David Ubilava
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
David Ubilava has a total of 26 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kadir Atalay
School of Economics, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia
4 shared publications Jayson L. Lusk
Department of Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, 411 Ag Hall, Stillwater, OK 74078, USA
2 shared publications- Jesse Tack
Mississippi State University
2 shared publications Kenneth A. Foster
Department of Agricultural Economics, Purdue University, 403 W. State St., West Lafayette, IN 47907-2056, USA
2 shared publications- Stefanie Schurer
The University of Sydney
2 shared publications - Tomas Nilsson
Ministry of Finance and Enterprise, Government of Alberta, 4th Floor, Commerce Place, 403, 10155 - 102 St., Edmonton, Alberta T5J 4L6, Canada
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Aid, Interrupted: Conflict Dynamics Following the USAID Suspension in Africa
Foreign aid withdrawal may put the stability of aid-dependent states at risk. Yet short-term conflict responses to donor-side aid disruptions remain poorly understood. We exploit the abrupt and unanticipated suspension of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding in January 2025 as an exogenous shock to examine its effects on conflict dynamics in Africa. Using monthly conflict data for 44 Sub-Saharan African countries, we apply event-study and difference-in-differences designs to trace conflict responses in highly aid-dependent countries relative to less aid-dependent countries following the suspension. We find a general elevation in conflict, with a statistically significant 15 percent increase in armed conflict between organized groups and up to a 10 percent increase in militia-perpetrated violence against civilians during the first six months following the USAID suspension. These effects vary systematically across institutional environments, suggesting that pre-existing state capacity shapes vulnerability to sudden aid disruptions.
- 3 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessAid, Interrupted: Conflict Dynamics Following the USAID Suspension in Africa
Foreign aid withdrawal may put the stability of aid-dependent states at risk. Yet short-term conflict responses to donor-side aid disruptions remain poorly understood. We exploit the abrupt and unanticipated suspension of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funding in January 2025 as an exogenous shock to examine its effects on conflict dynamics in Africa. Using monthly conflict data for 44 Sub-Saharan African countries, we apply event-study and difference-in-differences designs to trace conflict responses in highly aid-dependent countries relative to less aid-dependent countries following the suspension. We find a general elevation in conflict, with a statistically significant 15 percent increase in armed conflict between organized groups and up to a 10 percent increase in militia-perpetrated violence against civilians during the first six months following the USAID suspension. These effects vary systematically across institutional environments, suggesting that pre-existing state capacity shapes vulnerability to sudden aid disruptions.
- Open Access
- 18 March 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 62 (6) , 1714-1732
Agricultural roots of social conflict in Southeast Asia
We examine whether harvest-time transitory shifts in employment and income lead to changes in political violence and social unrest in rice-producing croplands of Southeast Asia. Using monthly data from 2010 to 2023 on over 86,000 incidents covering 376 one-degree cells across eight Southeast Asian countries, we estimate a general increase in political violence and a decrease in social unrest in croplands with rice production during the harvest season relative to the rest of the crop year. In a finding that is least sensitive to alternative model specifications and data subsetting, we estimate a 9% increase in violence against civilians in locations with considerable rice production compared to other parts of the region during the harvest season, relative to the rest of the year. We show that the harvest-time changes in conflict are most evident in rural cells with rainfed agriculture. Using location-specific annual variation in growing season rainfall, we then show that the harvest-time increase in violence against civilians occurs in presumably good harvest years, whereas increase in battles between actors of political violence follows growing seasons with scarce rainfall. The harvest-time decrease in social unrest, protests in particular, occurs after presumably bad harvest years. These findings contribute to research on the agroclimatic and economic roots of conflict and offer insights to policymakers by suggesting the spatiotemporal concentration of conflict as well as diverging effects by forms of conflict at harvest time in the rice-producing regions of Southeast Asia.
- 18 March 2025
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 62 (6) , 1714-1732
Open AccessAgricultural roots of social conflict in Southeast Asia
We examine whether harvest-time transitory shifts in employment and income lead to changes in political violence and social unrest in rice-producing croplands of Southeast Asia. Using monthly data from 2010 to 2023 on over 86,000 incidents covering 376 one-degree cells across eight Southeast Asian countries, we estimate a general increase in political violence and a decrease in social unrest in croplands with rice production during the harvest season relative to the rest of the crop year. In a finding that is least sensitive to alternative model specifications and data subsetting, we estimate a 9% increase in violence against civilians in locations with considerable rice production compared to other parts of the region during the harvest season, relative to the rest of the year. We show that the harvest-time changes in conflict are most evident in rural cells with rainfed agriculture. Using location-specific annual variation in growing season rainfall, we then show that the harvest-time increase in violence against civilians occurs in presumably good harvest years, whereas increase in battles between actors of political violence follows growing seasons with scarce rainfall. The harvest-time decrease in social unrest, protests in particular, occurs after presumably bad harvest years. These findings contribute to research on the agroclimatic and economic roots of conflict and offer insights to policymakers by suggesting the spatiotemporal concentration of conflict as well as diverging effects by forms of conflict at harvest time in the rice-producing regions of Southeast Asia.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Market Concentration and Resilience in Agricultural Supply Chains
Problem Definition: U.S. agricultural supply chains are arguably among the most efficient in the world, yet recent disruptions have exposed a fundamental lack of resilience. Some point to market concentration as one reason for this lack of resilience, but there is little empirical evidence to support this claim. In this paper, we develop a model to test the effect of market concentration, both in the supplier and retail markets, on agricultural supply chain resilience. Methodology / Results: We measure resilience using the time it takes price spreads the difference between retail and wholesale prices-to return to their previous levels after a major disruptive event. We test our model using data from the US beef supply chain following the 2019 Tyson beef packing plant fire in Holcomb, KS, which temporarily removed 6% of the beef supply from the market. Using an event-study approach, we find that supplier and retail concentration improve recovery times by about 1.45%. Managerial Implications: Our results demonstrate that market concentration may not necessarily reduce resilience in agricultural supply chains. Therefore, managerial strategies that promote closer supply chain relationships between supply chain partners may promote broader supply chain resilience than previously thought. Moreover, government policies targeting market concentration, specifically to achieve resilience goals, may be misguided.
- 1 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessMarket Concentration and Resilience in Agricultural Supply Chains
Problem Definition: U.S. agricultural supply chains are arguably among the most efficient in the world, yet recent disruptions have exposed a fundamental lack of resilience. Some point to market concentration as one reason for this lack of resilience, but there is little empirical evidence to support this claim. In this paper, we develop a model to test the effect of market concentration, both in the supplier and retail markets, on agricultural supply chain resilience. Methodology / Results: We measure resilience using the time it takes price spreads the difference between retail and wholesale prices-to return to their previous levels after a major disruptive event. We test our model using data from the US beef supply chain following the 2019 Tyson beef packing plant fire in Holcomb, KS, which temporarily removed 6% of the beef supply from the market. Using an event-study approach, we find that supplier and retail concentration improve recovery times by about 1.45%. Managerial Implications: Our results demonstrate that market concentration may not necessarily reduce resilience in agricultural supply chains. Therefore, managerial strategies that promote closer supply chain relationships between supply chain partners may promote broader supply chain resilience than previously thought. Moreover, government policies targeting market concentration, specifically to achieve resilience goals, may be misguided.
- Open Access
- 11 December 2022
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 105 (5) , 1309-1332
Agricultural windfalls and the seasonality of political violence in Africa
When the prices of cereal grains rise, social unrest and conflict become likely. In rural areas, the predation motives of perpetrators can explain the positive relationship between prices and conflict. Predation happens at places and in periods where and when spoils to be appropriated are available. In predominantly agrarian societies, such opportune times align with the harvest season. Does the seasonality of agricultural income lead to the seasonality of conflict? We address this question by analyzing over 55 thousand incidents involving violence against civilians staged by paramilitary groups across Africa during the 1997–2020 period. We investigate the crop year pattern of violence in response to agricultural income shocks via changes in international cereal prices. We find that a year‐on‐year one standard deviation annual growth of the price of the major cereal grain results in a harvest‐time spike in violence by militias in areas where this cereal grain is grown. This translates to a nearly 10% increase in violence during the early postharvest season. We observe no such change in violence by state forces or rebel groups—the other two notable actors. By further investigating the mechanisms, we show that the violence by militias is amplified after plausibly rich harvest seasons when the value of spoils to be appropriated is higher. By focusing on harvest‐related seasonality of conflict, as well as actors more likely to be involved in violence against civilians, we contribute to the growing literature on the economic causes of conflict in predominantly agrarian societies.
- 11 December 2022
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 105 (5) , 1309-1332
Open AccessAgricultural windfalls and the seasonality of political violence in Africa
When the prices of cereal grains rise, social unrest and conflict become likely. In rural areas, the predation motives of perpetrators can explain the positive relationship between prices and conflict. Predation happens at places and in periods where and when spoils to be appropriated are available. In predominantly agrarian societies, such opportune times align with the harvest season. Does the seasonality of agricultural income lead to the seasonality of conflict? We address this question by analyzing over 55 thousand incidents involving violence against civilians staged by paramilitary groups across Africa during the 1997–2020 period. We investigate the crop year pattern of violence in response to agricultural income shocks via changes in international cereal prices. We find that a year‐on‐year one standard deviation annual growth of the price of the major cereal grain results in a harvest‐time spike in violence by militias in areas where this cereal grain is grown. This translates to a nearly 10% increase in violence during the early postharvest season. We observe no such change in violence by state forces or rebel groups—the other two notable actors. By further investigating the mechanisms, we show that the violence by militias is amplified after plausibly rich harvest seasons when the value of spoils to be appropriated is higher. By focusing on harvest‐related seasonality of conflict, as well as actors more likely to be involved in violence against civilians, we contribute to the growing literature on the economic causes of conflict in predominantly agrarian societies.
- Open Access
Agricultural Windfalls and the Seasonality of Political Violence in Africa
When the prices of cereal grains rise, social unrest and conflict become likely. In rural areas, the predation motives of perpetrators can explain the positive relationship between prices and conflict. Predation happens at places and in periods where and when spoils to be appropriated are available. In predominantly agrarian societies, such opportune times align with the harvest season. Does the seasonality of agricultural income lead to the seasonality of conflict? We address this question by analyzing over 55 thousand incidents involving violence against civilians staged by paramilitary groups across Africa during the 1997-2020 period. We investigate the crop year pattern of violence in response to agricultural income shocks via changes in international cereal prices. We find that a year-on-year one standard deviation annual growth of the price of the major cereal grain results in a harvest-time spike in violence by militias in a one-degree cell where this cereal grain is grown. This translates to a nearly ten percent increase in violence during the early postharvest season. We observe no such change in violence by state forces or rebel groups--the other two notable actors. By further investigating the mechanisms, we show that the violence by militias is amplified after plausibly rich harvest seasons when the value of spoils to be appropriated is higher. By focusing on harvest-related seasonality of conflict, as well as actors more likely to be involved in violence against civilians, we contribute to the growing literature on the economic causes of conflict in predominantly agrarian societies.
Open AccessAgricultural Windfalls and the Seasonality of Political Violence in Africa
When the prices of cereal grains rise, social unrest and conflict become likely. In rural areas, the predation motives of perpetrators can explain the positive relationship between prices and conflict. Predation happens at places and in periods where and when spoils to be appropriated are available. In predominantly agrarian societies, such opportune times align with the harvest season. Does the seasonality of agricultural income lead to the seasonality of conflict? We address this question by analyzing over 55 thousand incidents involving violence against civilians staged by paramilitary groups across Africa during the 1997-2020 period. We investigate the crop year pattern of violence in response to agricultural income shocks via changes in international cereal prices. We find that a year-on-year one standard deviation annual growth of the price of the major cereal grain results in a harvest-time spike in violence by militias in a one-degree cell where this cereal grain is grown. This translates to a nearly ten percent increase in violence during the early postharvest season. We observe no such change in violence by state forces or rebel groups--the other two notable actors. By further investigating the mechanisms, we show that the violence by militias is amplified after plausibly rich harvest seasons when the value of spoils to be appropriated is higher. By focusing on harvest-related seasonality of conflict, as well as actors more likely to be involved in violence against civilians, we contribute to the growing literature on the economic causes of conflict in predominantly agrarian societies.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2022
- Published by Wiley in Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
- Vol. 66 (4) , 737-752
Global commodity market disruption and the fallout
The war in the breadbasket of Europe, which spawned at the heels of the once‐in‐a‐lifetime pandemic, sent major cereal prices spiralling upward. The unprecedented sequence of events leading to and including the war has tested the resilience of global commodity markets and the craftsmanship of policymakers. While the circumstances may differ, the disruption of global commodity markets is not exactly uncharted territory, with many examples and experiences from near and distant history. By showcasing anecdotal and empirical evidence from the past, this study puts the current crisis and its consequences in perspective and offers an outlook with a specific focus on low‐ and middle‐income countries.
- 1 October 2022
- Published by Wiley in Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
- Vol. 66 (4) , 737-752
Open AccessGlobal commodity market disruption and the fallout
The war in the breadbasket of Europe, which spawned at the heels of the once‐in‐a‐lifetime pandemic, sent major cereal prices spiralling upward. The unprecedented sequence of events leading to and including the war has tested the resilience of global commodity markets and the craftsmanship of policymakers. While the circumstances may differ, the disruption of global commodity markets is not exactly uncharted territory, with many examples and experiences from near and distant history. By showcasing anecdotal and empirical evidence from the past, this study puts the current crisis and its consequences in perspective and offers an outlook with a specific focus on low‐ and middle‐income countries.
- Open Access
- 8 April 2022
- Published by Wiley in Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 53 (5) , 687-701
A comparison of multistep commodity price forecasts using direct and iterated smooth transition autoregressive methods
- 8 April 2022
- Published by Wiley in Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 53 (5) , 687-701
Open AccessA comparison of multistep commodity price forecasts using direct and iterated smooth transition autoregressive methods
- 1 October 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 190, 255-262
Geographic diversity in economic publishing
- 1 October 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 190, 255-262
Geographic diversity in economic publishing
- 15 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 30 (10) , 2452-2467
Lives saved during economic downturns: Evidence from Australia
Worldwide, countries have been restricting work and social activities to counter the emerging public health crisis due to the coronavirus pandemic. These measures have caused dramatic increases in unemployment. Some commentators argue that the "draconian measures" will do more harm than good due to the economic contraction, despite a large literature that finds mortality rates decline during recessions. We estimate the relationship between unemployment, a proxy for economic climate, and mortality in Australia, a country with universal health care. Using administrative time-series data on mortality by state, age, sex, and cause of death for 1979–2017, we find no relationship between unemployment and mortality on average. However, we observe beneficial health effects in economic downturns for young men, associated with a reduction in transport accidents. Our estimates imply 431 fewer deaths in 2020 if unemployment rates double as forecast. For the early 1980s, we find a procyclical pattern in infant mortality rates. However, this pattern disappears starting from the mid-1980s, coincident with the 1984 implementation of universal health care. Our results suggest that universal health care may insulate individuals from the health effects of macroeconomic fluctuations.
- 15 July 2021
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 30 (10) , 2452-2467
Lives saved during economic downturns: Evidence from Australia
Worldwide, countries have been restricting work and social activities to counter the emerging public health crisis due to the coronavirus pandemic. These measures have caused dramatic increases in unemployment. Some commentators argue that the "draconian measures" will do more harm than good due to the economic contraction, despite a large literature that finds mortality rates decline during recessions. We estimate the relationship between unemployment, a proxy for economic climate, and mortality in Australia, a country with universal health care. Using administrative time-series data on mortality by state, age, sex, and cause of death for 1979–2017, we find no relationship between unemployment and mortality on average. However, we observe beneficial health effects in economic downturns for young men, associated with a reduction in transport accidents. Our estimates imply 431 fewer deaths in 2020 if unemployment rates double as forecast. For the early 1980s, we find a procyclical pattern in infant mortality rates. However, this pattern disappears starting from the mid-1980s, coincident with the 1984 implementation of universal health care. Our results suggest that universal health care may insulate individuals from the health effects of macroeconomic fluctuations.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Lives Saved During Economic Downturns: Evidence from Australia
Worldwide, countries have been restricting work and social activities to counter an emerging public health crisis due to the coronavirus pandemic. These measures have caused dramatic increases in unemployment in the short run, with an expected deepening of the recession in the long run. Some commentators argue that the "draconian measures" will do more harm than good due to the economic contraction, despite a large literature that finds mortality rates decline during recessions.We estimate the relationship between unemployment, a widely accepted proxy for economic climate, and mortality in Australia, a country with universal health care. Using administrative time-series data on mortality that varies by state, age, sex, and cause of death collected for the years 1979-2017, we find no relationship between unemployment and mortality on average. However, we observe beneficial health effects in economic downturns for young men aged 25 to 34 associated with a reduction in vehicle transport accidents.Our estimates imply 425 fewer deaths if Reserve Bank of Australia expectations of a doubling of unemployment rates are realized by the end of 2020. For the early 1980s, we also find a procyclical pattern in the mortality rates of infants. However, this pattern disappears starting from the mid-1980s, coincident with the full implementation of universal health care in Australia in 1984. Our results suggest that universal health care may insulate individuals from the health effects of macroeconomic fluctuations. We conclude that the economic recession is an unlikely mediator for pandemic-related deaths in Australia.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessLives Saved During Economic Downturns: Evidence from Australia
Worldwide, countries have been restricting work and social activities to counter an emerging public health crisis due to the coronavirus pandemic. These measures have caused dramatic increases in unemployment in the short run, with an expected deepening of the recession in the long run. Some commentators argue that the "draconian measures" will do more harm than good due to the economic contraction, despite a large literature that finds mortality rates decline during recessions.We estimate the relationship between unemployment, a widely accepted proxy for economic climate, and mortality in Australia, a country with universal health care. Using administrative time-series data on mortality that varies by state, age, sex, and cause of death collected for the years 1979-2017, we find no relationship between unemployment and mortality on average. However, we observe beneficial health effects in economic downturns for young men aged 25 to 34 associated with a reduction in vehicle transport accidents.Our estimates imply 425 fewer deaths if Reserve Bank of Australia expectations of a doubling of unemployment rates are realized by the end of 2020. For the early 1980s, we also find a procyclical pattern in the mortality rates of infants. However, this pattern disappears starting from the mid-1980s, coincident with the full implementation of universal health care in Australia in 1984. Our results suggest that universal health care may insulate individuals from the health effects of macroeconomic fluctuations. We conclude that the economic recession is an unlikely mediator for pandemic-related deaths in Australia.