Greg Hebb
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Greg Hebb has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ali Fatemi
2 shared publications- Ashrafee Tanvir Hossain
Faculty of Business Administration Memorial University of Newfoundland Saint John's Newfoundland and Labrador Canada
2 shared publications Iraj Fooladi
2 shared publicationsGreg H. MacKinnon
Saint Mary's University, Canada - Department of Finance, Information Systems & Management Science
1 shared publication- Mostafa Monzur Hasan
Department of Accounting and Corporate Governance Macquarie Business School, Macquarie University North Ryde New South Wales Australia
1 shared publication - Mostafa Monzur Hasan
Macquarie University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Economics & Finance
- Vol. 105
Greenwashing: Motivations, causes and consequences
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Economics & Finance
- Vol. 105
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessGreenwashing: Motivations, causes and consequences
- Open Access
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
How to Become Green without Costing Taxpayers: A Revenue-Neutral Model
This paper presents a revenue-neutral model designed to encourage (discourage) production of sustainable (unsustainable) goods and services and discourage greenwashing, without imposing any cost on taxpayers. The model exhibits how a government may encourage production of sustainable products and discourage the production of their unsustainable counterparts without imposing additional costs to the taxpayer. We illustrate the workings of such a model through a numerical example. We also argue that successful implementation of the model mitigates greenwashing problem.
- 1 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessHow to Become Green without Costing Taxpayers: A Revenue-Neutral Model
This paper presents a revenue-neutral model designed to encourage (discourage) production of sustainable (unsustainable) goods and services and discourage greenwashing, without imposing any cost on taxpayers. The model exhibits how a government may encourage production of sustainable products and discourage the production of their unsustainable counterparts without imposing additional costs to the taxpayer. We illustrate the workings of such a model through a numerical example. We also argue that successful implementation of the model mitigates greenwashing problem.
- Open Access
- 4 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 78
Firm-level litigation risk and CEO equity incentives
- 4 March 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 78
Open AccessFirm-level litigation risk and CEO equity incentives
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Firm-level litigation risk and CEO equity incentives
Using Kim and Skinner (2012)’s firm-level litigation risk measure, we show that it is positively associated with CEO equity incentives. Additional tests show that this positive association is more (less) pronounced for firms with weaker (stronger) corporate governance. In supplemental analyses, we find that implied cost of capital is higher (lower) for firms that have weaker (stronger) governance and pay their CEOs more while experiencing higher level of litigation risk. Our results are robust to an array of sensitivity and endogeneity tests.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessFirm-level litigation risk and CEO equity incentives
Using Kim and Skinner (2012)’s firm-level litigation risk measure, we show that it is positively associated with CEO equity incentives. Additional tests show that this positive association is more (less) pronounced for firms with weaker (stronger) corporate governance. In supplemental analyses, we find that implied cost of capital is higher (lower) for firms that have weaker (stronger) governance and pay their CEOs more while experiencing higher level of litigation risk. Our results are robust to an array of sensitivity and endogeneity tests.
- 14 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in The North American Journal of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 69, 102025
Are banks better money doctors? An analysis of mutual fund flows of bank and non-bank funds using Canadian data
- 14 October 2023
- Published by Elsevier in The North American Journal of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 69, 102025
Are banks better money doctors? An analysis of mutual fund flows of bank and non-bank funds using Canadian data
- 18 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 45 (1) , 22-48
On the performance of Bank-managed mutual funds: Canadian evidence
- 18 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Economics and Finance
- Vol. 45 (1) , 22-48
On the performance of Bank-managed mutual funds: Canadian evidence
- 1 March 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 64, 101-111
An efficient and functional model for predicting bank distress: In and out of sample evidence
- 1 March 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 64, 101-111
An efficient and functional model for predicting bank distress: In and out of sample evidence
- Open Access
- 1 December 2000
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Valuation Uncertainty and IPO's: Investment Bank versus Commercial Bank Underwriters
This paper examines the microstructure trading characteristics of initial public offerings underwritten by commercial banks. The degree of asymmetric information present in the market for these issues is measured by the price impact of trades and the size of the bid-ask spread. If there is more uncertainty in the market about the value of issues underwritten by commercial banks, than these securities should exhibit a greater degree of asymmetric information in their trading environment than non-commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings. More uncertainty could be due to a perceived conflict of interest when commercial banks underwrite securities. Conversely, if the market believes that commercial bank involvement signals firm quality and provides additional information to the public, less asymmetric information will be present in the market. This topic has recently gained in importance with the passage of the Financial Services Reform Act in November 1999 and the inevitable move towards universal banking. We find that, when characteristics of the IPO are controlled for, trades in commercial bank underwritten issues exhibit significantly higher price impacts. This is consistent with greater uncertainty about the value of commercial bank underwritten IPO's and also consistent with the market perceiving a possible conflict of interest on the part of commercial banks.
- 1 December 2000
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessValuation Uncertainty and IPO's: Investment Bank versus Commercial Bank Underwriters
This paper examines the microstructure trading characteristics of initial public offerings underwritten by commercial banks. The degree of asymmetric information present in the market for these issues is measured by the price impact of trades and the size of the bid-ask spread. If there is more uncertainty in the market about the value of issues underwritten by commercial banks, than these securities should exhibit a greater degree of asymmetric information in their trading environment than non-commercial bank underwritten initial public offerings. More uncertainty could be due to a perceived conflict of interest when commercial banks underwrite securities. Conversely, if the market believes that commercial bank involvement signals firm quality and provides additional information to the public, less asymmetric information will be present in the market. This topic has recently gained in importance with the passage of the Financial Services Reform Act in November 1999 and the inevitable move towards universal banking. We find that, when characteristics of the IPO are controlled for, trades in commercial bank underwritten issues exhibit significantly higher price impacts. This is consistent with greater uncertainty about the value of commercial bank underwritten IPO's and also consistent with the market perceiving a possible conflict of interest on the part of commercial banks.