Amie Kreppel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Amie Kreppel has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- George Tsebelis
University of Michigan
2 shared publications Michael Webb
Department of Political Science University of Florida Gainesville FL USA
2 shared publicationsBuket Oztas
University of Florida, Gainesville, USA
1 shared publication- Buket Oztas
Furman University
1 shared publication Carlo Fusaro
1 shared publicationCorinne Tomasi
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Italian Politics
- Vol. 18 (3) , 1-14
Governing without choosing: the limits of performative politics
- 4 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Italian Politics
- Vol. 18 (3) , 1-14
Open AccessGoverning without choosing: the limits of performative politics
- Open Access
- 30 January 2025
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 13
Oversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
The Monetary Dialogue (MD) between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Parliament (EP) has received ample research that has offered an insightful discussion on the effectiveness of the dialogue as a forum for ECB accountability. However, most of the literature has focused on what the ECB is held accountable for or how the ECB engages in the dialogues. Key questions remain, however, regarding the goals and actions of the individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that this article seeks to address. First, we develop a theoretical framework that moves beyond a general concept of “accountability” and differentiates between accountability, oversight, and influence. By defining the concepts more precisely, our aim is to distinguish types of engagement and offer a comparative perspective to broaden the discussion of accountability forums. Second, our article contributes to a growing subset of literature on the MD that shifts the focus from what the ECB gets from the dialogues to how MEPs utilize the MD. To achieve this, we analyze and code MEP questions during the quarterly MD and investigate the impact that member state, national party, and EP political group affiliation have on the character of the questions asked by MEPs over time.
- 30 January 2025
- Published by Cogitatio in Politics and Governance
- Vol. 13
Open AccessOversight, Accountability, or Influence? Understanding the Use of Monetary Dialogues in the European Parliament
The Monetary Dialogue (MD) between the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Parliament (EP) has received ample research that has offered an insightful discussion on the effectiveness of the dialogue as a forum for ECB accountability. However, most of the literature has focused on what the ECB is held accountable for or how the ECB engages in the dialogues. Key questions remain, however, regarding the goals and actions of the individual members of the European Parliament (MEPs) that this article seeks to address. First, we develop a theoretical framework that moves beyond a general concept of “accountability” and differentiates between accountability, oversight, and influence. By defining the concepts more precisely, our aim is to distinguish types of engagement and offer a comparative perspective to broaden the discussion of accountability forums. Second, our article contributes to a growing subset of literature on the MD that shifts the focus from what the ECB gets from the dialogues to how MEPs utilize the MD. To achieve this, we analyze and code MEP questions during the quarterly MD and investigate the impact that member state, national party, and EP political group affiliation have on the character of the questions asked by MEPs over time.
- 27 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 117-139
7. Legislatures
This chapter focuses on the political roles and powers of legislatures. It first describes different types of legislatures on the basis of their functions and relationship with the executive branch, before analysing the roles of legislatures within the political system as a whole, as well as several critical aspects of the internal organizational structures of legislatures. It then examines the relationship between the political power and influence of a legislature and the structure of the broader political and party system. The discussion focuses on legislatures within modern democratic political systems, although many points apply to all legislatures, regardless of regime. The chapter also explains how legislature differs from assembly, parliament, and congress.
- 27 April 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 117-139
7. Legislatures
This chapter focuses on the political roles and powers of legislatures. It first describes different types of legislatures on the basis of their functions and relationship with the executive branch, before analysing the roles of legislatures within the political system as a whole, as well as several critical aspects of the internal organizational structures of legislatures. It then examines the relationship between the political power and influence of a legislature and the structure of the broader political and party system. The discussion focuses on legislatures within modern democratic political systems, although many points apply to all legislatures, regardless of regime. The chapter also explains how legislature differs from assembly, parliament, and congress.
- 3 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Italian Politics
- Vol. 14 (2) , 133-150
From the ‘yellow-red’ to the technocratic government in the pandemic era. The formation and activity of the Draghi government during its first nine months in charge
This article analyses the Draghi government in its first nine months in office, focusing on three main areas: (1) the formation and characteristics of the executive; (2) the positioning of the executive on the supranational political stage, in particular, its relationship with the European Union; (3) the legislative and policymaking activity of the Government. The main aim is to highlight the extent to which the technocratic nature of the executive played a role in each of these three areas of analysis. Elements of change and continuity with the governments of the recent past are also emphasized.
- 3 April 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Italian Politics
- Vol. 14 (2) , 133-150
From the ‘yellow-red’ to the technocratic government in the pandemic era. The formation and activity of the Draghi government during its first nine months in charge
This article analyses the Draghi government in its first nine months in office, focusing on three main areas: (1) the formation and characteristics of the executive; (2) the positioning of the executive on the supranational political stage, in particular, its relationship with the European Union; (3) the legislative and policymaking activity of the Government. The main aim is to highlight the extent to which the technocratic nature of the executive played a role in each of these three areas of analysis. Elements of change and continuity with the governments of the recent past are also emphasized.
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 29 (1) , 23-41
Loyal agent or shirking partner: understanding the policy goals of national ministers in the Council of the European Union
Research on representation within the European Union (EU) often assumes that partisan policy preferences are mediated primarily through the European Parliament, while the European Council and Council of the EU (Council) represent national interests. This assumption obfuscates the potential for divergent policy preferences within Council delegations, the majority of which are coalitions comprised of ideologically diverse parties. Such divergent preferences within national governments provide an incentive for coalition partners to pursue policy outcomes at the EU level that diverge from those of their coalition. This research assesses the existence of such policy shirking by members of the Council utilizing the DEU III dataset, party manifestos, and a new dataset on the partisan characteristics of individual Council members. This analysis provides insights into the factors that affect variations between national positions (as measured by the DEU III) and coalition member preferences (as reflected in party manifestos).
- 27 October 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 29 (1) , 23-41
Loyal agent or shirking partner: understanding the policy goals of national ministers in the Council of the European Union
Research on representation within the European Union (EU) often assumes that partisan policy preferences are mediated primarily through the European Parliament, while the European Council and Council of the EU (Council) represent national interests. This assumption obfuscates the potential for divergent policy preferences within Council delegations, the majority of which are coalitions comprised of ideologically diverse parties. Such divergent preferences within national governments provide an incentive for coalition partners to pursue policy outcomes at the EU level that diverge from those of their coalition. This research assesses the existence of such policy shirking by members of the Council utilizing the DEU III dataset, party manifestos, and a new dataset on the partisan characteristics of individual Council members. This analysis provides insights into the factors that affect variations between national positions (as measured by the DEU III) and coalition member preferences (as reflected in party manifestos).
- 13 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 60 (2) , 408-426
Power or Luck? The Limitations of the European Commission's Agenda Setting Power and Autonomous Policy Influence
Building on the existing research on the European Commission's agenda‐setting powers, this study examines the relationship between the policy priorities of the Commission and those of the other key policy actors in the European Union to determine the impact of other EU institutional actor preferences on the success of Commission priority initiatives. By using new and existing datasets to compare the European Commission's Work Programmes with European Council Summit Conclusions, the European Parliament's own initiative reports and Council Presidency Work Programmes, we are able to analyse the effect of policy priority congruence on the Commission's success and measure the autonomous policy influence of the Commission more accurately. Our results demonstrate that the Commission's priority initiatives are significantly more likely to result in legislative outcomes when they address policy topics already highlighted (whether fortuitously or as a result of Commission efforts) by the other key EU institutions. They also suggest that interpretations of the EU political system that ascribe the role of political executive to the Commission misconstrue its role.
- 13 September 2021
- Published by Wiley in JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies
- Vol. 60 (2) , 408-426
Power or Luck? The Limitations of the European Commission's Agenda Setting Power and Autonomous Policy Influence
Building on the existing research on the European Commission's agenda‐setting powers, this study examines the relationship between the policy priorities of the Commission and those of the other key policy actors in the European Union to determine the impact of other EU institutional actor preferences on the success of Commission priority initiatives. By using new and existing datasets to compare the European Commission's Work Programmes with European Council Summit Conclusions, the European Parliament's own initiative reports and Council Presidency Work Programmes, we are able to analyse the effect of policy priority congruence on the Commission's success and measure the autonomous policy influence of the Commission more accurately. Our results demonstrate that the Commission's priority initiatives are significantly more likely to result in legislative outcomes when they address policy topics already highlighted (whether fortuitously or as a result of Commission efforts) by the other key EU institutions. They also suggest that interpretations of the EU political system that ascribe the role of political executive to the Commission misconstrue its role.
- 27 July 2020
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 99 (2) , 304-320
The European Parliament's role as an informalEUagenda setter: The influence of own initiative reports
This article examines the conditions under which the European Parliament (EP) effectively exercises its informal agenda setting powers to directly influence the content of the European Union's policy agenda through the use of ‘own initiative reports’ or EPOIR. We test three models of EPOIR influence (salience, linkage and ideology) utilizing a newly created dataset of all substantive references to EPOIR within Commission pre‐legislative communications and legislative proposals produced between 2000 and 2017. These references serve as the dependent variable in our analysis, which seeks to identify the traits of EPOIR that increase their likelihood of exerting agenda influence. Our findings suggest not only that EPOIR can and do help to shape the EU policy agenda, but that salience and inter‐institutional linkage are the most effective attributes in explaining when this type of EP agenda setting effort via EPOIR is most likely to be successful.
- 27 July 2020
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration
- Vol. 99 (2) , 304-320
The European Parliament's role as an informalEUagenda setter: The influence of own initiative reports
This article examines the conditions under which the European Parliament (EP) effectively exercises its informal agenda setting powers to directly influence the content of the European Union's policy agenda through the use of ‘own initiative reports’ or EPOIR. We test three models of EPOIR influence (salience, linkage and ideology) utilizing a newly created dataset of all substantive references to EPOIR within Commission pre‐legislative communications and legislative proposals produced between 2000 and 2017. These references serve as the dependent variable in our analysis, which seeks to identify the traits of EPOIR that increase their likelihood of exerting agenda influence. Our findings suggest not only that EPOIR can and do help to shape the EU policy agenda, but that salience and inter‐institutional linkage are the most effective attributes in explaining when this type of EP agenda setting effort via EPOIR is most likely to be successful.
- 9 June 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 115-136
European Parliament resolutions—effective agenda setting or whistling into the wind?
- 9 June 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 115-136
European Parliament resolutions—effective agenda setting or whistling into the wind?
- Open Access
- 13 November 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 17 (4) , 1240-1241
Parliaments in Time: The Evolution of Legislative Democracy in Western Europe, 1866–2015. By Michael Koß. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 336p. $85.00 cloth.
- 13 November 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 17 (4) , 1240-1241
Open AccessParliaments in Time: The Evolution of Legislative Democracy in Western Europe, 1866–2015. By Michael Koß. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. 336p. $85.00 cloth.
- 3 April 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 41 (3) , 383-404
European Parliament resolutions—effective agenda setting or whistling into the wind?
The European Parliament is one of the most studied legislatures in the world. The general consensus in most of these analyses is that the power of the EP in the legislative processes of the EU has increased precipitously, since the introduction of the co-decision procedure. One continuing perceived weakness of the EP, however, is its inability to introduce new legislation. While the EP can request that the Commission initiate a proposal, it lacks the power to introduce bills itself. This research looks at the indirect agenda power of the EP through an analysis of EP own initiative resolutions and their impact on the policy agenda of the EU. The research introduces anew dataset on all EP resolutions between 2000 and 2015 and compares the pre- and post-2009 period to assess the impact of formal treaty changes to the legislative role of the EP have had on its agenda-setting capacity.
- 3 April 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Integration
- Vol. 41 (3) , 383-404
European Parliament resolutions—effective agenda setting or whistling into the wind?
The European Parliament is one of the most studied legislatures in the world. The general consensus in most of these analyses is that the power of the EP in the legislative processes of the EU has increased precipitously, since the introduction of the co-decision procedure. One continuing perceived weakness of the EP, however, is its inability to introduce new legislation. While the EP can request that the Commission initiate a proposal, it lacks the power to introduce bills itself. This research looks at the indirect agenda power of the EP through an analysis of EP own initiative resolutions and their impact on the policy agenda of the EU. The research introduces anew dataset on all EP resolutions between 2000 and 2015 and compares the pre- and post-2009 period to assess the impact of formal treaty changes to the legislative role of the EP have had on its agenda-setting capacity.