Marc Schröder
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Marc Schröder has a total of 40 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marco Scarsini
Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, Luiss University, 00197 Roma, Italy
6 shared publications - Dries Vermeulen
Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands
5 shared publications - Roberto Cominetti
Facultad de Ingeniería y Ciencias, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, Santiago 7941169, Chile
4 shared publications - Tami Tamir
Reichman University
4 shared publications - André Berger
Department of Quantitative Economics Maastricht University The Netherlands
3 shared publications Dries Vermeulen
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Interval Scheduling Games with Color-Based Concurrent Jobs
We consider a game theoretic variant of an interval scheduling problem. Every job is associated with a length, a weight, and a color. Each player controls all the jobs of a specific color, and needs to decide on a processing interval for each of its jobs. Jobs of the same color can be processed simultaneously by the machine. A job is covered if the machine is configured to its color during its whole processing interval. The goal of the machine is to maximize the sum of weights of all covered jobs, and the goal of each player is to maximize the sum of weights of covered jobs from its color. The study of this game is motivated by several applications like antenna scheduling for wireless networks. We first show that given a strategy profile of the players, the machine scheduling problem can be solved in polynomial time. We then study the game from the players’ point of view. We analyze the existence of Nash equilibria, its computation, and inefficiency. We distinguish between instances of the classical interval scheduling problem, in which every player controls a single job, and instances in which color sets may include multiple jobs.
- 22 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Open AccessInterval Scheduling Games with Color-Based Concurrent Jobs
We consider a game theoretic variant of an interval scheduling problem. Every job is associated with a length, a weight, and a color. Each player controls all the jobs of a specific color, and needs to decide on a processing interval for each of its jobs. Jobs of the same color can be processed simultaneously by the machine. A job is covered if the machine is configured to its color during its whole processing interval. The goal of the machine is to maximize the sum of weights of all covered jobs, and the goal of each player is to maximize the sum of weights of covered jobs from its color. The study of this game is motivated by several applications like antenna scheduling for wireless networks. We first show that given a strategy profile of the players, the machine scheduling problem can be solved in polynomial time. We then study the game from the players’ point of view. We analyze the existence of Nash equilibria, its computation, and inefficiency. We distinguish between instances of the classical interval scheduling problem, in which every player controls a single job, and instances in which color sets may include multiple jobs.
- Open Access
- 16 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 335 (2) , 648-660
Searching for a mobile hider in a directed bipartite graph
- 16 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 335 (2) , 648-660
Open AccessSearching for a mobile hider in a directed bipartite graph
- Open Access
- 11 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 125
Maximal matchings
- 11 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 125
Open AccessMaximal matchings
- 1 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 236-253
Nash Flows Over Time with Tolls
- Open Access
Interval Scheduling Games
We consider a game-theoretic variant of an interval scheduling problem. Every job is associated with a length, a weight, and a color. Each player controls all the jobs of a specific color, and needs to decide on a processing interval for each of its jobs. Jobs of the same color can be processed simultaneously by the machine. A job is covered if the machine is configured to its color during its whole processing interval. The goal of the machine is to maximize the sum of weights of all covered jobs, and the goal of each player is to place its jobs such that the sum of weights of covered jobs from its color is maximized. The study of this game is motivated by several applications like antenna scheduling for wireless networks. We first show that given a strategy profile of the players, the machine scheduling problem can be solved in polynomial time. We then study the game from the players' point of view. We analyze the existence of Nash equilibria, its computation, and inefficiency. We distinguish between instances of the classical interval scheduling problem, in which every player controls a single job, and instances in which color sets may include multiple jobs.
Open AccessInterval Scheduling Games
We consider a game-theoretic variant of an interval scheduling problem. Every job is associated with a length, a weight, and a color. Each player controls all the jobs of a specific color, and needs to decide on a processing interval for each of its jobs. Jobs of the same color can be processed simultaneously by the machine. A job is covered if the machine is configured to its color during its whole processing interval. The goal of the machine is to maximize the sum of weights of all covered jobs, and the goal of each player is to place its jobs such that the sum of weights of covered jobs from its color is maximized. The study of this game is motivated by several applications like antenna scheduling for wireless networks. We first show that given a strategy profile of the players, the machine scheduling problem can be solved in polynomial time. We then study the game from the players' point of view. We analyze the existence of Nash equilibria, its computation, and inefficiency. We distinguish between instances of the classical interval scheduling problem, in which every player controls a single job, and instances in which color sets may include multiple jobs.
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 124-142
Interval Scheduling Games
- Open Access
Nash Flows Over Time with Tolls
We study a dynamic routing game motivated by traffic flows. The base model for an edge is the Vickrey bottleneck model. That is, edges are equipped with a free flow transit time and a capacity. When the inflow into an edge exceeds its capacity, a queue forms and the following particles experience a waiting time. In this paper, we enhance the model by introducing tolls, i.e., a cost each flow particle must pay for traversing an edge. In this setting we consider non-atomic equilibria, which means flows over time in which every particle is on a cheapest path, when summing up toll and travel time. We first show that unlike in the non-tolled version of this model, dynamic equilibria are not unique in terms of costs and do not necessarily reach a steady state. As a main result, we provide a procedure to compute steady states in the model with tolls.
Open AccessNash Flows Over Time with Tolls
We study a dynamic routing game motivated by traffic flows. The base model for an edge is the Vickrey bottleneck model. That is, edges are equipped with a free flow transit time and a capacity. When the inflow into an edge exceeds its capacity, a queue forms and the following particles experience a waiting time. In this paper, we enhance the model by introducing tolls, i.e., a cost each flow particle must pay for traversing an edge. In this setting we consider non-atomic equilibria, which means flows over time in which every particle is on a cheapest path, when summing up toll and travel time. We first show that unlike in the non-tolled version of this model, dynamic equilibria are not unique in terms of costs and do not necessarily reach a steady state. As a main result, we provide a procedure to compute steady states in the model with tolls.
- Open Access
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Discrete Optimization
- Vol. 58
An improved bound for the price of anarchy for related machine scheduling
- 17 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Discrete Optimization
- Vol. 58
Open AccessAn improved bound for the price of anarchy for related machine scheduling
- Open Access
- 14 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 61
Fixed order scheduling with deadlines
- 14 May 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Operations Research Letters
- Vol. 61
Open AccessFixed order scheduling with deadlines
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 73 (2) , 672-688
Ordinary and Prophet Planning Under Uncertainty in Bernoulli Congestion Games
Uncertain Demand in Transportation Reduces Worst-Case Congestion In “Ordinary and Prophet Planning Under Uncertainty in Bernoulli Congestion Games,” Cominetti, Scarsini, Schröder, and Stier-Moses characterize the inefficiency introduced by self-minded travelers in congested networks, such as those in big cities. When the likelihood that travelers are present in a congested network is smaller, the uncertainty affects the resulting conditions but also what a social planner would do. Contrary to what might be expected, the consequence is a reduction of the worst-case expressions for the inefficiency of the prevailing traffic conditions with respect to the routes of a social planner. This reduction holds under two possible informational assumptions for the social planner. An ordinary planner only has statistical information based on past data in terms of the expected number of travelers, whereas a prophet planner is informed of the participation outcomes right when travelers start their trips.
- 1 March 2025
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Operations Research
- Vol. 73 (2) , 672-688
Ordinary and Prophet Planning Under Uncertainty in Bernoulli Congestion Games
Uncertain Demand in Transportation Reduces Worst-Case Congestion In “Ordinary and Prophet Planning Under Uncertainty in Bernoulli Congestion Games,” Cominetti, Scarsini, Schröder, and Stier-Moses characterize the inefficiency introduced by self-minded travelers in congested networks, such as those in big cities. When the likelihood that travelers are present in a congested network is smaller, the uncertainty affects the resulting conditions but also what a social planner would do. Contrary to what might be expected, the consequence is a reduction of the worst-case expressions for the inefficiency of the prevailing traffic conditions with respect to the routes of a social planner. This reduction holds under two possible informational assumptions for the social planner. An ordinary planner only has statistical information based on past data in terms of the expected number of travelers, whereas a prophet planner is informed of the participation outcomes right when travelers start their trips.