Benjamin Schreer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Benjamin Schreer has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Timo Noetzel
5 shared publications- Sheryn Lee
Swedish Def Univ, Stockholm, Sweden
4 shared publications - Stephan Frühling
Australian National University Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs Canberra Australien
2 shared publications - Bates Gill
Department of Security Studies and Criminology, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia
1 shared publication Brendan Taylor
1 shared publicationDerek Grossman
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 45 (3) , 163-182
Will Europe Defend Taiwan?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led European powers, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) all to realize that significant steps were needed to redress the Europea...
- 3 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 45 (3) , 163-182
Open AccessWill Europe Defend Taiwan?
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led European powers, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) all to realize that significant steps were needed to redress the Europea...
- 4 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Comparative Strategy
- Vol. 41 (2) , 189-202
A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge
How will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) respond to China’s rise? At the heart of NATO’s China challenge is the need for allies to grasp the magnitude of Beijing’s emerging geopolitical challenge to the Euro-Atlantic area. Utilizing geopolitical theories developed by Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman, the article argues that China is evolving into a transatlantic challenge on the Eurasian “maritime periphery.” Consequently, NATO can play a significant role in putting pressure on China’s continental direction and its efforts to extend its strategic reach into the “far seas.”
- 4 March 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Comparative Strategy
- Vol. 41 (2) , 189-202
A geopolitical and geostrategic blueprint for NATO’s China challenge
How will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) respond to China’s rise? At the heart of NATO’s China challenge is the need for allies to grasp the magnitude of Beijing’s emerging geopolitical challenge to the Euro-Atlantic area. Utilizing geopolitical theories developed by Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman, the article argues that China is evolving into a transatlantic challenge on the Eurasian “maritime periphery.” Consequently, NATO can play a significant role in putting pressure on China’s continental direction and its efforts to extend its strategic reach into the “far seas.”
- 2 January 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 43 (1) , 143-157
After the INF: What Will US Indo-Pacific Allies Do?
(2020). After the INF: What Will US Indo-Pacific Allies Do? The Washington Quarterly: Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 143-157.
- 2 January 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 43 (1) , 143-157
After the INF: What Will US Indo-Pacific Allies Do?
(2020). After the INF: What Will US Indo-Pacific Allies Do? The Washington Quarterly: Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 143-157.
- 26 June 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of International Affairs
- Vol. 73 (5) , 431-448
Why US-Sino strategic competition is good for Australia
Faced with an increasingly authoritarian and assertive China, the United States (US) under President Trump administration’s has embarked on a course toward a more openly competitive US–China relationship. However, the debate in Australia has viewed the new era of US-Sino strategic competition mostly negatively. Indeed, arguments have been made for a need to ‘radically’ rethink Australia’s defence policy in order to prepare for a ‘post-US-led’ regional order. For some analysts, Canberra has even no other choice than to adopt a strategy of ‘armed neutrality’ to deal with an emerging China-dominated regional order and a declining US, confused and unwilling to defend its allies. In contrast, this article argues that on balance Trump’s course correction on China is positive for Australia as the US is likely to maintain its robust engagement in the Indo-Pacific. While the president’s inconsistencies partly undermine US declaratory statements in regards to greater competition with China, a bipartisan consensus is likely to continue to shift US policy in this direction. While greater US-Sino competition requires Australia to assume greater responsibilities for regional security, radical changes to its defence policy and security alignment are not needed.
- 26 June 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of International Affairs
- Vol. 73 (5) , 431-448
Why US-Sino strategic competition is good for Australia
Faced with an increasingly authoritarian and assertive China, the United States (US) under President Trump administration’s has embarked on a course toward a more openly competitive US–China relationship. However, the debate in Australia has viewed the new era of US-Sino strategic competition mostly negatively. Indeed, arguments have been made for a need to ‘radically’ rethink Australia’s defence policy in order to prepare for a ‘post-US-led’ regional order. For some analysts, Canberra has even no other choice than to adopt a strategy of ‘armed neutrality’ to deal with an emerging China-dominated regional order and a declining US, confused and unwilling to defend its allies. In contrast, this article argues that on balance Trump’s course correction on China is positive for Australia as the US is likely to maintain its robust engagement in the Indo-Pacific. While the president’s inconsistencies partly undermine US declaratory statements in regards to greater competition with China, a bipartisan consensus is likely to continue to shift US policy in this direction. While greater US-Sino competition requires Australia to assume greater responsibilities for regional security, radical changes to its defence policy and security alignment are not needed.
- 3 April 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 41 (2) , 155-170
Countering China’s “United Front”
Concerns are mounting in Washington and other capitals around the globe about the negative aspects of China’s growing power and reach. Beyond pursuing economic and military competition, the Chinese...
- 3 April 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Washington Quarterly
- Vol. 41 (2) , 155-170
Countering China’s “United Front”
Concerns are mounting in Washington and other capitals around the globe about the negative aspects of China’s growing power and reach. Beyond pursuing economic and military competition, the Chinese...
- 1 March 2018
- Published by University of California Press in Asian Survey
- Vol. 58 (2) , 302-319
Australia and the Rules-Based Order in Asia
In response to a more-contested Asia, Australia has placed the ‘rules-based order’ at the heart of its declaratory strategic policy. This move signals Australia’s commitment to this order, to its alliance with the United States, and to a more active strategic role in the region. However, a failure to match rhetoric with action risks undermining Australia’s strategic interests by emboldening China and reducing Australia’s value as an American ally.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by University of California Press in Asian Survey
- Vol. 58 (2) , 302-319
Australia and the Rules-Based Order in Asia
In response to a more-contested Asia, Australia has placed the ‘rules-based order’ at the heart of its declaratory strategic policy. This move signals Australia’s commitment to this order, to its alliance with the United States, and to a more active strategic role in the region. However, a failure to match rhetoric with action risks undermining Australia’s strategic interests by emboldening China and reducing Australia’s value as an American ally.
- 6 September 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Geopolitics
- Vol. 24 (2) , 503-522
Towards Contested ‘Spheres of Influence’ in the Western Pacific: Rising China, Classical Geopolitics, and Asia-Pacific Stability
The evolution of US-Sino great power competition in East Asia has emerged as a key geostrategic issue in international politics. A central question is whether the ‘geography of the peace’ will prevail where, despite their natural predisposition to compete for regional hegemony, the two great powers respect each other’s ‘spheres of influence’. This concept assumes that, as a major continental power, China remains preoccupied with securing its land borders and expanding its influence on the Eurasian land mass. In contrast, this article argues that the Sino-US rivalry likely leads to the emergence of a ‘geography of conflict’ in East Asia because of overlapping zones of strategic interests. Applying a classical geopolitics approach, it shows that the geopolitical models of British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder, US naval strategist Alfred Thayer and Dutch-American geostrategist Nicholas Spykman are useful to explain the current behaviour of China and the United States, and why, as a result, East Asia is becoming more contested.
- 6 September 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Geopolitics
- Vol. 24 (2) , 503-522
Towards Contested ‘Spheres of Influence’ in the Western Pacific: Rising China, Classical Geopolitics, and Asia-Pacific Stability
The evolution of US-Sino great power competition in East Asia has emerged as a key geostrategic issue in international politics. A central question is whether the ‘geography of the peace’ will prevail where, despite their natural predisposition to compete for regional hegemony, the two great powers respect each other’s ‘spheres of influence’. This concept assumes that, as a major continental power, China remains preoccupied with securing its land borders and expanding its influence on the Eurasian land mass. In contrast, this article argues that the Sino-US rivalry likely leads to the emergence of a ‘geography of conflict’ in East Asia because of overlapping zones of strategic interests. Applying a classical geopolitics approach, it shows that the geopolitical models of British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder, US naval strategist Alfred Thayer and Dutch-American geostrategist Nicholas Spykman are useful to explain the current behaviour of China and the United States, and why, as a result, East Asia is becoming more contested.
- 15 March 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Global Affairs
- Vol. 3 (2) , 153-163
Embracing the dragon? Europe’s major powers and the rise of China
How have Europe’s major powers – the United Kingdom, France and Germany – responded to China’s growing assertiveness? The common view is that they continue a strategy of “engagement” towards Beijing. However, by tracing their respective patterns of “security alignment behaviour” towards the two rival great powers, the United States and China, we find that despite some variation each of the three powers has responded to China’s growing assertiveness by strengthening its security engagement in the Asia-Pacific and by closer aligning their security policies with the United States and its allies and partners. Political and economic engagement with China is now complemented by security policies designed to contribute to efforts to restrain China’s strategic behaviour. However, this policy choice is likely to create greater costs for Europe’s major powers in the future as the Asia-Pacific is becoming even more contested and the costs of standing up to China increases.
- 15 March 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Global Affairs
- Vol. 3 (2) , 153-163
Embracing the dragon? Europe’s major powers and the rise of China
How have Europe’s major powers – the United Kingdom, France and Germany – responded to China’s growing assertiveness? The common view is that they continue a strategy of “engagement” towards Beijing. However, by tracing their respective patterns of “security alignment behaviour” towards the two rival great powers, the United States and China, we find that despite some variation each of the three powers has responded to China’s growing assertiveness by strengthening its security engagement in the Asia-Pacific and by closer aligning their security policies with the United States and its allies and partners. Political and economic engagement with China is now complemented by security policies designed to contribute to efforts to restrain China’s strategic behaviour. However, this policy choice is likely to create greater costs for Europe’s major powers in the future as the Asia-Pacific is becoming even more contested and the costs of standing up to China increases.
- 25 January 2017
- Published by Wiley in Asian Politics & Policy
- Vol. 9 (1) , 50-65
The Double‐Edged Sword of Coercion: Cross‐Strait Relations After the 2016 Taiwan Elections
Whereas “optimists” argue that military conflict in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly unlikely, “pessimists” warn that conflict remains a real option. The landslide victory for the pro‐independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of President Tsai Ing‐wen in the January 2016 presidential and legislative elections adds fire to the debate. The DPP win makes a peaceful unification on China's terms an ever‐distant prospect. Since the election, Beijing's strategy has rested on pressuring Taipei into accepting the “1992 consensus” as the precondition for constructive relations. However, this article argues that strategies of “coercion” are a double‐edged sword for China: its very success in deterring Taiwan from declaring formal independence has backfired as far as compelling the island from accepting unification on its terms. While pessimism about a new period of cross‐Strait tensions is premature, the Taiwan Strait remains a volatile regional flash point in East Asia.
- 25 January 2017
- Published by Wiley in Asian Politics & Policy
- Vol. 9 (1) , 50-65
The Double‐Edged Sword of Coercion: Cross‐Strait Relations After the 2016 Taiwan Elections
Whereas “optimists” argue that military conflict in the Taiwan Strait has become increasingly unlikely, “pessimists” warn that conflict remains a real option. The landslide victory for the pro‐independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of President Tsai Ing‐wen in the January 2016 presidential and legislative elections adds fire to the debate. The DPP win makes a peaceful unification on China's terms an ever‐distant prospect. Since the election, Beijing's strategy has rested on pressuring Taipei into accepting the “1992 consensus” as the precondition for constructive relations. However, this article argues that strategies of “coercion” are a double‐edged sword for China: its very success in deterring Taiwan from declaring formal independence has backfired as far as compelling the island from accepting unification on its terms. While pessimism about a new period of cross‐Strait tensions is premature, the Taiwan Strait remains a volatile regional flash point in East Asia.
- 1 October 2016
- Published by MIT Press in International Security
- Vol. 41 (2) , 192-197
Correspondence: Stability or Volatility across the Taiwan Strait?
- 1 October 2016
- Published by MIT Press in International Security
- Vol. 41 (2) , 192-197
Correspondence: Stability or Volatility across the Taiwan Strait?