Ulrich Sedelmeier
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Ulrich Sedelmeier has a total of 17 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Frank Schimmelfennig
5 shared publicationsAlasdair R. Young
University of Glasgow
3 shared publications- Michael Blauberger
University of Salzburg
3 shared publications - Frank Schimmelfennig
ETH Zurich Zurich
2 shared publications - Anand Menon
Kings College London
1 shared publication - Antoaneta Dimitrova
Leiden University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- p. 1-31
Flexible firewalls: selective cooperation and strategic demarcation between centre-right and far-right parties in the EU
The recent electoral successes of far-right parties1 across Europe – in national elections as well as in the European Parliament (EP) elections in 2024 (see, e.g., Hobolt et al., 2026) – have trigg...
- 3 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- p. 1-31
Open AccessFlexible firewalls: selective cooperation and strategic demarcation between centre-right and far-right parties in the EU
The recent electoral successes of far-right parties1 across Europe – in national elections as well as in the European Parliament (EP) elections in 2024 (see, e.g., Hobolt et al., 2026) – have trigg...
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 112-123
EU Responses to Democratic Backsliding
The European Union (EU) has long considered itself a community of shared values such as democracy and the Rule of Law. Nevertheless, in the face of severe democratic backsliding in Hungary (since 2010) and Poland (from 2015 to 2023), EU institutions and leaders remained inactive or relied on soft instruments for about a decade. Only in recent years have EU institutions taken a more assertive stance against backsliding governments, most notably by supporting the (temporary) suspension of EU funds designated for Hungary and Poland since 2022. Reflecting the EU's policy change and the underlying evolution of EU politics, this chapter consists of two main parts, which describe and explain (i) the EU's lost decade in countering member state democratic backsliding since 2010, and (ii) its growing assertiveness in recent years.
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 112-123
EU Responses to Democratic Backsliding
The European Union (EU) has long considered itself a community of shared values such as democracy and the Rule of Law. Nevertheless, in the face of severe democratic backsliding in Hungary (since 2010) and Poland (from 2015 to 2023), EU institutions and leaders remained inactive or relied on soft instruments for about a decade. Only in recent years have EU institutions taken a more assertive stance against backsliding governments, most notably by supporting the (temporary) suspension of EU funds designated for Hungary and Poland since 2022. Reflecting the EU's policy change and the underlying evolution of EU politics, this chapter consists of two main parts, which describe and explain (i) the EU's lost decade in countering member state democratic backsliding since 2010, and (ii) its growing assertiveness in recent years.
- Open Access
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 32 (12) , 3113-3158
Rhetorical action in a liberal international order in crisis: theorising EU and NATO enlargements post-2022
- 13 November 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 32 (12) , 3113-3158
Open AccessRhetorical action in a liberal international order in crisis: theorising EU and NATO enlargements post-2022
- Open Access
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 63 (3) , 1042-1061
Issue framing, political identities, and public support for multilateral vaccine cooperation during Covid‐19
Research shows that information cues influence public opinion on international cooperation, yet it is unclear whether all cues are equally effective in the context of a global crisis. This paper sheds light on this issue by analysing how frames in public discourse influence support for multilateral vaccine cooperation during Covid‐19. Building on research on in‐group favouritism, decision‐making under uncertainty, and public support for multilateralism, the paper argues that frames emphasizing vaccine nationalism are more potent than those emphasizing international cooperation and that nationalist political identities moderate these framing effects. An original survey experiment in the United Kingdom confirms this argument and shows that public support for multilateralism is substantial but vulnerable. A vaccine nationalism frame reduces support for multilateralism, while an international cooperation frame has no effect. Moreover, ‘Brexit identities’ moderate this framing effect, with ‘Leavers’ being more susceptible to the detrimental effect of the vaccine nationalism frame than ‘Remainers’.
- 1 August 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 63 (3) , 1042-1061
Open AccessIssue framing, political identities, and public support for multilateral vaccine cooperation during Covid‐19
Research shows that information cues influence public opinion on international cooperation, yet it is unclear whether all cues are equally effective in the context of a global crisis. This paper sheds light on this issue by analysing how frames in public discourse influence support for multilateral vaccine cooperation during Covid‐19. Building on research on in‐group favouritism, decision‐making under uncertainty, and public support for multilateralism, the paper argues that frames emphasizing vaccine nationalism are more potent than those emphasizing international cooperation and that nationalist political identities moderate these framing effects. An original survey experiment in the United Kingdom confirms this argument and shows that public support for multilateralism is substantial but vulnerable. A vaccine nationalism frame reduces support for multilateralism, while an international cooperation frame has no effect. Moreover, ‘Brexit identities’ moderate this framing effect, with ‘Leavers’ being more susceptible to the detrimental effect of the vaccine nationalism frame than ‘Remainers’.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 32 (2) , 365-391
Sanctioning democratic backsliding in the European Union: transnational salience, negative intergovernmental spillover, and policy change
- 21 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 32 (2) , 365-391
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessSanctioning democratic backsliding in the European Union: transnational salience, negative intergovernmental spillover, and policy change
- Open Access
- 13 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 31 (3) , 825-849
Is there an East–West divide on democracy in the European Union? Evidence from democratic backsliding and attitudes towards rule of law interventions
Perceptions of an East–West divide in the European Union (EU) with regard to democracy have led to re-evaluations of EU eastern enlargement as a policy failure and militate against further enlargement. This article examines the accuracy of narratives of an intra-EU East–West divide on democracy, in which the western member states outperform the eastern members, and in which the former support, and the latter oppose, rule of law (RoL) interventions by the EU in member states engaged in democratic backsliding. The article considers two aspects of a potential democracy divide: the quality of democracy and attitudes towards RoL interventions. It draws on several quantitative indicators for a more comprehensive assessment of intra-EU democracy divides and uses set-theory to identify different in- and out-groups that demarcate such intra-EU divides. Although different indicators and different conceptions of set-membership reveal to varying extents East–West patterns, none fit with a clear regional divide. It is more fruitful to conceive of these differences as a continuum, with (currently) a small group of (western) member states at one end and a small group of (eastern) members at the other, and most member states in distinctive sub-groups in-between.
- 13 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 31 (3) , 825-849
Open AccessIs there an East–West divide on democracy in the European Union? Evidence from democratic backsliding and attitudes towards rule of law interventions
Perceptions of an East–West divide in the European Union (EU) with regard to democracy have led to re-evaluations of EU eastern enlargement as a policy failure and militate against further enlargement. This article examines the accuracy of narratives of an intra-EU East–West divide on democracy, in which the western member states outperform the eastern members, and in which the former support, and the latter oppose, rule of law (RoL) interventions by the EU in member states engaged in democratic backsliding. The article considers two aspects of a potential democracy divide: the quality of democracy and attitudes towards RoL interventions. It draws on several quantitative indicators for a more comprehensive assessment of intra-EU democracy divides and uses set-theory to identify different in- and out-groups that demarcate such intra-EU divides. Although different indicators and different conceptions of set-membership reveal to varying extents East–West patterns, none fit with a clear regional divide. It is more fruitful to conceive of these differences as a continuum, with (currently) a small group of (western) member states at one end and a small group of (eastern) members at the other, and most member states in distinctive sub-groups in-between.
- Top Cited Papers
- 2 June 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 27 (8) , 1236-1255
Does monitoring without enforcement make a difference? The European Union and anti-corruption policies in Bulgaria and Romania after accession
The European Union (EU) has made effective corruption control a condition for membership, but it cannot sanction non-compliance once a country has joined. The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was an institutional experiment to compensate the loss of sanctioning power after accession with continued monitoring. Most commentators dismiss the potential of such monitoring without enforcement. This article’s original coding of the CVM reports with regard to corruption control in Romania and Bulgaria provides an empirical basis to assess the CVM’s ability to foster compliance. It suggests that monitoring can have a positive impact on state compliance even without material sanctions: despite the low expectations in the literature, compliance in Romania was significantly better than in Bulgaria. We explain Romania’s better compliance record with successful domestic institution-building. In contrast to Bulgaria, Romania created strong anti-corruption institutions that served as a powerful institutional base for the fight against corruption. The CVM has not only had a direct effect on institution-building, but also an important indirect effect. As the anti-corruption institutions remain vulnerable to governmental interference, the CVM played a key role as a social constraint on attempts by the government to curb their power and as a focal point for societal mobilisation.
- 2 June 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 27 (8) , 1236-1255
Top Cited PapersDoes monitoring without enforcement make a difference? The European Union and anti-corruption policies in Bulgaria and Romania after accession
The European Union (EU) has made effective corruption control a condition for membership, but it cannot sanction non-compliance once a country has joined. The Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was an institutional experiment to compensate the loss of sanctioning power after accession with continued monitoring. Most commentators dismiss the potential of such monitoring without enforcement. This article’s original coding of the CVM reports with regard to corruption control in Romania and Bulgaria provides an empirical basis to assess the CVM’s ability to foster compliance. It suggests that monitoring can have a positive impact on state compliance even without material sanctions: despite the low expectations in the literature, compliance in Romania was significantly better than in Bulgaria. We explain Romania’s better compliance record with successful domestic institution-building. In contrast to Bulgaria, Romania created strong anti-corruption institutions that served as a powerful institutional base for the fight against corruption. The CVM has not only had a direct effect on institution-building, but also an important indirect effect. As the anti-corruption institutions remain vulnerable to governmental interference, the CVM played a key role as a social constraint on attempts by the government to curb their power and as a focal point for societal mobilisation.
- Top Cited Papers
- 17 May 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 27 (6) , 814-833
The Europeanization of Eastern Europe: the external incentives model revisited
The External Incentives Model (EIM) was designed to explain the Europeanization of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) through the EU’s accession conditionality. This article asks how relevant the model remains beyond its original context. We examine recent data and research on the EU’s impact in two additional contexts: post-accession developments in the CEECs and the Southeast European countries currently in the accession process. We find that the model generally accounts well for the variation in Europeanization across domains and countries. More specifically, the credibility of incentives stands out as a crucial condition for the success of EU conditionality. At the same time, we note omissions and limitations of the original model: first, the model works with highly abstract conditions that require contextual specification to render them more meaningful and better testable. Second, the EIM starts from generally favourable, but underspecified, background conditions.
- 17 May 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 27 (6) , 814-833
Top Cited PapersThe Europeanization of Eastern Europe: the external incentives model revisited
The External Incentives Model (EIM) was designed to explain the Europeanization of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) through the EU’s accession conditionality. This article asks how relevant the model remains beyond its original context. We examine recent data and research on the EU’s impact in two additional contexts: post-accession developments in the CEECs and the Southeast European countries currently in the accession process. We find that the model generally accounts well for the variation in Europeanization across domains and countries. More specifically, the credibility of incentives stands out as a crucial condition for the success of EU conditionality. At the same time, we note omissions and limitations of the original model: first, the model works with highly abstract conditions that require contextual specification to render them more meaningful and better testable. Second, the EIM starts from generally favourable, but underspecified, background conditions.
- 24 October 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 41-59
Larger and more law abiding? The impact of enlargement on compliance in the European Union
- 24 October 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 41-59
Larger and more law abiding? The impact of enlargement on compliance in the European Union
- 4 February 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 24 (2) , 197-215
Larger and more law abiding? The impact of enlargement on compliance in the European Union
Although enlargement increases the preference diversity in the European Union (EU), this paper shows that enlargement has not led to a deterioration of compliance with EU law. In three of the EU’s four enlargement rounds, the new member states comply better with EU law than the old member states. The Southern enlargement in the 1980s is the only one that led to a substantial increase in non-compliance. Particularly surprising for the main compliance theories, which focus on state power, adjustment costs, administrative capacities or legitimacy, is the good performance of the post-communist Central and Eastern European new member states after the Eastern enlargement in the 2000s. Our analysis suggests that the use of pre-accession conditionality in the Eastern enlargement explains why these new members perform so well – unlike their Southern counterparts who faced equally unfavourable country-level conditions for compliance.
- 4 February 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 24 (2) , 197-215
Larger and more law abiding? The impact of enlargement on compliance in the European Union
Although enlargement increases the preference diversity in the European Union (EU), this paper shows that enlargement has not led to a deterioration of compliance with EU law. In three of the EU’s four enlargement rounds, the new member states comply better with EU law than the old member states. The Southern enlargement in the 1980s is the only one that led to a substantial increase in non-compliance. Particularly surprising for the main compliance theories, which focus on state power, adjustment costs, administrative capacities or legitimacy, is the good performance of the post-communist Central and Eastern European new member states after the Eastern enlargement in the 2000s. Our analysis suggests that the use of pre-accession conditionality in the Eastern enlargement explains why these new members perform so well – unlike their Southern counterparts who faced equally unfavourable country-level conditions for compliance.