RKRyan Kok Leong Ko

Ryan Kok Leong Ko

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Ryan Kok Leong Ko has a total of 236 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Which Factors Improve Organizational Cyber Resilience?

    by Elinor Tsen, Ryan Kl Ko, Sergeja Slapničar

    1. The increasing frequency of damaging and far-reaching cyber incidents, such as SolarWinds, Optus and Uber in 2020 and 2022 (Manson 2022; Newman 2023; Optus 2022), have highlighted the need for i...


  • Open Access

    ICSHIve: A Framework for Measurable and High-Interactive Honeypots in Industrial Control Systems

    by Wenlu Zhang, Naipeng Dong, Taejun Choi, Abigail Koay, Ryan K. L. Ko

    Existing industrial control systems (ICS) honeypots primarily focus on simulating programmable logic controllers (PLCs). However, these honeypots are mostly considered “low-interaction” honeypots, resulting in ineffective tracing of attacker tactics, techniques, and procedures. From existing literature, we observed a lack of metrics and frameworks to guide “high-interaction” ICS honeypot development. In this article, we propose metrics to measure ICS honeypot interactivity and apply them to assess existing honeypots. Using our metrics, we design ICSHIve, a novel framework to build high-interaction honeypots across PLC models and vendors. Guided by our framework, we implement honeypots supporting prominent vendors: Allen-Bradley and Schneider—validating ICSHIve’s generalizability and device-independent benefits. ICSHIve is evaluated using MITRE ATT&CK to showcase its realism against state-of-the-art reconnaissance tools and accurate physical process simulation. We deployed ICSHIve on Amazon Web Services where it demonstrated high interactivity, accuracy, and realistic responses and significant effectiveness in attracting attackers. ICSHIve’s source code is available online.

  • Open Access

    Situational crime prevention for securing business processes: challenges and opportunities

    by Cheng Miao, Heemeng Ho, Elinor Tsen, John Gilmour, Ryan K L Ko

    Despite a widespread ‘People–Process–Technology’ (PPT) approach to organizational cybersecurity, research on re-engineering processes for cybercrime prevention remains limited. While business process management (BPM) has been traditionally used to improve process efficiency and effectiveness, there is an opportunity to integrate criminological approaches to address cybercrime risks embedded within organisational processes. The criminological frameworks, crime script analysis (CSA) and situational crime prevention (SCP), promise to offer valuable insights into analysing how crime develops within processes and informing crime-opportunity reduction interventions. However, their application within business process contexts remains underexplored in research and practice. To address this, we systematically reviewed literature focusing on maturing or managing business processes for cybercrime prevention, classifying existing research through a holistic PPT perspective. The review results indicate that the ‘Technology’ aspect is comparatively well developed. However, two gaps were identified: (i) the need for a balanced integration of ‘People-focused’ strategy alongside technical perspective to enhance cybercrime prevention, and (ii) the need for a ‘Process-centric’ cybercrime prevention approach to re-engineer vulnerable processes. To address these gaps, we propose the Cybercrime Prevention for Business Processes (CP4BP) model, which integrates CSA and SCP as a structured approach, preparing for process re-engineering when organizations require necessary process changes in response to cybercrime. By integrating these criminological insights, the model promotes a more holistic, socio-technical cybersecurity practice for organizations and informs security by design at the process level. It incorporates criminological perspectives to improve cybercrime understanding among ‘People’, guide the re-engineering ‘Process’, and complement cybersecurity with additional criminological insights, ensuring a comprehensive enhancement of organisational processes for cybercrime prevention. We demonstrate the model’s application in addressing cybercrime risks through two real-world cases, illustrating how it can strengthen organizations’ internal workflows and processes involving external third parties. These case applications also highlight its flexibility in supporting reactive postincident re-engineering of flawed internal workflows to reduce opportunities for insider exploitation, and proactive re-engineering that enforces clear third-party responsibilities to reduce opportunities for criminal exploitation arising from weaknesses in third-party management. The model further advances research and practice by providing an interdisciplinary foundation for cybercrime-resilient and secure processes.

  • Open Access

    SEED: A Minimal‑Footprint TEE Framework for Verifiable, Confidential Microservice Deployment

    by Omar Jarkas, Ryan K L Ko, Naipeng Dong, Redowan Mahmud

    We present SEED, a system that enables the deployment of distributed privacy-preserving micro-services in the cloud while maintaining the secrecy of user code and data and ensuring correct, complete results. Unlike prior approaches that minimize the TCB by pushing large parts of the software stack outside the enclave, SEED includes the entire container software stack—from the application layer up to the operating system—inside the TCB. This holistic design protects proprietary software, datasets, and optional ML models from exposure; prevents leakage of sensitive inputs or queries; and thwarts metadata-inference attacks that could reveal workload identity or versioning. Yet we achieve an optimized TCB (22 MB in total), over 30× smaller than the typical 690 MB TCB for confidential privacy-enhancing VMs. In practice, SEED runs on AMD SEV-SNP–capable machines and supports real container workloads (i.e., TensorFlow, OpenVINO inference, PyTorch training, Redis, NGINX, Apache httpd). We demonstrate that SEEDCore matches or outperforms mainstream runtime workload deployment, staying within 5% of native throughput and reaching up to 6× higher performance on CPU-bound jobs. Finally, we conduct a thorough privacy and security evaluation against 11 cloud attack vectors and show that SEED blocks or confines every exploit that remains possible even under the state-of-the-art Gramine-TDX model, thanks to late binding, per-container PCR chains, and continuous in-TEE attestation throughout the workload’s lifetime.

  • Open Access

    Cyber-attackers as a social force: conceptualizing value sabotage in cybersecurity services

    by Ivano Bongiovanni, David Goyeneche, Elinor Tsen, Edidiong Christopher James, Priyanka Singh, Ryan Ko

    Purpose: This paper examines the role of cyber-attackers as a critical social force within the cybersecurity service ecosystem. We propose a conceptual framework that integrates attackers into the traditional service triad, reframing them as attackers who influence value co-creation and service dynamics within the cybersecurity industry, particularly in the context of Cybersecurity-as-a-Service (CSaaS). We conclude that cyber-attackers represent agents of “value sabotage,” a novel concept that captures how threat actors reshape service dynamics. Design/methodology/approach: The study draws on a review of service management and cybersecurity literature, complemented by case studies of notable cyber-attacks. Building on service-dominant logic and ecosystem theory, a conceptual framework is developed, positioning attackers as influential disruptors within the CSaaS ecosystem. Findings: The findings reveal attackers as adversarial social forces driving innovation and adaptation in the CSaaS ecosystem. An analysis of their motivations and strategies reveals how their actions compel organizations and service providers to prioritize resilience and defensive value co-creation. In turn, attackers' actions “sabotage” the value co-creation process. Our proposed framework demonstrates a transition from dyadic to triadic service interactions, incorporating attackers as critical agents. Research limitations/implications: Future research could explore the generalizability of this framework across other industries and more specific comparisons between value sabotage and value co-destruction. Additional social forces could also be considered, such as regulators and end-customers (pentadic model). Practical implications: The findings underscore the need for organizations to adopt adaptive service strategies that prioritize resilience, threat anticipation and collaboration to counter cyber-attacks. Originality/value: This paper uniquely positions attackers as active contributors to the service ecosystem, extending service theory and challenging conventional notions of value co-creation in service management through the novel concept of “value sabotage.” Framing attackers as malicious orchestrators of disruption, our work offers a new lens to understand how threat actors shape service design, resilience and co-creation strategies in digitally mediated service environments.


  • Open Access

    VIMA: A Privacy-Preserving Integrity Measurement Architecture for Containerized Environments

    by Omar Jarkas, Ryan K L Ko, Naipeng Dong, Redowan Mahmud

    Integrity verification and attestation are critical in containerized environments, where traditional Linux Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) falls short due to its lack of container-specific contextualization. These gaps undermine container autonomy, escalate privacy risks, and impede granular integrity checks. Addressing these challenges, this paper introduces the Virtual IMA (VIMA), a novel framework that refines Linux IMA’s principles to support containerized settings. Using nested Merkle trees, VIMA’s Two-Tree Architecture (2TA) enables detailed integrity assessments across system-wide monolithic trees and individual container trees. Integrating Merkle and zero-knowledge (ZK) proofs establishes VIMA as a secure, privacy-preserving verification and attestation solution. Our comparative analysis and initial prototype testing reveal that VIMA significantly improves upon traditional IMA with minimal performance overhead, offering substantial scope for optimization.


  • Older Australians’ experiences navigating digital identity security

    by William Bingley, Alina Bialkowski, Nicole Gillespie, Alex Haslam, Ryan Ko, Jacki Liddle, Peter Worthy, Janet Wiles

    The University of Queensland's institutional repository, UQ eSpace, aims to create global visibility and accessibility of UQ’s scholarly research.

  • Open Access

    Intelligent Data Refinement and Analysis of Real-World Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems

    by Wenlu Zhang, Naipeng Dong, Taejun Choi, Guangdong Bai, Ryan K. L. Ko