Ekaterina Moiseeva
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ekaterina Moiseeva has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Mohammad R. Hesamzadeh
Electricity Market Research Group, KTH Royal Institute of Technology Sweden, Stockholm SE-100 44
3 shared publicationsMohammad Reza Hesamzadeh
3 shared publications- Mohammad Reza Hesamzadeh
KTH Royal Institute of Technology
2 shared publications Darryl R. Biggar
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Melbourne, Australia
1 shared publication- Ilias Dimoulkas
School of Electrical Engineering, Electric Power and Energy Systems, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication M. R. Hesamzadeh
Electricity Market Research Group, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden, Stockholm SE-100 44
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 October 2017
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy
- Vol. 9 (2) , 818-830
Bayesian and Robust Nash Equilibria in Hydrodominated Systems Under Uncertainty
In this paper we model strategic interaction of multiple producers in hydro-dominated power systems under uncertainty as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), reformulated as a stochastic mixed-integer linear program (MILP) with disjunctive constraints. We model strategic hydropower producers, who can affect the market price by submitting strategic bids in quantity, price, and ramp rate. The bids are submitted to the system operator, who minimizes the dispatch cost. We take into account the hydro-specific constraints and uncertainty in the system. Solving the problem results in finding Nash equilibria. We discuss two types of Nash equilibria under uncertainty: Bayesian and robust Nash equilibria. Large EPEC instances can be solved using a decomposition method - Modified Benders Decomposition Approach (MBDA). This method eliminates the problem of tuning the disjunctive parameter and reduces the memory requirements, resulting in improved computation time.
- 11 October 2017
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy
- Vol. 9 (2) , 818-830
Bayesian and Robust Nash Equilibria in Hydrodominated Systems Under Uncertainty
In this paper we model strategic interaction of multiple producers in hydro-dominated power systems under uncertainty as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC), reformulated as a stochastic mixed-integer linear program (MILP) with disjunctive constraints. We model strategic hydropower producers, who can affect the market price by submitting strategic bids in quantity, price, and ramp rate. The bids are submitted to the system operator, who minimizes the dispatch cost. We take into account the hydro-specific constraints and uncertainty in the system. Solving the problem results in finding Nash equilibria. We discuss two types of Nash equilibria under uncertainty: Bayesian and robust Nash equilibria. Large EPEC instances can be solved using a decomposition method - Modified Benders Decomposition Approach (MBDA). This method eliminates the problem of tuning the disjunctive parameter and reduces the memory requirements, resulting in improved computation time.
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 261 (2) , 755-771
Generation flexibility in ramp rates: Strategic behavior and lessons for electricity market design
- 1 September 2017
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 261 (2) , 755-771
Generation flexibility in ramp rates: Strategic behavior and lessons for electricity market design
- 24 April 2017
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
- Vol. 33 (1) , 861-873
Strategic Bidding of a Hydropower Producer Under Uncertainty: Modified Benders Approach
This paper proposes a stochastic bilevel program for strategic bidding of a hydropower producer. The price, quantity and ramp-rate bids are considered. The uncertainty of wind power generation, variation of inflows for the hydropower producer, and demand variability are modeled through the momentmatching scenario generation technique. Using discretization the stochastic bilevel program is reformulated as a stochastic mixedinteger linear program (MILP) with disjunctive constraints. We propose a modified Benders decomposition algorithm (MBDA), which fully exploits the disjunctive structure of reformatted MILP model. More importantly, the MBDA does not require optimal tuning of disjunctive parameters and it can be efficiently parallelized. Through an illustrative 5-node example, we identify possible strategies (specific to a hydropower producer) for maximizing profit, which in turn leads to market insights. We also use the IEEE 24-node, 118-node and 300-node case studies to show how our parallelized MBDA outperforms the standard Benders decomposition algorithm. The parallelized MBDA is also compared to the state-of-the-art CPLEX solver.
- 24 April 2017
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
- Vol. 33 (1) , 861-873
Strategic Bidding of a Hydropower Producer Under Uncertainty: Modified Benders Approach
This paper proposes a stochastic bilevel program for strategic bidding of a hydropower producer. The price, quantity and ramp-rate bids are considered. The uncertainty of wind power generation, variation of inflows for the hydropower producer, and demand variability are modeled through the momentmatching scenario generation technique. Using discretization the stochastic bilevel program is reformulated as a stochastic mixedinteger linear program (MILP) with disjunctive constraints. We propose a modified Benders decomposition algorithm (MBDA), which fully exploits the disjunctive structure of reformatted MILP model. More importantly, the MBDA does not require optimal tuning of disjunctive parameters and it can be efficiently parallelized. Through an illustrative 5-node example, we identify possible strategies (specific to a hydropower producer) for maximizing profit, which in turn leads to market insights. We also use the IEEE 24-node, 118-node and 300-node case studies to show how our parallelized MBDA outperforms the standard Benders decomposition algorithm. The parallelized MBDA is also compared to the state-of-the-art CPLEX solver.
- 1 September 2015
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-6
Modeling the unilateral multi-part strategic withholding in electricity markets
Modeling and predicting the exercise of market power is an important problem for modern electricity markets. A change in the generation mix and an evolvement of bidding procedures give ascent to a variety of new types of strategic behavior involving elaborate strategies with unconventional strategic variables. In this paper we show how it is important to consider all parameters of the bid to perform a sound market power assessment. We propose a bi-level model of a profit-maximizing decision maker bidding to the electricity market. A company, owning a portfolio of generating units, can strategically choose a price offer, capacity and a ramp rate of its units. We show that withholding the flexibility of the sources causes considerable market power costs. The strategic decision of the company is followed by the optimal dispatch, where the market price is calculated. The problem is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) and recast as a single-stage mixed-integer linear programming problem (MILP). Developed model is applied to a 24-node IEEE test system to highlight the withholding and demonstrate the cost of market power.
- 1 September 2015
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-6
Modeling the unilateral multi-part strategic withholding in electricity markets
Modeling and predicting the exercise of market power is an important problem for modern electricity markets. A change in the generation mix and an evolvement of bidding procedures give ascent to a variety of new types of strategic behavior involving elaborate strategies with unconventional strategic variables. In this paper we show how it is important to consider all parameters of the bid to perform a sound market power assessment. We propose a bi-level model of a profit-maximizing decision maker bidding to the electricity market. A company, owning a portfolio of generating units, can strategically choose a price offer, capacity and a ramp rate of its units. We show that withholding the flexibility of the sources causes considerable market power costs. The strategic decision of the company is followed by the optimal dispatch, where the market price is calculated. The problem is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) and recast as a single-stage mixed-integer linear programming problem (MILP). Developed model is applied to a 24-node IEEE test system to highlight the withholding and demonstrate the cost of market power.
- 1 June 2015
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-6
Strategic bidding by a risk-averse firm with a portfolio of renewable resources
The possibility of market power abuse in the systems with a high amount of flexible power sources (hydro units and energy storage) is believed to be very low. However, in practice strategic owners of these resources may limit the ramping rate whenever the price spikes occur. This is particularly relevant for the power systems with a high penetration of wind power, due to the high levels of uncertainty. In this paper we propose a bilevel game-theoretic model to investigate the effect of this type of strategic bidding. The lower-level is a security-constrained economic dispatch carried out by the system operator. The upper-level is a profit-maximization problem solved by a risk-averse company owning a varied portfolio of energy sources: energy storage, hydro power units, wind generators, as well as traditional generators. We represent the uncertainty affecting the decision making by introducing a set of wind power scenarios and variable competitors' price bids. The resulting mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) is recast as a single-stage mixed-integer linear program (MILP) and solved with CPLEX. In the case study we demonstrate the effect of withholding the ramp-rate on the social welfare.
- 1 June 2015
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-6
Strategic bidding by a risk-averse firm with a portfolio of renewable resources
The possibility of market power abuse in the systems with a high amount of flexible power sources (hydro units and energy storage) is believed to be very low. However, in practice strategic owners of these resources may limit the ramping rate whenever the price spikes occur. This is particularly relevant for the power systems with a high penetration of wind power, due to the high levels of uncertainty. In this paper we propose a bilevel game-theoretic model to investigate the effect of this type of strategic bidding. The lower-level is a security-constrained economic dispatch carried out by the system operator. The upper-level is a profit-maximization problem solved by a risk-averse company owning a varied portfolio of energy sources: energy storage, hydro power units, wind generators, as well as traditional generators. We represent the uncertainty affecting the decision making by introducing a set of wind power scenarios and variable competitors' price bids. The resulting mathematical problem with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) is recast as a single-stage mixed-integer linear program (MILP) and solved with CPLEX. In the case study we demonstrate the effect of withholding the ramp-rate on the social welfare.
- 1 October 2014
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
- Vol. 30 (3) , 1614-1623
Exercise of Market Power on Ramp Rate in Wind-Integrated Power Systems
With an increasing penetration of wind power, there is likely to be an increasing need for fast-ramping generating units. These generators ensure that no load is lost if supply drops due to the uncertainties in wind power generation. However, it is observed in practice that, in a presence of network constraints, fast-ramping generating units are prone to act strategically and exercise market power by withholding their ramp rates. In this paper we model this gaming behavior on ramp rates. We assume a market operator who collects bids in form of marginal costs, quantities, and ramp rates. He runs a ramp-constrained economic dispatch given the generators' bids, forecasted demand, and contingencies. Following the game-theoretic concepts, we set up a multi-level optimization problem. The lower-level problem is the ramp-constrained economic dispatch and the higher-level represents the profit maximization problems solved by strategic generators. The whole problem is formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). The outcome of the EPEC problem is a set of Nash equilibria. To tackle the multiple Nash equilibria problem, the concept of the extremal-Nash equilibria is defined and formulated. We model the concept of extremal-Nash equilibria as a single-stage mixed-integer linear programming problem (MILP) and demonstrate the application of this mathematical framework on an illustrative case and on a more realistic case study with tractable results.
- 1 October 2014
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
- Vol. 30 (3) , 1614-1623
Exercise of Market Power on Ramp Rate in Wind-Integrated Power Systems
With an increasing penetration of wind power, there is likely to be an increasing need for fast-ramping generating units. These generators ensure that no load is lost if supply drops due to the uncertainties in wind power generation. However, it is observed in practice that, in a presence of network constraints, fast-ramping generating units are prone to act strategically and exercise market power by withholding their ramp rates. In this paper we model this gaming behavior on ramp rates. We assume a market operator who collects bids in form of marginal costs, quantities, and ramp rates. He runs a ramp-constrained economic dispatch given the generators' bids, forecasted demand, and contingencies. Following the game-theoretic concepts, we set up a multi-level optimization problem. The lower-level problem is the ramp-constrained economic dispatch and the higher-level represents the profit maximization problems solved by strategic generators. The whole problem is formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). The outcome of the EPEC problem is a set of Nash equilibria. To tackle the multiple Nash equilibria problem, the concept of the extremal-Nash equilibria is defined and formulated. We model the concept of extremal-Nash equilibria as a single-stage mixed-integer linear programming problem (MILP) and demonstrate the application of this mathematical framework on an illustrative case and on a more realistic case study with tractable results.
- 1 July 2014
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 19325517,p. 1-5
Tacit collusion with imperfect information: Ex-ante detection
The liberalization of electricity markets had a significant impact on the whole process of optimal dispatch. The positive effect of competition is partly canceled out by profit-maximizing behavior of market participants. Strategic generators can exercise market power or collude tacitly with other participants to ensure higher electricity price and therefore higher profits. In this paper we study the generators' possibility to come to a tacit collusion by distributed computations. Due to the strategic nature of market interactions, the information corresponding to the power production by generating companies is often fully confidential outside the generating unit. Such information includes the data about planned and emergency outages, capacity constraints, ramping rates specific to the units, probability of failures, etc. Under certain assumptions the constraint set of a generating unit can be represented as a convex set. Using a novel multi-agent distributed constrained optimization algorithm we show how market participants with confidential constraint sets can reach the collusion on the production share, while maximizing their own profit. We compare this outcome to the outcome of Nash equilibrium over specified time horizon and conclude, if both generators find it profitable to collude. This modeling is important for early detection and prevention of tacit collusion.
- 1 July 2014
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 19325517,p. 1-5
Tacit collusion with imperfect information: Ex-ante detection
The liberalization of electricity markets had a significant impact on the whole process of optimal dispatch. The positive effect of competition is partly canceled out by profit-maximizing behavior of market participants. Strategic generators can exercise market power or collude tacitly with other participants to ensure higher electricity price and therefore higher profits. In this paper we study the generators' possibility to come to a tacit collusion by distributed computations. Due to the strategic nature of market interactions, the information corresponding to the power production by generating companies is often fully confidential outside the generating unit. Such information includes the data about planned and emergency outages, capacity constraints, ramping rates specific to the units, probability of failures, etc. Under certain assumptions the constraint set of a generating unit can be represented as a convex set. Using a novel multi-agent distributed constrained optimization algorithm we show how market participants with confidential constraint sets can reach the collusion on the production share, while maximizing their own profit. We compare this outcome to the outcome of Nash equilibrium over specified time horizon and conclude, if both generators find it profitable to collude. This modeling is important for early detection and prevention of tacit collusion.
- 1 October 2013
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 21654816,p. 1-5
Modeling the hedging decisions in electricity markets using two-stage games
The electricity market structure aims to provide effective competition among producers. However, the exercise of market power considerably affects energy prices and induces the wealth transfer from consumers to generators. It is widely recognized that the incentive of generator to exercise market power depends on its hedging decision. The hedged generator has very little or no tendency to exercise market power. However, existing approaches for forecasting market power typically take the hedge cover level as an external input to the model, providing an open-loop analysis. In practice, the level of hedge is chosen by a generating firm and treated confidentially. Omitting this assumption results in equilibrium constraints in the forward and spot stages of the trade period. This type of problem can be modelled as a two-stage game, where in the first stage the generator decides on the profit-maximizing level of hedging and in the second stage it takes part in Cournot game on output in spot market. We show that in the oligopoly case with no constraints on installed capacity and transmission limits there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, which corresponds to the “all-or-nothing” decision. In the case when transmission and capacity constraints are binding, we use a backward induction approach and closed-loop analysis to find a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) on the level of hedging and a corresponding SPNE in spot market. We show that the solution in this constrained network is similar to the unconstrained one.
- 1 October 2013
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- No. 21654816,p. 1-5
Modeling the hedging decisions in electricity markets using two-stage games
The electricity market structure aims to provide effective competition among producers. However, the exercise of market power considerably affects energy prices and induces the wealth transfer from consumers to generators. It is widely recognized that the incentive of generator to exercise market power depends on its hedging decision. The hedged generator has very little or no tendency to exercise market power. However, existing approaches for forecasting market power typically take the hedge cover level as an external input to the model, providing an open-loop analysis. In practice, the level of hedge is chosen by a generating firm and treated confidentially. Omitting this assumption results in equilibrium constraints in the forward and spot stages of the trade period. This type of problem can be modelled as a two-stage game, where in the first stage the generator decides on the profit-maximizing level of hedging and in the second stage it takes part in Cournot game on output in spot market. We show that in the oligopoly case with no constraints on installed capacity and transmission limits there is no equilibrium in pure strategies, which corresponds to the “all-or-nothing” decision. In the case when transmission and capacity constraints are binding, we use a backward induction approach and closed-loop analysis to find a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) on the level of hedging and a corresponding SPNE in spot market. We show that the solution in this constrained network is similar to the unconstrained one.
- 1 May 2013
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-8
Impact of energy storage devices on energy price in decentralized wind-diesel utilities
The most widely spread method of supplying the customers in isolated areas is to use single or multiple diesel generators with constant or variable speed. The price of energy in such areas is highly influenced by the cost of fuel transportation to the place of consumption. We propose an approach to reduce this price by complementing the diesel generators with wind turbines and high-capacity energy storage devices. We create a model to define the proportion between the installed capacities and to provide the proper sizing of elements. The paper studies the case of an isolated area in central Russia, where the fuel transportation share of energy price reaches 65%. We propose a new energy supply system, which includes diesel generators, wind turbines and energy storage devices. We study the system statistically and model it in Homer software. To decrease the capital and operating costs, we introduce the specific algorithm: the diesel generator operates only when wind turbines are not covering the load and energy storage device is exhausted. We test the proposed algorithm using MATLAB to obtain both economic and technical operation results. The economic modeling then continues the system evaluation. We evaluate the investment criteria and define the new minimum price for electricity. The paper is concluded by a systematic analysis of the results and remarks towards the efficiency of investment into the new equipment.
- 1 May 2013
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 1-8
Impact of energy storage devices on energy price in decentralized wind-diesel utilities
The most widely spread method of supplying the customers in isolated areas is to use single or multiple diesel generators with constant or variable speed. The price of energy in such areas is highly influenced by the cost of fuel transportation to the place of consumption. We propose an approach to reduce this price by complementing the diesel generators with wind turbines and high-capacity energy storage devices. We create a model to define the proportion between the installed capacities and to provide the proper sizing of elements. The paper studies the case of an isolated area in central Russia, where the fuel transportation share of energy price reaches 65%. We propose a new energy supply system, which includes diesel generators, wind turbines and energy storage devices. We study the system statistically and model it in Homer software. To decrease the capital and operating costs, we introduce the specific algorithm: the diesel generator operates only when wind turbines are not covering the load and energy storage device is exhausted. We test the proposed algorithm using MATLAB to obtain both economic and technical operation results. The economic modeling then continues the system evaluation. We evaluate the investment criteria and define the new minimum price for electricity. The paper is concluded by a systematic analysis of the results and remarks towards the efficiency of investment into the new equipment.