Erik Haixiao Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Erik Haixiao Wang has a total of 48 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dennis Vasquez-Montes
Departments of Orthopaedic and Neurologic Surgery, NYU Langone Orthopedic Hospital, New York Spine Institute, New York, NY, USA
3 shared publications- Aaron J. Buckland
Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, NYU Langone Health, New York, NY, USA
2 shared publications - Bassel Georges Diebo
Department of Orthopedic Surgery, Warren Alpert Medical School, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island
2 shared publications - Cole Bortz
Division of Spinal Surgery/Departments of Orthopaedic and Neurosurgery, NYU Medical Center, NY Spine Institute, New York, NY, USA
2 shared publications - Fangqi Wen
Department of Sociology, The Ohio State University, United States
2 shared publications Haddy Alas
Departments of Orthopaedic and Neurologic Surgery, NYU Langone Orthopedic Hospital, New York Spine Institute, New York, NY, USA; New York Spine Institute, New York, NY, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 27 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
State-Building at What Cost? The Consequences of Military Control in Medieval China
A key challenge to state-building in conflict-prone societies is the proliferation of autonomous armed actors. As governments seek to enhance their monopoly over violence, consequences of military centralization deserve scholarly attention. We argue that centralization undermines state’s coercive capacity: by weakening the leaders of armed groups, it simultaneously erodes the military efficiency and discipline of these groups, which also serve as agents of coercion for the state. We leverage a centralization reform in China’s Tang Dynasty (618-907 CE) after a civil war, using unique data on soldier mutinies, rebellions by local generals, civilian uprisings, and battle outcomes. Difference-in-differences estimates reveal that centralization successfully reduced local generals’ rebellions, but led to increased soldier mutinies against the generals and more civilian uprisings. It also worsened battlefield performance. While research on state capacity has focused on its extractive and administrative dimensions, these findings deepen our understanding about another important aspect: the coercive dimension.
- 27 October 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Comparative Political Studies
State-Building at What Cost? The Consequences of Military Control in Medieval China
A key challenge to state-building in conflict-prone societies is the proliferation of autonomous armed actors. As governments seek to enhance their monopoly over violence, consequences of military centralization deserve scholarly attention. We argue that centralization undermines state’s coercive capacity: by weakening the leaders of armed groups, it simultaneously erodes the military efficiency and discipline of these groups, which also serve as agents of coercion for the state. We leverage a centralization reform in China’s Tang Dynasty (618-907 CE) after a civil war, using unique data on soldier mutinies, rebellions by local generals, civilian uprisings, and battle outcomes. Difference-in-differences estimates reveal that centralization successfully reduced local generals’ rebellions, but led to increased soldier mutinies against the generals and more civilian uprisings. It also worsened battlefield performance. While research on state capacity has focused on its extractive and administrative dimensions, these findings deepen our understanding about another important aspect: the coercive dimension.
- Open Access
- 13 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Leader Health and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Powersharing: Evidence from Republican China
Why do some powersharing arrangements unravel? We argue that a publicly observable decline in the health of a senior patron can destabilize elite bargains by lowering expectations about his ability to protect clients, influence appointments, and resist rival encroachment. We test this argument using a 1935 attempted assassination in China that missed its intended target, Chiang Kai-shek, and left his rival Wang Jingwei, one of the ruling Kuomintang coalition's two most powerful leaders, permanently incapacitated. Drawing on a monthly panel of senior officials, we show that Wang's associates became significantly more likely to leave government after the attack. Their presence in party institutions declined, while Chiang's faction expanded its representation in key decision-making bodies. Associates who exited disproportionately joined Wang's wartime collaborationist regime. Exit effects were strongest among officials with better outside options in the labor market, suggesting fragility during early regime formation before insiders' expected payoffs were locked in.
- 13 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLeader Health and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Powersharing: Evidence from Republican China
Why do some powersharing arrangements unravel? We argue that a publicly observable decline in the health of a senior patron can destabilize elite bargains by lowering expectations about his ability to protect clients, influence appointments, and resist rival encroachment. We test this argument using a 1935 attempted assassination in China that missed its intended target, Chiang Kai-shek, and left his rival Wang Jingwei, one of the ruling Kuomintang coalition's two most powerful leaders, permanently incapacitated. Drawing on a monthly panel of senior officials, we show that Wang's associates became significantly more likely to leave government after the attack. Their presence in party institutions declined, while Chiang's faction expanded its representation in key decision-making bodies. Associates who exited disproportionately joined Wang's wartime collaborationist regime. Exit effects were strongest among officials with better outside options in the labor market, suggesting fragility during early regime formation before insiders' expected payoffs were locked in.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Logic and Consequences of Equalizing Bureaucratic Recruitment: Evidence from the 1073 Examination Reform in Song China
We study how equalizing opportunities for bureaucratic recruitment reshapes politics in distinct stages. Initially, it brings more officials from humble backgrounds into the bureaucracy. Their lack of patronage ties, however, limits prospects for career advancement and thus motivates them to seek promotion by displaying exceptional loyalty and zeal in carrying out the ruler's preferred policies, often with downstream effects on governance and social stability. We test this argument using a reform of the civil service examinations in Northern Song China (960-1127), which shifted from literary composition to formulaic interpretation of the Confucian classics, a change that favored candidates from modest backgrounds. The reform increased the presence of nonelite bureaucrats whose hometowns had greater access to printed books. These officials extracted more revenue as prefects, were increasingly assigned to posts implementing the ruler's agenda, pursued the ruler's preferred policies with greater intensity, and faced higher rates of rebellion.
- 1 August 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Logic and Consequences of Equalizing Bureaucratic Recruitment: Evidence from the 1073 Examination Reform in Song China
We study how equalizing opportunities for bureaucratic recruitment reshapes politics in distinct stages. Initially, it brings more officials from humble backgrounds into the bureaucracy. Their lack of patronage ties, however, limits prospects for career advancement and thus motivates them to seek promotion by displaying exceptional loyalty and zeal in carrying out the ruler's preferred policies, often with downstream effects on governance and social stability. We test this argument using a reform of the civil service examinations in Northern Song China (960-1127), which shifted from literary composition to formulaic interpretation of the Confucian classics, a change that favored candidates from modest backgrounds. The reform increased the presence of nonelite bureaucrats whose hometowns had greater access to printed books. These officials extracted more revenue as prefects, were increasingly assigned to posts implementing the ruler's agenda, pursued the ruler's preferred policies with greater intensity, and faced higher rates of rebellion.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Keju, Not Violence: How the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy Declined in the Tang Dynasty Long Before the Huang Chao Rebellion
When and how did the medieval Chinese aristocracy decline? Generations of historians have argued that the political power of the aristocracy was gradually displaced by the imperial examination system (Keju) during the Tang dynasty. In recent decades, however, other historians have alleged that aristocratic political dominance persisted until the Huang Chao Rebellion at the end of the Tang, pointing to the ostensibly stable share of aristocrats among high ranking officials across the dynasty. This article identifies several fundamental flaws in the statistical reasoning underlying claims of aristocratic persistence, including conceptual ambiguity, definitional tautology, misinterpretation of conditional probabilities, and the absence of control variables in existing quantitative analyses. Using multivariate statistical models applied to a large sample of Tang tomb epitaphs, drawn from essentially the same epitaph based evidence used in prior quantitative studies but analyzed with more adequate methods, I show that the political advantage associated with aristocratic pedigree declined rapidly after the early Tang, while the net premium associated with Keju credentials increased steadily over time, even after controlling for aristocratic influence. Both trends-the erosion of pedigree-based advantage and the rising importance of Keju-were already underway more than two centuries before the Huang Chao Rebellion and other violent upheavals marking the end of the Tang and its immediate successor polities. These new findings leave the social and political dimensions of the Tang-Song Transition thesis on shaky ground. This article is an English translation of a study previously published in Historical Research (历史研究), with minor adaptations for an English-language audience.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessKeju, Not Violence: How the Medieval Chinese Aristocracy Declined in the Tang Dynasty Long Before the Huang Chao Rebellion
When and how did the medieval Chinese aristocracy decline? Generations of historians have argued that the political power of the aristocracy was gradually displaced by the imperial examination system (Keju) during the Tang dynasty. In recent decades, however, other historians have alleged that aristocratic political dominance persisted until the Huang Chao Rebellion at the end of the Tang, pointing to the ostensibly stable share of aristocrats among high ranking officials across the dynasty. This article identifies several fundamental flaws in the statistical reasoning underlying claims of aristocratic persistence, including conceptual ambiguity, definitional tautology, misinterpretation of conditional probabilities, and the absence of control variables in existing quantitative analyses. Using multivariate statistical models applied to a large sample of Tang tomb epitaphs, drawn from essentially the same epitaph based evidence used in prior quantitative studies but analyzed with more adequate methods, I show that the political advantage associated with aristocratic pedigree declined rapidly after the early Tang, while the net premium associated with Keju credentials increased steadily over time, even after controlling for aristocratic influence. Both trends-the erosion of pedigree-based advantage and the rising importance of Keju-were already underway more than two centuries before the Huang Chao Rebellion and other violent upheavals marking the end of the Tang and its immediate successor polities. These new findings leave the social and political dimensions of the Tang-Song Transition thesis on shaky ground. This article is an English translation of a study previously published in Historical Research (历史研究), with minor adaptations for an English-language audience.
- Open Access
- 6 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Hayek in China: The Effect of Economic Control on Coercive State Capacity
Does privatization weaken the state's ability to enforce core policies? We argue that state control over economic life underpins coercive state capacity through two mechanisms: economic leverage over livelihoods and administrative legibility of the population. Privatization can erode both. We test this argument in China and develop a novel measure of coercive capacity: excess births inferred from individual birth histories that we construct with population census. This measure tracks the enforcement gap of birth control, Beijing's longstanding policy priority. Exploiting county-level differences in the timing of agricultural decollectivization, we find that it substantially increased excess births. The effect is attenuated where households retained economic ties to the state and is accompanied by increased birth underreporting in local police records, consistent with the leverage and legibility mechanisms. Additional analyses rule out interpretations based on fertility intentions and highlight state responses to coercive capacity erosion following the retreat from economic control.
- 6 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHayek in China: The Effect of Economic Control on Coercive State Capacity
Does privatization weaken the state's ability to enforce core policies? We argue that state control over economic life underpins coercive state capacity through two mechanisms: economic leverage over livelihoods and administrative legibility of the population. Privatization can erode both. We test this argument in China and develop a novel measure of coercive capacity: excess births inferred from individual birth histories that we construct with population census. This measure tracks the enforcement gap of birth control, Beijing's longstanding policy priority. Exploiting county-level differences in the timing of agricultural decollectivization, we find that it substantially increased excess births. The effect is attenuated where households retained economic ties to the state and is accompanied by increased birth underreporting in local police records, consistent with the leverage and legibility mechanisms. Additional analyses rule out interpretations based on fertility intentions and highlight state responses to coercive capacity erosion following the retreat from economic control.
- Open Access
- 30 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Too Much But Never Enough: Government Overburden and Backlashes to State-building in Medieval Japan
Could state-building undermine the state? We argue that rapid expansion of state reach can generate governance demands that overwhelm the government, thereby fueling grievances and unrest. We test this argument using data from Japan under the Kamakura Shogunate (1185–1333), where the Mongol invasions prompted the state to strengthen its control over regions deemed important for national defense. Difference-in-differences analyses show that this expansion triggered rebellions. It also caused long-run state decay, evidenced by the proliferation of private castles after the Shogunate’s collapse. Further analyses indicate that state-building sharply increased disputes brought to the state for arbitration and heightened frustration over unresolved disputes, which in turn fueled rebellion. Our findings highlight the interplay between state reach and administrative competence as different dimensions of state capacity. When the expansion of state reach outpaces the government’s ability to manage the rising governance demands, such over-extension paradoxically erodes the long-term viability of state institutions.
- 30 September 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessToo Much But Never Enough: Government Overburden and Backlashes to State-building in Medieval Japan
Could state-building undermine the state? We argue that rapid expansion of state reach can generate governance demands that overwhelm the government, thereby fueling grievances and unrest. We test this argument using data from Japan under the Kamakura Shogunate (1185–1333), where the Mongol invasions prompted the state to strengthen its control over regions deemed important for national defense. Difference-in-differences analyses show that this expansion triggered rebellions. It also caused long-run state decay, evidenced by the proliferation of private castles after the Shogunate’s collapse. Further analyses indicate that state-building sharply increased disputes brought to the state for arbitration and heightened frustration over unresolved disputes, which in turn fueled rebellion. Our findings highlight the interplay between state reach and administrative competence as different dimensions of state capacity. When the expansion of state reach outpaces the government’s ability to manage the rising governance demands, such over-extension paradoxically erodes the long-term viability of state institutions.
- Open Access
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Chinese Governance
- Vol. 10 (3) , 446-481
The effect of anti-corruption efforts on evaluations of governance
- 7 April 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Chinese Governance
- Vol. 10 (3) , 446-481
Open AccessThe effect of anti-corruption efforts on evaluations of governance
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 18 January 2024
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 121 (4)
Social mobility in the Tang Dynasty as the Imperial Examination rose and aristocratic family pedigree declined, 618–907 CE
Data from the distant past are fertile ground for testing social science theories of education and social mobility. In this study, we construct a dataset from 3,640 tomb epitaphs of males in China’s Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE), which contain granular and extensive information about the ancestral origins, family background, and career histories of the deceased elites. Our statistical analysis of the complete profiles yields evidence of the transition away from an aristocratic society in three key trends: 1) family pedigree (i.e., aristocracy) mattered less for career achievement over time, 2) passing the Imperial Examination ( Keju ) became an increasingly important predictor of one’s career achievement, and 3) father’s position always mattered throughout the Tang, especially for men who did not pass the Keju . The twilight of medieval Chinese aristocracy, according to the data, began in as early as the mid-seventh century CE.
- 18 January 2024
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 121 (4)
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessSocial mobility in the Tang Dynasty as the Imperial Examination rose and aristocratic family pedigree declined, 618–907 CE
Data from the distant past are fertile ground for testing social science theories of education and social mobility. In this study, we construct a dataset from 3,640 tomb epitaphs of males in China’s Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE), which contain granular and extensive information about the ancestral origins, family background, and career histories of the deceased elites. Our statistical analysis of the complete profiles yields evidence of the transition away from an aristocratic society in three key trends: 1) family pedigree (i.e., aristocracy) mattered less for career achievement over time, 2) passing the Imperial Examination ( Keju ) became an increasingly important predictor of one’s career achievement, and 3) father’s position always mattered throughout the Tang, especially for men who did not pass the Keju . The twilight of medieval Chinese aristocracy, according to the data, began in as early as the mid-seventh century CE.
- 25 April 2023
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 36 (3) , 996-998
Localized bargaining: The political economy of China's high‐speed railway program. By XiaoMa, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2022
- 25 April 2023
- Published by Wiley in Governance
- Vol. 36 (3) , 996-998
Localized bargaining: The political economy of China's high‐speed railway program. By XiaoMa, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2022
- 3 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 30 (5) , 962-963
Governing and ruling: the political logic of taxation in China
Changdong Zhang’s book combines in-depth area expertise with highly innovative and generalized theoretical insights. The core contribution of the book is “bringing taxation back in” for the field o...
- 3 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Democratization
- Vol. 30 (5) , 962-963
Governing and ruling: the political logic of taxation in China
Changdong Zhang’s book combines in-depth area expertise with highly innovative and generalized theoretical insights. The core contribution of the book is “bringing taxation back in” for the field o...