Haydée Lugo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Haydée Lugo has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Raúl Jiménez
Department of Statistics, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Madrid, Spain
6 shared publications - Maxi San Miguel
Instituto de Física Interdisciplinar y Sistemas Complejos IFISC (CSIC-UIB) Campus Universitat Illes Balears E-07122 Palma de Mallorca Spain
4 shared publications Juan Carlos González-Avella
APSL S.L, Edifici Europa—Planta baja Galileo Galilei, Parc Bit 2 , 07121 Palma de Mallorca, Spain
3 shared publications- Jose A. Cuesta
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
2 shared publications Maxi San Miguel
ICAE, Department of Economic Analysis, Complutense University of Madrid, Madrid, Spain
2 shared publicationsA. Sánchez
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 August 2020
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 30 (8) , 083125
Local connectivity effects in learning and coordination dynamics in a two-layer network
Anticoordination and chimera states occur in a two-layer model of learning and coordination dynamics in fully connected networks. Learning occurs in the intra-layer networks, while a coordination game is played in the inter-layer network. In this paper, we study the robustness of these states against local effects introduced by the local connectivity of random networks. We identify threshold values for the mean degree of the networks such that below these values, local effects prevent the existence of anticoordination and chimera states found in the fully connected setting. Local effects in the intra-layer learning network are more important than in the inter-layer network in preventing the existence of anticoordination states. The local connectivity of the intra- and inter-layer networks is important to avoid the occurrence of chimera states, but the local effects are stronger in the inter-layer coordination network than in the intra-layer learning network. We also study the effect of local connectivity on the problem of equilibrium selection in the asymmetric coordination game, showing that local effects favor the selection of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in situations in which the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in the fully connected network. In this case, again, the important local effects are those associated with the coordination dynamics inter-layer network. Indeed, lower average degree of the network connectivity between layers reduces the probability of achieving the risk-dominant strategy, favoring the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
- 1 August 2020
- Published by AIP Publishing in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
- Vol. 30 (8) , 083125
Local connectivity effects in learning and coordination dynamics in a two-layer network
Anticoordination and chimera states occur in a two-layer model of learning and coordination dynamics in fully connected networks. Learning occurs in the intra-layer networks, while a coordination game is played in the inter-layer network. In this paper, we study the robustness of these states against local effects introduced by the local connectivity of random networks. We identify threshold values for the mean degree of the networks such that below these values, local effects prevent the existence of anticoordination and chimera states found in the fully connected setting. Local effects in the intra-layer learning network are more important than in the inter-layer network in preventing the existence of anticoordination states. The local connectivity of the intra- and inter-layer networks is important to avoid the occurrence of chimera states, but the local effects are stronger in the inter-layer coordination network than in the intra-layer learning network. We also study the effect of local connectivity on the problem of equilibrium selection in the asymmetric coordination game, showing that local effects favor the selection of the Pareto-dominant equilibrium in situations in which the risk-dominant equilibrium is selected in the fully connected network. In this case, again, the important local effects are those associated with the coordination dynamics inter-layer network. Indeed, lower average degree of the network connectivity between layers reduces the probability of achieving the risk-dominant strategy, favoring the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
- Open Access
- 9 April 2019
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics
- Vol. 5
Chimera and Anticoordination States in Learning Dynamics
In many real-life situations, individuals are dared to simultaneously achieve social objectives of acceptance or approval and strategic objectives of coordination. Since these two objectives may take place in different environments, a two-layer network is the simple and natural framework for the study of such kind of dynamical situations. In this paper we present a model in which the state of the agents corresponds to one of two possible strategies. They change their states by interaction with their neighbors in the network. Inside each layer the agents interact by a social pressure mechanism, while between the layers the agents interact via a coordination game. From an evolutionary approach, we focus on the asymptotic solutions for all-to-all interactions across and inside the layers and for any initial distribution of strategies. We find new asymptotic configurations which do not exist in a single isolated social network analysis. We report the emergence and existence of chimera states in which two different collective states coexist in the network. Namely, one layer reaches a state of full coordination while the other remains in a dynamical state of coexistence of strategies. In addition, the system may also reach a state of global anticoordination where a full coordination is reached inside each layer but with opposite strategies in each of the two network layers. We trace back the emergence of chimera states and global anticoordination states to the agents inertia against social pressure, referred here to as the level of skepticism, along with the degree of risk taken into account in a general coordination game.
- 9 April 2019
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Applied Mathematics and Statistics
- Vol. 5
Open AccessChimera and Anticoordination States in Learning Dynamics
In many real-life situations, individuals are dared to simultaneously achieve social objectives of acceptance or approval and strategic objectives of coordination. Since these two objectives may take place in different environments, a two-layer network is the simple and natural framework for the study of such kind of dynamical situations. In this paper we present a model in which the state of the agents corresponds to one of two possible strategies. They change their states by interaction with their neighbors in the network. Inside each layer the agents interact by a social pressure mechanism, while between the layers the agents interact via a coordination game. From an evolutionary approach, we focus on the asymptotic solutions for all-to-all interactions across and inside the layers and for any initial distribution of strategies. We find new asymptotic configurations which do not exist in a single isolated social network analysis. We report the emergence and existence of chimera states in which two different collective states coexist in the network. Namely, one layer reaches a state of full coordination while the other remains in a dynamical state of coexistence of strategies. In addition, the system may also reach a state of global anticoordination where a full coordination is reached inside each layer but with opposite strategies in each of the two network layers. We trace back the emergence of chimera states and global anticoordination states to the agents inertia against social pressure, referred here to as the level of skepticism, along with the degree of risk taken into account in a general coordination game.
- 6 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
- Vol. 14 (1) , 203-214
Coordination in a skeptical two-group population
- 6 June 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
- Vol. 14 (1) , 203-214
Coordination in a skeptical two-group population
- 16 April 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 23 (2) , 218-233
A public good model with lotteries in large groups
- 16 April 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in International Tax and Public Finance
- Vol. 23 (2) , 218-233
A public good model with lotteries in large groups
- Open Access
- 14 January 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 5 (1) , 7776
Learning and coordinating in a multilayer network
We introduce a two layer network model for social coordination incorporating two relevant ingredients: a) different networks of interaction to learn and to obtain a pay-off, and b) decision making processes based both on social and strategic motivations. Two populations of agents are distributed in two layers with intralayer learning processes and playing interlayer a coordination game. We find that the skepticism about the wisdom of crowd and the local connectivity are the driving forces to accomplish full coordination of the two populations, while polarized coordinated layers are only possible for all-to-all interactions. Local interactions also allow for full coordination in the socially efficient Pareto-dominant strategy in spite of being the riskier one.
- 14 January 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 5 (1) , 7776
Open AccessLearning and coordinating in a multilayer network
We introduce a two layer network model for social coordination incorporating two relevant ingredients: a) different networks of interaction to learn and to obtain a pay-off, and b) decision making processes based both on social and strategic motivations. Two populations of agents are distributed in two layers with intralayer learning processes and playing interlayer a coordination game. We find that the skepticism about the wisdom of crowd and the local connectivity are the driving forces to accomplish full coordination of the two populations, while polarized coordinated layers are only possible for all-to-all interactions. Local interactions also allow for full coordination in the socially efficient Pareto-dominant strategy in spite of being the riskier one.
- Open Access
Learning and coordinating in a multilayer network
We introduce a two layer network model for social coordination incorporating two relevant ingredients: a) different networks of interaction to learn and to obtain a payoff , and b) decision making processes based both on social and strategic motivations. Two populations of agents are distributed in two layers with intralayer learning processes and playing interlayer a coordination game. We find that the skepticism about the wisdom of crowd and the local connectivity are the driving forces to accomplish full coordination of the two populations, while polarized coordinated layers are only possible for all-to-all interactions. Local interactions also allow for full coordination in the socially efficient Pareto-dominant strategy in spite of being the riskier one.
Open AccessLearning and coordinating in a multilayer network
We introduce a two layer network model for social coordination incorporating two relevant ingredients: a) different networks of interaction to learn and to obtain a payoff , and b) decision making processes based both on social and strategic motivations. Two populations of agents are distributed in two layers with intralayer learning processes and playing interlayer a coordination game. We find that the skepticism about the wisdom of crowd and the local connectivity are the driving forces to accomplish full coordination of the two populations, while polarized coordinated layers are only possible for all-to-all interactions. Local interactions also allow for full coordination in the socially efficient Pareto-dominant strategy in spite of being the riskier one.
- 5 May 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
- Vol. 8 (2) , 267-276
Heterogeneity in the resistance to learning
- 5 May 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
- Vol. 8 (2) , 267-276
Heterogeneity in the resistance to learning
- 18 August 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in The European Physical Journal B
- Vol. 71 (2) , 273-280
Gradual learning and the evolution of cooperation in the spatial Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma
- 18 August 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in The European Physical Journal B
- Vol. 71 (2) , 273-280
Gradual learning and the evolution of cooperation in the spatial Continuous Prisoner’s Dilemma
- 30 April 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
- Vol. 4 (2) , 183-193
The shared reward dilemma on structured populations
- 30 April 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination
- Vol. 4 (2) , 183-193
The shared reward dilemma on structured populations
- 1 March 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 251 (2) , 253-263
The shared reward dilemma
- 1 March 2008
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Theoretical Biology
- Vol. 251 (2) , 253-263
The shared reward dilemma