Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
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Jon Pérez Laraudogoitia has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Joseph S. Alper
University of Massachusetts – Boston
1 shared publicationMark Bridger
Northeastern University
1 shared publicationRafael Águila Ruiz
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 208 (3) , 115
On conditional convergence and non-well ordering
Linnebo recently presented a puzzle about infinite sums according to which the net weight marked by a spring balance depends on the order the weights are placed on it when these weights form a conditionally convergent series. The aim here is to show that Linnebo’s analysis has an interesting limitation that has gone unnoticed: its conclusions only follow when conditional convergence is considered on the basis of a well-ordered sequence of operations. The consequences otherwise are even more puzzling. There is however a way to avoid them, but only for magnitudes (which certainly do not include weight nor the like), for which a continuity principle is available (such as the principle of continuity of motion, associated with the position of a material object). This also has interesting implications regarding the metaphysical adequacy of the standard mathematical concept of convergence for a whole class of infinite series, so-called doubly infinite series. Cases are shown here in which this concept of convergence is metaphysically adequate (useful), and cases where it is not.
- 19 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 208 (3) , 115
Open AccessOn conditional convergence and non-well ordering
Linnebo recently presented a puzzle about infinite sums according to which the net weight marked by a spring balance depends on the order the weights are placed on it when these weights form a conditionally convergent series. The aim here is to show that Linnebo’s analysis has an interesting limitation that has gone unnoticed: its conclusions only follow when conditional convergence is considered on the basis of a well-ordered sequence of operations. The consequences otherwise are even more puzzling. There is however a way to avoid them, but only for magnitudes (which certainly do not include weight nor the like), for which a continuity principle is available (such as the principle of continuity of motion, associated with the position of a material object). This also has interesting implications regarding the metaphysical adequacy of the standard mathematical concept of convergence for a whole class of infinite series, so-called doubly infinite series. Cases are shown here in which this concept of convergence is metaphysically adequate (useful), and cases where it is not.
- Open Access
- 2 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Physics
- Vol. 56 (3)
Rescher’s Aporetics and a Road to the Voigt and Lorentz Transformations
With the classical distinction between context of discovery and context of justification considered by many to have been overcome, heuristics (understood in a broad sense) has increasingly rekindled the interest of philosophers of science. Building on this trend, a heuristic approach to the Voigt transformation (based on Rescher’s Aporetics) is first presented – a topic on which there seem to be no precedents in the literature. Second, the value of this approach is defended from a philosophical (and, indirectly, pedagogical) viewpoint. By using this approach, several conceptual links in the theory of space-time can be highlighted (links which go unnoticed in classical hypothetical-deductive methods leading to the Voigt transformation). Third, Rescher’s aporetics also suggests a heuristic path from the previously obtained Voigt transformation to the Lorentz transformation. Taken together, the proposed heuristic route enables the structure of the conceptual process underpinning the following chain of links (obviously not logical, but heuristic) Galileo ⇒ Voigt ⇒ Lorentz to be presented in an original and unified form. According to this route, an interesting sense is thus established in that the Voigt transformation occupies a natural place between the Galilean and Lorentz transformations.
- 2 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Physics
- Vol. 56 (3)
Open AccessRescher’s Aporetics and a Road to the Voigt and Lorentz Transformations
With the classical distinction between context of discovery and context of justification considered by many to have been overcome, heuristics (understood in a broad sense) has increasingly rekindled the interest of philosophers of science. Building on this trend, a heuristic approach to the Voigt transformation (based on Rescher’s Aporetics) is first presented – a topic on which there seem to be no precedents in the literature. Second, the value of this approach is defended from a philosophical (and, indirectly, pedagogical) viewpoint. By using this approach, several conceptual links in the theory of space-time can be highlighted (links which go unnoticed in classical hypothetical-deductive methods leading to the Voigt transformation). Third, Rescher’s aporetics also suggests a heuristic path from the previously obtained Voigt transformation to the Lorentz transformation. Taken together, the proposed heuristic route enables the structure of the conceptual process underpinning the following chain of links (obviously not logical, but heuristic) Galileo ⇒ Voigt ⇒ Lorentz to be presented in an original and unified form. According to this route, an interesting sense is thus established in that the Voigt transformation occupies a natural place between the Galilean and Lorentz transformations.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 57 (3) , 549-562
No Nothing from Infinity Paradox: A Detailed Analysis
Shackel recently defended a revised formulation of what he calls ‘the nothing from infinity paradox’. In contrast to other well-known and unchallenged examples of ‘nothing from infinity’ in the literature, it will be argued here that the model he proposes (which would be far more surprising than the others if correct) fails to work as such. Quite the contrary, it is argued here that the form of dynamic evolution underlying it is actually rather trivial. The basis of this criticism contains an elementary foundation that is not contingent on conflicting theoretical assumptions and/or their debatable applications. It is built on the following commonplace: if we wish to determine how a system of particles evolves, the particles must be tracked. As trivial as this may seem, Shackel fails to do so, and in not doing so, is mistaken.
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 57 (3) , 549-562
Open AccessNo Nothing from Infinity Paradox: A Detailed Analysis
Shackel recently defended a revised formulation of what he calls ‘the nothing from infinity paradox’. In contrast to other well-known and unchallenged examples of ‘nothing from infinity’ in the literature, it will be argued here that the model he proposes (which would be far more surprising than the others if correct) fails to work as such. Quite the contrary, it is argued here that the form of dynamic evolution underlying it is actually rather trivial. The basis of this criticism contains an elementary foundation that is not contingent on conflicting theoretical assumptions and/or their debatable applications. It is built on the following commonplace: if we wish to determine how a system of particles evolves, the particles must be tracked. As trivial as this may seem, Shackel fails to do so, and in not doing so, is mistaken.
- Open Access
- 26 July 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 85 (4) , 882-891
On a puzzle about sums
While the problem of the philosophical significance of Riemann’s theorem on conditionally convergent series has been discussed in detail for some time, specific versions of it have appeared in the literature very recently, over which there have been widespread disagreements. I argue that such discrepancies can be clarified by introducing a rather conventional type of composition rule for the treatment of some infinite systems (as well as supertasks) while analysing and clarifying the role of the concept of continuity by stripping it of the excesses to which its application by the Leibnizian tradition has led. The conclusion reached is that the indeterminacy associated with conditional convergence has a clear philosophical significance, but no fundamental ontological significance.
- 26 July 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 85 (4) , 882-891
Open AccessOn a puzzle about sums
While the problem of the philosophical significance of Riemann’s theorem on conditionally convergent series has been discussed in detail for some time, specific versions of it have appeared in the literature very recently, over which there have been widespread disagreements. I argue that such discrepancies can be clarified by introducing a rather conventional type of composition rule for the treatment of some infinite systems (as well as supertasks) while analysing and clarifying the role of the concept of continuity by stripping it of the excesses to which its application by the Leibnizian tradition has led. The conclusion reached is that the indeterminacy associated with conditional convergence has a clear philosophical significance, but no fundamental ontological significance.
- Open Access
- 2 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 51 (3) , 1353-1367
The Convergence Approach to Benardete’s Paradox
The paper analyses Benardete's paradox of the gods from a more general perspective (the convergence approach) than several of the most important proposals made to date, but in close relation (and sharp contrast) with them. The new theory, based on the notion of limit, is systematically applicable in different possible scenarios involving a denumerable infinity of objects. In particular, it reveals in what way ω-consistency can be compromised in an otherwise consistent description of such "infinitary" situations.
- 2 February 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 51 (3) , 1353-1367
Open AccessThe Convergence Approach to Benardete’s Paradox
The paper analyses Benardete's paradox of the gods from a more general perspective (the convergence approach) than several of the most important proposals made to date, but in close relation (and sharp contrast) with them. The new theory, based on the notion of limit, is systematically applicable in different possible scenarios involving a denumerable infinity of objects. In particular, it reveals in what way ω-consistency can be compromised in an otherwise consistent description of such "infinitary" situations.
- Open Access
- 13 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 29 (3) , 803-820
A New Contact Paradox
There is a well-known variety of contact paradoxes which are significantly linked to topology. The aim of this paper is to present a new paradox concerning contact with bodies composed of a denumerable infinity of parts. This paradox establishes the logical necessity, in a Newtonian context, of contact forces (herein called “phantom forces”) that violate what is probably our most basic causal intuition, embodied in what I call the Principle of Influence: any force exerted on a body B induces (causes) change of movement of B or (inclusive disjunction) the emergence of internal forces in B. However, the above paradox can be made strictly compatible with a Newtonian framework by introducing phantom forces as ideal elements in the Hilbert sense, though it will be seen that this does not solve all the problems.
- 13 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 29 (3) , 803-820
Open AccessA New Contact Paradox
There is a well-known variety of contact paradoxes which are significantly linked to topology. The aim of this paper is to present a new paradox concerning contact with bodies composed of a denumerable infinity of parts. This paradox establishes the logical necessity, in a Newtonian context, of contact forces (herein called “phantom forces”) that violate what is probably our most basic causal intuition, embodied in what I call the Principle of Influence: any force exerted on a body B induces (causes) change of movement of B or (inclusive disjunction) the emergence of internal forces in B. However, the above paradox can be made strictly compatible with a Newtonian framework by introducing phantom forces as ideal elements in the Hilbert sense, though it will be seen that this does not solve all the problems.
- Open Access
- 24 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 12 (3) , 1-23
Unmoved movers: a very simple and novel form of indeterminism
It is common knowledge that the Aristotelian idea of an unmoved mover (Primum Mobile) was abandoned definitively (from a mechanical standpoint, at least) with the advent of modern science and, in particular, Newton’s precise formulation of mechanics. Here I show that the essential attribute of an unmoved mover (in a non-trivial sense, and in the context of infinite systems theory) is not incompatible with such mechanics; quite the contrary, it makes this possible. The unmoved mover model proposed does not involve supertasks, and (perhaps precisely for this reason) leads both to an outrageous form of indeterminism and a new, accountable form of interaction. The process presents a more precise characterization of the crucial going-to-the-limit operation (which will admittedly require further development in future research). It has long been acknowledged in the existing literature that, theoretically, in infinite Newtonian systems, masses can move from rest to motion through supertasks. Numerous minor variations on the original schemes have already been published. Against this backdrop, this paper introduces three significant additions: 1) It formulates for the first time a limit postulate for systematically addressing infinite systems; 2) It shows that an Aristotelian unmoved mover (with no supertask) is possible in systems of infinitely many particles that interact with each other solely by contact collision; 3) It shows how interaction at a distance can emerge in systems of infinitely many particles (at relative rest) that interact with each other solely by contact.
- 24 June 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in European Journal for Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 12 (3) , 1-23
Open AccessUnmoved movers: a very simple and novel form of indeterminism
It is common knowledge that the Aristotelian idea of an unmoved mover (Primum Mobile) was abandoned definitively (from a mechanical standpoint, at least) with the advent of modern science and, in particular, Newton’s precise formulation of mechanics. Here I show that the essential attribute of an unmoved mover (in a non-trivial sense, and in the context of infinite systems theory) is not incompatible with such mechanics; quite the contrary, it makes this possible. The unmoved mover model proposed does not involve supertasks, and (perhaps precisely for this reason) leads both to an outrageous form of indeterminism and a new, accountable form of interaction. The process presents a more precise characterization of the crucial going-to-the-limit operation (which will admittedly require further development in future research). It has long been acknowledged in the existing literature that, theoretically, in infinite Newtonian systems, masses can move from rest to motion through supertasks. Numerous minor variations on the original schemes have already been published. Against this backdrop, this paper introduces three significant additions: 1) It formulates for the first time a limit postulate for systematically addressing infinite systems; 2) It shows that an Aristotelian unmoved mover (with no supertask) is possible in systems of infinitely many particles that interact with each other solely by contact collision; 3) It shows how interaction at a distance can emerge in systems of infinitely many particles (at relative rest) that interact with each other solely by contact.
- Open Access
- 2 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 50 (4) , 1945-1953
Fluids, Molecules and Paradoxes of Infinity
Several paradoxes of infinity have recently featured in this journal involving gases distributed in a denumerable infinite series of compartments. I shall demonstrate in this paper that:a) None of these new paradoxes applies where the gases comply with both Boyle’s law and Avogadro’s law. As several of these new paradoxes expressly require compliance with Boyle’s law, it is unclear, in principle, as to whether there is a plausible model of gas that is able to uphold them all.b) Notwithstanding a), any of the above paradoxes (and their variations) can be reinstated by acknowledging (contrary to what is widely assumed in the literature) that there are two distinct, non-equivalent concepts of ideal gas. Indeed, the various infinity puzzles actually enable a distinction to be made between the two concepts (which is a particularly elegant way of doing so).
- 2 February 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 50 (4) , 1945-1953
Open AccessFluids, Molecules and Paradoxes of Infinity
Several paradoxes of infinity have recently featured in this journal involving gases distributed in a denumerable infinite series of compartments. I shall demonstrate in this paper that:a) None of these new paradoxes applies where the gases comply with both Boyle’s law and Avogadro’s law. As several of these new paradoxes expressly require compliance with Boyle’s law, it is unclear, in principle, as to whether there is a plausible model of gas that is able to uphold them all.b) Notwithstanding a), any of the above paradoxes (and their variations) can be reinstated by acknowledging (contrary to what is widely assumed in the literature) that there are two distinct, non-equivalent concepts of ideal gas. Indeed, the various infinity puzzles actually enable a distinction to be made between the two concepts (which is a particularly elegant way of doing so).
- 11 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Axiomathes
- Vol. 32 (4) , 605-625
Undeformable Bodies that are Not Rigid Bodies: A Philosophical Journey Through Some (Unexpected) Supertasks
- 11 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Axiomathes
- Vol. 32 (4) , 605-625
Undeformable Bodies that are Not Rigid Bodies: A Philosophical Journey Through Some (Unexpected) Supertasks
- 26 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 48 (4) , 1483-1491
A Note on some New Infinity Puzzles
- 26 November 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophia
- Vol. 48 (4) , 1483-1491
A Note on some New Infinity Puzzles