Jeroen Van Bouwel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Jeroen Van Bouwel has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Erik Weber
CLPS-Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, UGent
10 shared publications Erik Weber
7 shared publicationsLeen De Vreese
Ghent University (UGent)
6 shared publications- Anton Froeyman
Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences, Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
1 shared publication - Erik Weber1 shared publication
Laszlo Kosolosky
Ghent University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Ghent University in Ethiek en Maatschappij
- Vol. 26 (2)
Epistocratie, goed idee? Over het verkennissen van democratie
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Ghent University in Ethiek en Maatschappij
- Vol. 26 (2)
Epistocratie, goed idee? Over het verkennissen van democratie
- 26 June 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 37 (1) , 110-126
Strengthening the Epistemic Case against Epistocracy and for Democracy
Is epistocracy epistemically superior to democracy? In this paper, I scrutinize some of the arguments for and against the epistemic superiority of epistocracy. Using empirical results from the literature on the epistemic benefits of diversity as well as the epistemic contributions of citizen science, I strengthen the case against epistocracy and for democracy. Disenfranchising, or otherwise discouraging anyone to participate in political life, on the basis of them not possessing a certain body of (social scientific) knowledge, is untenable also from an epistemic point of view. Rather than focussing on individual competence, we should pay attention to the social constellation through which we produce knowledge to make sure we decrease epistemic loss (by ensuring diversity and inclusion) and increase epistemic productivity (by fostering a multiplicity of perspectives interacting fruitfully). Achieving those epistemic benefits requires a more democratic approach that differs significantly from epistocracy.
- 26 June 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 37 (1) , 110-126
Strengthening the Epistemic Case against Epistocracy and for Democracy
Is epistocracy epistemically superior to democracy? In this paper, I scrutinize some of the arguments for and against the epistemic superiority of epistocracy. Using empirical results from the literature on the epistemic benefits of diversity as well as the epistemic contributions of citizen science, I strengthen the case against epistocracy and for democracy. Disenfranchising, or otherwise discouraging anyone to participate in political life, on the basis of them not possessing a certain body of (social scientific) knowledge, is untenable also from an epistemic point of view. Rather than focussing on individual competence, we should pay attention to the social constellation through which we produce knowledge to make sure we decrease epistemic loss (by ensuring diversity and inclusion) and increase epistemic productivity (by fostering a multiplicity of perspectives interacting fruitfully). Achieving those epistemic benefits requires a more democratic approach that differs significantly from epistocracy.
- Open Access
- 15 April 2019
- Published by Ghent University in Ethiek en Maatschappij
- Vol. 21 (1-2)
Lewis Fry Richardson, klimaatmodellen en beleidsondersteunende wetenschap: over de rol van waarden, waardevrijheid en onzekerheid
Starting from the pioneering work of Lewis Fry Richardson on numerical models of weather forecasting and his fantasy forecast factory, we explore the role of values in science and science-based policy advice. Central questions being addressed are: What role do values play when scientists inform policymakers and the public about uncertain findings? How do values influence the collection of (enough) evidence? What are the different ways in which values do play a role in science and does it entail that value-free science is an illusion? How best to deal with values in scientific practice? Reviewing the relevant philosophical literature and ana lysing climate modelling as a case, I aim to answer these questions, concluding that the literature better supports a valued science than the idea of a value-free science and that Richardson fantastic forecast factory misses to take into account some important aspects of modelling, namely uncertainty and the role of values.
- 15 April 2019
- Published by Ghent University in Ethiek en Maatschappij
- Vol. 21 (1-2)
Open AccessLewis Fry Richardson, klimaatmodellen en beleidsondersteunende wetenschap: over de rol van waarden, waardevrijheid en onzekerheid
Starting from the pioneering work of Lewis Fry Richardson on numerical models of weather forecasting and his fantasy forecast factory, we explore the role of values in science and science-based policy advice. Central questions being addressed are: What role do values play when scientists inform policymakers and the public about uncertain findings? How do values influence the collection of (enough) evidence? What are the different ways in which values do play a role in science and does it entail that value-free science is an illusion? How best to deal with values in scientific practice? Reviewing the relevant philosophical literature and ana lysing climate modelling as a case, I aim to answer these questions, concluding that the literature better supports a valued science than the idea of a value-free science and that Richardson fantastic forecast factory misses to take into account some important aspects of modelling, namely uncertainty and the role of values.
- 21 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 50 (2) , 263-282
Do Mechanism-Based Social Explanations Make a Case for Methodological Individualism?
- 21 February 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 50 (2) , 263-282
Do Mechanism-Based Social Explanations Make a Case for Methodological Individualism?
- 1 August 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 31 (6) , 497-513
Participation Beyond Consensus? Technology Assessments, Consensus Conferences and Democratic Modulation
In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats that seek to democratically intervene in scientific practice: the consensus conference and participatory technology assessment (pTA). We explain how these formats delegitimize conflict and disagreement by making a strong appeal to consensus. Based on our direct involvement in these formats and informed both by political philosophy and science and technology studies, we outline conceptions that contrast with the consensus ideal, including dissensus, disclosure, conflictual consensus and agonistic democracy. Drawing on the notion of meta-consensus and a distinction between four models of democracy (aggregative, deliberative, participatory and agonistic), we elaborate how a more positive valuation of conflict provides opportunities for mutual learning, the articulation of disagreement, and democratic modulation—three aspirations that are at the heart of most pTAs and consensus conferences. Disclosing the strengths and weaknesses of these different models is politically and epistemically useful, and should therefore be an integral part of the development of participation theory and process in science and technology.status: publishe
- 1 August 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 31 (6) , 497-513
Participation Beyond Consensus? Technology Assessments, Consensus Conferences and Democratic Modulation
In this article, we inquire into two contemporary participatory formats that seek to democratically intervene in scientific practice: the consensus conference and participatory technology assessment (pTA). We explain how these formats delegitimize conflict and disagreement by making a strong appeal to consensus. Based on our direct involvement in these formats and informed both by political philosophy and science and technology studies, we outline conceptions that contrast with the consensus ideal, including dissensus, disclosure, conflictual consensus and agonistic democracy. Drawing on the notion of meta-consensus and a distinction between four models of democracy (aggregative, deliberative, participatory and agonistic), we elaborate how a more positive valuation of conflict provides opportunities for mutual learning, the articulation of disagreement, and democratic modulation—three aspirations that are at the heart of most pTAs and consensus conferences. Disclosing the strengths and weaknesses of these different models is politically and epistemically useful, and should therefore be an integral part of the development of participation theory and process in science and technology.status: publishe
- 1 April 2015
- Published by MIT Press in Perspectives on Science
- Vol. 23 (2) , 149-172
Towards Democratic Models of Science: Exploring the Case of Scientific Pluralism
- 1 April 2015
- Published by MIT Press in Perspectives on Science
- Vol. 23 (2) , 149-172
Towards Democratic Models of Science: Exploring the Case of Scientific Pluralism
- 9 September 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 21 (1) , 1-13
Introduction: Social Epistemology Meets the Philosophy of the Humanities
- 9 September 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 21 (1) , 1-13
Introduction: Social Epistemology Meets the Philosophy of the Humanities
- 8 May 2014
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 153-175
Explanatory Strategies Beyond the Individualism/Holism Debate
- 8 May 2014
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 153-175
Explanatory Strategies Beyond the Individualism/Holism Debate