WKWillemien Kets

Willemien Kets

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Willemien Kets has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • The value of a coordination game

    by Willemien Kets, Wouter Kager, Alvaro Sandroni


  • Open Access

    The Value of a Coordination Game

    by Willemien Kets, Wouter Kager, Alvaro Sandroni

    The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone's payoffs can reduce welfare.

  • Open Access

    Organizational Design: Culture and Incentives

    by Willemien Kets

    Why do some organizations perform so much better than others, and often persistently so? While the economics literature traditionally emphasizes the importance of incentives, other social sciences focus on the role of organizational culture. Yet very little is known about how an organization's incentive structure and its culture jointly shapes its performance. This paper therefore develops a formal model of how an organization's incentives and culture interact. The model offers a unified explanation for a variety of empirical phenomena, including why an organization's culture can be difficult to change and why there can be persistent performance differences across companies even when they have access to the same technology and resources.

  • Open Access

    Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty

    by Willemien Kets

    A standard assumption in game theory is that players have an infinite depth of reasoning: they think about what others think and about what others think that othersthink, and so on, ad infinitum. However, in practice, players may have a finite depth of reasoning. For example, a player may reason about what other players think, but not about what others think he thinks. This paper proposes a class of type spaces that generalizes the type space formalism due to Harsanyi (1967) so that it can model players with an arbitrary depth of reasoning. I show that the type space formalism does not impose any restrictions on the belief hierarchies that can be modeled, thus generalizing the classic result of Mertens and Zamir (1985). However, there is no universal type space that contains all type spaces.

  • Open Access

    Robustness of Equilibria in Anonymous Local Games

    by Willemien Kets

    This paper studies the robustness of symmetric equilibria in anonymous local games to perturbations of prior beliefs. Two priors are strategically close on a class of games if players receive similar expected payoffs in equilibrium under the priors, for any game in that class. I show that if the structure of payoff interdependencies is sparse in a well-defined sense, the conditions for strategic proximity in anonymous local games are strictly weaker than the conditions for general Bayesian games of Kajii and Morris [11] when attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria. Hence, by exploiting the properties of anonymous local games, it is possible to obtain stronger robustness results for this class.

  • A belief-based theory of homophily

    by Willemien Kets, Alvaro Sandroni


  • Open Access

    Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté

    by Aviad Heifetz, Willemien Kets

    Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that no refinement is robust to perturbations of high-order beliefs. We show that robust refinements do exist if we relax the assumption that all players are unlimited in their reasoning ability. In particular, for a class of models, every strict Bayesian–Nash equilibrium is robust. In these environments, a researcher interested in making sharp predictions can use refinements to select among the strict equilibria of the game, and these predictions will be robust.


  • Open Access

    When Do Types Induce the Same Belief Hierarchy?

    by Andrés Perea, Willemien Kets

    Type structures are a simple device to describe higher-order beliefs. However, how can we check whether two types generate the same belief hierarchy? This paper generalizes the concept of a type morphism and shows that one type structure is contained in another if and only if the former can be mapped into the other using a generalized type morphism. Hence, every generalized type morphism is a hierarchy morphism and vice versa. Importantly, generalized type morphisms do not make reference to belief hierarchies. We use our results to characterize the conditions under which types generate the same belief hierarchy.


  • Open Access

    Random intersection graphs with tunable degree distribution and clustering

    by Maria Deijfen, Willemien Kets

    A random intersection graph is constructed by assigning independently to each vertex a subset of a given set and drawing an edge between two vertices if and only if their respective subsets intersect. In this paper a model is developed in which each vertex is given a random weight, and vertices with larger weights are more likely to be assigned large subsets. The distribution of the degree of a given vertex is characterized and is shown to depend on the weight of the vertex. In particular, if the weight distribution is a power law, the degree distribution will be so as well. Furthermore, an asymptotic expression for the clustering in the graph is derived. By tuning the parameters of the model, it is possible to generate a graph with arbitrary clustering, expected degree and -- in the power law case -- tail exponent.

  • Ambiguous language and common priors

    by Joseph Y. Halpern, Willemien Kets