Jonas Rønningsdalen Kunst

Large language models (LLMs) can reduce belief in conspiracy theories through brief, evidence-based dialogue, and the same capacity can be turned to instill such beliefs. Less is known about who is susceptible. In two nationally representative U.S. samples (N = 401 and N = 492; the first preregistered, the second a close replication), participants were randomly assigned to a debiasing, biasing, or neutral control conversation with an LLM and rated their conspiracy beliefs before, immediately after, and one month later. A single conversation moved belief substantially in whichever direction the model argued, with no change in the control condition. The two directions were comparable in magnitude and most changes remained a month later. Immediate change was largely uniform across individuals. Anthropomorphism and schizotypal paranoia marked those who more readily accepted, and retained, conspiratorial arguments, whereas distrust- and threat-related traits predicted not whether belief changed but how much of it lasted.

Creativity and flourishing are core aims of higher education (HE) institutions and government initiatives globally. Large‐scale projects have linked creativity and flourishing with cultural diversity, yet their associations with majority‐group acculturation (i.e., how members of dominant culture groups adopt minority‐cultural elements and/or maintain their national culture) remain unexplored. We tested relationships between majority‐group acculturation and seven components of creativity and flourishing in UK (Study 1, N = 323) and Chinese (Study 2, N = 174) majority‐group university students and a three‐wave, English majority‐group longitudinal sample (Study 3, N at Time 1 = 219). Results found integration (i.e., adopting other cultures while maintaining one's own) predicted higher cognitive flexibility (Study 1), meaning‐in‐life (Studies 1 and 2) and quality of interpersonal relationships (Studies 1 and 2), while cultural adoption predicted higher cognitive flexibility, curiosity‐exploration and flourishing over time (Study 3). Findings align majority‐group acculturation with key priorities of HE and government programmes.

In increasingly diverse societies, people in intercultural contact must navigate cultural diversity to find their place and sense of belonging. Yet, research on acculturation has largely focused on minority groups, leaving majority group responses to cultural change underexplored. A substantial subset of majority group members adopts an undifferentiated acculturation strategy, expressing low or neutral scores on both heritage culture maintenance and other culture adoption. This pre-registered mixed-methods study provides the first comprehensive examination of this strategy’s internal heterogeneity. We surveyed 316 undifferentiated White British participants and applied Latent Profile Analysis across psychological, ideological, and demographic variables, integrating these results with quantified qualitative data. The analysis revealed two subgroups. The larger Humanistic profile ( n = 242) was characterised by politically liberal views, stronger identification with all humanity, and inclusive attitudes towards immigrants, and scored significantly higher—though still neutral in absolute terms—on other culture adoption. Their neutrality appeared to reflect a universalist, equality-oriented outlook rather than indifference, suggesting a cosmopolitan form of belonging grounded in global human identification. The smaller Detached profile ( n = 74) showed higher cultural-identity reflection and cultural essentialism, and greater indifference to intercultural contact, but did not differ from the Humanistic group on heritage culture maintenance. This orientation reflected a more disengaged or ambivalent sense of belonging, marked by scepticism towards cultural identity as a basis for social connection. These findings demonstrate that the undifferentiated strategy is not monolithic but comprises at least two orientations: one grounded in inclusive, humanity-based belonging and another reflecting detachment from cultural involvement. We propose extending acculturation theory to incorporate these humanistic and detached patterns, which may represent distinct adaptations to culturally complex, globalised societies. We discuss their implications for fostering or hindering belonging among a substantial segment of majority-group members.

Reply to Romano and De Dreu: Why violent extremism cannot be reduced to laboratory games

Evolutionary theory and historical evidence suggest humans possess distinct psychological tendencies for defensive and offensive violence, which have insufficiently been considered in research. In a large-scale preregistered study across 58 countries ( N = 18,128), we demonstrate that violent extremist intentions manifest along two distinct psychological phenomena: defensive extremism, motivated by protecting one’s group from (perceived) threats, and offensive extremism, driven by establishing group dominance. We show that these dimensions a) can be reliably differentiated across diverse cultural contexts, b) are distinctively associated with psychological dispositions, and c) systematically differentiate countries varying in macrolevel sociopolitical functioning and violence. Across nations, a two-factorial structure was observed that was invariant at the scalar level. Defensive extremist intentions were consistently higher than offensive extremism in 56 out of 58 countries, suggesting greater moral acceptance of protective violence. While psychopathy was positively related to both types of violent extremist intentions, those high in Machiavellianism and narcissism demonstrated particularly higher levels of defensive extremist intentions. By contrast, those scoring high on religious fundamentalism and social dominance orientation demonstrated particularly higher levels of offensive extremist intentions. Unexpectedly, liberal political group identification was associated with higher offensive but lower defensive extremist intentions. Crucially, offensive (but not defensive) intentions were associated with macrolevel societal dysfunction, including political terror and internal conflict. These findings establish that defensive and offensive violent extremist intentions represent two conceptually different forms of extremism across a large and diverse range of countries, with consequences for research and practice.

Academic Advances in AI require a revision of the psychological and socio-technical dynamics by which individuals are radicalized to embrace violent extremism. This review synthesizes process models of radicalization with research on social and personality risk factors, AI, and psychological mechanisms to propose a four-stage framework mapping the AI architecture of radicalization: (1) Exposure , where recommender systems and virality features create initial attraction to extreme content; (2) Reinforcement , where filter bubbles and group recommendations leverage biases to strengthen extremist beliefs and create echo chambers; (3) Group Integration , where ideologically homogenous clusters, AI bot swarms and companions foster group belonging and readiness for action; cumulatively resulting in (4) Violent Extremist Action . We examine how established social, cognitive, personality, and contextual vulnerability factors heighten psychological risk in the AI-driven radicalization process, as well as the emerging role of generative AI. We conclude by outlining a stage-based framework for governance and future research. Public AI-driven algorithms designed to maximize engagement on social media, compounded by generative AI, can unintentionally set the stage for radicalization. It begins with Exposure , where algorithms push users toward extreme content because it captures attention. Next, during Reinforcement , algorithms feed users personalized content while AI swarms can create a synthetic consensus that reinforces emerging biases, normalizes extremity, and insulates users from alternative views. Third, during Group Integration , individuals are absorbed into extremist networks, reinforced by human peers, AI companions, and bot swarms that validate radical beliefs and deepen identity ties. By exploiting psychological needs for belonging and certainty, this stage becomes particularly pernicious, potentially opening the door for violence. We propose policy measures that can reduce radicalization at each stage.

This special issue, Acculturation Reimagined, argues for a paradigm shift in acculturation science to address 21st-century globalization, digital connectivity, and shifting cultural landscapes. Moving beyond static models, the contributions challenge foundational tenets through rigorous methodological critiques and innovative theoretical frameworks. Key discussions include a re-examination of the integration hypothesis, where recent meta-analyses reveal that past findings may stem from flawed bivariate methods rather than true interaction effects. The issue also highlights the “integration paradox,” showing how discrimination can undermine the well-being of the most structurally integrated immigrants. Expanding the field’s scope, authors introduce concepts of digitally mediated acculturation and advocate for indigenizing research to honor Indigenous epistemologies. A significant focus is placed on temporal dynamics, distinguishing true developmental perspectives—such as acculturation tempo—from simple longitudinal measurement. Empirical work further illustrates the complexity of adaptation, revealing that emotional fit with a majority culture can paradoxically lead to disengagement in discriminatory contexts. Collectively, these papers chart a future for acculturation research that is multivariate, context-sensitive, temporally dynamic, and inclusive of diverse lived experiences.