Maria Loumioti
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Maria Loumioti has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aleksander A. Aleszczyk
New York University
1 shared publication Caterina Mendicino
Centre for Economic Policy Research, 75007 Paris, France; and European Central Bank, 60314 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
1 shared publicationFlorin P. Vasvari
1 shared publication- George Serafeim
Harvard University
1 shared publication - Mariassunta Giannetti
Stockholm School of Economics, SE-113 83 Stockholm, Sweden; and Centre for Economic Policy Research, 75007 Paris, France; and European Corporate Governance Institute, 1000 Brussels, Belgium; and Swedish House of Finance, 11383 Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication Martina Jasova
Centre for Economic Policy Research, 75007 Paris, France; and Barnard College, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- p. 1-32
The Issuance and Design of Sustainability-Linked Loans
We explore the contract design of sustainability-linked loans (SLLs), a rapidly growing form of ESG-labeled debt that ties loan pricing to firms’ sustainability performance. Using a global SLL sample issued between 2017 and 2023, we examine whether SLLs are structured to discipline borrowers with weak ESG performance through stringent sustainability-linked provisions. We find no association between borrower ESG performance and the rigor of SLL provisions, suggesting that SLLs are generally not designed as incentive contracts. Instead, SLL contract design aligns more closely with ESG branding and credit-product-expansion motives: borrowers leverage SLLs to enhance legitimacy and visibility and to attract additional capital, whereas lenders can convey their ESG commitment, cater to investor demand for ESG-labeled debt, and expand their credit product offering. Overall, our evidence suggests that SLLs function primarily as symbolic labels rather than credible mechanisms for driving meaningful improvements in firms’ sustainability outcomes. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M14; M41; G21; G32; Q56.
- 1 September 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- p. 1-32
The Issuance and Design of Sustainability-Linked Loans
We explore the contract design of sustainability-linked loans (SLLs), a rapidly growing form of ESG-labeled debt that ties loan pricing to firms’ sustainability performance. Using a global SLL sample issued between 2017 and 2023, we examine whether SLLs are structured to discipline borrowers with weak ESG performance through stringent sustainability-linked provisions. We find no association between borrower ESG performance and the rigor of SLL provisions, suggesting that SLLs are generally not designed as incentive contracts. Instead, SLL contract design aligns more closely with ESG branding and credit-product-expansion motives: borrowers leverage SLLs to enhance legitimacy and visibility and to attract additional capital, whereas lenders can convey their ESG commitment, cater to investor demand for ESG-labeled debt, and expand their credit product offering. Overall, our evidence suggests that SLLs function primarily as symbolic labels rather than credible mechanisms for driving meaningful improvements in firms’ sustainability outcomes. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M14; M41; G21; G32; Q56.
- Top Cited Papers
- 9 April 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
“Glossy Green” Banks: The Disconnect Between Environmental Disclosures and Lending Activities
Using confidential information on banks’ portfolios, we show that banks that emphasize the sustainability of their lending policies in their disclosures do not exhibit a reduced environmental impact and, if anything, they extend a higher volume of credit to brown borrowers, without charging higher interest rates, shortening debt maturity, or requiring more collateral. These results cannot be attributed to the financing of borrowers’ transition toward greener technologies. Examining the mechanisms behind the strategic disclosure choices reveals that banks extend credit to existing brown borrowers, especially those who are financially underperforming. This paper was accepted by Caroline Flammer, sustainability. Funding: M. Giannetti acknowledges financial support from the Swedish House of Finance, the Nasdaq Nordic Foundation, the Karl-Adam Bonnier Foundation, and the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation. M. Jasova acknowledges financial support from the Barnard College Presidential Research Award. M. Loumioti acknowledges financial support from the University of Texas at Dallas. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB or the Eurosystem. All errors are the authors’ own. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07420 .
- 9 April 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Top Cited Papers“Glossy Green” Banks: The Disconnect Between Environmental Disclosures and Lending Activities
Using confidential information on banks’ portfolios, we show that banks that emphasize the sustainability of their lending policies in their disclosures do not exhibit a reduced environmental impact and, if anything, they extend a higher volume of credit to brown borrowers, without charging higher interest rates, shortening debt maturity, or requiring more collateral. These results cannot be attributed to the financing of borrowers’ transition toward greener technologies. Examining the mechanisms behind the strategic disclosure choices reveals that banks extend credit to existing brown borrowers, especially those who are financially underperforming. This paper was accepted by Caroline Flammer, sustainability. Funding: M. Giannetti acknowledges financial support from the Swedish House of Finance, the Nasdaq Nordic Foundation, the Karl-Adam Bonnier Foundation, and the Jan Wallander and Tom Hedelius Foundation. M. Jasova acknowledges financial support from the Barnard College Presidential Research Award. M. Loumioti acknowledges financial support from the University of Texas at Dallas. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB or the Eurosystem. All errors are the authors’ own. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.07420 .
- 1 April 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 67 (2-3) , 438-462
Portfolio performance manipulation in collateralized loan obligations
- 1 April 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 67 (2-3) , 438-462
Portfolio performance manipulation in collateralized loan obligations