Willemien Kets
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Willemien Kets has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Joseph Y. Halpern
3 shared publications- Mark Voorneveld
Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Box 6501, 113 83 Stockholm, Sweden
3 shared publications Alvaro Sandroni
2 shared publicationsHenk Norde
Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
2 shared publications- Maria Deijfen
Stockholm University
2 shared publications A. J. A. van Roij
Research Institute for Materials, University of Nijmegen, Toernooiveld 1, 6525 ED Nijmegen, The Netherlands
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 7 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 201, 105419
The value of a coordination game
- 7 February 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 201, 105419
The value of a coordination game
- Open Access
- 3 June 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
The Value of a Coordination Game
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone's payoffs can reduce welfare.
- 3 June 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessThe Value of a Coordination Game
The value of a game is the payoff a player can expect (ex ante) from playing the game. Understanding how the value changes with economic primitives is critical for policy design and welfare. However, for games with multiple equilibria, the value is difficult to determine. We therefore develop a new theory of the value of coordination games. The theory delivers testable comparative statics on the value and delivers novel insights relevant to policy design. For example, policies that shift behavior in the desired direction can make everyone worse off, and policies that increase everyone's payoffs can reduce welfare.
- Open Access
- 28 April 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Organizational Design: Culture and Incentives
Why do some organizations perform so much better than others, and often persistently so? While the economics literature traditionally emphasizes the importance of incentives, other social sciences focus on the role of organizational culture. Yet very little is known about how an organization's incentive structure and its culture jointly shapes its performance. This paper therefore develops a formal model of how an organization's incentives and culture interact. The model offers a unified explanation for a variety of empirical phenomena, including why an organization's culture can be difficult to change and why there can be persistent performance differences across companies even when they have access to the same technology and resources.
- 28 April 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessOrganizational Design: Culture and Incentives
Why do some organizations perform so much better than others, and often persistently so? While the economics literature traditionally emphasizes the importance of incentives, other social sciences focus on the role of organizational culture. Yet very little is known about how an organization's incentive structure and its culture jointly shapes its performance. This paper therefore develops a formal model of how an organization's incentives and culture interact. The model offers a unified explanation for a variety of empirical phenomena, including why an organization's culture can be difficult to change and why there can be persistent performance differences across companies even when they have access to the same technology and resources.
- Open Access
- 24 April 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Bounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty
A standard assumption in game theory is that players have an infinite depth of reasoning: they think about what others think and about what others think that othersthink, and so on, ad infinitum. However, in practice, players may have a finite depth of reasoning. For example, a player may reason about what other players think, but not about what others think he thinks. This paper proposes a class of type spaces that generalizes the type space formalism due to Harsanyi (1967) so that it can model players with an arbitrary depth of reasoning. I show that the type space formalism does not impose any restrictions on the belief hierarchies that can be modeled, thus generalizing the classic result of Mertens and Zamir (1985). However, there is no universal type space that contains all type spaces.
- 24 April 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessBounded Reasoning and Higher-Order Uncertainty
A standard assumption in game theory is that players have an infinite depth of reasoning: they think about what others think and about what others think that othersthink, and so on, ad infinitum. However, in practice, players may have a finite depth of reasoning. For example, a player may reason about what other players think, but not about what others think he thinks. This paper proposes a class of type spaces that generalizes the type space formalism due to Harsanyi (1967) so that it can model players with an arbitrary depth of reasoning. I show that the type space formalism does not impose any restrictions on the belief hierarchies that can be modeled, thus generalizing the classic result of Mertens and Zamir (1985). However, there is no universal type space that contains all type spaces.
- Open Access
- 22 April 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Robustness of Equilibria in Anonymous Local Games
This paper studies the robustness of symmetric equilibria in anonymous local games to perturbations of prior beliefs. Two priors are strategically close on a class of games if players receive similar expected payoffs in equilibrium under the priors, for any game in that class. I show that if the structure of payoff interdependencies is sparse in a well-defined sense, the conditions for strategic proximity in anonymous local games are strictly weaker than the conditions for general Bayesian games of Kajii and Morris [11] when attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria. Hence, by exploiting the properties of anonymous local games, it is possible to obtain stronger robustness results for this class.
- 22 April 2021
- Published by Center for Open Science in SocArXiv
Open AccessRobustness of Equilibria in Anonymous Local Games
This paper studies the robustness of symmetric equilibria in anonymous local games to perturbations of prior beliefs. Two priors are strategically close on a class of games if players receive similar expected payoffs in equilibrium under the priors, for any game in that class. I show that if the structure of payoff interdependencies is sparse in a well-defined sense, the conditions for strategic proximity in anonymous local games are strictly weaker than the conditions for general Bayesian games of Kajii and Morris [11] when attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria. Hence, by exploiting the properties of anonymous local games, it is possible to obtain stronger robustness results for this class.
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 115, 410-435
A belief-based theory of homophily
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 115, 410-435
A belief-based theory of homophily
- Open Access
- 1 January 2018
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 13 (1) , 415-465
Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté
Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that no refinement is robust to perturbations of high-order beliefs. We show that robust refinements do exist if we relax the assumption that all players are unlimited in their reasoning ability. In particular, for a class of models, every strict Bayesian–Nash equilibrium is robust. In these environments, a researcher interested in making sharp predictions can use refinements to select among the strict equilibria of the game, and these predictions will be robust.
- 1 January 2018
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 13 (1) , 415-465
Open AccessRobust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté
Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable strategies, applications commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an important paper, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) show that no refinement is robust to perturbations of high-order beliefs. We show that robust refinements do exist if we relax the assumption that all players are unlimited in their reasoning ability. In particular, for a class of models, every strict Bayesian–Nash equilibrium is robust. In these environments, a researcher interested in making sharp predictions can use refinements to select among the strict equilibria of the game, and these predictions will be robust.
- Open Access
When Do Types Induce the Same Belief Hierarchy?
Type structures are a simple device to describe higher-order beliefs. However, how can we check whether two types generate the same belief hierarchy? This paper generalizes the concept of a type morphism and shows that one type structure is contained in another if and only if the former can be mapped into the other using a generalized type morphism. Hence, every generalized type morphism is a hierarchy morphism and vice versa. Importantly, generalized type morphisms do not make reference to belief hierarchies. We use our results to characterize the conditions under which types generate the same belief hierarchy.
Open AccessWhen Do Types Induce the Same Belief Hierarchy?
Type structures are a simple device to describe higher-order beliefs. However, how can we check whether two types generate the same belief hierarchy? This paper generalizes the concept of a type morphism and shows that one type structure is contained in another if and only if the former can be mapped into the other using a generalized type morphism. Hence, every generalized type morphism is a hierarchy morphism and vice versa. Importantly, generalized type morphisms do not make reference to belief hierarchies. We use our results to characterize the conditions under which types generate the same belief hierarchy.
- Open Access
Random intersection graphs with tunable degree distribution and clustering
A random intersection graph is constructed by assigning independently to each vertex a subset of a given set and drawing an edge between two vertices if and only if their respective subsets intersect. In this paper a model is developed in which each vertex is given a random weight, and vertices with larger weights are more likely to be assigned large subsets. The distribution of the degree of a given vertex is characterized and is shown to depend on the weight of the vertex. In particular, if the weight distribution is a power law, the degree distribution will be so as well. Furthermore, an asymptotic expression for the clustering in the graph is derived. By tuning the parameters of the model, it is possible to generate a graph with arbitrary clustering, expected degree and -- in the power law case -- tail exponent.
Open AccessRandom intersection graphs with tunable degree distribution and clustering
A random intersection graph is constructed by assigning independently to each vertex a subset of a given set and drawing an edge between two vertices if and only if their respective subsets intersect. In this paper a model is developed in which each vertex is given a random weight, and vertices with larger weights are more likely to be assigned large subsets. The distribution of the degree of a given vertex is characterized and is shown to depend on the weight of the vertex. In particular, if the weight distribution is a power law, the degree distribution will be so as well. Furthermore, an asymptotic expression for the clustering in the graph is derived. By tuning the parameters of the model, it is possible to generate a graph with arbitrary clustering, expected degree and -- in the power law case -- tail exponent.
- 1 March 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 90, 171-180
Ambiguous language and common priors
- 1 March 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 90, 171-180
Ambiguous language and common priors