Klaus Gugler
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Klaus Gugler has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Adhurim Haxhimusa
1 shared publicationB. Burcin Yurtoglu
WHU – Otto Beisheim School of Management Vallendar Germany
1 shared publication- B. Burcin Yurtoglu
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
1 shared publication - Carlo Cambini
Politecnico di Torino
1 shared publication - Christine Zulehner
University of Vienna
1 shared publication Dennis C. Mueller
Department of Economics University of Vienna Vienna Austria
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 107
The gas price brake increases gas prices: Empirical evidence
- 23 June 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 107
Open AccessThe gas price brake increases gas prices: Empirical evidence
- Open Access
- 19 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 124, 102916
Environmental Policies and directed technological change
- 19 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 124, 102916
Open AccessEnvironmental Policies and directed technological change
- Open Access
- 1 March 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 106
Effectiveness of climate policies: Carbon pricing vs. subsidizing renewables
- 1 March 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 106
Open AccessEffectiveness of climate policies: Carbon pricing vs. subsidizing renewables
- Open Access
- 23 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 55 (3) , 375-402
Static or Dynamic Efficiency: Horizontal Merger Effects in the Wireless Telecommunications Industry
- 23 August 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 55 (3) , 375-402
Open AccessStatic or Dynamic Efficiency: Horizontal Merger Effects in the Wireless Telecommunications Industry
- Open Access
- 21 September 2016
- Published by CBU Research Institute in CBU International Conference Proceedings
- Vol. 4, 214-222
THE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION ON PERFORMANCE OF PAKISTANI LISTED COMPANIES
This paper analyzes the effects of ownership concentration on investment performance in a large sample of Pakistani publicly-listed companies from 1997 to 2007. Special attention is directed to statistical methods from the field of panel-data econometrics, which are able to deal with endogeneity problems and with structural reverse causality. The preferred estimator that is based on firm fixed effects insinuates that the voting rights of ultimate shareholders affect Tobin’s q unambiguously negatively, whereas the squared voting rights affect it unambiguously positively. This implies a U-curved relationship between Tobin’s q and voting rights concentration with a turning point at 45%. More than 75% of the companies fall in the upward sloping part of the curve. While positive incentive effects are at work in Pakistan, financial market development is retarded by the reluctance of minority shareholders facing dominant shareholders to hold small stakes in listed companies. Consistently, institutional shareholders do not yet provide a positive monitoring role in Pakistan.
- 21 September 2016
- Published by CBU Research Institute in CBU International Conference Proceedings
- Vol. 4, 214-222
Open AccessTHE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION ON PERFORMANCE OF PAKISTANI LISTED COMPANIES
This paper analyzes the effects of ownership concentration on investment performance in a large sample of Pakistani publicly-listed companies from 1997 to 2007. Special attention is directed to statistical methods from the field of panel-data econometrics, which are able to deal with endogeneity problems and with structural reverse causality. The preferred estimator that is based on firm fixed effects insinuates that the voting rights of ultimate shareholders affect Tobin’s q unambiguously negatively, whereas the squared voting rights affect it unambiguously positively. This implies a U-curved relationship between Tobin’s q and voting rights concentration with a turning point at 45%. More than 75% of the companies fall in the upward sloping part of the curve. While positive incentive effects are at work in Pakistan, financial market development is retarded by the reluctance of minority shareholders facing dominant shareholders to hold small stakes in listed companies. Consistently, institutional shareholders do not yet provide a positive monitoring role in Pakistan.
- 14 July 2015
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 54 (1) , 408-432
DIVIDEND POLICY IN REGULATED NETWORK INDUSTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE EU
We study the dividend policy of firms in regulated network industries, focusing on the impact of different regulatory regimes and government control. We link payout and smoothing decisions to different regulatory mechanisms (cost‐based vs. incentive regulation) and state versus private ownership. We test our predictions on a panel of listed European electric utilities, accounting for potential endogeneity of the choice of regulatory and ownership patterns. We find that incentive‐regulated firms smooth their dividends less than cost‐based regulated firms and that they report higher target payout ratios. Consistent with the interest group theory of regulation, we find that incentive regulation schemes are less likely when the state is still an important shareholder in the sector. Additionally, our results show that government control undermines the efficiency‐enhancing effects of incentive regulation on dividend policy, for example, lower smoothing is only due to private firms. (JELG35, L51, L32, L9)
- 14 July 2015
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 54 (1) , 408-432
DIVIDEND POLICY IN REGULATED NETWORK INDUSTRIES: EVIDENCE FROM THE EU
We study the dividend policy of firms in regulated network industries, focusing on the impact of different regulatory regimes and government control. We link payout and smoothing decisions to different regulatory mechanisms (cost‐based vs. incentive regulation) and state versus private ownership. We test our predictions on a panel of listed European electric utilities, accounting for potential endogeneity of the choice of regulatory and ownership patterns. We find that incentive‐regulated firms smooth their dividends less than cost‐based regulated firms and that they report higher target payout ratios. Consistent with the interest group theory of regulation, we find that incentive regulation schemes are less likely when the state is still an important shareholder in the sector. Additionally, our results show that government control undermines the efficiency‐enhancing effects of incentive regulation on dividend policy, for example, lower smoothing is only due to private firms. (JELG35, L51, L32, L9)
- Open Access
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 73, 35-57
Competition in the economic crisis: Analysis of procurement auctions
- 1 January 2015
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 73, 35-57
Open AccessCompetition in the economic crisis: Analysis of procurement auctions
- 4 March 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirica
- Vol. 40 (2) , 343-362
The determinants of rent extraction in the parent-subsidiary relation
- 4 March 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirica
- Vol. 40 (2) , 343-362
The determinants of rent extraction in the parent-subsidiary relation
- 28 February 2012
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 33 (3) , 159-175
Market Optimism and Merger Waves
We argue that stock and bond market booms and merger waves are both driven by increases in optimism in financial markets and discuss two behavioral hypotheses, the managerial discretion and overvaluation hypotheses that claim that merger waves are driven by market optimism. Empirical support for the managerial theory is provided by evidence that the amounts of assets acquired increase as optimism in financial markets increases and that the returns to acquiring companies are inversely related to market optimism at the time of mergers. Our measures of market optimism also explain managerial choices of finance for mergers. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 28 February 2012
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 33 (3) , 159-175
Market Optimism and Merger Waves
We argue that stock and bond market booms and merger waves are both driven by increases in optimism in financial markets and discuss two behavioral hypotheses, the managerial discretion and overvaluation hypotheses that claim that merger waves are driven by market optimism. Empirical support for the managerial theory is provided by evidence that the amounts of assets acquired increase as optimism in financial markets increases and that the returns to acquiring companies are inversely related to market optimism at the time of mergers. Our measures of market optimism also explain managerial choices of finance for mergers. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 30 (1) , 1-15
The determinants of merger waves: An international perspective
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 30 (1) , 1-15
Open AccessThe determinants of merger waves: An international perspective