LGLars-Erik De Geer

Lars-Erik De Geer

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Lars-Erik De Geer has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:

  • Christer Persson

    Swedish Meteorological and Hydrological Institute, SMHI, SE-601 76 Norrköping, Sweden

    1 shared publication
  • Christopher M. Wright

    UNSW Canberra, School of Physical, Environmental and Mathematical Sciences, Research Group on Science & Security, The Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra BC, Australia

    1 shared publication
  • Christopher M. Wright

    UNSW Canberra, School of Physical, Environmental and Mathematical Sciences, Research Group on Science & Security, The Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra BC, Australia

    1 shared publication
  • Christopher M. Wright

    School of Science, UNSW Canberra, Canberra, Australia

    1 shared publication
  • H. Ramebäck

    Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), Division of CBRN Defence and Security, SE-901 82 Umeå, Sweden; Chalmers University of Technology, Department of Chemistry and Chemical Engineering, SE-412 96 Göteborg, Sweden

    1 shared publication
  • Henning Rodhe

    Stockholm University, Department of Meteorology and Bolin Centre for Climate Research, SE-106 91 Stockholm, Sweden

    1 shared publication

Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Establishing the case for a May 2010 low-yield, unannounced nuclear test in North Korea

    by Lars-Erik De Geer, Christopher M. Wright, Lennart Robertson

    New data, analyses and modelling are presented concerning the unprecedented mid-May 2010 series of fission product detections in ground level air on and around the Korean Peninsula. For the first time Ba-140 is revealed at Ussuriysk, for which only La-140 had been reported. Thus aerosol particles containing the same parent-daughter pair Ba-140/La-140 were detected at both Ussuriysk and Okinawa, establishing beyond reasonable doubt that their physical, spatial and temporal origins are the same. Together with Ce-141 and Cs-137, all with short-lived xenon isotope parents, a supercritical fission excursion, which experienced a near prompt filtered vent, is the only viable scenario for their explanation. New modelling suggests that the vent occurred around 9 s after the excursion and that the CTBT-relevant xenon isotopes Xe-133 and Xe-135 were ‘quenched’ around 25 min later and released some 10–20 h afterwards. Published corroborating seismic and infrasound data of an event at the North Korean nuclear test site 8 min and 45 s past midnight on 12 May 2010 is subsequently reviewed. These papers adopted a conventional depth of the event although the data suggested a shallower one. Despite arguments in the seismic community about its exact nature, it is prudent to test how well the waveform signals marry the radionuclide detection pattern. Thus the location and time are input into a new atmospheric transport model. The advanced software suite MATCH was used in forward mode with prompt and delayed releases, revealing the presence of plumes at each detection site at the time of their first detection and extending over the observed timeframe. Thus a very consistent picture of a shallow low yield nuclear test is obtained.

  • The 22 September 1979 Vela Incident: Radionuclide and Hydroacoustic Evidence for a Nuclear Explosion

    by Lars-Erik De Geer, Christopher M. Wright

    This article offers a new analysis of radionuclide and hydroacoustic data to support a low-yield nuclear weapon test as a plausible explanation for the still contentious 22 September 1979 Vela Incident, in which U.S. satellite Vela 6911 detected an optical signal characteristic of an atmospheric nuclear explosion over the Southern Indian or Atlantic Ocean. Based on documents not previously widely available, as well as recently declassified papers and letters, this article concludes that iodine-131 found in the thyroids of some Australian sheep would be consistent with them having grazed in the path of a potential radioactive fallout plume from a 22 September low-yield nuclear test in the Southern Indian Ocean. Further, several declassified letters and reports which describe aspects of still classified hydroacoustic reports and data favor the test scenario. The radionuclide and hydroacoustic data taken together with the analysis of the double-flash optical signal picked up by Vela 6911 that was described in a companion 2017 article (“The 22 September 1979 Vela Incident: The Detected Double-Flash”) can be traced back to sources with similar spatial and temporal origins and serve as a strong indicator for a nuclear explosion being responsible for the 22 September 1979 Vela Incident.


  • Open Access

    A Nuclear Jet at Chernobyl Around 21:23:45 UTC on April 25, 1986

    by Lars-Erik De Geer, Christer Persson, Henning Rodhe

    The nature of two explosions that were witnessed within 3 s at the Chernobyl-4 reactor less than a minute after 21:23:00 UTC on April 25, 1986, have since then been the subject of sprawling interpretations. This paper renders the following hypothesis. The first explosion consisted of thermal neutron mediated nuclear explosions in one or rather a few fuel channels, which caused a jet of debris that reached an altitude of some 2500 to 3000 m. The second explosion would then have been the steam explosion most experts believe was the first one. The solid support for this new scenario rests on two pillars and three pieces of corroborating evidence. The first pillar is that a group at the V. G. Khlopin Radium Institute in then Leningrad on April 29, 1986, detected newly produced, or fresh, xenon fission products at Cherepovets, 370 km north of Moscow and far away from the major track of Chernobyl debris ejected by the steam explosion and subsequent fires. The second pillar is built on state-of-the-art meteorological dispersion calculations, which show that the fresh xenon signature observed at Cherepovets was only possible if the injection altitude of the fresh debris was considerably higher than that of the bulk reactor core releases that turned toward Scandinavia and central Europe. These two strong pieces of evidence are corroborated by what were manifest physical effects of a downward jet in the southeastern part of the reactor, by seismic measurements some 100 km west of the reactor, and by observations of a blue flash above the reactor a few seconds after the first explosion.


  • The 22 September 1979 Vela Incident: The Detected Double-Flash

    by Christopher M. Wright, Lars-Erik De Geer

    On 22 September 1979 two optical sensors on U.S. satellite Vela 6911 detected a double-flash of light that appeared characteristic of an atmospheric nuclear explosion conducted over the southern Atlantic or Indian Ocean. It became known as the Vela Incident, Event 747, or Alert 747. An anomaly between the amplitude of the two signals during the second pulse led a U.S. government expert panel established to assess the event to conclude in mid-1980 that a more likely explanation was the impact of a small meteoroid on the satellite, the debris from which reflected sunlight into the sensors' field of view. No model was presented to support the contention, and a similar anomaly—known as background modulation—was a given for the second pulse of all confirmed explosions detected by Vela, though beginning later. Nonetheless, this event has remained the subject of intense debate. This article reviews the evidence and presents an updated analysis of the original Vela signal based on recently declassified literature and on modern knowledge of interplanetary dust and hyper velocity impact. Given the geometry of the satellite, and that the bulk of the surface comprised solar panels, much of the debris from any collision would be carried away from the sensors' field of view. Thus, a meteoroid collision appears much less likely than previously assumed. The double flash is instead consistent with a nuclear explosion, albeit detected by an aged satellite for which background modulation was abnormal and/or commenced earlier, also seen in post-event SYSTEM tests. A companion paper to be published in 2018 presents radionuclide and hydroacoustic evidence supporting the conclusion that the Vela Incident was a nuclear weapon test explosion.