Rineke Verbrugge
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Rineke Verbrugge has a total of 39 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bart Verheij
University of Groningen
5 shared publications - Edoardo Baccini
University of Groningen
4 shared publications - Sujata Ghosh
Indian Statistical Institute
4 shared publications - Zoé Christoff
University of Groningen
4 shared publications - Harmen de Weerd
University of Groningen
3 shared publications - Ludi van Leeuwen
Bernoulli Institute for Mathematics, Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence, University of Groningen
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Logic, Language and Information
- Vol. 35 (1-2) , 5-40
A Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Lying and Theory of Mind Limitations
Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute and reason about unobservable mental states of others, such as knowledge, beliefs, and intentions. ToM is needed in social interactions, negotiations, cooperation, and deception, but there is a limit to the recursive depth of ToM attributions humans can make. Researchers in epistemic logic classically assume that agents have common knowledge of honesty and perfect rationality, whereas humans lie and have ToM limitations. In our present work, we bridge this gap by developing a sound and strongly complete dynamic epistemic logic that models both lying and human ToM limitations. The design of our logic is inspired by findings from prior behavioural research. Our logic makes use of action models to model belief change caused by lying and other types of announcements. Using theoretical examples, we show how a listener deals with lies that she cannot understand due to her ToM limits.
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Logic, Language and Information
- Vol. 35 (1-2) , 5-40
Open AccessA Dynamic Epistemic Logic with Lying and Theory of Mind Limitations
Theory of mind (ToM) is the ability to attribute and reason about unobservable mental states of others, such as knowledge, beliefs, and intentions. ToM is needed in social interactions, negotiations, cooperation, and deception, but there is a limit to the recursive depth of ToM attributions humans can make. Researchers in epistemic logic classically assume that agents have common knowledge of honesty and perfect rationality, whereas humans lie and have ToM limitations. In our present work, we bridge this gap by developing a sound and strongly complete dynamic epistemic logic that models both lying and human ToM limitations. The design of our logic is inspired by findings from prior behavioural research. Our logic makes use of action models to model belief change caused by lying and other types of announcements. Using theoretical examples, we show how a listener deals with lies that she cannot understand due to her ToM limits.
- Open Access
- 17 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 207 (3)
Tracking the truth by selecting good data: coherence measures and data selection
In formal epistemology, a variety of probability-based coherence measures have been proposed that provide a quantitative formal representation of the coherence of a set of information pieces. While research has long focused on whether coherence measures are truth-conducive, the truth-conduciveness of coherence measures has so far been evaluated in static settings only: Coherence provides assessments about the truth of incoming information, but does not actively guide decisions to believe or discard pieces of information. In this paper, we propose to assess the truth-conduciveness of coherence measures with respect to their ability to lead agents to select true information and form correct beliefs in a dynamic iterative setting. At every time step, an agent receives a number of noisy signals about the actual truth values of a finite set of atomic propositional variables. The agent uses a coherence measure to decide which signals to trust and which to discard. By repeatedly picking signals that maximise the coherence of the propositions they currently believe to be true, the agent tries to select truthful signals and learn the correct truth-value assignment for the atomic variables. The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, we propose a computational model to assess the truth-tracking abilities of different coherence measures. Second, using computational simulations, we compare a number of widely discussed coherence measures from the novel standpoint of our iterated data-collection setting: We show that, when signals are not too noisy, agents who employ the Glass-Olsson relative overlap measure outperform agents employing all other tested measures, and that all measures become progressively worse at leading agents towards the truth as signals degrade. Finally, we discuss how coherence affects the emergence of different dynamics and attitudes in belief revision.
- 17 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 207 (3)
Open AccessTracking the truth by selecting good data: coherence measures and data selection
In formal epistemology, a variety of probability-based coherence measures have been proposed that provide a quantitative formal representation of the coherence of a set of information pieces. While research has long focused on whether coherence measures are truth-conducive, the truth-conduciveness of coherence measures has so far been evaluated in static settings only: Coherence provides assessments about the truth of incoming information, but does not actively guide decisions to believe or discard pieces of information. In this paper, we propose to assess the truth-conduciveness of coherence measures with respect to their ability to lead agents to select true information and form correct beliefs in a dynamic iterative setting. At every time step, an agent receives a number of noisy signals about the actual truth values of a finite set of atomic propositional variables. The agent uses a coherence measure to decide which signals to trust and which to discard. By repeatedly picking signals that maximise the coherence of the propositions they currently believe to be true, the agent tries to select truthful signals and learn the correct truth-value assignment for the atomic variables. The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, we propose a computational model to assess the truth-tracking abilities of different coherence measures. Second, using computational simulations, we compare a number of widely discussed coherence measures from the novel standpoint of our iterated data-collection setting: We show that, when signals are not too noisy, agents who employ the Glass-Olsson relative overlap measure outperform agents employing all other tested measures, and that all measures become progressively worse at leading agents towards the truth as signals degrade. Finally, we discuss how coherence affects the emergence of different dynamics and attitudes in belief revision.
- Open Access
- 26 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Modelling
- Vol. 514
Effects of different coping strategies in foragers dealing with predators and non-predators: a spatial agent-based modelling account
- 26 January 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Ecological Modelling
- Vol. 514
Open AccessEffects of different coping strategies in foragers dealing with predators and non-predators: a spatial agent-based modelling account
- Open Access
- 27 November 2025
- Published by Open Publishing Association in Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 437, 301-320
Who is Afraid of Minimal Revision?
The principle of minimal change in belief revision theory requires that, when accepting new information, one keeps one's belief state as close to the initial belief state as possible. This is precisely what the method known as minimal revision does. However, unlike less conservative belief revision methods, minimal revision falls short in learning power: It cannot learn everything that can be learned by other learning methods. We begin by showing that, despite this limitation, minimal revision is still a successful learning method in a wide range of situations. Firstly, it can learn any problem that is finitely identifiable. Secondly, it can learn with positive and negative data, as long as one considers finitely many possibilities. We then characterize the prior plausibility assignments (over finitely many possibilities) that enable one to learn via minimal revision, and do the same for conditioning and lexicographic upgrade. Finally, we show that not all of our results still hold when learning from possibly erroneous information.
- 27 November 2025
- Published by Open Publishing Association in Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
- Vol. 437, 301-320
Open AccessWho is Afraid of Minimal Revision?
The principle of minimal change in belief revision theory requires that, when accepting new information, one keeps one's belief state as close to the initial belief state as possible. This is precisely what the method known as minimal revision does. However, unlike less conservative belief revision methods, minimal revision falls short in learning power: It cannot learn everything that can be learned by other learning methods. We begin by showing that, despite this limitation, minimal revision is still a successful learning method in a wide range of situations. Firstly, it can learn any problem that is finitely identifiable. Secondly, it can learn with positive and negative data, as long as one considers finitely many possibilities. We then characterize the prior plausibility assignments (over finitely many possibilities) that enable one to learn via minimal revision, and do the same for conditioning and lexicographic upgrade. Finally, we show that not all of our results still hold when learning from possibly erroneous information.
- Open Access
- 16 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 83-92
Evaluating Methods for Scenario Reasoning using Bayesian Networks in Exhaustive and Non-Exhaustive Settings
- 16 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 83-92
Open AccessEvaluating Methods for Scenario Reasoning using Bayesian Networks in Exhaustive and Non-Exhaustive Settings
- Open Access
- 17 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 113 (5) , 1245-1315
Dynamic Logics of Diffusion and Link Changes on Social Networks
This paper introduces a comprehensive logical framework to reason about threshold-driven diffusion and threshold-driven link change in social networks. It considers both monotonic dynamics, where agents can only adopt new features and create new connections, and non-monotonic dynamics, where agents may also abandon features or cut ties. Three types of operators are combined: one capturing diffusion only, one capturing link change only, and one capturing both at the same time. We first characterise the models on which diffusion of a unique feature and link change stabilise, whilst discussing salient properties of stable models with multiple spreading features. Second, we show that our operators (and any combination of them) are irreplaceable, in the sense that the sequences of model updates expressed by a combination of operators cannot always be expressed using any other operators. Finally, we analyse classes of models on which some operators can be replaced.
- 17 July 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 113 (5) , 1245-1315
Open AccessDynamic Logics of Diffusion and Link Changes on Social Networks
This paper introduces a comprehensive logical framework to reason about threshold-driven diffusion and threshold-driven link change in social networks. It considers both monotonic dynamics, where agents can only adopt new features and create new connections, and non-monotonic dynamics, where agents may also abandon features or cut ties. Three types of operators are combined: one capturing diffusion only, one capturing link change only, and one capturing both at the same time. We first characterise the models on which diffusion of a unique feature and link change stabilise, whilst discussing salient properties of stable models with multiple spreading features. Second, we show that our operators (and any combination of them) are irreplaceable, in the sense that the sequences of model updates expressed by a combination of operators cannot always be expressed using any other operators. Finally, we analyse classes of models on which some operators can be replaced.
- 13 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 85-103
Predictive Theory of Mind Models Based on Public Announcement Logic
- 13 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 85-103
Predictive Theory of Mind Models Based on Public Announcement Logic
- Open Access
- 19 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 323-332
Using Agent-Based Simulations to Evaluate Bayesian Networks for Criminal Scenarios
- 19 June 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 323-332
Open AccessUsing Agent-Based Simulations to Evaluate Bayesian Networks for Criminal Scenarios
- Open Access
- 17 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 52 (4) , 1101-1132
Solutions to the Knower Paradox in the Light of Haack’s Criteria
The knower paradox states that the statement ‘We know that this statement is false’ leads to inconsistency. This article presents a fresh look at this paradox and some well-known solutions from the literature. Paul Égré discusses three possible solutions that modal provability logic provides for the paradox by surveying and comparing three different provability interpretations of modality, originally described by Skyrms, Anderson, and Solovay. In this article, some background is explained to clarify Égré’s solutions, all three of which hinge on intricacies of provability logic and its arithmetical interpretations. To check whether Égré’s solutions are satisfactory, we use the criteria for solutions to paradoxes defined by Susan Haack and we propose some refinements of them. This article aims to describe to what extent the knower paradox can be solved using provability logic and to what extent the solutions proposed in the literature satisfy Haack’s criteria. Finally, the article offers some reflections on the relation between knowledge, proof, and provability, as inspired by the knower paradox and its solutions.
- 17 April 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Philosophical Logic
- Vol. 52 (4) , 1101-1132
Open AccessSolutions to the Knower Paradox in the Light of Haack’s Criteria
The knower paradox states that the statement ‘We know that this statement is false’ leads to inconsistency. This article presents a fresh look at this paradox and some well-known solutions from the literature. Paul Égré discusses three possible solutions that modal provability logic provides for the paradox by surveying and comparing three different provability interpretations of modality, originally described by Skyrms, Anderson, and Solovay. In this article, some background is explained to clarify Égré’s solutions, all three of which hinge on intricacies of provability logic and its arithmetical interpretations. To check whether Égré’s solutions are satisfactory, we use the criteria for solutions to paradoxes defined by Susan Haack and we propose some refinements of them. This article aims to describe to what extent the knower paradox can be solved using provability logic and to what extent the solutions proposed in the literature satisfy Haack’s criteria. Finally, the article offers some reflections on the relation between knowledge, proof, and provability, as inspired by the knower paradox and its solutions.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
- Vol. 26 (4)
The Wisdom of the Small Crowd: Myside Bias and Group Discussion
The my-side bias is a well-documented cognitive bias in the evaluation of arguments, in which reasoners in a discussion tend to overvalue arguments that confirm their prior beliefs, while undervaluing arguments that attack their prior beliefs. The first part of this paper develops and justifies a Bayesian model of myside bias at the level of individual reasoning. In the second part, this Bayesian model is implemented in an agent-based model of group discussion among myside-biased agents. The agent-based model is then used to perform a number of experiments with the objective to study whether the myside bias hinders or enhances the ability of groups to collectively track the truth, that is, to reach the correct answer to a given binary issue. An analysis of the results suggests the following: First, whether the truth-tracking ability of groups is helped or hindered by myside bias crucially depends on how the strength of myside bias is differentially distributed across subgroups of discussants holding different beliefs. Second, small groups are more likely to track the truth than larger groups, suggesting that increasing group size has a detrimental effect on collective truth-tracking through discussion.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation in Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation
- Vol. 26 (4)
Open AccessThe Wisdom of the Small Crowd: Myside Bias and Group Discussion
The my-side bias is a well-documented cognitive bias in the evaluation of arguments, in which reasoners in a discussion tend to overvalue arguments that confirm their prior beliefs, while undervaluing arguments that attack their prior beliefs. The first part of this paper develops and justifies a Bayesian model of myside bias at the level of individual reasoning. In the second part, this Bayesian model is implemented in an agent-based model of group discussion among myside-biased agents. The agent-based model is then used to perform a number of experiments with the objective to study whether the myside bias hinders or enhances the ability of groups to collectively track the truth, that is, to reach the correct answer to a given binary issue. An analysis of the results suggests the following: First, whether the truth-tracking ability of groups is helped or hindered by myside bias crucially depends on how the strength of myside bias is differentially distributed across subgroups of discussants holding different beliefs. Second, small groups are more likely to track the truth than larger groups, suggesting that increasing group size has a detrimental effect on collective truth-tracking through discussion.