Michael Brady
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Michael Brady has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Bain
University of Glasgow
1 shared publication - Eranda Jayawickreme
Wake Forest University
1 shared publication - Leah Ritterfeld
University of Vienna
1 shared publication Margaret Plews-Ogan
University of Virginia
1 shared publicationMonika Ardelt
University of Florida
1 shared publicationNuwan Jayawickreme
Touro University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- p. 1-23
Post-traumatic diminishment as the opposite of post-traumatic growth
- 29 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- p. 1-23
Open AccessPost-traumatic diminishment as the opposite of post-traumatic growth
- Open Access
- 15 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality Science
- Vol. 7
Multidisciplinary Recommendations for Improving the Credibility of Research on Posttraumatic Growth
Research on posttraumatic growth (PTG) is widely invoked as evidence that adversity can catalyze positive change. However, existing research often conflates coping with transformation, relies on culturally specific assumptions, and lacks a clear standard for what counts as growth. Integrating philosophy, personality science, and cultural psychology, we articulate six necessary criteria—lasting change, conceptual distinctiveness, meaningful positivity, normative significance, causal linkage to trauma, and empirical verifiability—that a credible PTG account must satisfy. We propose a virtue-based framework that meets these criteria, reconciling universal aspirations with context-sensitive manifestations of character virtues in the context of adversity. This multidisciplinary synthesis resets PTG science on a clearly defined, culturally plural, and normatively robust footing by defining enduring post-traumatic positive change as the cultivation of culturally situated virtues .
- 15 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality Science
- Vol. 7
Open AccessMultidisciplinary Recommendations for Improving the Credibility of Research on Posttraumatic Growth
Research on posttraumatic growth (PTG) is widely invoked as evidence that adversity can catalyze positive change. However, existing research often conflates coping with transformation, relies on culturally specific assumptions, and lacks a clear standard for what counts as growth. Integrating philosophy, personality science, and cultural psychology, we articulate six necessary criteria—lasting change, conceptual distinctiveness, meaningful positivity, normative significance, causal linkage to trauma, and empirical verifiability—that a credible PTG account must satisfy. We propose a virtue-based framework that meets these criteria, reconciling universal aspirations with context-sensitive manifestations of character virtues in the context of adversity. This multidisciplinary synthesis resets PTG science on a clearly defined, culturally plural, and normatively robust footing by defining enduring post-traumatic positive change as the cultivation of culturally situated virtues .
- Open Access
- 6 February 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- Vol. 35 (1) , 58-68
Why We Should Be Experientialists about Suffering
Increased interest in suffering has given rise to different accounts of what suffering is. This paper focuses the debate between experientialists and non-experientialists about suffering. The former hold that suffering is necessarily experiential—for instance, because it is necessarily unpleasant or painful; the latter deny this—for instance, because one can suffer when and because one’s objective properties are damaged, even if one does not experience this. After surveying how the two accounts fare on a range of issues, the paper presents a decisive argument in favor of experientialism. The central claim is that non-experientialist accounts cannot accommodate cases of suffering that are virtuous and that directly contribute to some objective good.
- 6 February 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics
- Vol. 35 (1) , 58-68
Open AccessWhy We Should Be Experientialists about Suffering
Increased interest in suffering has given rise to different accounts of what suffering is. This paper focuses the debate between experientialists and non-experientialists about suffering. The former hold that suffering is necessarily experiential—for instance, because it is necessarily unpleasant or painful; the latter deny this—for instance, because one can suffer when and because one’s objective properties are damaged, even if one does not experience this. After surveying how the two accounts fare on a range of issues, the paper presents a decisive argument in favor of experientialism. The central claim is that non-experientialist accounts cannot accommodate cases of suffering that are virtuous and that directly contribute to some objective good.
- Open Access
- 13 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (4) , 611-623
Response to Commentators on Suffering and Virtue
- 13 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (4) , 611-623
Open AccessResponse to Commentators on Suffering and Virtue
- Open Access
- 12 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (4) , 567-569
Precis of Suffering and Virtue
- 12 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (4) , 567-569
Open AccessPrecis of Suffering and Virtue
- Open Access
- 30 September 2021
- Published by Society for Philosophy of Emotion in Journal of Philosophy of Emotion
- Vol. 3 (1) , 49-61
Replies to Ben-Ze’ev, Starkey, Reyes Càrdenas, Bloomfield, LaGuardia-LoBianco, and Mendonça
In these replies, I respond to all six of my commentators. I acknowledge a number of areas where the book could be improved—not least in terms of the categorisation of theories of emotion; the emphasis on the positive value of emotion as opposed to emotion’s negative aspects; and the need to consider how emotions function in a broader range of circumstances. Alongside this, I welcome the defences of the perceptual model and new perspectives on the relations between emotion and virtue that a number of commentators present.
- 30 September 2021
- Published by Society for Philosophy of Emotion in Journal of Philosophy of Emotion
- Vol. 3 (1) , 49-61
Open AccessReplies to Ben-Ze’ev, Starkey, Reyes Càrdenas, Bloomfield, LaGuardia-LoBianco, and Mendonça
In these replies, I respond to all six of my commentators. I acknowledge a number of areas where the book could be improved—not least in terms of the categorisation of theories of emotion; the emphasis on the positive value of emotion as opposed to emotion’s negative aspects; and the need to consider how emotions function in a broader range of circumstances. Alongside this, I welcome the defences of the perceptual model and new perspectives on the relations between emotion and virtue that a number of commentators present.
- Open Access
- 30 September 2021
- Published by Society for Philosophy of Emotion in Journal of Philosophy of Emotion
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-4
Précis: Emotion: The Basics
Emotion: The Basics is an introductory text about the nature and value of emotion, and highlights the very many ways in which emotions can be good for us: epistemically, deliberatively, socially, morally, and aesthetically. It proposes a pluralist account of what emotions are, and includes both an overview of current literature on emotion, and original proposals about emotion’s importance.
- 30 September 2021
- Published by Society for Philosophy of Emotion in Journal of Philosophy of Emotion
- Vol. 3 (1) , 1-4
Open AccessPrécis: Emotion: The Basics
Emotion: The Basics is an introductory text about the nature and value of emotion, and highlights the very many ways in which emotions can be good for us: epistemically, deliberatively, socially, morally, and aesthetically. It proposes a pluralist account of what emotions are, and includes both an overview of current literature on emotion, and original proposals about emotion’s importance.
- 13 August 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Moral Philosophy
- Vol. 17 (4) , 461-463
Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives, edited by Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber
"Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives, edited by Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber" published on 13 Aug 2020 by Brill.
- 13 August 2020
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Journal of Moral Philosophy
- Vol. 17 (4) , 461-463
Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives, edited by Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber
"Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives, edited by Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber" published on 13 Aug 2020 by Brill.
- 10 September 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 53 (3) , 463-465
Adversity, Conflict, Wisdom
- 10 September 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 53 (3) , 463-465
Adversity, Conflict, Wisdom
- Open Access
- 14 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 53 (3) , 467-469
Why Suffering Is Essential to Wisdom
- 14 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 53 (3) , 467-469
Open AccessWhy Suffering Is Essential to Wisdom