Mich Tvede
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Mich Tvede has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Christian Ghiglino
Copenhagen Business School
6 shared publications- Hervé Crès
New York University in Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi, UAE
4 shared publications Jens Leth Hougaard
4 shared publications- Hervé Crès
Sciences Po
3 shared publications - Yves Balasko
University of York
3 shared publications - Christian Ghiglino
Department of Economics , University of Bern , Gesellschaftsstrasse 49, 3012, Bern, Switzerland
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 4 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Existence of a majority equilibrium in the presence of a reference point
We study the existence of majority equilibria in multidimensional policy spaces when choices are made in the presence of a reference point, for example an incumbent. Voters are described by strict preference correspondences such that, for any incumbent policy, the set of strictly preferred alternatives is contained in a pointed cone with vertex at that policy. Theorem 1 shows that a majority equilibrium exists whenever the cone angle is smaller than $\arcsin\sqrt{(d{+}1)/(2d)}$ with a dimension-free bound at $45^\circ$. In a Euclidean model with ideal points, Theorem 3 shows that for random electorates in high dimensions, majority equilibria exist with probability one even when the angle is close to $90^\circ$, the unrestricted case.- 4 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessExistence of a majority equilibrium in the presence of a reference point
We study the existence of majority equilibria in multidimensional policy spaces when choices are made in the presence of a reference point, for example an incumbent. Voters are described by strict preference correspondences such that, for any incumbent policy, the set of strictly preferred alternatives is contained in a pointed cone with vertex at that policy. Theorem 1 shows that a majority equilibrium exists whenever the cone angle is smaller than $\arcsin\sqrt{(d{+}1)/(2d)}$ with a dimension-free bound at $45^\circ$. In a Euclidean model with ideal points, Theorem 3 shows that for random electorates in high dimensions, majority equilibria exist with probability one even when the angle is close to $90^\circ$, the unrestricted case. - 15 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 75 (4) , 1181-1205
Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition
- 15 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 75 (4) , 1181-1205
Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition
- 29 July 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 116-132
Making a Virtue of Necessity
The Pareto principle can be read as a positive hypothesis, reconciling theory with reality, or as a normative hypothesis, standing for a behavior that might be nudged or not, depending on the desirability of its consequences. The behavioral underpinnings of the Pareto principle are reviewed, together with its ethical foundations. In particular, the thesis of adaptive preferences is critically examined, and an axiomatic characterization of such preferences is proposed. Their likeliness is explored in light of the duality between persons and groups, a classic notion of theoretical sociology. Finally, a contribution to the reflection on group agency and corporate social responsibility is provided. It is argued that environmental and social responsibility can emerge from collective decision-making of selfish individuals depending on the governance adopted.
- 29 July 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 116-132
Making a Virtue of Necessity
The Pareto principle can be read as a positive hypothesis, reconciling theory with reality, or as a normative hypothesis, standing for a behavior that might be nudged or not, depending on the desirability of its consequences. The behavioral underpinnings of the Pareto principle are reviewed, together with its ethical foundations. In particular, the thesis of adaptive preferences is critically examined, and an axiomatic characterization of such preferences is proposed. Their likeliness is explored in light of the duality between persons and groups, a classic notion of theoretical sociology. Finally, a contribution to the reflection on group agency and corporate social responsibility is provided. It is argued that environmental and social responsibility can emerge from collective decision-making of selfish individuals depending on the governance adopted.
- 29 July 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 60-88
Voting and Trading in Symbiosis
The notion of political stability of Chapter 2 is applied to the general equilibrium analysis of Chapter 1, highlighting how trading and voting mechanisms help each other’s functioning. On an incomplete financial market, trading reduces the dimensionality of the collective decision-making problem; in the presence of externalities or imperfect competition, trading reduces the polarization of the electorate. In both cases, political stability obtains for lowered rates of super majority. Hence trading facilitates the emergence of a voting-stable decision. It is furthermore argued that stability with respect to the lowest possible rate of super majority is more likely to result in economic efficiency. Hence voting mitigates market failures. However, it takes different governance rules to ensure efficiency of stable decisions: shareholder governance on an incomplete financial market, stakeholder democracy when facing externalities or imperfect competition. And expectations about the outcome of the decision-making process can play a crucial, potentially destabilizing role.
- 29 July 2021
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 60-88
Voting and Trading in Symbiosis
The notion of political stability of Chapter 2 is applied to the general equilibrium analysis of Chapter 1, highlighting how trading and voting mechanisms help each other’s functioning. On an incomplete financial market, trading reduces the dimensionality of the collective decision-making problem; in the presence of externalities or imperfect competition, trading reduces the polarization of the electorate. In both cases, political stability obtains for lowered rates of super majority. Hence trading facilitates the emergence of a voting-stable decision. It is furthermore argued that stability with respect to the lowest possible rate of super majority is more likely to result in economic efficiency. Hence voting mitigates market failures. However, it takes different governance rules to ensure efficiency of stable decisions: shareholder governance on an incomplete financial market, stakeholder democracy when facing externalities or imperfect competition. And expectations about the outcome of the decision-making process can play a crucial, potentially destabilizing role.
- Open Access
- 25 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 30 (1) , 83-112
The impact of trade with pure exporters
- 25 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Review of International Economics
- Vol. 30 (1) , 83-112
Open AccessThe impact of trade with pure exporters
- Open Access
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 87, 31-42
Debt constraints and monetary policy
- 1 March 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Mathematical Economics
- Vol. 87, 31-42
Open AccessDebt constraints and monetary policy
- Open Access
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 102, 98-110
Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture
- 1 March 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 102, 98-110
Open AccessSharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture
- 31 July 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 245-262
Revenue Sharing in European Football Leagues: A Theoretical Analysis
- 31 July 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 245-262
Revenue Sharing in European Football Leagues: A Theoretical Analysis
- Open Access
- 20 May 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 62 (1-2) , 201-219
Incomplete financial markets and jumps in asset prices
- 20 May 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 62 (1-2) , 201-219
Open AccessIncomplete financial markets and jumps in asset prices