Issofa Moyouwou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Issofa Moyouwou has a total of 38 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Boniface Mbih
Université de Caen
7 shared publications Nicolas Gabriel Andjiga
Université de Yaoundé1
4 shared publications- Mostapha Diss
Université Marie et Louis Pasteur, CRESE (UR 3190), Besançon, France
3 shared publications Sébastien Courtin
3 shared publications- Aurélien Mekuko Yonta
Department of Mathematics, Higher Teacher Training College, University of Yaoundé I, Yaoundé, Cameroon
2 shared publications Boniface Mbih
Université de Caen Normandie
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 23 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 34 (4) , 683-713
Combining Diversity and Excellence in Multiwinner Elections
- 23 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Group Decision and Negotiation
- Vol. 34 (4) , 683-713
Combining Diversity and Excellence in Multiwinner Elections
- 25 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 64 (3) , 633-663
Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains
- 25 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 64 (3) , 633-663
Plurality rule and Condorcet criterion over restricted domains
- Open Access
Combining diversity and excellence in multiwinner elections
We address the problem of electing a committee subject to diversity constraints. Given a set of candidates and a set of voters, such that each voter is represented by a linear order, the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of candidates by combining the excellence of candidates and a given form of diversity requirements. The grounding assumption in this paper is that the set of candidates is slotted into at least two groups according to a specific attribute such as gender, religion, ethnicity, or profession, and the diversity constraint takes the form of a vector of integers specifying the lowest number of candidates required from each group. We introduce a class of voting rules suitable for electing a diverse committee in this framework and we show how this class of rules handles the issue of combining both excellence and diversity. Furthermore, we provide some axiomatic properties that highlight the behavior of these rules when we aim to select a diverse committee.
Open AccessCombining diversity and excellence in multiwinner elections
We address the problem of electing a committee subject to diversity constraints. Given a set of candidates and a set of voters, such that each voter is represented by a linear order, the goal is to select a fixed-size subset of candidates by combining the excellence of candidates and a given form of diversity requirements. The grounding assumption in this paper is that the set of candidates is slotted into at least two groups according to a specific attribute such as gender, religion, ethnicity, or profession, and the diversity constraint takes the form of a vector of integers specifying the lowest number of candidates required from each group. We introduce a class of voting rules suitable for electing a diverse committee in this framework and we show how this class of rules handles the issue of combining both excellence and diversity. Furthermore, we provide some axiomatic properties that highlight the behavior of these rules when we aim to select a diverse committee.
- 6 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 61 (3) , 489-510
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
- 6 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 61 (3) , 489-510
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
- Open Access
Social acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
We study the relationships between two well-known social choice concepts, namely the principle of social acceptability introduced by Mahajne and Volij (2018), and the majoritarian compromise rule introduced by Sertel (1986) and studied in detail by Sertel and Yılmaz (1999). The two concepts have been introduced separately in the literature in the spirit of selecting an alternative that satisfies most individuals in single-winner elections. Our results in this paper show that the two concepts are so closely related that the interaction between them cannot be ignored. We show that the majoritarian compromise rule always selects a socially acceptable alternative when the number of alternatives is even and we provide a necessary and sufficient condition so that the majoritarian compromise rule always selects a socially acceptable alternative when the number of alternatives is odd. Moreover, we show that when we restrict ourselves to the three well-studied classes of single-peaked, single-caved, and single-crossing preferences, the majoritarian compromise rule always picks a socially acceptable alternative whatever the number of alternatives and the number of voters.
Open AccessSocial acceptability and the majoritarian compromise rule
We study the relationships between two well-known social choice concepts, namely the principle of social acceptability introduced by Mahajne and Volij (2018), and the majoritarian compromise rule introduced by Sertel (1986) and studied in detail by Sertel and Yılmaz (1999). The two concepts have been introduced separately in the literature in the spirit of selecting an alternative that satisfies most individuals in single-winner elections. Our results in this paper show that the two concepts are so closely related that the interaction between them cannot be ignored. We show that the majoritarian compromise rule always selects a socially acceptable alternative when the number of alternatives is even and we provide a necessary and sufficient condition so that the majoritarian compromise rule always selects a socially acceptable alternative when the number of alternatives is odd. Moreover, we show that when we restrict ourselves to the three well-studied classes of single-peaked, single-caved, and single-crossing preferences, the majoritarian compromise rule always picks a socially acceptable alternative whatever the number of alternatives and the number of voters.
- 25 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 191 (1-2) , 75-103
Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games
- 25 January 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 191 (1-2) , 75-103
Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Discrete Applied Mathematics
- Vol. 305, 86-102
Axiomatizing the Public Good Index via merging and new arrival properties
- 1 December 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Discrete Applied Mathematics
- Vol. 305, 86-102
Axiomatizing the Public Good Index via merging and new arrival properties
- 20 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 58 (3) , 567-587
Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items
For cost allocation problems with an existing set of indivisible public resources with heterogeneous individual needs and non-rivalry access, an axiomatization is provided for the allocation rule that proportionally charges agents for a given resource with respect to their counting liability indices. The main result we obtain holds in the class of cost allocation rules that are additive in cost and simply combines a new independence property together with the well-known axioms of consistency and independence of supplementary items.
- 20 October 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 58 (3) , 567-587
Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items
For cost allocation problems with an existing set of indivisible public resources with heterogeneous individual needs and non-rivalry access, an axiomatization is provided for the allocation rule that proportionally charges agents for a given resource with respect to their counting liability indices. The main result we obtain holds in the class of cost allocation rules that are additive in cost and simply combines a new independence property together with the well-known axioms of consistency and independence of supplementary items.
- Open Access
On Riemann Integrability of Monotone Multivariate Real-Valued Functions
A monotonicity condition for multivariate real-valued functions is presented as a simple sufficient condition for Riemman integrability. The one dimension well-known result is extended to show that any monotone and bounded real-valued function on a bounded Jordan measurable subset of the n-cartesian product of the set R of real numbers is Riemann integrable. As an application, this result allows to show that some characteristics of aggregation functions are well-defined without further constraints such as continuity.
Open AccessOn Riemann Integrability of Monotone Multivariate Real-Valued Functions
A monotonicity condition for multivariate real-valued functions is presented as a simple sufficient condition for Riemman integrability. The one dimension well-known result is extended to show that any monotone and bounded real-valued function on a bounded Jordan measurable subset of the n-cartesian product of the set R of real numbers is Riemann integrable. As an application, this result allows to show that some characteristics of aggregation functions are well-defined without further constraints such as continuity.
- Open Access
Inconsistent weighting in weighted voting games
In a weighted voting game, each voter has a given weight and a coalition of voters is successful if the sum of its weights exceeds a given quota. Such voting systems translate the idea that voters are not all equal by assigning them different weights. In such a situation, two voters are symmetric in a game if interchanging the two voters leaves the outcome of the game unchanged. Two voters with the same weight are naturally symmetric in every weighted voting game, but the converse statement is not necessarily true. We call this latter type of scenario inconsistent weighting. We investigate the conditions that give rise to such a phenomenon within the class of weighted voting games. We also study how the choice of the quota and the total weight can affect the probability of observing inconsistent weighting. Finally, we investigate various applications where inconsistent weighting is observed.
Open AccessInconsistent weighting in weighted voting games
In a weighted voting game, each voter has a given weight and a coalition of voters is successful if the sum of its weights exceeds a given quota. Such voting systems translate the idea that voters are not all equal by assigning them different weights. In such a situation, two voters are symmetric in a game if interchanging the two voters leaves the outcome of the game unchanged. Two voters with the same weight are naturally symmetric in every weighted voting game, but the converse statement is not necessarily true. We call this latter type of scenario inconsistent weighting. We investigate the conditions that give rise to such a phenomenon within the class of weighted voting games. We also study how the choice of the quota and the total weight can affect the probability of observing inconsistent weighting. Finally, we investigate various applications where inconsistent weighting is observed.