Jason Low
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Jason Low has a total of 49 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alexis Garland
School of Psychology, Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
7 shared publications - Kevin Chase Burns
Te Kura Mātauranga Koiora, School of Biological Sciences Te Herenga Waka, Victoria University of Wellington Wellington New Zealand
7 shared publications Bo Wang
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
4 shared publications- Katheryn Edwards
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
3 shared publications Kevin Durkin
Victoria University of Wellington and University of Western Australia
2 shared publicationsSteve Hollis
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Unveiling the Dot-Perspective Task: Integrating Implicit-Mentalistic with Sub-Mentalistic Processes
Adults’ performances on the dot-perspective task showed a consistency effect: participants were slower to judge their own visual perspective when their own perspective and others’ perspective were different compared to when both perspectives were the same. This effect has been explained by two competing accounts: the implicit mentalising account suggests the effect arises from relatively automatic tracking of others’ visual perspectives, whereas the submentalising account suggests the effect arises from domain-general attentional orienting. We conducted three experiments to adjudicate between the two competing accounts. Experiment 1 manipulated eye–head directional cues (gaze-averted-face versus head-averted-face) and measured its effect on implicit mentalising (in the dot-perspective task) and attentional orienting (in the Posner task). Eye–head directional cues modulated attentional orienting but not implicit mentalising, supporting the importance of visual access and the existence of implicit mentalising in the dot-perspective task. Experiment 2 compared the effect of gaze-averted versus finger-pointing agents. Finger-pointing direction might induce attentional orienting effects on both tasks. Experiment 3 combined finger-pointing with manipulation of the agent’s visual access (eyes-sighted versus eyes-covered) on the dot-perspective task. Visual access did not modulate the consistency effect when finger-pointing was simultaneously displayed. The findings of Experiments 2 and 3 indicated the contribution of the sub-mentalistic process to the dot-perspective task. Overall, the findings suggest that implicit mentalising and submentalising may co-exist in human social perceptual processes. Visual access appears to play a dominant role in modulating implicit mentalising on the dot-perspective task, but the process may be interfered with by finger-pointing cues (more salient than gaze cues) via a sub-mentalistic attentional-orienting mechanism.
Open AccessUnveiling the Dot-Perspective Task: Integrating Implicit-Mentalistic with Sub-Mentalistic Processes
Adults’ performances on the dot-perspective task showed a consistency effect: participants were slower to judge their own visual perspective when their own perspective and others’ perspective were different compared to when both perspectives were the same. This effect has been explained by two competing accounts: the implicit mentalising account suggests the effect arises from relatively automatic tracking of others’ visual perspectives, whereas the submentalising account suggests the effect arises from domain-general attentional orienting. We conducted three experiments to adjudicate between the two competing accounts. Experiment 1 manipulated eye–head directional cues (gaze-averted-face versus head-averted-face) and measured its effect on implicit mentalising (in the dot-perspective task) and attentional orienting (in the Posner task). Eye–head directional cues modulated attentional orienting but not implicit mentalising, supporting the importance of visual access and the existence of implicit mentalising in the dot-perspective task. Experiment 2 compared the effect of gaze-averted versus finger-pointing agents. Finger-pointing direction might induce attentional orienting effects on both tasks. Experiment 3 combined finger-pointing with manipulation of the agent’s visual access (eyes-sighted versus eyes-covered) on the dot-perspective task. Visual access did not modulate the consistency effect when finger-pointing was simultaneously displayed. The findings of Experiments 2 and 3 indicated the contribution of the sub-mentalistic process to the dot-perspective task. Overall, the findings suggest that implicit mentalising and submentalising may co-exist in human social perceptual processes. Visual access appears to play a dominant role in modulating implicit mentalising on the dot-perspective task, but the process may be interfered with by finger-pointing cues (more salient than gaze cues) via a sub-mentalistic attentional-orienting mechanism.
- 18 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 46, e130
A view from mindreading on fast-and-slow thinking
De Neys's incisive critique of empirical and theoretical research on the exclusivity feature underscores the depth of the challenge of explaining the interplay of fast and slow processes. We argue that a closer look at research on mindreading reveals abundant evidence for the exclusivity feature – as well as methodological and theoretical perspectives that could inform research on fast and slow thinking.
- 18 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 46, e130
A view from mindreading on fast-and-slow thinking
De Neys's incisive critique of empirical and theoretical research on the exclusivity feature underscores the depth of the challenge of explaining the interplay of fast and slow processes. We argue that a closer look at research on mindreading reveals abundant evidence for the exclusivity feature – as well as methodological and theoretical perspectives that could inform research on fast and slow thinking.
- 27 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Ecology & Evolution
- Vol. 37 (12) , 1029-1031
The psychology of natural history
- 27 September 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Ecology & Evolution
- Vol. 37 (12) , 1029-1031
The psychology of natural history
- 14 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Psychology
- Vol. 81
Botanical priming helps overcome plant blindness on a memory task
- 14 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Psychology
- Vol. 81
Botanical priming helps overcome plant blindness on a memory task
- 1 February 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Developmental Psychology
- Vol. 58 (2) , 367-375
Retrieval-induced forgetting for autobiographical memories beyond recall rates: A developmental study.
We investigated whether selective discussion of autobiographical memory narratives would impact the quality of young people's recall of their nondiscussed memory narratives. Children (ages 8-9 years, n = 65) and adolescents (ages 13-15 years, n = 58) completed an adapted version of the retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) paradigm for self-generated positively and negatively valenced autobiographical memories. Overall, 54.5% of the sample were female and 63.4% were of European ethnicity (11.4% Pacific Peoples, 8.1% Middle Eastern/Latin American/African, 7.3% Maori, 7.3% Asian, 2.4% Other). We defined narrative qualities as narrative coherence (Reese et al., 2011) and episodic and nonepisodic information (Addis et al., 2008). In light of developmental findings in other domains of autobiographical memory research (e.g., Reese et al., 2011; Willoughby et al., 2012), we hypothesized that selective discussion would result in RIF for children's, but not adolescents', narrative coherence and episodic detail, and that RIF would not occur for nonepisodic details for either children or adolescents. Findings for narrative coherence and nonepisodic detail indicated support for our hypotheses. Findings for episodic detail were in partial support of our hypothesis; RIF for episodic detail was found for both children and adolescents. Our findings not only demonstrate the importance of investigating the wider effects of RIF but also uncovered developmental differences previously overlooked in the field.
- 1 February 2022
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Developmental Psychology
- Vol. 58 (2) , 367-375
Retrieval-induced forgetting for autobiographical memories beyond recall rates: A developmental study.
We investigated whether selective discussion of autobiographical memory narratives would impact the quality of young people's recall of their nondiscussed memory narratives. Children (ages 8-9 years, n = 65) and adolescents (ages 13-15 years, n = 58) completed an adapted version of the retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) paradigm for self-generated positively and negatively valenced autobiographical memories. Overall, 54.5% of the sample were female and 63.4% were of European ethnicity (11.4% Pacific Peoples, 8.1% Middle Eastern/Latin American/African, 7.3% Maori, 7.3% Asian, 2.4% Other). We defined narrative qualities as narrative coherence (Reese et al., 2011) and episodic and nonepisodic information (Addis et al., 2008). In light of developmental findings in other domains of autobiographical memory research (e.g., Reese et al., 2011; Willoughby et al., 2012), we hypothesized that selective discussion would result in RIF for children's, but not adolescents', narrative coherence and episodic detail, and that RIF would not occur for nonepisodic details for either children or adolescents. Findings for narrative coherence and nonepisodic detail indicated support for our hypotheses. Findings for episodic detail were in partial support of our hypothesis; RIF for episodic detail was found for both children and adolescents. Our findings not only demonstrate the importance of investigating the wider effects of RIF but also uncovered developmental differences previously overlooked in the field.
- Open Access
- 9 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-12
Visibly constraining an agent modulates observers’ automatic false-belief tracking
Our motor system can generate representations which carry information about the goals of another agent’s actions. However, it is not known whether motor representations play a deeper role in social understanding, and, in particular, whether they enable tracking others’ beliefs. Here we show that, for adult observers, reliably manifesting an ability to track another’s false belief critically depends on representing the agent’s potential actions motorically. One signature of motor representations is that they can be disrupted by constraints on an observed agent’s action capacities. We therefore used a ‘mummification’ technique to manipulate whether the agent in a visual ball-detection task was free to act or whether he was visibly constrained from acting. Adults’ reaction times reliably reflected the agent’s beliefs only when the agent was free to act on the ball and not when the agent was visibly constrained from acting. Furthermore, it was the agent’s constrained action capabilities, rather than any perceptual novelty, that determined whether adult observers’ reaction times reliably reflected the agent’s beliefs. These findings signal that our motor system may underpin more of social cognition than previously imagined, and, in particular, that motor representations may underpin automatic false-belief tracking.
- 9 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 10 (1) , 1-12
Open AccessVisibly constraining an agent modulates observers’ automatic false-belief tracking
Our motor system can generate representations which carry information about the goals of another agent’s actions. However, it is not known whether motor representations play a deeper role in social understanding, and, in particular, whether they enable tracking others’ beliefs. Here we show that, for adult observers, reliably manifesting an ability to track another’s false belief critically depends on representing the agent’s potential actions motorically. One signature of motor representations is that they can be disrupted by constraints on an observed agent’s action capacities. We therefore used a ‘mummification’ technique to manipulate whether the agent in a visual ball-detection task was free to act or whether he was visibly constrained from acting. Adults’ reaction times reliably reflected the agent’s beliefs only when the agent was free to act on the ball and not when the agent was visibly constrained from acting. Furthermore, it was the agent’s constrained action capabilities, rather than any perceptual novelty, that determined whether adult observers’ reaction times reliably reflected the agent’s beliefs. These findings signal that our motor system may underpin more of social cognition than previously imagined, and, in particular, that motor representations may underpin automatic false-belief tracking.
- 1 April 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Development
- Vol. 46, 86-96
The curious case of adults’ interpretations of violation-of-expectation false belief scenarios
- 1 April 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Cognitive Development
- Vol. 46, 86-96
The curious case of adults’ interpretations of violation-of-expectation false belief scenarios
- 5 August 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Child Development Perspectives
- Vol. 10 (3) , 184-189
Cognitive Architecture of Belief Reasoning in Children and Adults: A Primer on the Two-Systems Account
Characterizing the cognitive architecture of human mindreading forces us to address two puzzles in people's attributions of belief: Why children show inconsistent expectations about others' belief-based actions, and why adults' reasoning about belief is sometimes automatic and sometimes not. The seemingly puzzling data suggest that humans have many mindreading systems that use different models of mental representations. The efficient system is shared by infants, children, and adults, and uses a minimal model of the mind, which enables belief-like states to be tracked. The flexible system develops late and uses a canonical model, which incorporates propositional attitudes. A given model's operation has signature limits that produce performance contrasts, in children as well as adults, between certain types of mindreading tasks.
- 5 August 2016
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Child Development Perspectives
- Vol. 10 (3) , 184-189
Cognitive Architecture of Belief Reasoning in Children and Adults: A Primer on the Two-Systems Account
Characterizing the cognitive architecture of human mindreading forces us to address two puzzles in people's attributions of belief: Why children show inconsistent expectations about others' belief-based actions, and why adults' reasoning about belief is sometimes automatic and sometimes not. The seemingly puzzling data suggest that humans have many mindreading systems that use different models of mental representations. The efficient system is shared by infants, children, and adults, and uses a minimal model of the mind, which enables belief-like states to be tracked. The flexible system develops late and uses a canonical model, which incorporates propositional attitudes. A given model's operation has signature limits that produce performance contrasts, in children as well as adults, between certain types of mindreading tasks.