David Stadelmann
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
David Stadelmann has a total of 503 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Reiner Eichenberger
Professor für Theorie der Wirtschafts- und Finanzpolitik an der Universität Fribourg , Schweiz und Forschungsdirektor von CREMA ( Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts , Schweiz) Switzerland
20 shared publications- Marco Portmann
Institute for Swiss Economic Policy (IWP) at the University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland
19 shared publications - Reiner Eichenberger
Department of Economics, University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland
17 shared publications - Benno Torgler
ARC Training Centre for Behavioural Insights for Technology Adoption and School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
14 shared publications - Raymond Boadi Frempong
European School of Political and Social Sciences (ESPOL) Université Catholique de Lille Lille France
11 shared publications Benno Torgler
10 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Political Returns to Environmental Governance
Climate change is altering citizen-state relationships by changing citizens' expectations of environmental public goods and political incentives. Politicians respond to citizen demands when doing so generates electoral or political rewards. However, policy-induced environmental improvements are often diffuse, difficult to attribute to specific governments, and sometimes realised after the electoral term of the incumbent. This raises a fundamental political economy question: do citizens reward governments for effective environmental governance, and if so, under what conditions? Using the Afrobarometer Round 9 from 29 multiparty democracies in Africa, we show that approval of government environmental performance significantly predicts trust in the president, parliament, local government, and the ruling party, and increases stated willingness to vote the incumbent. We find that the effect is concentrated among citizens who hold national government responsible for environmental outcomes and among non-partisan citizens. These findings suggest that environmental governance constitutes a valued public good whose effective provision has direct implications for state legitimacy and democratic accountability in Africa. Thus, effective environmental protection could be employed as a tool enhance state legitimacy, especially in the sub-region where the legitimacy of the state is sometimes contested and questioned.
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessPolitical Returns to Environmental Governance
Climate change is altering citizen-state relationships by changing citizens' expectations of environmental public goods and political incentives. Politicians respond to citizen demands when doing so generates electoral or political rewards. However, policy-induced environmental improvements are often diffuse, difficult to attribute to specific governments, and sometimes realised after the electoral term of the incumbent. This raises a fundamental political economy question: do citizens reward governments for effective environmental governance, and if so, under what conditions? Using the Afrobarometer Round 9 from 29 multiparty democracies in Africa, we show that approval of government environmental performance significantly predicts trust in the president, parliament, local government, and the ruling party, and increases stated willingness to vote the incumbent. We find that the effect is concentrated among citizens who hold national government responsible for environmental outcomes and among non-partisan citizens. These findings suggest that environmental governance constitutes a valued public good whose effective provision has direct implications for state legitimacy and democratic accountability in Africa. Thus, effective environmental protection could be employed as a tool enhance state legitimacy, especially in the sub-region where the legitimacy of the state is sometimes contested and questioned.
- Open Access
- 13 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Straight Borders are not a Curse
The artificial-states literature associates straight borders with harmful political partition. We test this view within countries. We construct a GIS-based measure of border straightness for 1,639 subnational regions and relate it to regional GDP per capita over 1950-2020, comparing regions in the same country and year. Straightness is positively associated with income: a 10-percentage-point increase in a region's straight-border share is associated with about 4.8 percent higher GDP per capita. Domestic and international straightness both enter positively, and their coefficients are not statistically different. The association is positive in countries with low and medium ethnic fractionalization, and negative but imprecise in highly fractionalized ones. We interpret these patterns through the processes that create borders. Straight lines can reflect harmful partition, but also administrative organization and negotiated coordination. Border geometry alone is a poor proxy for harmful artificiality.
- 13 November 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessStraight Borders are not a Curse
The artificial-states literature associates straight borders with harmful political partition. We test this view within countries. We construct a GIS-based measure of border straightness for 1,639 subnational regions and relate it to regional GDP per capita over 1950-2020, comparing regions in the same country and year. Straightness is positively associated with income: a 10-percentage-point increase in a region's straight-border share is associated with about 4.8 percent higher GDP per capita. Domestic and international straightness both enter positively, and their coefficients are not statistically different. The association is positive in countries with low and medium ethnic fractionalization, and negative but imprecise in highly fractionalized ones. We interpret these patterns through the processes that create borders. Straight lines can reflect harmful partition, but also administrative organization and negotiated coordination. Border geometry alone is a poor proxy for harmful artificiality.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Beyond Homicide: Criminal Governance Disruption and Adolescent Fertility in Mexico
This paper studies how disruptions to local criminal governance affect adolescent fertility. We examine two episodes in Mexico: the militarized crackdown beginning in 2007 and the fentanyl-era territorial expansion of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel beginning in 2013. The first design compares municipalities where criminal organization was more deeply embedded before the crackdown with a low-exposure comparison group; the second exploits predetermined transport corridors associated with the later territorial reorganization. Conventional differencein-differences estimates imply increases of about 3.7 and 4.1 registered births per 1,000 females ages 10-19, respectively, and synthetic difference-indifferences estimates closely corroborate both effects. Organizational timing provides supporting evidence consistent with disruption, while descriptive accounting with recorded homicide measures leaves most of the fertility response unexplained. Survey evidence from ENDIREH shows larger increases in reported harassment among younger women, while a comparative corrido corpus documents more organized coercion alongside less frequent female narrative agency. Together, these findings show that changes in criminal authority can adversely affect young women's demographic and social outcomes in ways that homicide records alone fail to capture.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessBeyond Homicide: Criminal Governance Disruption and Adolescent Fertility in Mexico
This paper studies how disruptions to local criminal governance affect adolescent fertility. We examine two episodes in Mexico: the militarized crackdown beginning in 2007 and the fentanyl-era territorial expansion of the Jalisco New Generation Cartel beginning in 2013. The first design compares municipalities where criminal organization was more deeply embedded before the crackdown with a low-exposure comparison group; the second exploits predetermined transport corridors associated with the later territorial reorganization. Conventional differencein-differences estimates imply increases of about 3.7 and 4.1 registered births per 1,000 females ages 10-19, respectively, and synthetic difference-indifferences estimates closely corroborate both effects. Organizational timing provides supporting evidence consistent with disruption, while descriptive accounting with recorded homicide measures leaves most of the fertility response unexplained. Survey evidence from ENDIREH shows larger increases in reported harassment among younger women, while a comparative corrido corpus documents more organized coercion alongside less frequent female narrative agency. Together, these findings show that changes in criminal authority can adversely affect young women's demographic and social outcomes in ways that homicide records alone fail to capture.
- Open Access
- 8 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- p. 1-16
Party discipline, representation, and the condorcet jury theorem
How does district magnitude affect the quality of political representation? The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) predicts that majority decisions improve with group size when members vote independently and are more likely than not to be correct. We test whether this aggregation mechanism applies to political decisions by examining whether larger legislative delegations better reflect constituent preferences. Nominal district magnitude often overstates the number of independent decision-makers because of party discipline. We therefore introduce effective district magnitude as a measure that more accurately captures the number of independently voting politicians within a constituency. Using 263 Swiss referenda (1992–2024) matched to parliamentary decisions, we find that the probability that a majority of a district’s delegation aligns with the preferences of its constituents increases with (effective) district magnitude, consistent with the CJT. The CJT aggregation mechanism closely predicts delegation-constituency congruence only for effective, not nominal, district magnitude. Our results provide empirical evidence that the CJT applies to representative democracies. They also show how party discipline limits the advantages of larger districts.
- 8 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- p. 1-16
Open AccessParty discipline, representation, and the condorcet jury theorem
How does district magnitude affect the quality of political representation? The Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) predicts that majority decisions improve with group size when members vote independently and are more likely than not to be correct. We test whether this aggregation mechanism applies to political decisions by examining whether larger legislative delegations better reflect constituent preferences. Nominal district magnitude often overstates the number of independent decision-makers because of party discipline. We therefore introduce effective district magnitude as a measure that more accurately captures the number of independently voting politicians within a constituency. Using 263 Swiss referenda (1992–2024) matched to parliamentary decisions, we find that the probability that a majority of a district’s delegation aligns with the preferences of its constituents increases with (effective) district magnitude, consistent with the CJT. The CJT aggregation mechanism closely predicts delegation-constituency congruence only for effective, not nominal, district magnitude. Our results provide empirical evidence that the CJT applies to representative democracies. They also show how party discipline limits the advantages of larger districts.
- Open Access
- 12 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Eyes without Teeth: Evidence from Giving and Taking Frames
We study how observability affects behaviour when neither monetary sanctions nor counterpart identification are possible, a setting we describe as "eyes without teeth.'' We implement a 2x2 laboratory design crossing moral frame (giving in a Dictator Game versus taking in a Gangster Game) with observability (strict double-blind anonymity versus exposure). We evaluate choices relative to explicit rule benchmarks, equal split in the giving frame and no taking in the taking frame, and focus on distributional responses rather than mean effects alone. Exposure shifts behaviour toward the relevant rule in both frames, but the form of adjustment differs sharply across environments. In the giving frame, choices move gradually toward the equal-split benchmark. In the taking frame, exposure induces a much more discrete response: many subjects move directly to exact compliance by leaving the full endowment to the passive subject, generating a clear mass point at the rule. Overall, observability without enforcement increases alignment with salient rule benchmarks, but its behavioural signature differs markedly between giving and taking frames.
- 12 May 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessEyes without Teeth: Evidence from Giving and Taking Frames
We study how observability affects behaviour when neither monetary sanctions nor counterpart identification are possible, a setting we describe as "eyes without teeth.'' We implement a 2x2 laboratory design crossing moral frame (giving in a Dictator Game versus taking in a Gangster Game) with observability (strict double-blind anonymity versus exposure). We evaluate choices relative to explicit rule benchmarks, equal split in the giving frame and no taking in the taking frame, and focus on distributional responses rather than mean effects alone. Exposure shifts behaviour toward the relevant rule in both frames, but the form of adjustment differs sharply across environments. In the giving frame, choices move gradually toward the equal-split benchmark. In the taking frame, exposure induces a much more discrete response: many subjects move directly to exact compliance by leaving the full endowment to the passive subject, generating a clear mass point at the rule. Overall, observability without enforcement increases alignment with salient rule benchmarks, but its behavioural signature differs markedly between giving and taking frames.
- Open Access
- 26 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Economics
- Vol. 158
Whether it’s weather or climate: Temperature and individual deprivation in Sub-Saharan Africa
- 26 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Economics
- Vol. 158
Open AccessWhether it’s weather or climate: Temperature and individual deprivation in Sub-Saharan Africa
- Open Access
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Comparative Economics
- Vol. 54 (3) , 769-783
Beyond the last term: Analyzing politicians’ responsiveness in a no-term-limit context
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Comparative Economics
- Vol. 54 (3) , 769-783
Open AccessBeyond the last term: Analyzing politicians’ responsiveness in a no-term-limit context
- Open Access
- 18 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 93
The beauty premium in politics? Perceptions and political behavior
- 18 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 93
Open AccessThe beauty premium in politics? Perceptions and political behavior
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 333-339
Government failure as failure of the market for politics
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 333-339
Government failure as failure of the market for politics
- Open Access
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 206 (3-4) , 593-608
Too hot to play it cool? Temperature and negative media bias
This paper examines the impact of outdoor temperature on media bias in a quasi-experimental setting. We take advantage of the geographical proximity of the locations of the three major US news networks, ABC News, CBS News, and NBC News, all headquartered in New York City, and granular variations in local daily temperatures. We use more than 10 years of daily hand-coded data on the tonality of evening weekday news broadcasts by each news network to estimate the effect of hot weather on negative media bias in reporting the news affiliated with the Republican and Democratic parties, controlling for time and network-month fixed effects. In line with theoretical expectations regarding human behavior, our results suggest an increase in negative media bias: a 0.5 °C (0.9 °F) increment in daily maximum temperature on a hot day (> 25 °C or > 77 °F) leads to about a 10% increase in the negative bias measured as the difference in the share of negative news about the Republicans and the Democrats. This effect is mainly driven by an increase of the share of negative news about the Republicans. This bias in political reporting exists only for maximum temperatures, as opposed to minimum or average temperatures. The results are robust to an array of placebo tests using past or future temperatures. Examining a similar effect for positive coverage bias, we detect precisely null effects, suggesting that high temperatures are associated only with biased negativity in reporting.
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 206 (3-4) , 593-608
Open AccessToo hot to play it cool? Temperature and negative media bias
This paper examines the impact of outdoor temperature on media bias in a quasi-experimental setting. We take advantage of the geographical proximity of the locations of the three major US news networks, ABC News, CBS News, and NBC News, all headquartered in New York City, and granular variations in local daily temperatures. We use more than 10 years of daily hand-coded data on the tonality of evening weekday news broadcasts by each news network to estimate the effect of hot weather on negative media bias in reporting the news affiliated with the Republican and Democratic parties, controlling for time and network-month fixed effects. In line with theoretical expectations regarding human behavior, our results suggest an increase in negative media bias: a 0.5 °C (0.9 °F) increment in daily maximum temperature on a hot day (> 25 °C or > 77 °F) leads to about a 10% increase in the negative bias measured as the difference in the share of negative news about the Republicans and the Democrats. This effect is mainly driven by an increase of the share of negative news about the Republicans. This bias in political reporting exists only for maximum temperatures, as opposed to minimum or average temperatures. The results are robust to an array of placebo tests using past or future temperatures. Examining a similar effect for positive coverage bias, we detect precisely null effects, suggesting that high temperatures are associated only with biased negativity in reporting.