Kai Sauerwald
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Kai Sauerwald has a total of 27 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christoph Beierle
FernUniversität in Hagen
12 shared publications Gabriele Kern-Isberner
5 shared publications- Gabriele Kern-Isberner
TU Dortmund University
5 shared publications - Marco Ragni
Technische Universität Chemnitz
5 shared publications - Sebastian Rudolph
TU Dresden
5 shared publications Christoph Beierle
4 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 129-157
Intentional Forgetting Operators—Formal Foundations and Empirical Support
This chapter presents a framework for understanding intentional forgetting processes in humans that is jointly grounded in cognitive psychology and knowledge representation. It provides formal modeling structures, experimental designs, and best implementation practices. We identify kinds of forgetting, axiomatically formalize belief change operators involving forgetting, and elaborate their interrelationships. This general abstract framework is instantiated with conditional beliefs and realizations of forgetting operators employing ranking functions. On a cognitive level, we examine the cognitive mechanisms of intentional forgetting experimentally by employing the counting game paradigm. Our results show that changes to conditionals in procedural memory leave behind artifacts, which can improve performance when old and new conditionals align.
- 10 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 129-157
Open AccessIntentional Forgetting Operators—Formal Foundations and Empirical Support
This chapter presents a framework for understanding intentional forgetting processes in humans that is jointly grounded in cognitive psychology and knowledge representation. It provides formal modeling structures, experimental designs, and best implementation practices. We identify kinds of forgetting, axiomatically formalize belief change operators involving forgetting, and elaborate their interrelationships. This general abstract framework is instantiated with conditional beliefs and realizations of forgetting operators employing ranking functions. On a cognitive level, we examine the cognitive mechanisms of intentional forgetting experimentally by employing the counting game paradigm. Our results show that changes to conditionals in procedural memory leave behind artifacts, which can improve performance when old and new conditionals align.
- 20 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 121-133
Mutual Irreducibility ofRevision and Multiple Revision
- 20 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 121-133
Mutual Irreducibility ofRevision and Multiple Revision
- Open Access
- 1 November 2025
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 22 (1) , 376-385
A Framework for Inconsistency-tolerant Reasoning with Sets of Models
We propose a framework for reasoning from inconsistent knowledge bases using minimal hitting sets, i. e., sets of interpretations such that each formula of the knowledge base is satisfied by at least one those interpretations. By additionally considering preference orders over minimal hitting sets, we can define a wide variety of non-monotonic inference relations. We consider concrete preference orders based on set inclusion, cardinality, the number of conflicting atoms within the hitting set, and using the Hamming distance between pairs of interpretations. We compare the resulting inference relations, characterize their logical properties, and position them relative to classical inference from maximal consistent subsets. Finally, we show that inference based on minimal conflicting atoms coincides with reasoning in Priest’s 3-valued logic.
- 1 November 2025
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 22 (1) , 376-385
Open AccessA Framework for Inconsistency-tolerant Reasoning with Sets of Models
We propose a framework for reasoning from inconsistent knowledge bases using minimal hitting sets, i. e., sets of interpretations such that each formula of the knowledge base is satisfied by at least one those interpretations. By additionally considering preference orders over minimal hitting sets, we can define a wide variety of non-monotonic inference relations. We consider concrete preference orders based on set inclusion, cardinality, the number of conflicting atoms within the hitting set, and using the Hamming distance between pairs of interpretations. We compare the resulting inference relations, characterize their logical properties, and position them relative to classical inference from maximal consistent subsets. Finally, we show that inference based on minimal conflicting atoms coincides with reasoning in Priest’s 3-valued logic.
- Open Access
- 24 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Computational Logic
- Vol. 26 (4) , 1-54
AGM Belief Revision, Semantically
We establish a generic, model-theoretic characterization of rational belief revision operators implementing the paradigm of minimal change according to the seminal work by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM). Our characterization applies to all Tarskian logics, that is, all logics with a classical model-theoretic semantics, and hence a wide variety of formalisms were used in knowledge representation and beyond, including many for which a model-theoretic characterization has hitherto been lacking. Our starting point is the approach by Katsuno and Mendelzon (K&M), who provided such a characterization for propositional logic over finite signatures. We generalize K&M’s approach to the setting of AGM-style revision over bases in arbitrary Tarskian logics, where base may refer to one of the various ways of representing an agent’s beliefs (such as belief sets, arbitrary or finite sets of sentences, or single sentences). Our first core result is a representation theorem providing a two-way correspondence between AGM-style revision operators and specific assignments : functions associating every base to a “preference” relation over interpretations, which must be total but is—in contrast to prior approaches—not always transitive. As our second core contribution, we provide a characterization of all logics for which our result can be strengthened to assignments producing transitive preference relations (as in K&M’s original work). Alongside these main contributions, we discuss diverse variants of our findings as well as ramifications for other areas of belief revision theory.
- 24 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Computational Logic
- Vol. 26 (4) , 1-54
Open AccessAGM Belief Revision, Semantically
We establish a generic, model-theoretic characterization of rational belief revision operators implementing the paradigm of minimal change according to the seminal work by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson (AGM). Our characterization applies to all Tarskian logics, that is, all logics with a classical model-theoretic semantics, and hence a wide variety of formalisms were used in knowledge representation and beyond, including many for which a model-theoretic characterization has hitherto been lacking. Our starting point is the approach by Katsuno and Mendelzon (K&M), who provided such a characterization for propositional logic over finite signatures. We generalize K&M’s approach to the setting of AGM-style revision over bases in arbitrary Tarskian logics, where base may refer to one of the various ways of representing an agent’s beliefs (such as belief sets, arbitrary or finite sets of sentences, or single sentences). Our first core result is a representation theorem providing a two-way correspondence between AGM-style revision operators and specific assignments : functions associating every base to a “preference” relation over interpretations, which must be total but is—in contrast to prior approaches—not always transitive. As our second core contribution, we provide a characterization of all logics for which our result can be strengthened to assignments producing transitive preference relations (as in K&M’s original work). Alongside these main contributions, we discuss diverse variants of our findings as well as ramifications for other areas of belief revision theory.
- 29 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 58-74
Axiomatics of Restricted Choices by Linear Orders of Sets with Minimum as Fallback
- 29 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 58-74
Axiomatics of Restricted Choices by Linear Orders of Sets with Minimum as Fallback
- 12 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 429-444
Credibility-Limited Revision for Epistemic Spaces
- 12 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 429-444
Credibility-Limited Revision for Epistemic Spaces
- Open Access
- 8 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
- Vol. 176
Sequential merging and construction of rankings as cognitive logic
- 8 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
- Vol. 176
Open AccessSequential merging and construction of rankings as cognitive logic
- Open Access
- 1 November 2024
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 21 (1) , 665-670
The Realizability of Revision and Contraction Operators in Epistemic Spaces
This paper studies the realizability of belief revision and belief contraction operators in epistemic spaces. We observe that AGM revision and AGM contraction operators for epistemic spaces are only realizable in precisely determined epistemic spaces. We define the class of linear change operators, which are a special kind of maxichoice operators. When AGM revision, respectively, AGM contraction, is realizable, linear change operators are a canonical realization.
- 1 November 2024
- Published by International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 21 (1) , 665-670
Open AccessThe Realizability of Revision and Contraction Operators in Epistemic Spaces
This paper studies the realizability of belief revision and belief contraction operators in epistemic spaces. We observe that AGM revision and AGM contraction operators for epistemic spaces are only realizable in precisely determined epistemic spaces. We define the class of linear change operators, which are a special kind of maxichoice operators. When AGM revision, respectively, AGM contraction, is realizable, linear change operators are a canonical realization.
- Open Access
Credibility-Limited Revision for Epistemic Spaces
We consider credibility-limited revision in the framework of belief change for epistemic spaces, permitting inconsistent belief sets and inconsistent beliefs. In this unrestricted setting, the class of credibility-limited revision operators does not include any AGM revision operators. We extend the class of credibility-limited revision operators in a way that all AGM revision operators are included while keeping the original spirit of credibility-limited revision. Extended credibility-limited revision operators are defined axiomatically. A semantic characterization of extended credibility-limited revision operators that employ total preorders on possible worlds is presented.
Open AccessCredibility-Limited Revision for Epistemic Spaces
We consider credibility-limited revision in the framework of belief change for epistemic spaces, permitting inconsistent belief sets and inconsistent beliefs. In this unrestricted setting, the class of credibility-limited revision operators does not include any AGM revision operators. We extend the class of credibility-limited revision operators in a way that all AGM revision operators are included while keeping the original spirit of credibility-limited revision. Extended credibility-limited revision operators are defined axiomatically. A semantic characterization of extended credibility-limited revision operators that employ total preorders on possible worlds is presented.
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
- Vol. 174
Formal and cognitive reasoning
- 23 August 2024
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
- Vol. 174
Formal and cognitive reasoning