Sophie Manigart
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Sophie Manigart has a total of 104 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Mike Wright
10 shared publications- Tom Vanacker
Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Gent, Belgium
10 shared publications - Miguel Meuleman
Vlerick Business School and Ghent University
7 shared publications Andy Lockett
Nottingham University Business School
5 shared publications- Mike Wright
Nottingham University Business School
5 shared publications - Christof Beuselinck
Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg University
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 November 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Family Business Review
Family Offices: Governing Transgenerational Wealth Across Organizational and Generational Boundaries
Family offices have become increasingly important organizational actors in the governance and deployment of private family wealth. Yet, despite growing scholarly attention, family office research remains fragmented across research traditions that build on different conceptualizations of family offices as wealth managers, governance mechanisms, investment vehicles, professional service organizations, or infrastructures of dynastic wealth. This definitional plurality has generated valuable insights, but it also inhibits cumulative theory building and empirical comparison. We synthesize existing theoretical and empirical evidence and propose a theoretical definition and a definitional taxonomy of family offices, thereby developing a conceptual baseline for family office research. We then develop an analytical framework that connects family goals and willingness, organizational forms, activities and ability, boundary mechanisms, and multidimensional outcomes. By positioning contemporary research within this framework, we identify priorities for cumulative scholarship and practical challenges in family office design and renewal.
- 10 November 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Family Business Review
Open AccessFamily Offices: Governing Transgenerational Wealth Across Organizational and Generational Boundaries
Family offices have become increasingly important organizational actors in the governance and deployment of private family wealth. Yet, despite growing scholarly attention, family office research remains fragmented across research traditions that build on different conceptualizations of family offices as wealth managers, governance mechanisms, investment vehicles, professional service organizations, or infrastructures of dynastic wealth. This definitional plurality has generated valuable insights, but it also inhibits cumulative theory building and empirical comparison. We synthesize existing theoretical and empirical evidence and propose a theoretical definition and a definitional taxonomy of family offices, thereby developing a conceptual baseline for family office research. We then develop an analytical framework that connects family goals and willingness, organizational forms, activities and ability, boundary mechanisms, and multidimensional outcomes. By positioning contemporary research within this framework, we identify priorities for cumulative scholarship and practical challenges in family office design and renewal.
- 18 June 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 64-88
Venture capital
Despite a growing literature on venture capital (VC), some aspects are still poorly understood. This chapter highlights important recent developments that warrant further scrutiny. Different types of VCs have emerged lately, like family offices or evergreen funds, and VC teams have become more diverse. This may lead to different practices in deal sourcing, selection, value creation, and exiting. Recent developments, such as the use of AI by both VCs and their targets, and the rising importance of environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices should be explored. Finally, the role of limited partners – or investors in VC firms and VC funds – has only received scant attention. Thorough studies of these phenomena should yield important theoretical and practical insights. However, alternative themes may generate equally fruitful research avenues.
- 18 June 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 64-88
Venture capital
Despite a growing literature on venture capital (VC), some aspects are still poorly understood. This chapter highlights important recent developments that warrant further scrutiny. Different types of VCs have emerged lately, like family offices or evergreen funds, and VC teams have become more diverse. This may lead to different practices in deal sourcing, selection, value creation, and exiting. Recent developments, such as the use of AI by both VCs and their targets, and the rising importance of environmental, social and governance (ESG) practices should be explored. Finally, the role of limited partners – or investors in VC firms and VC funds – has only received scant attention. Thorough studies of these phenomena should yield important theoretical and practical insights. However, alternative themes may generate equally fruitful research avenues.
- 22 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Small Business Economics
- Vol. 67 (2) , 1-33
Practices of European and American venture capitalists: homogeneity and heterogeneity at work
- 22 May 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Small Business Economics
- Vol. 67 (2) , 1-33
Practices of European and American venture capitalists: homogeneity and heterogeneity at work
- 11 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 438-443
Family Firms and Private Equity
- 11 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 180-186
Contracting in Private Equity-Backed Buyouts
- 22 February 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Venture Capital
- Vol. 26 (1) , 1-29
Unanswered questions in entrepreneurial finance
While the academic literature on entrepreneurial finance has expanded exponentially, many gaps in our knowledge remain. This is driven by digitalization impacting the development of new investment types such as crowdfunding and ICO, the emergence of new investors based upon digital technologies, and the functioning of existing investors. Next, the supply of entrepreneurial finance has become more diverse and new types of investors developed, like incubators and accelerators, family funds, impact investors, or sovereign wealth funds. This increases the sources and type of funding new ventures can get access to. Third, investors pay increasingly attention to non-financial goals like providing solutions to environmental or societal challenges. This paper explores these trends and suggests avenues for future research.
- 22 February 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Venture Capital
- Vol. 26 (1) , 1-29
Unanswered questions in entrepreneurial finance
While the academic literature on entrepreneurial finance has expanded exponentially, many gaps in our knowledge remain. This is driven by digitalization impacting the development of new investment types such as crowdfunding and ICO, the emergence of new investors based upon digital technologies, and the functioning of existing investors. Next, the supply of entrepreneurial finance has become more diverse and new types of investors developed, like incubators and accelerators, family funds, impact investors, or sovereign wealth funds. This increases the sources and type of funding new ventures can get access to. Third, investors pay increasingly attention to non-financial goals like providing solutions to environmental or societal challenges. This paper explores these trends and suggests avenues for future research.
- 5 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Venture Capital
- Vol. 25 (2) , 135-160
How private equity-backed buyout contracts shape corporate governance
This paper explores how contracts in private equity-backed buyouts shape corporate governance in portfolio companies. Drawing upon agency theory and incomplete contracting theory, 50 actual contracts are analyzed in detail. Contracts focus on reducing adverse selection risks through limiting pre-investment information asymmetries and aligning the goals of investors and sellers. Moral hazard risks vis-à-vis management are limited through limiting post-investment information asymmetries and limiting shirking behavior through limiting free cash flows. Goal alignment is achieved through high-powered incentive structures combined with shifting risk of underperformance to management. Managerial hold-up problems are addressed through restricting share transactions and limiting managerial actions. Residual powers and contingencies are mainly used to deal with incomplete contract designs due to uncertainties. Few clauses are used to address the reverse agency problem in which management is protected against moral hazard problems created by the private equity investor. PE contracts have transparent and very strong outcome-based cash flow rights, both limiting downside risk and rewarding upside potential. This contrasts with VC contracts which are especially contingency-based given the high levels of uncertainty of the portfolio companies.
- 5 September 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Venture Capital
- Vol. 25 (2) , 135-160
How private equity-backed buyout contracts shape corporate governance
This paper explores how contracts in private equity-backed buyouts shape corporate governance in portfolio companies. Drawing upon agency theory and incomplete contracting theory, 50 actual contracts are analyzed in detail. Contracts focus on reducing adverse selection risks through limiting pre-investment information asymmetries and aligning the goals of investors and sellers. Moral hazard risks vis-à-vis management are limited through limiting post-investment information asymmetries and limiting shirking behavior through limiting free cash flows. Goal alignment is achieved through high-powered incentive structures combined with shifting risk of underperformance to management. Managerial hold-up problems are addressed through restricting share transactions and limiting managerial actions. Residual powers and contingencies are mainly used to deal with incomplete contract designs due to uncertainties. Few clauses are used to address the reverse agency problem in which management is protected against moral hazard problems created by the private equity investor. PE contracts have transparent and very strong outcome-based cash flow rights, both limiting downside risk and rewarding upside potential. This contrasts with VC contracts which are especially contingency-based given the high levels of uncertainty of the portfolio companies.
- Open Access
- 18 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in CFA Magazine
- Vol. 78 (4) , 121-144
Private Debt Fund Returns, Persistence, and Market Conditions
This paper examines net-of-fees private debt fund performance, performance persistence across funds managed by the same general partner and a general partner’s ability to time the market. We document that private debt funds outperform bond and equity market benchmarks in the cross-section, with high performance dispersion across strategies and performance quartiles. Lagged performance significantly affects current fund performance. While ex ante and ex post credit market conditions strongly affect fund performance, general partners can only partially time them.
- 18 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in CFA Magazine
- Vol. 78 (4) , 121-144
Open AccessPrivate Debt Fund Returns, Persistence, and Market Conditions
This paper examines net-of-fees private debt fund performance, performance persistence across funds managed by the same general partner and a general partner’s ability to time the market. We document that private debt funds outperform bond and equity market benchmarks in the cross-section, with high performance dispersion across strategies and performance quartiles. Lagged performance significantly affects current fund performance. While ex ante and ex post credit market conditions strongly affect fund performance, general partners can only partially time them.