from other beliefs that motivate partisan animosity in the contemporary United States, such as populism, racial resentment, affective polarization, and ideology. While talk of an impending “civil war” may be exaggerated, the widespread prevalence of secessionist beliefs shows that the legitimacy of the country’s federal bargain is challenged by political nationalization.
- 12 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 54 (2) , 201-227
Seeing Red and Blue: Assessing How Americans Understand Geographic Polarization, Secession, and the Value of Federalism
This article examines how public perceptions about the divide between blue and red states shape attitudes about secession in the United States. Through a nationally representative survey of the adult American population, I measure how individuals perceive political differences between states, and demonstrate that as perceptions of political differences increase, so too does support for secession. Measured through multiple questions and an experimental design, these findings demonstrate a previously underexplored dynamic of the country’s partisan divisions. Both Democrats and Republicans are more likely to support secession as their awareness of the “red” and “blue” divide increases—an attitude that is statistically independent from other beliefs that motivate partisan animosity in the contemporary United States, such as populism, racial resentment, affective polarization, and ideology. While talk of an impending “civil war” may be exaggerated, the widespread prevalence of secessionist beliefs shows that the legitimacy of the country’s federal bargain is challenged by political nationalization.
- 24 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 21 (1) , 318-319
Response to Joshua N. Zingher’s Review of What Happened to the Vital Center? Presidentialism, Populist Revolt, and the Fracturing of America
- 24 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 21 (1) , 318-319
Response to Joshua N. Zingher’s Review of What Happened to the Vital Center? Presidentialism, Populist Revolt, and the Fracturing of America
- 28 February 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Congress & the Presidency
- Vol. 50 (3) , 291-316
Presidential Partisanship and Legislative Cooperation in the U.S. Senate, 1993–2021
In this article, we detail how the rise of executive-centered partisanship has transformed president-Senate relations since 1993. We argue that the growing centrality of the president as a figurehead for their party has produced incentives for both co-partisans and out-partisans. We use a measure of presidential “success” to model variation over time and between individual senators. We show that rising presidential partisanship has increased the likelihood for out-partisans to oppose the president’s legislative position, even after controlling for other markers of partisan polarization. This relationship is strongest among electorally vulnerable out-partisans. In addition, our data suggest that Republican out-partisans asymmetrically oppose Democratic presidents. We conclude that the growing centrality of the presidency in party affairs has had effects beyond administrative preemption of the legislative process; it has increasingly set a hard limit on bi-partisan cooperation on legislation and nominee confirmations in the Senate.
- 28 February 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Congress & the Presidency
- Vol. 50 (3) , 291-316
Presidential Partisanship and Legislative Cooperation in the U.S. Senate, 1993–2021
In this article, we detail how the rise of executive-centered partisanship has transformed president-Senate relations since 1993. We argue that the growing centrality of the president as a figurehead for their party has produced incentives for both co-partisans and out-partisans. We use a measure of presidential “success” to model variation over time and between individual senators. We show that rising presidential partisanship has increased the likelihood for out-partisans to oppose the president’s legislative position, even after controlling for other markers of partisan polarization. This relationship is strongest among electorally vulnerable out-partisans. In addition, our data suggest that Republican out-partisans asymmetrically oppose Democratic presidents. We conclude that the growing centrality of the presidency in party affairs has had effects beyond administrative preemption of the legislative process; it has increasingly set a hard limit on bi-partisan cooperation on legislation and nominee confirmations in the Senate.
- Top Cited Papers
- 7 September 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Research Quarterly
- Vol. 76 (3) , 1102-1118
Place-Based Resentment in Contemporary U.S. Elections: The Individual Sources of America’s Urban-Rural Divide
Drawing on a unique battery of questions fielded on the 2018 CCES and in two separate surveys—one in 2019 and the other during the 2020 election—we study the extent to which Americans feel animus toward communities that are geographically distinct from their own and whether these feelings explain Americans’ attitudes toward the two major political parties and self-reported vote choice. We report results on how place-based resentment predicted vote choice in the 2018 midterm and 2020 general elections and how those feelings relate to other widely studied facets of political behavior such as partisanship and racial resentment. Rural resentment is a powerful predictor of vote choice in both election years examined.
- 7 September 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Research Quarterly
- Vol. 76 (3) , 1102-1118
Top Cited PapersPlace-Based Resentment in Contemporary U.S. Elections: The Individual Sources of America’s Urban-Rural Divide
Drawing on a unique battery of questions fielded on the 2018 CCES and in two separate surveys—one in 2019 and the other during the 2020 election—we study the extent to which Americans feel animus toward communities that are geographically distinct from their own and whether these feelings explain Americans’ attitudes toward the two major political parties and self-reported vote choice. We report results on how place-based resentment predicted vote choice in the 2018 midterm and 2020 general elections and how those feelings relate to other widely studied facets of political behavior such as partisanship and racial resentment. Rural resentment is a powerful predictor of vote choice in both election years examined.
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The Forum
- Vol. 19 (4) , 709-744
Get Out of the Way: Joe Biden, the U.S. Congress, and Executive-Centered Partisanship During the President’s First Year in Office
On the campaign trail and at his inauguration, Joe Biden pledged, above all else, to be a uniter to restore the soul of America. At the end of his first year in office, many campaign promises have been met, but unity has not been one. Far from transcending partisanship as promised, Biden has embraced the levers of presidential discretion and power inherent within the modern executive office to advance partisan objectives. He is not just a victim of polarization, but actively contributes to it. This is not unexpected. Rather it is the culmination of a decades-long reorientation within both major parties: the rise of an executive-centered party-system, with Democrats and Republicans alike relying on presidents and presidential candidates to pronounce party doctrine, raise campaign funds, campaign on behalf of their partisan brethren, mobilize grass roots support, and advance party programs. Like Barack Obama and Donald Trump before him, Biden has aggressively used executive power to cut the Gordian knot of partisan gridlock in Congress. Even pandemic politics is not immune to presidential partisanship; in fact, it has accentuated the United States’ presidency-centered democracy, which weakens the public resolve to confront and solve national problems.
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The Forum
- Vol. 19 (4) , 709-744
Get Out of the Way: Joe Biden, the U.S. Congress, and Executive-Centered Partisanship During the President’s First Year in Office
On the campaign trail and at his inauguration, Joe Biden pledged, above all else, to be a uniter to restore the soul of America. At the end of his first year in office, many campaign promises have been met, but unity has not been one. Far from transcending partisanship as promised, Biden has embraced the levers of presidential discretion and power inherent within the modern executive office to advance partisan objectives. He is not just a victim of polarization, but actively contributes to it. This is not unexpected. Rather it is the culmination of a decades-long reorientation within both major parties: the rise of an executive-centered party-system, with Democrats and Republicans alike relying on presidents and presidential candidates to pronounce party doctrine, raise campaign funds, campaign on behalf of their partisan brethren, mobilize grass roots support, and advance party programs. Like Barack Obama and Donald Trump before him, Biden has aggressively used executive power to cut the Gordian knot of partisan gridlock in Congress. Even pandemic politics is not immune to presidential partisanship; in fact, it has accentuated the United States’ presidency-centered democracy, which weakens the public resolve to confront and solve national problems.
- Open Access
- 18 June 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 51 (4) , 693-719
Federalism, Polarization, and Policy Responsibility during COVID-19: Experimental and Observational Evidence from the United States
This article considers the ways in which partisanship structured public attitudes about the United States’ multiple governments as each tried to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 during the spring and summer of 2020. The evidence shows that Democrats and Republicans both made distinctions among their local, state, and federal governments, assigning them different functional responsibilities. Yet, members of the two parties did not agree on that division of intergovernmental responsibility. Rather, across a variety of issues, polarized partisan identities structured beliefs about the operation and efficacy of the American federal system’s ability to contend with the spread of coronavirus. Moreover, these beliefs did not stem from prior ideological commitments or the different composition of Democratic or Republican communities. Instead, party leaders proved especially capable of shifting public attitudes on questions of federal versus state authority through their shifting rhetoric and strategic framing.
- 18 June 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Publius: The Journal of Federalism
- Vol. 51 (4) , 693-719
Open AccessFederalism, Polarization, and Policy Responsibility during COVID-19: Experimental and Observational Evidence from the United States
This article considers the ways in which partisanship structured public attitudes about the United States’ multiple governments as each tried to mitigate the spread of COVID-19 during the spring and summer of 2020. The evidence shows that Democrats and Republicans both made distinctions among their local, state, and federal governments, assigning them different functional responsibilities. Yet, members of the two parties did not agree on that division of intergovernmental responsibility. Rather, across a variety of issues, polarized partisan identities structured beliefs about the operation and efficacy of the American federal system’s ability to contend with the spread of coronavirus. Moreover, these beliefs did not stem from prior ideological commitments or the different composition of Democratic or Republican communities. Instead, party leaders proved especially capable of shifting public attitudes on questions of federal versus state authority through their shifting rhetoric and strategic framing.